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The miscellaneous works of Thomas
Arnold

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THE

MISCELLANEOUS WORKS

OF

THOMAS ARNOLD, D.D.

LATE HEAD MASTER OF RUGBY SCHOOL,
AND REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF OXFORD.

COLLECTED AND REPUBLISHED.

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PREFACE.

THIS Volume consists of a republication of such Miscellaneous Writings of Dr. Arnold as appeared to possess any permanent interest, or to illustrate his general views, especially, as will be seen, on the subjects of education and of the social and political state of the country.

It has, therefore, seemed best to exclude from it the occasional publications of his earlier years, such as articles written in the British Critic, 1819, 20; or that on Niebuhr's History of Rome in the Quarterly Review of 1825, and on "Letters of an Episcopalian," in the Edinburgh Review of 1826; or, again, such publications of his later years as had a local or temporary character, including the Tract on the Cholera in 1831, and two or three letters to newspapers, as well as the article on "Dr. Hampden" in the Edinburgh Review of 1836, or such of the Essays appended to his edition of Thucydides, 1830–35, as were confined to questions of purely topographical or historical detail. The Essays on Church and State, which were to have appeared in this volume, have now, for various reasons, been published as Appendixes to the Second Edition of the Fragment on the Church; in which form they may also be had separately.

The contents of this volume express what, on the whole, were Dr. Arnold's deliberate views on the subjects of which he wrote; at the same time it will be obvious that his language would often have been modified by a change

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of circumstances, and that expressions are occasionally used which he would have himself wished subsequently to cancel, as, for instance, in two passages (pp. 40. 77.) of the pamphlet on the Roman Catholic Claims. (See Life and Correspondence, vol. i. 262. ii. 34; Letters, Oct. 29, 1829, May 4, 1836.)

In conclusion, the thanks of Dr. Arnold's friends are due for the kind permission of the Proprietors of the Quarterly Journal of Education, and of the Edition of Thucydides, to republish the parts of those works which appear in the present volume, as well as for the trouble taken by the Proprietors of the Sheffield Courant and the Hertford Reformer to recover and supply the various letters published in their Journals.

A. P. S.

Univ. Coll. Oxford,
May 29, 1845.

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THE

CHRISTIAN DUTY

OF

CONCEDING THE CLAIMS

OF

THE ROMAN CATHOLICS.

PREFACE.

In venturing to offer the following pages particularly to the notice of the clergy, my main object has been to correct this prevalent impression, that it may be wrong in a religious point of view to grant the Catholic claims, but it cannot be more than inexpedient to reject them. I have therefore argued the Question on the grounds of right: although I allow, that in the ordinary discussion of it, the topic of right is one which it is on many accounts better to wave; and where the opponents of the Catholics do not make conscience their plea for resisting the claims, it is enough to press them on grounds of political expediency. My particular object will account for my omission of many powerful arguments which are usually brought forward in favour of concession; and especially for my not noticing more at length the trite objection, that the measure now before Parliament is an inroad upon the constitution; whereas it is in fact the fulfilment of it, if by the constitution be meant a system for the government of the commonwealth on the principles of liberty and justice.

For my writing on the Catholic Question at all I need offer no other justification than the universal interest it excites, and the great misapprehension and irritation which exist concerning it. I write, because I wish to remove the one and allay the other amongst a class of men, who require arguments of a different class from those commonly used in the political and Parliamentary discussions on the subject.

Rugby, 1829.

CHRISTIAN DUTY

OF CONCEDING THE

ROMAN CATHOLIC CLAIMS.

THE political merits of the Catholic Question have been too often and too ably discussed, and the political authorities in favour of what is called Emancipation are too overwhelming, to render it necessary at this late period to state the grounds of national expediency on which that great measure may be defended. But the most respectable opponents of the Catholics, including, I believe, a large proportion of the Clergy of the Church of England, consider the Question in a higher light; they think that it involves more than political interests; that to admit Catholics to become Members of the Legislature would be most injurious to the cause of the Protestant Religion; and that therefore no views of worldly policy should induce a good man to compromise the service of God, and in effect to sacrifice his highest duty for the sake of obtaining a temporal advantage.

This is at once to put the Question on its true grounds: for as parties and public bodies are made up of individuals morally and religiously responsible; and as no individual Christian, who values his salvation, can knowingly prefer any temporal benefits however great to the strict line of his Christian duty; it is manifest that Parliament ought to reject the Catholic claims, even with the certainty of thereby provoking a civil war, if it be indeed a sin against God to grant them. I am therefore not

only willing to consider the Question as one of duty rather than of expediency, but it is my earnest wish to do so. These are the principles on which it becomes a Christian to argue; and woe to him who for party, or even for national considerations, allows himself to lower the high standard of Christian perfection; to value civil privileges and political freedom beyond a single and unwavering devotion to the will of God.

It will be my endeavour then in the following pages to prove,

First, that it is the direct duty of every Englishman to support the claims of the Roman Catholics of Ireland, even at the hazard of injuring the Protestant Establishment; because those claims cannot be rejected without great injustice; and it is a want of faith in God and an unholy zeal to think that he can be served by injustice, or to guard against contingent evil by committing certain sin.

Secondly, that as the path of duty is the path of wisdom, so the granting of the Catholic claims, to which we are bound as a plain point of duty, will in all human probability greatly benefit the cause of Christianity; that it will tend to purify the Catholic Religion in Ireland from its greatest superstitions, and gradually to assimilate it more and more to Protestantism.

The principle of the first assertion, when addressing myself to conscientious Christians, I need not waste time in proving. No good man in our days would defend the practice of pious frauds, or of supporting the interests of his Church by persecution. If then the exclusion of the Catholics of Ireland from their civil rights be an act of injustice, or in other words if it be a sin when knowingly committed, it is not a lawful means of advancing or defending the Protestant Religion.

Now in order to shew that this exclusion is unjust, it will be necessary to ascend to higher principles than those to which its advocates generally appeal; and to shew that

these higher principles can alone in fact determine the merits of the Question. And it is here that good men are blinded, as we shall see hereafter, by an original error in their political opinions; which being in its very essence destructive of our notions of justice, distorts the view of every political question, and makes those who entertain it mistake habitually wrong for right and right for wrong.

Nothing has ever been more pernicious to the growth of human virtue and happiness than the habit of looking backwards rather than forwards for our model of excellence. The individual who should compare his life with what he himself was in his earlier years, instead of contrasting it with that high Christian standard which he never yet has reached, but which it should be his daily prayer and labour to reach hereafter, would assuredly go back rather than improve in goodness and wisdom. And so on a larger scale is the improvement of civil society obstructed, by referring to its actual origin and past fortunes, rather than contemplating that hitherto unattained excellence, to which, if it rightly used its increasing experience, it should be approaching in every generation successively nearer. We might as well build our ships after the model of our forefathers' coracles, as endeavour to find the principles of wisdom and justice developed in our forefathers' government. Necessity or chance led to the first rude attempts at navigation: force and cunning were the predominant elements in the constitution of the earliest civil societies. The supremacy of strength and intellect over weakness and ignorance is no doubt sufficiently natural: so is selfishness natural; and nothing could be more in accordance with our unimproved nature, than that the strong and the wise should possess a pre-eminence and abuse it. Governments then being established, some on the base of mere physical force, some on priestcraft, and others on a mixture of both these elements, the language of the laws which were framed by the governing powers was naturally adapted to the prin-

ciples and interests of the framers. And as these principles were very different from those of justice and true wisdom, so the written or municipal law was also very different from that unwritten and universal law, whose "seat is in the bosom of God, whose voice is the harmony of the world."

But the dictates of this divine law were never wholly unknown to men; and their excellence is such, that those who hated them most were often ashamed openly to dispute them. Those who suffered under the yoke of a tyranny grounded upon force or superstition, appealed to justice as the most powerful advocate of the weak against the strong: they gave currency to her language, and asserted her principles; and even when success had corrupted them, and made them inclined themselves to forget her, yet the good which they had done continued to exist in spite of them: the truths by which they had profited remained to instruct others also; the wisdom of which they had opened the spring for their own necessities, flowed forth with a perpetual stream to refresh far distant lands. Meanwhile the language of municipal law underwent a very partial improvement. It ceased to press upon that part of the community who had succeeded in releasing themselves from bondage; and sometimes those who had obtained a participation in political power introduced into its enactments some of those just principles to which they had been indebted for their own deliverance. But the selfish fear, that from henceforth they had more to lose than to gain from the general ascendancy of truth and justice, disposed them to limit the application of those principles to their own particular case; and to shrink from substituting them broadly and universally for the language of the older constitution of things.

The repetition of this process in successive generations brings us to a state of things, in which most classes of the community have secured to themselves all the rights which equal justice could require; in which all have

gained the simplest and most necessary of these rights; in which the great principles of the eternal law are most widely known, and upheld by the unanimous voice of the wise and good; but in which the municipal or written law of the land has not yet learnt to avow those principles, but still retains amidst great partial improvements much of the narrow and iniquitous spirit of its earliest origin. It was at first a mere system of exclusion: and so far from being the standard in great questions of national right, every victory gained by public right has necessarily led to the improvement of the law, and could have only been rendered legal by the law's alteration. Nay, as those very alterations from various causes have generally expressed the particular application of principles, rather than the principles themselves, and as their particular application may greatly vary with times and circumstances, so it may sometimes happen, that laws promulgated in one age to further the cause of liberty and justice, may in another have the very opposite tendency, and must be repealed in the letter if we wish to fulfil their spirit.

What I meant then by the original error of the political creed of many good men, is the principle that in all questions of political alteration the presumption is against change. Now on the contrary the presumption is always in favour of change, because the origin of our existing societies was an unjust and ignorant system; because where that system has not been altered, it must require to be so; and even where it has, as the alteration was often of a temporary and particular nature, a fresh improvement will be generally desirable, if we wish to secure the substantial principle of justice and wisdom.

A similar fallacy is involved in another argument, commonly used by the enemies of improvement, that the constitution must not be tampered with. Now this is a plea of considerable weight wherever the existing order of things is the result of one comprehensive plan; wherever the claims of the different elements of the social body

have been impartially weighed, and each has received that exact proportion of power and consequence which a sound view of the general good would assign to it. Under such circumstances partial alterations may mar the symmetry of the whole; and a general change is not likely to be needed. But where the existing constitution is the mere result of various partial and independent reforms, each of which redressed one particular grievance, while incongruities in the rest of the body politic were suffered to continue unheeded; it is worse than idle to speak of it as one uniform system, digested by comprehensive wisdom; and to deprecate the repetition of those particular reforms to which all its excellence is owing, and which may by easy gradations bring it at last to a practical perfection, without the necessity of a complete revolution.

These remarks apply to the history of almost all nations; except those which have received an entire constitution at one particular time, founded on comprehensive views of the rights and interests of all orders of men in the country, and providing justly and wisely for the good of each and of all. Where such a constitution has been digested, proposals for any partial subsequent reforms are justly to be regarded with strong suspicion; because where the parts of a system have been expressly framed with a view to each other and to the whole, an alteration in any one of them introduced with a particular object is likely to harmonize ill with the rest, and to produce a general inconvenience greater than the local one which it was designed to remedy.

But it has rarely or never happened that the terms of this hypothesis have been fully complied with. In the constitutions given by the lawgivers of antiquity, or in that actually enjoyed by the United States of America, although these were framed much more on certain general principles than the constitutions of modern Europe, yet there was an order of men which they did not embrace, which formed no part in the civil edifice, and with regard

to which the system of the legislator was imperfect, and required future revision. While all classes of *citizens* were provided for, there was a class of *men* which remained unregarded, and whom justice seemed to have abandoned—the class of predial or domestic slaves. Among the ancient lawgivers, indeed, the time perhaps was never contemplated, when justice should have her perfect work, and all who possessed the same human nature should be regarded as fit elements of civil society. But now that Christianity has so greatly enlarged and purified our notions of moral good, all systems, where slavery exists, are regarded as confessedly imperfect, and the propriety of improvement, confessed by all as a question of principle, is only contested on particular and temporary grounds. I have shewn, that even the cases which I acknowledge as exceptions are not to be considered as altogether such, in order more fully to confirm the general statement, that considering the origin and subsequent history of civil societies, there is a presumption à priori in favour of any alteration, whose avowed tendency is to extend or enlarge the enjoyment of civil rights.

And now, I would ask of those who shrink from what they call liberal opinions, as if they were connected with a disregard for Christianity, in what do the opinions which have been here expressed differ from the spirit of the Gospel? Is it unchristian to labour to effect the destruction of injustice; to promote the growth of equal rights; to advance the physical and moral condition of mankind by applying to the constitution of society those notions of perfect goodness and wisdom, which the Gospel, and the Gospel alone, has taught us? Or will it be said, that all worldly objects are too insignificant to engage the attention of an heir of immortality? Yet it is only by the pursuit of some worldly object that we can perform our worldly duty, and so train ourselves up for immortality; it is by improving the various faculties that are given to us that we can fit ourselves for our everlasting habitations.

Or can the relief of the ordinary physical wants of individuals be so high and essential a virtue, and yet the remedying those political evils, which affect both the physical and moral condition of millions, be no fit object of our exertions? And since in the present state of society we can scarcely avoid being called upon to act, or to express an opinion directly or indirectly upon public matters which may influence the conduct of others, is it well to remain in such ignorance of the principles and facts of political science, that our practice is but a leap in the dark, and our advice and influence can do nothing but mislead?

But it may be said existing laws and existing governments are invested with the authority of God, and cannot be resisted without sin. It does not indeed require the light of Christianity to teach us, that no individual can be justified in offering active physical resistance to the government, or in disobeying the laws for any private advantage of his own. Metellus Numidicus understood the duty of passive obedience, when he yielded peaceably to an unjust sentence of banishment, and would not suffer his party to procure its repeal by violence. And certainly our Lord's strong expressions, when enjoining his disciples to resist not evil, must apply even more strongly, when the resistance, besides implying a want of meekness in ourselves, would also disturb the general peace of society. So also under a system of oppressive taxation, if the existing laws however unjustly authorize the exaction, then we are bound to be subject not only for wrath but also for conscience' sake; we should not presume to think that the injustice of the tax warrants us in evading it. But as the first Christians, while they never defended themselves by physical force, yet persevered in the most determined efforts to overthrow the established idolatry and corrupt practices of the Roman empire, and laboured earnestly to introduce a purer system in their room; so should we labour, every man according to his knowledge and influ-

ence, that established injustice and corruption should be overthrown, and that such laws as are oppressive or partial should be laws no longer. And is this only to be effected by violence? or does not experience shew that steady perseverance in a just cause mostly renders violence unnecessary; and that truth when sealed by the labours, the sufferings, nay, if it be needful, even the blood of its advocates, at last shames the few who have continued longest to oppose it from any further struggle against it? Or when its converts are become so numerous, that it is no more a small body of individuals striving to reform a corrupt state of society, but the society itself is divided, each division containing within itself the elements of a distinct social existence, numbers, and wealth, and rank, and intelligence; by what other laws can their mutual relations be judged, than by those which apply not to individuals the subjects of one society, but to the several societies of the human race themselves, who acknowledge no common law but that founded on the eternal principles of justice? Then if a contest ensue, its lawfulness must be decided on the same grounds which determine our judgment of national wars: one party must incur deep guilt in drawing the sword; but to which the guilt is to be attached depends solely on the merits of the question at issue, and in no degree on the former relation which subsisted between them while they were parts of the same society.

I may be allowed perhaps to notice one other impression, which tends strongly to indispose many minds à priori to what are called liberal principles: and this is the notion that the advocates for improvement rest their cause solely on theory, that the existing state of things may indeed be often liable to objection on abstract principles, but that practically it works and has worked well. No answer has been more frequent than this in the mouths of the enemies of Reform; none perhaps has so often satisfied the rising scruples of honest but ignorant

minds, and persuaded them that they may shut their eyes upon the evils which they see around them, for that the whole system with its evil and its good has had the sanction of experience; and that the plans proposed for its amendment are but the dreams of ingenious theorists, the mere imagination of intellectual enthusiasts. Now this belief, so injurious to our own moral improvement, as it accustoms us to a contented acquiescence in moral evil, is either altogether founded on falsehood, or is wholly inapplicable to the conclusions which they who inculcate it wish to make its practical consequence. It is false that experience sanctions existing institutions, and that theory alone objects to them. What is called theory, is in fact a wider experience than that which pretends exclusively to the name. The practical man sets his own individual experience, limited in place, and most span-like in duration, against that accumulated experience of many countries and all ages, whose conclusions he calls a theory. He presumes to judge of the whole by that small part of it which he has himself witnessed: he has seen the first stages only of intoxication, and knowing nothing but from his own observation, he calls it mere theory, when he is told that the short-lived merriment and animation which had so charmed him would surely be followed by stupefaction and nausea. The effect of institutions can only be judged of after an experience far longer than the longest life of an individual; nor will one single specimen inform us how far local or temporary causes may have aggravated or softened their inherent properties. They must be watched from their origin to their extinction; their natural consequences must be distinguished from their accidental results; the experiment must be tried on various subjects in order to be satisfied that its operation is uniform; before we can be fairly said to judge of them from experience. But this true experience, furnishing indeed a safe and universal rule, is no other than what is often called theory; unattainable to the vulgar, because it

alike exceeds their perseverance, their grasp of mind, and their capacities of discrimination; and hated by the ignorant and low principled, because it is at once above their reach, and because its lessons offer no apology for institutions founded on injustice, and supported by selfishness and folly.

So far then it is false, that men who are well acquainted with persons and things now existing, men who have mixed extensively in society in their own country, but whose knowledge of other times and other countries is exceedingly imperfect, have any right to put their experience on a level with that far more universal experience which thinking and inquiring minds have gained from a comprehensive study both of the present and the past. But if many of the advocates for reform in various parts of our institutions have been theorists in the true meaning of the term, if they have ventured to form conclusions on an imperfect induction, or from some defect in themselves have proposed systems almost as faulty as those which they wished to alter, they individually may be undeserving of confidence; yet this failure affords not the shadow of an excuse for the vaunts of their adversaries. "Even a one-eyed man is a king amongst the blind;" and the glimmering of twilight is better than the thick darkness on which it has begun to dawn. Let the light indeed shine more and more unto the perfect day; but let us not so complain of the indistinctness of the dawn as to prefer the unbroken obscurity of midnight. Let those who complain of the ill-grounded theories of reformers reprove their fault in the best manner, by working their way themselves to a fuller knowledge; but let them not rest contented in the very depths of ignorance, because those who have assayed to soar into a purer region, have been unable in their first trial to escape altogether beyond the range of the mists of the valley.

But is there then so much to learn, and have our forefathers indeed lived in so intense a darkness? Let any

Christian look first upon the volume of the New Testament, and then turn his eyes to the existing state of society, to the wars of ambition, to the conquests, the persecutions, the corruptions, the sufferings, the low principles, and lower practice, which have prevailed during the last eighteen hundred years, amidst men who have professed the Christian faith, and called themselves the redeemed and sanctified people of God! Alas! for the words of Christ's Prayer, so often repeated in mockery, when we daily beg of God that his kingdom may come, whilst our institutions, our principles, and our practice uphold the kingdom of another master! Alas! for the unfulfilled promises of the older prophecies, whose accomplishment has been so long hindered, while we either regard them as a splendid vision of eastern fancy, or murmur and are offended, because the blessings designed for a world that should be the image of Heaven have found no place amidst our evil passions and abounding iniquity! Dissatisfaction with ourselves is wisdom, but it is the most fatal folly to gaze with regret upon the past, rather than to turn with an eager and inquiring hope to the future. We are not worse than our fathers; it is shame enough that we are not more advanced than we are beyond their exceeding badness; but our desire should be to be ten thousand times better; not looking back to the things behind, but pressing forward to those that are before, until we grow up into the perfect man; into the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.

I write as a Christian to Christians, and I have thought it neither irrelevant to my particular subject, nor generally unimportant, to endeavour to point out the unchristian tendency of those prejudices in favour of past times and established institutions which with too many close the ears and the understanding against the claims of truth and justice. Whereas he who knows the origin of society and its actual vicissitudes on the one hand, and has learnt from Christ's Gospel to understand what it ought to be on

the other, will at once see that the antiquity of an institution does not afford a presumption in favour of its excellence; and that instead of idle language about holding fast to the laws of our ancestors, our constant object should be to carry on those successive improvements to which all that is good in them is owing; not to doat upon the productions of our childhood, but to labour to bring them to the perfection of the ripest wisdom of manhood. And we shall find that in the consideration of our immediate subject these general principles are peculiarly ap plicable.

The origin of the present form of civil society in Ireland was conquest; and what was more unfavourable to the establishment of just institutions, it was a conquest obtained over a barbarous people by another scarcely less barbarous, and of a race and language at once distinct and dissimilar. Now in that order of God's providence by which even our wickedness is sometimes made to promote his purposes of good, it cannot be denied that the ultimate consequences of conquest have been in many instances highly beneficial to the conquered themselves; a better national character has been produced by the intermixture of different races, and laws, commerce, and general civilization have been communicated by the conquerers to their subjects. To talk in this case of a continued right in the conquered people to regain by force that which they had lost by force is palpably foolish, for in a few generations there are neither conquerors nor conquered remaining, but one united people sprung from the intermixture of both, and professing in its improved moral and physical condition reasons for remembering only with thankfulness the cause which first brought its two elements into contact. But where the wounds inflicted by the first conquest have never been suffered to heal; where the conquerors have continued to form a distinct people, and the conquered have been regarded as an inferior race; where conquest, in short, has never been softened into

union, but retains all the harshness of its original features, aggravated by successive centuries of irritation; such a state of things is a perpetual crime, and the original guilt of the conquerors must for ever extend to their posterity, so long as by neglecting to remedy or palliate its evil consequences they make themselves a party to it. It is too late then to talk of the inconveniences of extending the rights of citizens to those whose peculiar opinions disqualify them for an union with their conquerors. We brought them forcibly into our national society, and we must not shrink from the just consequences of our own act. And the plea of conscience when urged as an excuse for not offering atonement for our crime, while we continue to profit by its fruits, is no better than self-deceit and hypocrisy. If Protestants urge that they cannot allow Catholics to have any voice in the government, why did they bring a Catholic people into political connexion with themselves? If they so dread the infection of Catholic opinions, why do they oblige Catholics to live and breathe in the same society with themselves? But this they have chosen to do; and if their health be endangered, they have only themselves to thank for it.

In saying this, it will not be supposed that I am gravely arguing in favour of a total separation between this country and Ireland. When I urge that those who refuse to do Ireland justice, and make conscience their plea for the refusal, are bound not to be conscientious only where it suits their own interests, but to make restitution in full if they scruple at coming to a fair compromise; I mean to shew the futility of their plea, and to insist that it is only a deceived or self-deceiving conscience which advances it. In fact, it is a plea which would dissolve the whole fabric of society throughout Europe; and would make it impossible for men of different religions to live together as fellow-citizens, if they mutually insisted upon their own exclusive supremacy. The connexion between this country and Ireland is not now to be torn asunder; the injus-

tice which we have done cannot now in that manner be rendered undone; but it is our bounden duty to remedy its actual evil effects. What ought to have been done long since, should at least no longer be delayed; we should hasten to remove all those marks of our original violence, which leave us still guilty till they are wiped away: we should make it as impossible even to dream of a separation with Ireland, as to break up England itself into the original elements of its heptarchy.

But it has been urged by Lord Bexley, that the Catholics of Ireland are not the Irish nation; that we are united with the Protestants of Ireland, and that they, politically speaking, constitute Ireland. Thus it is that the language of municipal law, so often the mere organ of power, is quoted to give an imposing sanction to injustice. What are the Protestants of Ireland, but military colonies planted by the conquering nation in a conquering province, who can only have a distinct existence so long as the evils of conquest are unatoned for, and the tenure is one of might and not of right. Such in the reign of Augustus were the colonies of Narbo, Vienna, and Lugdunum in Gaul; of Corduba and Hispalis in Spain; and whilst these alone possessed the privileges of citizenship, whilst these alone were regarded by the Romans as enjoying legal existence, so long was the connexion with Gaul and Spain forced and insecure, so long were the massacres and spoliations of the first Cæsar an enduring crime of the Roman government. But the Italian war had taught the Romans a memorable lesson; and the statesmen and lawyers of Rome were not incapable of profiting by the experience of the past. Within sixty years after the death of Augustus, the rights of Roman citizens were bestowed on all the free inhabitants of Gaul, and from that period Gaul was truly united to the empire, her old language and her old customs were gradually forgotten, and the bonds which bound her to Italy could only be torn asunder by the general convulsion of the civilized world.

To consider then the Protestants of Ireland as the Irish nation, is merely to perpetuate the injustice of our original conquest; to say that although inferior in nnmbers, they possess a great superiority in property, is to keep alive the memory of those sweeping confiscations which transferred the soil of Ireland to the conquerors, and of those more atrocious laws which, down to the year 1778, forbade the Irish Catholic to become a purchaser of land in his own country. Who can wonder, that if we on our part still display the trophies of victory, the majority of the Irish people should cherish a bitter recollection of their defeat? that if we, till within the last fifty years, so far abused the rights of conquest as to hinder the conquered from regaining by peaceful industry the property which they had lost, they should have remembered how they had lost it, and by what means alone they could expect to recover a share of it? The stream of events cannot flow backward, nor is there any fear that the injustice of our conquest will be removed by an opposite injustice: unless we obstinately refuse ourselves to obliterate its traces, and persist in treating Ireland as a conquered province, where our Protestant colonies alone are to enjoy the rights of citizens.

It may be urged as a last plea for still calling upon Parliament to persevere in the iniquities of our ancestors, that exclusion from the full rights of citizenship is not directed against the Irish Catholics as Irishmen, but as Catholics; and that the Catholics of England are in some respects subjected to still greater disqualifications. This also is one of those arguments which men are liable to advance, while they want the knowledge or the ability to connect the present state of things with the causes that produced it. That the majority of the Irish people are Catholics at this hour is almost demonstrably owing to the English conquest combined with the neglect of those measures which repair the evil of conquest. Had Ireland been left to herself, she would have experienced in all

human probability the same course of events with the other countries of the North of Europe. Her kings would have become impatient of the papal pretensions; her aristocracy would have been jealous of the wealth and consequence of the Church; her commons would have been alienated by the unworthy lives of the clergy; and with these predisposing causes to aid them, the doctrines of the reformers would have taken root as effectually as they did in Scotland and in England. Or had conquest been followed by an effectual union; had we known how to improve, and conciliate, and civilize, as well as we understood the arts of slaughter and confiscation, Ireland would have had one heart with England, and Connaught and Munster would have opposed no greater obstacles to Protestantism than Cornwall and Cumberland; it would have been merely the slowness of ignorance, and not the deep aversion of national hatred. But now Ireland is Catholic because Protestantism was associated in her eyes with subjugation and oppression; she clung the more fondly to her superstitions because they were renounced and persecuted by her enemy. And who can doubt but that the dread and hatred of Popery which prevailed in England during the seventeenth century were at least greatly aggravated by causes arising out of her political relations with Ireland. If there was one thing more than another which made Popery detestable, it was the Irish rebellion and massacre of 1642: or at a later period, the support which Ireland gave to James the Second, and the Acts of James's Irish Parliament in 1689. Now although religious animosity had a great share in the violences of both these periods; yet it was so mixed up with feelings of national and political hatred, that they ought not to be regarded as the mere effects of Catholic bigotry, but as the atrocious vengeance of a barbarous people upon those who had conquered and held them in subjection. In all these cases, to remember only the wickedness of the retaliation, and to pass over the injustice which provoked it,

is at once morally and politically blameable. Let us abhor as much as we will the individual actors in scenes of cruelty, but let us not think that their guilt can cancel ours; or that because evil has been overthrown by worse evil, that therefore we are justified in restoring and upholding it.

Once again, it is urged by some that the disabilities imposed on the Catholics are no other than all governments may enact in their discretion upon particular classes of their subjects: and parallels are sought for in the law which disables clergymen from sitting in the House of Commons; and in those which make the possession of a certain amount of income an indispensable qualification for a member of the legislature, or even for an elector in the county election. With respect to the privilegium against Horne Tooke, for such in fact it was, which assumed the thin cloak of a general principle to cover its real motives of personal aversion and fear, it is difficult to conceive how one act of injustice can be a defence for another; and the depriving the clergy of their rights as citizens, when their old rights as a distinct order in the State had been taken from them, was a measure worthy of the suspicions and violence of the time at which it was effected. But to require in a legislator the possession of such wealth as ought fairly to place him above any corrupt temptation, is allowed by the highest authorities in political science to be a provision for the common benefit; and it is a principle equally just and beneficial, however particular circumstances may sometimes require it to be modified, that he who has no interest in the maintenance of society, should have no voice in the choice of those who are to defend and govern it. But even admitting that it were otherwise, yet there is one great distinction between these laws of disqualification, and those which affect the Catholics of Ireland. The clergy form one particular profession; the poor form one particular class in society; but they are intermingled

locally as well as politically with other professions and other classes; so that it is impossible that either should constitute a distinct society by themselves. They are essentially parts of a whole; and as such, submission is their duty; and Government may lawfully, on its own conscientious belief of its being for the general good, impose on them restrictions which they may consider injurious. And this same principle applies also to the Catholics of England, whose claims certainly could not be urged with justice if they were likely to be dangerous to the Church establishment of England, that is to the interests of the great majority of that society of which the Catholics are necessarily and naturally a part. It applies also, it may be observed, to very small portions of a national society, even though they may be locally distinct; as, for instance, it were idle for the inhabitants of one single county, united as they are by laws, language, customs, and habits of living, to the rest of the nation, to consider themselves as capable of forming a distinct national society. Thus when Johnson[a], in order to ridicule the pretensions of the American Congress, imagines a congress of Cornishmen assembled at Truro to hold a similar language, and then adds, that he knows no argument used by the Americans which may not with greater justice be urged by the Cornishmen, he forgets the infinitely different ratio which America and Cornwall bear towards Great Britain; and that distance, resources, and population fitted the former as decidedly for a separate social existence, as its close local connexion, and its comparative insignificance in power and numbers, marked the latter as a natural part of the civil society of Britain. Now the Catholics of Ireland are not a single profession, like the clergy; nor a single class of society, like the poor; on the contrary, they comprehend all the different elements of a nation; nobility, wealth, intelligence, num-

[a] In his Pamphlet, entitled "Taxation no Tyranny," vol. viii. of his Works, 8vo. edit. 1806.

bers, and variety of professions and occupations. Nor again, are they so locally mixed up with the mass of British society, as to form only a necessary part of it, incapable of a separate existence. On the contrary, Nature herself has marked out their boundaries with a decided hand; and Ireland is, geographically speaking, a world by itself. Further, they are not so insignificant a portion of the society of the empire, as to be bound under all circumstances to submit to the will of the majority, because their separation could not be contemplated without ridicule. Many states in Europe far inferior to Ireland in population and resources, and far less favourably situated, have enjoyed, and still enjoy, a happy and glorious independence. If by a persevering refusal to treat the Irish as citizens, we urge them hereafter to consider themselves as foreigners, they may be called rebels in England during the continuance of the struggle, but as soon as it is over the name of rebellion will be exchanged for that of war, and even municipal law will allow of our then giving it a title which universal law and the voice of all other nations had conferred on it from the very beginning.

Nay, even were we to extend the principle of non-resistance to societies as well as to individuals; if we hold that war is under all circumstances unlawful, and that the nation which repels injury by force is ever to be condemned, still this cannot lessen the guilt of those who offer injury, or of those who make the injustice of the government their own by their loud petitions to persevere in it. Naboth certainly would have been guilty of rebellion, had he attempted as an individual to maintain his vineyard against Ahab by force; but would this have altered the wickedness of the king's act in seizing it, or of those counsellors who had instigated him to the crime? If it be sinful even to resist evil, how much more sinful is it to do evil? But some are not ashamed to argue, that although the present state of things in Ireland is the result of injustice, yet that it is not injustice now to main-

tain it; that our fathers are answerable for the sin, and that we may fairly reap the profit of it. I know not a more striking proof of the lamentable ignorance in which many good men live as to all political duties, than that any one calling himself a Christian should use such an argument as this. Apply it to private life, and he who would advance it is not an erroneous reasoner, but deficient in common honesty: "non verbis et disputatione philosophorum sed vinculis et carcere fatigandus." The Catholic St. Louis, King of France, had other notions of Christian duty than these. He, not contented with the scrupulous justice of his own Christian life, "appointed commissaries to inquire what possessions had been unjustly annexed to the Royal domain during the two last reigns. These were restored to the proprietors, or, where length of time had made it difficult to ascertain the claimant, their value was distributed among the poor."[a] This was the real tenderness of an enlightened conscience; this was a true horror of the contamination of that worst idolatry, unrighteous gain. But to make no attempts to compensate for our fathers' injustice, or to think that sin can ever die to those who retain the benefit of it without repairing the evil which it occasioned, is indeed to "allow the deeds of our fathers," and to expose ourselves to the heavy judgment denounced against those who repent not of their fathers' crimes.

As a last resource we are opposed by the argument, "that men have no right to govern themselves, but only to be kindly and justly treated by their governors. That therefore the Irish Catholics may indeed claim exemption from persecution and tyranny, but that they have no right to a voice in the Legislature, or to exercise the highest functions of free citizens, the administration of the whole state." Now if men, that is, if societies of men, for we are not speaking of individuals, have not a right to govern themselves, who has the right to govern them? Govern-

[a] Hallam's Middle Ages, vol. i. p. 42. 8vo. edit.

ment is either a matter of agreement, as when the proprietors in a joint stock company depute some of their body to manage the concerns of the whole; or it arises out of a natural superiority, either temporary, as that of men over boys and children, or perpetual, as that of men over beasts. Now it is very true that beasts have no right to govern themselves, but only to be kindly and justly governed; for men have a natural superiority over them, which is perpetual and unalterable; and God has accordingly declared his will, that to men they should be subject. It is true also, that boys and children have no right to govern themselves while they remain boys and children, for there also is a natural superiority in their parents and elders over them; and God has accordingly in this case also sanctioned this authority by his express law. But as soon as boys arrive at manhood, the superiority of nature on the part of the parent expires: then therefore the child has a right to govern himself, and this the law of Christian countries, justly, as I conceive, interpreting the divine law, has agreed to acknowledge. A child then has no right to govern himself while he is a child, but he has a right so to be governed as shall qualify him for governing himself hereafter; and what should we say of the guilt of that parent who should wilfully neglect his son's education in order to protract the period of his own authority? Now according to the general belief of ancient times, such a natural superiority existed in some classes of men over the rest, and was derived from a supposed divine extraction: for the descendants of those deified men who were amongst the earliest objects of idolatry, were accounted themselves to be a race of demigods or heroes, and to be entitled to the exclusive possession of the offices of king and priest; of king, because as men were the natural lords of the brute creation, so demigods were the natural rulers of men; of priest, because the gods would receive no strangers' services with the same satisfaction as those offered by their own descendants. These were the

διοτρεφέες βασιλῆες of the heroic age of Greece, and a similar belief gave a sacred authority to the Bramins of India, the Lucumones of Etruria, the Patricians of Rome, and the hero race who according to the national traditions were the earliest sovereigns of Egypt and of Aztlan. It was the government of such kings that the old philosophers accounted the most natural and perfect of all governments; because it was the government of a superior being, so far exalted above the nature of his subjects, that his single worth and fitness to govern surpassed the sum total of the virtues of the whole people besides. On similar principles the existence of slavery was defended; some divisions of the human race were naturally fitted to command, and others to obey; and the former, amongst whom the upholders of this doctrine took care to class themselves, were only acting agreeably to the order of nature when they made the latter their slaves. Still however it was a question whether this inferiority was accidental or perpetual; for if it were the former, then emancipation was the right of the slaves so soon as they became fit for it, and the duty of the masters was to prepare them in the mean time for exercising hereafter the power of self government. But in all these cases the principle was just and intelligible, that a superiority of nature conferred a title to authority over beings of an inferior order; and they who believed kings to be of superhuman extraction and to possess superhuman virtues, justly maintained their divine right to govern mankind, and justly asserted that men were lawfully subject to them, and could claim no more from them than they were bound themselves to render to the brute creation, that is, just and kind treatment, so far as it was compatible with an absolute right of dominion. When however the conclusions of one set of premises are appended to premises entirely opposite, the incongruity would be truly ludicrous, were not its consequences too mischievous to allow of laughter. It is among the most humiliating instances of human folly, that Chris-

tians while holding as one of the first principles of their religion the common descent of all mankind, their common sinful nature, and common need of being born again in Christ, should adopt a conclusion which rested wholly on their supposed different extraction, and on the high purity and excellence of some particular races contrasted with the degraded state of others. To us who admit of no such differences it is a conclusion little better than monstrous; and the very fact that no beings exist in the world who enjoy a natural superiority over mankind, and that no one race of mankind possesses, except from accidental causes, such a superiority over another, shews decisively that God has given to men the right of self government, and that as no one race can claim dominion as its peculiar birthright, so all lawful power over them is derived solely from their own consent, and is a mere matter of arrangement for the general benefit. Mankind therefore have a right to govern themselves, that is to say, society is the supreme power on earth, and the ordinances of society, or the laws and the commands of magistrates who act in the name and for the welfare of the society, are binding upon all the individual members of it; but neither has any one national society any authority to govern another, nor still less have magistrates, who are but the officers of society, any right to rule contrary to the will of that society, or to exercise any greater power than it may authorize. And if such magistrates, by the physical force of a body of men purposely kept distinct from the interests and feelings of the community, exercise and maintain a despotic power over society, it is a state as monstrous as if wild beasts were to occupy any country to the exclusion of mankind; and the social body would be as fully justified in delivering itself from the unnatural violence of one of these brute enemies as of the other. The Christian Scriptures indeed enjoin conscientious submission to government on the part of individuals, resting this duty on the divine authority vested in it, as the

representative on earth of our supreme moral Governor. They strongly condemn the doctrines of the Fifth Monarchy men, and of the ancient Jews, who held that the saints were not subject to any earthly society, especially when it consisted of heathens, because they had one only King in heaven. They discourage the notion so common amongst religious bigots, that there is something profane in political institutions with which the servants of God should not intermeddle. On the contrary, the apostles teach that these political institutions are God's appointed means of governing the world, and that he so highly regards them as to invest them with one of his own attributes, the dispensation of good to the well disposed, and of punishment to the evil doer. If they are perverted from fulfilling these purposes, they are faulty and require amendment, and every servant of God should use his best endeavours to restore them to their designed purity. But that they who had so perverted them should be allowed to profit by their own wrong, that they should in spite of nature transfer the principles of government exercised over beings naturally inferior to the government of beings naturally equal; and that this violation of the manifest laws of God's providence, and obstruction of his declared will for the perfecting of human society, should defend itself by arguments grounded upon falsehood and idolatry, and then claim to be sanctioned by divine truth, affords altogether a melancholy instance of the art with which the great enemy of all goodness employs the pretext of respect for the Gospel, when he would most effectually prevent the Gospel from bringing forth its proper fruits.

And now I would briefly recapitulate the proofs of my original position, that it is a direct Christian duty to grant the claims of the Roman Catholics, and a direct sin, however ignorantly committed, to endeavour to procure the rejection of them. We conquered Ireland unjustly, and have perpetuated the evils, and consequently the guilt, of our first conquest. We refuse to admit the Irish nation

into the pale of our civil society, whilst, by admitting into it those Protestant military colonies by which we have from time to time garrisoned Ireland, we keep up a broad line of distinction between union and conquest, between the small minority whom we make our fellow-citizens, and the majority whom we treat as subjects. We plead the inconveniences to ourselves of a connection with Ireland on equal and just terms, while we effected in the first instance, and still insist on maintaining, a connexion on unequal and unjust terms. We talk of the sin of uniting ourselves with Papists, yet we force Papists to belong to us; and we plead the idolatry of the Catholics as a reason for not doing them justice, when our own injustice has been the cause of this idolatry still existing: and had it not been for us, Ireland would in all human probability have been at this moment Protestant. We confound an entire national society with particular orders or professions of society, and sacrifice the rights of one nation to the interests of another, because the interests of a part of a nation may lawfully be sacrificed to the paramount rights of the whole. We attempt sometimes to justify our conduct by an argument, which, if acted upon in private life, would cause a man to be banished from all honest society; namely, that we are not bound to repair an injustice done by others, even though we continue to reap the profits of it. We attempt at other times to defend it by transferring conclusions, legitimately drawn from premises which we acknowledge to be false, to the very contrary premises which we acknowledge to be true. And we individually, that is, the clergy, gentry, farmers, and shopkeepers of this country, make ourselves each separately guilty of the injustice which we have committed as a nation, by calling upon our rulers to persevere in this wickedness, when they appear inclined to relieve us and our posterity from the curse which it must entail upon us, and to return at last to the path of duty.

It is not therefore the advocates, but the enemies of

the Catholics who are preferring state policy to their Christian duty; it is not their advocates who would sacrifice the Protestant religion to the views of worldly expediency, but their adversaries, who would violate the plain duties of our common Christianity, rather than consent to the political evil of abandoning Ireland to herself, if their consciences will not permit them to treat it with justice. The plea of religion is wholly foreign to the question, except upon such grounds as would authorize direct persecution. If the believers in a true religion claim a title to restrain those who are in error from the enjoyment of their natural rights, in order to have a greater chance of converting them to the truth; then also they may pretend to persecute them directly with the same object, and there is no doubt that a thorough persecution will generally root out the doctrines against which it is directed. Or if they claim a natural superiority on account of the truth of their religion, so that they are fitted to govern unbelievers, or heretics, on the same principles that men govern children, this is a pretension far less reasonable than if we were to claim dominion over those nations whose constitutions were unfavourable to the welfare of their people, or whose moral character we might judge to be inferior to our own. What human power can pronounce authoritatively upon the truth of a religion, when every nation will with equal zeal maintain the truth of its own? Or does Christ authorize his servants as such to assume the office of judging the world, until the day when he shall himself appear to pronounce the judgment?

Hitherto then I have argued the Question solely on the ground of justice: and have shewn, that a third part nearly of the inhabitants of the whole empire, containing in themselves all the different elements of a nation, locally distinct, differing in race, and a large part of them in language also, from the people of Great Britain, cannot be considered as necessarily forming only a part of our national society, on whom we as the majority may impose what

rules we will, while they have no other duty but submission. We are bound either to treat them fairly, or not to meddle with them at all; and if our constitution must be altered before they can be members of it, we are bound to alter it; as we, by making them subjects unjustly, contracted voluntarily the obligation to make them citizens; or else we are labouring at this hour under the guilt of our ancestor's usurpations. But although this would be the plain path of duty under any circumstances, yet it would be a most painful alternative, had we to choose between the overthrow of our religious institutions, and the dismemberment of the empire. No national evil that did not involve national sin could be greater in my judgment than the destruction of our Protestant Church Establishment. That union of Church and State, which so many good men lament and some condemn, appears to me to be far too powerful a means of diffusing the blessings of Christianity to be lightly broken asunder; and although I earnestly desire to see the actual abuses of that union remedied, yet even now the good which it is daily working is such as to make every sincere Christian regard at least with anxiety the prospect if its dissolution. I have said thus much, because the advocates of the Catholic claims are often accused of indifference to the safety of our own Establishment. With whatever justice this may be imputed to some of their number, I beg in my own case to protest against the charge as wholly groundless and untrue. I think certainly, that even the existence of our Establishment would be too dearly purchased, if it could only be upheld by injustice; I should be unwilling to do evil that good might come; to call upon Satan to cast out Satan. But our Protestant Church is one of the greatest blessings with which England has been favoured; and may it exist secure from every enemy under the care of its divine Head, and trusting in its lawful arms, the truth of its doctrines, and the holiness of its members!

With this feeling, not less sincere than theirs who

express most loudly their fears for its actual safety, it is to me a matter of deep joy, that the very course which justice calls on us to follow, should be also that which is most likely to ensure the safety of the Protestant Church, and to extend the influence of its doctrines: and that the very act which does justice to Ireland, holds out also the fairest promise of her moral and spiritual improvement. So universally true is our Lord's declaration, that if we seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, all other things shall be added unto us; if we do our duty without fear of the consequences, we shall most surely gain those advantages, which had they tempted us to flinch from our duty we should for ever have forfeited.

Now at the commencement of this argument I am willing to take the picture of Ireland and the Irish Catholics from those who think most unfavourably of them. I am willing to suppose that the Irish race are deeply tainted with barbarism; that they know little of obedience to law; that they are the slaves of passion and feeling, and by consequence deficient in the highest qualification of human nature, self-denying virtue founded upon a high-principled sense of duty to God and man. I would allow also, that in no part of Europe does the Roman Catholic religion exist in a more aggravated form; nowhere are its superstitions more gross, or its bigotry more ferocious; nowhere is it a more fearful corruption of Christ's Gospel. But with this unpromising race and with this dreadful religion we have chosen to connect ourselves; and we have thus deprived ourselves of the right to regard them with mere disgust and abhorrence; we must endeavour to better them, and the more so as the virulence of the evil is in a great degree to be attributed to our own neglect or absolute ill treatment. Now how are they to be bettered, or can they not be bettered at all? They can be bettered, for the Roman Catholic religion wears so different an aspect in different countries, that it may evidently be influenced by external causes: and they who believe in the

common origin of all mankind, must conclude that all important moral differences, between one race and another, may be gradually removed as they have been created; and that as unfavourable circumstances made them differ, so a happier system and better institutions may in time restore their original equality. Now a religion may be externally influenced either by forcible or by gentle measures; by persecution, or by persuasion and example. I will not insult any of my readers by enlarging on the utter wickedness of the first of these means; but will at once proceed to consider those others which we may and ought to use. If we wish to influence any one by our arguments or by our practice, should we be most likely to succeed if previously he regarded us with suspicion and ill will, or if he were living on friendly terms with us? The question may seem too simple to be seriously asked; and yet there are some who believe that Protestantism is less likely to win its way among the Irish Catholics, when being treated justly and kindly they will regard its professors as countrymen and friends, than it is at this moment, when it is looked upon as the badge of an enemy, and when its name is indissolubly associated with hostility and oppression. But let us see what I mean by saying that Protestantism will win its way in Ireland if the claims of the Catholics are granted. There will not be many direct conversions; not many who will say in so many words that they abjure the errors of popery, and go over to the Protestant Church: there will be very little of this on either side, for there are stronger feelings in men's minds opposed to a professed change of religion than any that can be brought in favour of it. The nominal conversion of the heathen world to Christianity is a misleading example: for heathenism was not a matter of conscience with most of its votaries, and wanted many of the strongest links by which all forms of Christianity, and even Mohammedanism itself, are bound to the hearts and minds of their respective professors. Thus in modern Europe, wherever

Catholics and Protestants have been mixed largely together, as in Germany, France, and Switzerland, neither religion has nominally gained much over the other; and in those cantons of Switzerland in particular which are divided between Catholics and Protestants, the Catholic parishes have in general continued to be Catholic, and the Protestant to be Protestant, without the limits of either faith having been enlarged by proselytism. In fact, if men of different religions are to live together in peace, they must abstain from a direct interference with each other's tenets; just as in marriages between two persons of different persuasions, an arrangement is commonly made which limits the influence of either parent over their common children, and determines that some shall be brought up in the opinions of their father, and others in those of their mother. But although direct renunciations of the Roman Catholic tenets are likely to be few, yet the general approximation of those tenets to the faith of Protestants is likely to be very considerable. For this experience is our warrant; inasmuch as the Roman Catholic religion exists in its most corrupted form in those countries where there are either no Protestants, as in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, or where from political animosities Protestants are regarded with suspicion and abhorrence, as in Ireland. On the contrary, where Protestants are numerous, and are living on friendly terms with Catholics, there the Catholic religion exists in a very improved state, and its worst abuses are practically done away with. I have now before me two Catechisms: the one a Spanish one, printed at Valladolid, apparently during the war with Napoleon, but the date of the year is not given; the other printed at Rheims in 1822, and circulated by the orders of the Archbishop of Rheims, for the use of his diocese. Much certainly that is offensive to a Protestant ear may be found even in the latter; yet the difference in tone between it and the Spanish Catechism is very remarkable; and sufficiently shews that the Roman Catholic religion is

not always practically one and the same, although its members, if pressed on the point by Protestants, might think themselves bound to assert its unchangeableness. For example, in the Spanish Catechism, after the catechumen has expounded the several Articles of the Apostles' Creed, the catechist proceeds to ask, whether there are any other things which he believes? To which the answer is given[a], "Yes, father; every thing contained in the holy Scriptures, and every thing revealed by God to his Church." "And what things are these?" proceeds the catechist. "That," replies the catechumen, "you should not ask of me, who am ignorant. There are Doctors in our holy Mother Church, who will know how to answer it." "You say well," resumes the catechist, "that it becomes the Doctors of the Church and not such as you to give an account of the extent of all the points of faith. It is not enough for you to give an account of the Articles as contained in the Creed." And again in another place, the catechumen, after enumerating the several means of grace, mentions as the last and most powerful[b], "the making choice of a wise, virtuous, and prudent confessor, and obeying him in every thing." "You say well," rejoins the catechist, "and remember to act accordingly; for such a confessor will be like an angel, who will guide

[a] Si, Padre, todo lo que está en la Sagrada Escutura, y quanto Dios tiene revelado á su Iglesia. P. Qué cosas son estas? R. Eso no me lo pregunteis á mi, que soy ignorante: Doctores tiene la santa Madre Iglesia, que lo sabrán responder. M. Bien decis, qué a los Doctores conviene, y no á vosotros, dar cuenta por extenso de las cosas de la Fé: á vosotros bástaos darla de los Articulos como se contienen en el Credo.

[b] Por decir uno que abraza muchos, el elegir un confesor sábio, virtuoso, y prudente, y sujetarse á el en todo. M. Bien decis. Hacedlo pues vosotros asi, pues este os será como un Angel, que os guiará, proponiendo-os estos y otros medios, &c.

I have inserted the original words of these passages, because, as my knowledge of Spanish is exceedingly slight, I may possibly have committed some mistakes in my translation of them; although I believe I have not mistaken the exact sense.

you by proposing to you these and other means of grace," &c. Now to the first of these extracts there is nothing at all similar in the French Catechism; and with regard to the confessor, all that is said is a practical rule at the end of the Article on Confession, recommending every one to choose a good confessor, who may question them, instruct them in their duties, and be a check on them; and advising them "to listen to his counsels, and follow them with docility." Again, in the French Catechism the nature of the honour paid to the Virgin Mary and the Saints is carefully defined; and it is expressly said, that we may not worship either the Virgin, or the Saints and Angels, but God alone: nor may we pray to them to give us grace, but to pray for it to God in our behalf; and that the cross and the images of the Saints are not to be respected in themselves; for they have in them no divinity and no virtue; Catholics address to them no prayers, and put no trust in them; but they may be honoured for the sake of those whom they represent to us. But in the Spanish Catechism there are none of these explanations, and it is simply said that we should honour the images of the Virgin, and of the Saints, and pray to the Angels and Saints, as to our mediators. Finally, in the French Catechism there is at the end of every Article a list of passages from the Scripture bearing on the subject of the Article, which can only be inserted in order to encourage the study of very large parts of the Scripture at least, if it does not imply the recommendation of the whole volume. There is not a word in the Spanish Catechism, on the other hand, which refers the reader to the Bible, or would lead him to consider the study of the Scriptures as useful to him. And this brings me to a difference in the Roman Catholic religion as it exists in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, on the one hand, and in Italy on the other, of which every one who has travelled through these countries may speak from his own knowledge. In the three former, crucifixes by the road side are sufficiently common; but images of

the Virgin and the Saints are comparatively rare; while in Italy these last are more frequent than the crucifix. Again, most of the modern paintings in the French Churches are taken from Scriptural subjects: and what is perhaps even more remarkable, amongst a collection of thirty or forty coloured prints of the cheapest description which I looked over in a shop at Cologne in June last, there was not one relating to any legend of the Saints or the Virgin, but the subjects of all were taken from the New Testament. Whereas at Rome and in its neighbourhood the pictures and legends of the Saints are far more numerous on the walls of the Churches, by the road sides, in shops, and in houses, than pictures relating to our Lord, or that are taken from the Old or New Testament. Now it may be very true that a French or German priest, if pressed by a Protestant, would declare that the faith of his Church was one and unchangeable, and that the Catholics of Italy held the same doctrines as himself: but still the practical effect is infinitely different, if the parts of these doctrines which are prominently brought forward be in one country the main truths of Christianity which Catholics hold in common with Protestants, and in another their own peculiar corruptions of it. And this more Christian aspect of the Roman Catholic faith exists in every country where it has been much in contact with Protestantism, *except in Ireland;* while there, on the contrary, it presents itself in its very worst form. This is in itself a phenomenon; and this alone, if duly considered, should induce every man who is anxious for the religious improvement of his countrymen to promote the admission of the Irish Catholics to their civil rights. Wherever Catholics and Protestants have lived together on a friendly footing, the influence of Protestantism has been insensibly operating, and has practically improved the character of Catholicism; but where they have lived together as a degraded and a persecuting caste; while the one has groaned under a system of exclusion, and the other ex-

ulted in the enjoyment of its ascendancy, there has been no room for the exercise of any beneficial influence; men's religion has become their party also; and thus its most distinctive peculiarities have been rather obstinately maintained than softened or abandoned. Yet the Irish Protestant Church is wealthy and learned; and has numbered amongst its ministers some of the most apostolical men who have ever borne the Christian name. Under any other circumstances their talents and their virtues, and the political influence of their Church, might have attracted the respect and love of the Catholics, might have drawn them into a cordial union in works of charity and public utility, and might in time have induced them to tolerate, if not, like the Catholics of Germany, to encourage, the circulation of the Scriptures amongst their people. But in Ireland the system of ascendancy has poisoned every thing; and while the Catholic regarded the Protestant as an oppressor, and the Protestant looked upon the Catholic as meditating insurrection, both were repelled from all approaches to union; and each was forward to hurl upon the other the names of heretic and idolater.

Nor should it be forgotten, that if the influence of Protestantism has improved the Catholic religion in Germany, it might be expected, if it were once disentangled from its encumbering armour of ascendancy, to produce a much stronger effect in Ireland. That which the Puritans charged upon the Church of England as its crime, has always recommended it to the Catholics as the least offensive of the Protestant Churches; I mean its form of Church government, its Liturgy, and its ceremonies. Hitherto the objects of our Reformers, in avoiding all needless departure from the doctrines and discipline of the Church of Rome, have not been fully answered; their policy has perhaps disgusted more Protestants than it has conciliated Catholics. I do not mean therefore to urge that it was blameable; but it will be a great reproach to ourselves if, after having suffered so long from its ill

effects, as exemplified in our bitter dissensions with the Puritans, we do not now avail ourselves of the opportunity which Ireland affords, to realize some of its intended benefits. A Puritan clergy in Ireland, or a clergy at all partaking of the spirit of Puritanism, would be an evil which the Government should carefully watch over, and to the utmost of its power vigorously prevent. There should be no furious commentaries on the Apocalypse, no raving about the sin of tolerating idolaters. The deep folly of such conduct can hardly be an excuse for its utter uncharitableness, and the incalculable mischief of its consequences. Our language to the Roman Catholics should be that of St. Paul to the Jews: "Believest thou the Prophets? I know that thou believest." "After the way that you call heresy, so worship we the God of our fathers, believing none other things than those which the Prophets and Moses did say should come." "You have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge." You are our brethren, "yours are the fathers," and "if concerning the Gospel you are at all our enemies, yet are you beloved for the fathers' sake," even those same fathers[a], who in their heroic zeal for Christ's sake became the fathers of this very nation in Christ, and "in Christ Jesus have begotten us through the Gospel." And if they receive our charity with unkindness, against all example; if our Church after all shall produce less effect upon them than has been wrought by other Protestant communions, whose differences with them are more universal, we shall then at least be entitled to say, what at present would be an impious mockery, "Your blood be upon your own heads, we are clean." We have at last presented truth to you fairly, not as your oppressors and persecutors, from whose hands even truth herself must be received with suspicion, but as your countrymen and brethren, not pretending to have dominion over your bodies, but, if it might be, willing to deliver your minds from error, and to be helpers of

[a] Pope Gregory and Augustine.

your joy. If you reject it now, you reject not us, but the truth itself: your fall will be your own fault, and we shall be no more guilty of having thrown a stumbling-block in your way, by uniting truth of religious profession with the practice of iniquity and oppression.

The answer to all this is the mere repetition of the assertion, "that popery is unchanged and unchangeable." It is in vain that we appeal to facts, and shew that it is not unchanged in practice; that in some countries it is practically Christianity mixed with some errors, while in others it is practically idolatry and superstition bearing the name of Christianity: that the German Catholics who circulate the Scriptures are not exactly the same sort of persons as the Italian Catholics who carefully proscribe them: that the Catholic Kings of Saxony, who being the absolute Sovereigns of a Protestant people have left the Protestant Church Establishment in Saxony uninjured and unmolested for a hundred years; and the reigning monarch in particular, who by a recent law will allow no convert from Protestantism to be received into the Catholic Church till after an interval of some months after his declaring his change, or without producing a certificate from his Protestant minister that he had tried without effect to shake his conviction; that these Catholic princes do not exactly resemble that picture of a persecuting bigot, which we from the single example of James the Second pronounce to be the common likeness of all Catholic sovereigns. Or if we say that the Pope would be very thankful to our zealous Protestants if they could make their words good, and prove that his political influence over all Catholics outweighed all considerations of allegiance, patriotism, or national interest; if we suggest that not only have the Kings of France, the eldest sons of the Church, constantly asserted against the Popes the rights of their crown and nation; but that Pope Pius the Sixth went from Rome to Vienna in person to deprecate in vain the vigorous ecclesiastical reforms of the Emperor

Joseph the Second; that the Republic of Venice, by its well known distinction between the Church and the Court of Rome, resisted all political interference of the Popes while acknowledging their spiritual supremacy: and that neither the Catholic cantons of Switzerland nor the Catholic subjects of Prussia have ever allowed their religion to interfere with their civil duties to their country and their King: if we quote all these facts and a hundred others of the same kind, our opponents content themselves with answering, that they know nothing about facts, (which indeed is true,) but that they know that a Catholic must always be a bigot, and must always obey the Pope implicitly. They say that Catholics must be bigots, because they believe that no heretics can be saved; that they cannot change their opinions, because holding the Church to be infallible, what she has once decreed must for ever remain valid; or at least that they are fairly chargeable with all the doctrines professed by the Council of Trent, until another General Council shall have declared that those doctrines are no longer to be maintained. If we bring instances of Catholics who have shewn themselves not bigoted, and who have not considered themselves bound to obey the Pope in temporal matters; then we are told that these are not true Catholics: and although if this be so, a majority of the Catholics of Europe are not true Catholics, and the probability is that the Catholics of Ireland will be no truer, in this sense of the term, than those of the Continent, yet it is always assumed that *they* will retain the extremest rigour of the tenets of their Church, even under circumstances which, as experience has shewn, have generally qualified them.

It is important however to enter into this subject somewhat more fully, and to shew the unfairness or the ignorance of the enemies of the Catholics when they thus press upon them the most obnoxious tenets of the worst ages of papal superstition and violence. Nearly three centuries have now elapsed since the dissolution of the

Council of Trent; and since that time no General Council has been assembled, and the Catholic Church has had no opportunity of officially declaring its sentiments. As then the long suspension of the sittings of the Convocation of our own Church has caused many things to remain unaltered in our Liturgy and Church Government and probably in our Articles, which would have been reformed ere now had the Church still possessed the means of expressing its collective sentiments, the very same thing may be fairly presumed with regard to the doctrines of the Council of Trent.

But we are not left to mere conjecture as to the possibility of a Church heartily disapproving its former official acts without having ever actually disavowed them. Is there any member of the Church of England now alive, who does not disclaim and condemn the provisions and orders which I have here extracted from the "Constitution and Canons Ecclesiastical, treated and agreed upon by the two Archbishops of Canterbury and York, and the rest of the Bishops and Clergy of those Provinces, in their Synods begun at London and York, 1640, and published for the due observation of them by his Majesty's authority under the Great Seal of England." I quote these Canons the more gladly[a], because they are very little known; as it would be impossible for honest men so often to deny that the Church of England was officially and by its public acts a persecuting Church, if they had even suspected the existence of such Canons as the following.

[a] They are to be found in "A Collection of Articles, Injunctions, Canons, Orders, &c., of the Church of England, *published to vindicate the Church of England,* and to promote uniformity and *peace* in the same," by Sparrow, in 1671; a proof, by the way, that in spite of the non-confirmation of them by the statute 13 Charles II. the clergy were not yet inclined to disavow them.

From Canon I. Concerning the Regal Power.

"For any person or persons to set up, maintain, or avow in any their (i. e. the realms or territories of Kings) said realms or territories respectively, under any pretence whatsoever, any independent coactive power, either papal or popular, (whether directly or indirectly,) is to undermine their great royal office, and cunningly to overthrow that most sacred ordinance which God himself hath established: and so is treasonable against God, as well as against the king."

From Canon III. For the Suppressing of the Growth of Popery.

"But if neither conferring nor censures will prevail with such persons, (i. e. Roman Catholics,) the Church hath no way left but complaints to the secular power; and for them we straitly enjoin, that all Deans and Archdeacons, and all having inferior or exempt jurisdiction, shall every year, within six months after any Visitation by them holden, make certificate unto their several Bishops, or Archbishop, (if it be within his diocese,) under their seal of office, of all such persons who have been presented unto them as aforesaid, under pain of suspension from their said jurisdictions by the space of one whole year.

"And we in like manner enjoin all Archbishops and Bishops, that once every year at the least they certify under their Episcopal seal in parchment, unto the Justices of Assize of every county in the circuits and within their dioceses respectively, the names and surnames not only of those who have been presented unto them from the said Deans, Archdeacons, &c., but of those also who upon the oaths of churchwardens and other sworn-men at their Visitations, or upon the information of ministers employed in the said conferences, have been presented unto them,

that so the said intended proceedings may have the more speedy and the more general success.

"In particular, it shall be carefully inquired into at all Visitations, under the oaths of the churchwardens and other sworn-men, what recusants or Popish persons have been either married or buried, or have had their children baptized otherwise than according unto the rules and forms established in the Church of England; and the names of such delinquents (if they can learn them, or otherwise such names as for the time they carry) shall be as aforesaid given up to the Bishop, who shall present them to the Justices of Assize, to be punished according to the statutes.

"And for the education of recusants' children, since by Canon already established no man can teach school, (no, not in any private house,) except he be allowed by the Ordinary of the place, and withal have subscribed to the Articles of Religion established in the Church of England: we therefore straitly enjoin, that forthwith at all Visitations there be diligent inquiry made by the churchwardens or other sworn ecclesiastical officers of each parish, under their oaths, who are employed as schoolmasters to the children of recusants; and that their several names be presented to the Bishop of the diocese, who, citing the said schoolmasters, shall make diligent search whether they have subscribed or no; and if they or any of them be found to refuse subscription, they shall be forbidden to teach hereafter, and censured for their former presumption; and withal the names of him or them that entertain such a schoolmaster, shall be certified to the Bishop of the diocese, who shall at the next Assize present them to the Judges to be proceeded against according to the statutes. And if they subscribe, inquiry shall be made what care they take for the instruction of the said children in the Catechism established in the Book of Common Prayer. And all Ordinaries shall censure those whom they find negligent in the said instruction;

and if it shall appear that the parents of the said children do forbid such schoolmasters to bring them up in the doctrine of the Church of England, they shall notwithstanding do their duty; and if thereupon the said parents shall take away their children, the said schoolmasters shall forthwith give up their names unto the Bishop of the diocese, who shall take care to return them to the Justices of Assize in manner and form aforesaid. And because some may cunningly elude this decree, by sending their children to be bred beyond the seas, therefore we ordain, that the churchwardens and other sworn ecclesiastical officers shall likewise make careful inquiry, and give in upon their oaths at all Visitations, the names of such recusants' children who are so sent beyond the seas to be bred there, or whom they probably suspect to be so sent: which names as aforesaid shall be given up to the Bishop, and from him returned to the Judges as aforesaid, that their parents, who so send them, may be punished according to law. Provided always, that this Canon shall not take away or derogate from any power or authority already given or established by any other Canon now in force.

"And all the said complaints or certificates shall be presented up to the Judges in their several circuits by the Bishop's Registrar, or some other of his deputies immediately after the publishing of his Majesty's commission, or at the end of the charge, which shall be then given by the Judge. And this upon pain of suspension for three months.

"This sacred Synod doth earnestly entreat the said Reverend Justices of Assize, to be careful in the execution of the said laws committed to their trust, as they will answer to God for the daily increase of this gross kind of superstition. And further, we do also exhort all Judges, whether ecclesiastical or temporal, upon the like account, that they would not admit in any of their courts any vexatious complaint, suit or suits, or presentments against any

minister, churchwardens, questmen, sidemen, or other church-officers for the making of any such presentments.

"And lastly, we enjoin that every Bishop shall once in every year send into his Majesty's high court of Chancery, a *significavit* of the names and surnames of all such recusants who have stood excommunicated beyond the time limited by the law, and shall desire that the writ *De excommunicato capiendo* might be at once sent out against them all *ex officio*. And for the better execution of this decree, this present Synod doth most humbly beseech his most sacred Majesty, that the officers of the said high court of Chancery, whom it shall concern, may be commanded to send out the aforesaid writ from time to time as is desired, for that it would much exhaust the particular estates of the Ordinaries, to sue out several writs at their own charge. And that the like command also may be laid upon the Sheriffs and their deputies, for the due and faithful execution of the said writs, as often as they shall be brought unto them.

"And to the end that this Canon may take the better and speedier effect, and not to be deluded or delayed; we further decree and ordain, that no popish recusant, who shall persist in the said sentence of excommunication beyond the time prescribed by law, shall be absolved by virtue of any appeal in any ecclesiastical court, unless the said party shall first in his or her own person, and not by a proctor, take the usual oath, *De parendo Juri, et stando mandatis Ecclesiæ*."

From Canon V. Against Sectaries.

"Whereas there is a provision now made by a Canon for the suppressing of Popery, and the growth thereof, by subjecting all popish recusants to the greatest severity of ecclesiastical censures in that behalf: this present Synod well knowing that there are other sects which endeavour the subversion both of the doctrine and discipline of the

Church of England no less than Papists do, although by another way; for the preventing thereof, doth hereby decree and ordain, that all those proceedings and penalties which are mentioned in the aforesaid Canon against popish recusants as far as they shall be applicable, shall stand in full force and vigour against all Anabaptists, Brownists, Separatists, Familists, or other sect or sects, person or persons whatsoever, who do or shall either obstinately refuse or ordinarily, not having a lawful impediment, (that is, for the space of a month,) neglect to repair to their parish churches or chapels where they inhabit, for the hearing of divine service established, and receiving of the holy communion according to law.

"And we do also further decree and ordain, that the clause contained in the Canon now made by this Synod against the books of Socinianism, shall also extend to the makers, importers, printers, and publishers, or dispersers of any book, writing, or scandalous pamphlet devised against the discipline and government of the Church of England, and unto the maintainers and abettors of any opinion or doctrine against the same.

"And further, because there are sprung up among us a sort of factious people, despisers and depravers of the Book of Common Prayer, who do not according to the law resort to their parish church or chapel to join in the public prayers, service and worship of God with the congregation, contenting themselves with the hearing of sermons only, thinking thereby to avoid the penalties due to such as wholly absent themselves from the Church. We therefore for the restraint of all such wilful contemners or neglecters of the service of God, do ordain, that the church or chapel-wardens, and questmen, or sidemen of every parish, shall be careful to inquire out all such disaffected persons, and shall present the names of all delinquents at all Visitations of Bishops, and other Ordinaries; and that the same proceedings and penalties mentioned in the Canon aforesaid respectively shall be used against

them as against other recusants, unless within one whole month after they are first denounced, they shall make acknowledgment and reformation of that their fault. Provided always, that this Canon shall not derogate from any other canon, law, or statute in that behalf provided against those sectaries."

These Canons have been censured indeed by both Houses of Parliament, during the civil war; and they are expressly declared not to have the sanction of Parliament by a Clause in a Statute passed after the Restoration, cap. xii. anno 13 Car. II. § 5. But the Church has never disavowed them, and they are thus still on a footing with her other Canons which have not received the sanction of Parliament, and therefore are not accounted part of the law of the land.

But they who charge on all the Roman Catholics of the present day the persecuting doctrines of the Council of Trent, are liable to another retort. In the Apology of Bishop Jewell there occurs the following passage. "Ex illo" (Verbo, scil. a Christo patefacto et ab Apostolis propagato) "nos solo omne genus veterum hæreticorum, quos isti nos aiunt ab inferis revocasse, condemnamus, et Arianos, Eutychianos, Marcionitas, Ebionæos, Valentinianos, Carpocratianos, Tatianos, Novatianos, eosque uno verbo omnes, qui vel de Deo Patre, vel de Christo, vel de Spiritu Sancto, vel de ullâ aliâ parte Religionis Christianæ impie senserunt, quia ab Evangelio Christi coarguuntur, impios et perditos pronuntiamus, et usque ad inferorum portas detestamur; *nec id solum, sed etiam si forte erumpant uspiam, et sese prodant, eos legitimis et civilibus suppliciis severi et sino coercemus.*" Now Jewell's Apology, to use the words of Bishop Randolph, "is said to have been published with the consent of the Bishops, and was always understood to speak the sense of the whole Church, in whose name it was written:" and this work expressly declares, and boasts that the Church of England, "severally and earnestly checks by secular and legal

punishments," (and the term *suppliciis* is most naturally to be understood of capital punishments,) all who in her opinion hold impious doctrines with regard to any point of the Christian religion. Nor is this all, for this very work of Jewell's containing this avowal of persecution was reprinted by Bishop Randolph in 1792, and again in 1812, amongst a Collection of Tracts, Catechisms, &c., whose express object was to convey the genuine sense of the Church of England. (See the Preface to the Enchiridion Theologicum, Oxford, 1812.) And yet should we not repel it as a calumny only excusable from the utter ignorance which it implied, if a Nestorian or Polish Socinian, unacquainted with the toleration actually enjoyed in England, and the actual sentiments of its members, were to assert that the Church of England is a persecuting Church, and thinks it her duty to burn all those whom she judges to be heretics?

The Catholics, it is true, are entangled by a difficulty which we do not feel, in their tenet of the infallibility of the Church. I call it an entanglement and a difficulty, for that is the true light in which to consider it. The tenet of the infallibility of the Church does not really keep the Catholics in perpetual ignorance, but it embarrasses them in the expression of their sentiments, and gives Protestants a means of unfairly perplexing and misrepresenting them. That is to say, that such being the tenet of the Church to which he belongs, an individual Catholic does not like directly to disavow it: his habitual respect for the Church makes him inclined generally to admit her infallibility; so that when he meets with particular decisions whose truth he cannot in his own mind allow, he would rather express his disbelief practically and indirectly, than by stating it directly permit himself to be charged with the conclusion, that then he must admit the Church to be fallible. It would be rather hard to tax the mathematicians of France and Italy with believing that the earth is the centre of the solar system; yet the Jesuits

who edited Newton's Principia thought it right to declare in their Preface, that although in order to illustrate Newton's reasoning they were obliged to assume the truth of his premises, yet they did not mean to deny the doctrine of the Church, which had declared the earth to be immoveable. No one is misled by such language in this instance: and if we dealt fairly with the Catholics we should in moral and political matters also believe their practice and the general tenor of their language, although they have not renounced, and perhaps would not renounce if called upon to do so, the general tenet of the Church with which their practice and sentiments may be inconsistent. We may call this if we will inconsistency or self deceit: but a similar state of mind is very common amongst those who are not Catholics; and it is certainly unjust either to tax them with consequences which they do not acknowledge, however legitimately drawn from their premises; or to represent them as insincere and unworthy of confidence in the ordinary duties and business of life, because in one of the most intricate parts of human duty they may not have traced their path clearly and boldly. I call it one of the most intricate parts of human duty, where a man is divided between his respect for the authority, and the inability of his reason to admit what that authority has declared: where he cannot practically agree, yet the public and direct expression of disagreement would break through ties which he holds most sacred. In these circumstances, which are incident more or less to all men in their relations with societies, but most of all in their relations with their Church or religious society, it is perfectly easy to silence or perplex an adversary, but not so to convince him, and release him from his entanglement. If we wish really to remove a tenet which is certainly a great impediment to the improvement of the Roman Catholic Church, we must not appeal to it on every occasion as rendering improvement impossible and incredible: we must welcome and encourage every effort

of individuals to release themselves from it, although they cannot distinctly disavow it without separating from a Church which they reverence; and the Church itself has no means of expressing its voice, since no General Council is likely to be ever again called together.

If I were writing politically I should hardly dwell longer on this part of the subject; but viewing the restoration of Catholics to their civil rights as opening, with God's blessing, the fairest prospect of their religious improvement, and considering that the realizing or disappointment of this prospect will mainly depend upon the conduct of the Protestant clergy, I am anxious to combat the notion that the Roman Catholic Religion is unchangeable and incurable, and that our business is only to try to gain individual converts from it, not to improve it by peaceful influence judiciously exerted. Now I believe that avowed proselytism will do very little in converting individuals, whilst it will irritate the bulk of the Roman Catholic Church, will keep alive a spirit of controversy always most unfavourable to the arriving at truth, and will confirm and aggravate those obnoxious tenets which we wish to do away with. On the contrary, our object should be to lead the Catholics first to alter practically the character of their religion by dwelling chiefly on those points which they hold as Christians, and avoiding as much as possible to draw their attention to their peculiar tenets as Roman Catholics. We should try to foster that state of mind so beautifully depicted in a little work equally pious and eloquent, in which the sincere Catholic priest, who dares not in his humility renounce the communion of his Church, is represented as converted from its errors to all purposes of his soul's salvation by sinking all minor points, and dwelling entirely on the love of Christ. We should study the gradual progress of the corruptions of Popery, and observe how large a portion of them grew out of the common superstition and common vices of human nature, deepening with the deeper ignorance of the times, and

likely to be first softened and finally dispelled with the progressive brightening of Christian light. We should direct our particular attention to the band which has united these into one mass, and thus given them a greater than their natural power of evil, a longer than their natural term of existence. Then we should see that this band, I mean the doctrines of the authority of the Church, and of the Papal supremacy, was first formed by honest ignorance upon principles whose falsehood we have ourselves hardly yet discovered, was then strengthened by men of great ability and lofty views, as a powerful means of counteracting the violences and abuses of the times; and was lastly maintained as an instrument of the lowest covetousness and ambition, and was thus wearing its most odious form when it was first exposed to a general attack. The attack of the Reformation was thus vehement, for the evil which it assailed was monstrous: but this vehemence excited the angry passions to defend what the baser passions had before maintained from interest, and frightened the humble and the ignorant by denouncing as a mass of iniquity what to them amidst all its evils had still imparted some drops of the water of life. Those in authority insisted that the system was one and indivisible, because the tainted part which would otherwise have been instantly cut out, was that which they most desired to keep: those who were engaged in the controversy as usual lost sight of truth in their ardour for victory, and defended error because their opponents had attacked it; while the ignorant shrunk from the sin of heresy, and trembled at the thought of abandoning the Catholic Church of Christ. The reformers on the other hand shared on many points the mistaken views of their adversaries, and therefore combated them unskilfully. What was a departure from Christian unity, what was the Church of Christ, and how its relations with corrupt forms of civil government had rendered the language of the New Testament in some respects inapplicable

now, were questions which in the sixteenth century men were too recently awakened from a long sleep of ignorance to be able to answer. To these must be added the evils occasioned by a misunderstanding of the nature and uses of the Old Testament; and the perpetual reference to the Jewish covenant as an authority for institutions and practices among Christians. Hence the cry of idolatry so loudly raised against the Church of Rome, and the bitter intolerance with which its worship and its members were regarded. Meantime national and political animosities mingled themselves with the religious dissension, and the breach between Catholics and Protestants became decided throughout Europe. A period of peace succeeded, of external peace, but with no approximations towards union. Other objects occupied the chief place in the attention of mankind; commerce was greatly extended; the useful arts, the physical sciences, and all the branches of general literature, were assiduously cultivated. Men's minds were engrossed with the present, forgetful of its indissoluble connexion with the past and the future. In the preceding age religious controversy had been loud, and religious bigotry ferocious: it was succeeded by religious indifference; and thus the ignorance on this point remained as a single dark spot amidst the rapidly advancing light of secular knowledge. The effects of this secular knowledge, for knowledge it really was, were felt in that great convulsion from which we have lately recovered, and to whose beneficent severity we and our children to the most distant times may look back with gratitude. Evils which the Reformation was powerless to remedy have now been swept away; and never was so fair a prospect of universal improvement opened upon mankind before. One thing was wanting in the great crisis which we have witnessed; the heavenly wisdom which the Gospel gives us, purified from all the corruptions of earthly ignorance, and united in just society as the companion and directress of political

wisdom. Enlightened and benevolent statesmen[a] saw in Christianity as presented to their view, nothing but a system to maintain ignorance and iniquity: humble and devout Christians shrunk from the truest views of social improvement because they were advocated by unbelievers. It was a bitter price that we paid for the ignorance that had so long neglected to develope the principles of the Gospel, and for the baseness which had corrupted them. During the last century then, Christianity was too much neglected by the public mind throughout Europe to afford any chance of clearing it from the abuses and erroneous notions which had encumbered it. In an earlier century the political knowledge and experience, the liberal views, and the dispassionate judgment required for so great a work, had been generally wanting; now they existed, but were directed to other objects. The work still remains to be done, to apply the full lights of modern knowledge to the true developement of the principles of the Gospel as applicable to man in a state of civil society; and thus and thus only will Protestants and Catholics be brought to a true Christian union; retaining if they will their separate social existence, but co-operating cordially in their one great work, to prepare themselves by establishing God's kingdom on earth for the everlasting enjoyment of it in heaven.

Then the very corner stone of Roman Catholic intolerance, the opinion that there is no salvation out of the pale of the Church, may be stripped of all its mischief, and reduced to the simple expression of a great Scriptural truth, that God's covenanted mercies can only be pro-

[a] I allude particularly to Turgot and Malesherbes; the notes of Condorcet on Pascal's Pensées also strongly illustrate the statements in the text. In the note on the 53rd clause of the 17th Article of the "Pensées," part 2. the various evil principles and actions which have either made a part of the institutions of countries nominally Christian, or have generally existed uncondemned by the ministers of Christianity, are stated with a force and purity which one would rather expect to find in Pascal than in his commentator.

mised to such as are within the covenant; that in the ark of Christ's Church alone is certain safety, and without it all is a dark wilderness of doubt and danger. The evil of the proposition has arisen from the false opinion that Christ's redeemed people must all form one separate ecclesiastical society, when we know that God's created people are not required to form one separate civil society. Had the countries in which Christianity was first preached been as now politically unconnected with each other, the confusion never would have arisen: for then the Christians in one nation must have formed a society avowedly distinct from those in another. Spiritually indeed they would have been one society, inasmuch as they would have had the same divine Head, the same indwelling Spirit, the same hope, and the same God; but externally they would have been perfectly independent, and competent like all other societies to form their own rules and appoint their own officers. But the first Christians being accidentally members of the same political society, naturally regarded themselves as forming also only one ecclesiastical society: and as their civil sovereign resided at Rome, so they looked to the same place for their ecclesiastical head; just as the branch religious societies in our several counties are subordinate to a central and supreme society in London. That which has always happened soon comes to be considered as necessary; and therefore because the Church had in point of fact been one society, it was declared that it essentially and necessarily was so: because the head of the central society at Rome was naturally the head of all the provincial societies, it was made out that his supremacy was not accidental and temporary, but necessary and perpetual. But a perpetual and necessary head of the Church was certainly Christ's vicar: and for so great an office it might well be supposed that an extraordinary portion of Christ's Spirit would be vouchsafed to him. The conclusion indeed was reasonable; and had Christ's servants been designed to

form of necessity one society, had it been their Lord's pleasure, that that should be without the common right of all other societies, the right of self-government, and be of necessity subject to one head, it is probable that this head would have been clearly marked out for his office by possessing superior gifts and graces, just as men are thus clearly marked out for authority over children, and dominion over the brute creation. And therefore the fact, that the bishops of Rome have not possessed this perpetual superiority of goodness and wisdom, renders it probable that they were not designed to be the perpetual heads of the Church, and that Christians as such possess the same rights of self-government in ecclesiastical society, which they enjoy as men in civil society. Now Protestants have seen and allowed all this as far as the supremacy of the Pope is concerned, but by retaining themselves a portion of the original error of Popery they have found it more difficult to combat the conclusions which that error gave rise to. They shared the error of the Catholics in supposing that the Church must be one society in a sense differing from that in which all mankind are one society; and therefore in order to acquit themselves of what they called the sin of schism, in separating from the Church, they charged that Church with idolatry, that they might represent it as a greater sin to remain in communion with it. Whereas had they remembered that the members of one nation are connected as Christians with the members of another nation only in the same way that they are connected with them as men; redeemed and sanctified by the same God, as the same God also created them; with the same spiritual, as they have the same natural faculties; and aiming at one common perfection of the former as they do of the latter; with one common law of reason binding them as men, and one common law of the Spirit binding them as Christians, but left equally as Christians and as men, to form their own municipal or particular laws, and to determine that form of government

by which they may respectively judge their common objects most likely to be obtained in their own case, independence would have implied no schism, nor would they have sought to aggravate the errors of their neighbours in order to make out a just ground of quarrel, when their forming themselves into a distinct society was no breach of charity, and should have been considered as no quarrel at all.

The Roman Catholics then are right in maintaining, that out of Christ's Church there is no covenanted salvation: but they are wrong; and many Protestants share in their error, in mistaking the accidental state of the Church at its first origin for something essential to its nature: as if, because it was one society then in the strictest sense of the term, it must be in some other than a spiritual sense one society now. In that spiritual sense indeed it is ever one: but in that sense all are members of it, to how many soever subordinate forms of Christian society they may respectively belong, so long as they acknowledge the same Maker and Saviour and Sanctifier, so long as they are one with each other, not in forms and regulations, but in principle and in spirit, in the Father and in the Son. And therefore when sincere Protestants[a] would acknowledge as members of the Catholic Church of Christ those societies of Christians only which are governed by Bishops, on the ground that amongst them alone the apostolical succession is preserved, there appears a misapprehension of the true nature of a spiritual society, and a participation in the same erroneous views which have led the Romanists to exclude from *their* sense of the Catholic Church all who will not acknowledge the succession of the Popes from St. Peter the chief of the apostles.

[a] I allude to a Sermon published two or three years since, by the Rev. Walter Hook, of Christ Church, Oxford. I have the less scruple in mentioning his name, as I know him to be a sincere and zealous minister of Christ; and my belief that his views on one point are erroneous, does not interfere with my high respect for his character.

The principle which we should follow in our endeavours to purify the Roman Catholic religion, might be exemplified in numerous other instances: but it will better suit my present limits if I state once more what it is, and shew the bearing of what I have last written upon my general subject. The principle is this; that we should trace the errors of the Catholics to their origin, and should thus perceive how much of them is mere corruption, that is, error introduced for an interested or ambitious purpose; how much arises from ignorance or misconception, and what the misconception was; and, above all, how much of truth is mixed with the error, and may be extracted from it by a careful and delicate analysis. In doing this we should also observe how far Protestants have either condemned the whole of a tenet of the Romish Church, without discrimination, or themselves retain the original error which gave birth to it, and therefore contend against it on wrong grounds. We should consider that our true object is not to convert Catholics to Protestantism, but to perfect their views and our own to the full wisdom and holiness of Christianity, although we may each remain distinct societies, and retain different rites and internal regulations. We should substitute inquiry for controversy; not wishing to bring them over to our side, but that both they and we should be on the side of truth, renouncing our errors, and clearing our views when indistinct and imperfect. "Whereunto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing:" that is to say, while aspiring to more perfect knowledge, let not those who are more advanced despise their more backward brethren, but let both walk in the same rule of Christian holiness, and with the same spirit of Christian charity.

And for the application of all this to the great Question which now engrosses the whole mind of England; I wish to impress upon the Christian opponents of concession, that while I maintain the positive duty of granting the

Catholic claims as an act of simple justice, it is also with the most deliberate conviction, that thus and thus only can the spiritual improvement of our Catholic countrymen ever be effected. If Protestants will not endure to hear the language of impartiality and charity towards the Catholics, if they will only look upon them as men without truth, and without humanity, as ferocious bigots and blasphemous idolaters, do they think that the Catholics can be more favourably disposed to them, when over and above the irreligious prejudices they must entertain against them the galling sense of national and civil injustice? What Protestant missionary, however holy and eloquent, can have any chance of influencing men, who are not only daily reviled by Protestants, but actually degraded and oppressed by them; are treated as aliens in their own land, as unfit and unworthy to become citizens of their own country? They who are most zealous in their endeavours to convert the slaves in the West Indies to Christianity, are also most eager to effect their temporal deliverance: they are regarded therefore as friends, and the Gospel is doubly loved for the sake of those who offer the knowledge of it. Would the negroes listen to a mission of tyrannical overseers, who spoke to them with the whip in one hand and the Bible in the other; or to a set of plantation proprietors, who had most steadily refused to adopt every measure recommended by the government of Britain for the improvement of their temporal condition? We have a great, a solemn duty to perform towards our Irish brethren; we have connected them with ourselves, and therefore we are bound first to do them justice, and then to do them kindness: to labour at this eleventh hour to atone for the long day during which we have not only neglected to do them good, but have heaped upon them evil alike physical and moral.

The great numerical majority of the clergy of England are united against doing an act of Christian justice, and Christian wisdom: and they tax their opponents with

acting upon worldly views, and sacrificing their religion to political expediency. I will not retort by impugning the motives of those who think differently from me, nor by depreciating their understandings. I know that there are amongst them men who are not to be surpassed in holiness of life, or in vigour of natural abilities. But what they do want, and I speak it neither reproachfully nor insultingly, is acquired knowledge and impartiality. It is notorious that a large portion of them abstain habitually upon principle from the study of politics; and how can they possibly understand what they have refused to learn? And what is the ordinary education of a clergyman? The history of his own country, except in a mere abridgment, forms no part of his necessary studies either at school or at the university; still less does it generally occupy his attention when he begins to prepare himself for his own profession. Many persons certainly read much more than they are compelled to do; but not the majority; and in point of fact, I should not underrate the historical knowledge of the mass of the clergy, if I supposed them to have read Hume, perhaps with Smollett's Continuation, Clarendon, and Burnet's History of the Reformation. Of the Laws and of the progress of our Constitution of England they know but little; and of the history of the other nations of Europe, their knowledge is commonly still more limited. The *impressions* which they gain from the writers I have mentioned, for with the mass of readers the tone of an author's sentiments leaves a much deeper impression than his detail of facts, are all in favour of Toryism, or against the Catholics; and these in the present state of affairs belong to the same party, and lead to the same political conduct. Their professional studies tend to produce the same bias: their making the thirty-nine Articles the text book for a large portion of their theological reading, accustoms them to look at religion controversially; they learn what are the arguments by which the Catholics are to be combated; and the obnoxious

tenets of the Romish Church are brought before their eyes in their most offensive form, while the good parts of the system, and the causes which led to its errors, and which, although they do not make them less errors, yet would often moderate our dislike and suspicion of those who held them, are not presented to them. With this previous education, if they travel for a short time[a] on the continent of Europe, and particularly if they visit Italy, they return home with prejudices increased and ignorance unenlightened. With little knowledge of the history and literature of the countries they travel through, and with few personal acquaintances among the people to soften their feelings towards them, they catch directly at those gross exhibitions of superstition which are so common, and think that they have now a confirmation of all their former notions of the monstrous nature of Popery.

On their return home they settle mostly in country parishes, and the little time they can spare from their pastoral duties for pursuing their own studies, is naturally devoted to works on divinity. In this state of mind and

[a] A longer residence abroad might perhaps lead to a different result. I was told two years ago by an English Clergyman who has resided at Rome since the year 1814, that he settled there with a strong impression against the Roman Catholic religion, and against granting the claims of the Catholics of Ireland: that his sense of the evils and errors of the Catholic religion had become continually stronger and stronger; but his opinion with regard to the Catholic Question was wholly changed: and he was satisfied that there was no prospect of relieving Ireland from its superstitions, but by granting to the Catholics their civil rights, and so alienating them from their dependence on Rome by uniting them on equal terms to their Protestant countrymen.

In confirmation of this view of the subject, I know that some of the principal members of the Papal Government, in conversation with an individual totally unconnected with England, have expressed their apprehensions lest the Catholic claims should be granted; as the influence actually enjoyed by the Pope, in Ireland, would then be superseded in the minds of the Irish by natural feelings of attachment to their country and constitution.

with this previous education, the Catholic Question presents itself to their notice: a question involving at once the first principles of civil society; and requiring a copious knowledge of the history of the Christian Church, of the constitution and parties of England, and of the history and institutions of several of the nations of the Continent. They who have never considered great political questions, nor have examined the origin of civil society, and the rights and duties of individuals as members of it, cannot appreciate the sin of that flagrant injustice which we have offered to the Catholics of Ireland. They who know not the history of the Christian Church, are ignorant of the causes which led successively to the growth of Popery, and know not the probability of its improvement, if its nature be thoroughly understood, and a suitable plan of dealing with it be devised. They who have never studied the contests of our parties, and the vicissitudes of our government, are not aware that in their sense of the term we have no constitution at all; that we have no code in which the principles of our government were at once fully laid down, and the whole social edifice constructed according to them; but that what we call our constitution is a state of things resulting from various successive struggles, each of which had its own particular object, and led to its own particular reform. Thus the struggle which ended at the Revolution of 1688, was substantially and in principle, whether the crown or the nation as represented in Parliament should possess the effective control of our government; and all the enactments against Catholics were merely accidental, and arose partly out of the circumstance that the popular party in the last two reigns had consisted chiefly of Puritans; partly because persecution of Popery was the only point in which the Tories could sympathize with the Whigs; and they were glad by their zeal against the Catholics to compensate for their long oppression of the Protestant Dissenters; and partly because the great reliance of the two last Stuart princes

was on the support of the Catholic despotism of France. But so little are the principles of Roman Catholics necessarily adverse to civil liberty, that had the quarrels between the Guelfs and Ghibelines lasted for three centuries longer, we should have seen the Pope supporting and supported by the free Republics of Italy in a contest against the Protestant tyranny and high monarchical doctrines of the emperors of Germany. They who know the Roman Catholic religion only from the naked statement of its worst tenets as exhibited in the works of Protestant controversialists—and are ignorant of what it is and has been in practice for the last hundred and fifty years wherever it has been placed in peaceful contact with Protestantism—judge of it naturally from the tendency of its most offensive principles, supposing that all men will carry their principles into practice, and ignorant of the checks and palliatives which in actual life neutralize their virulence. Not feeling therefore the sin of national injustice, not understanding the nature of Catholicism, not acquainted with our parties and their struggles, not familiar with the actual state of the Catholic Religion in other countries, they act upon one impression only, which their education and professional studies have alike fostered, that Popery is an unchristian thing, and that nothing should be done to favour it. Influenced by this impression themselves they impart it to their parishioners, whose ignorance is more complete, and their passions more violent; and thus a clamour is raised, powerful from the numbers that join in it, and respectable from the honesty of their motives; but worth nothing in determining the merits of the Question, as the knowledge of those who raise it is so little proportioned to their zeal. I know that it savours of arrogance to claim a superiority of knowledge over those who differ from us; and the carvers among the lions would no doubt represent the matter differently. Yet the statement which I have given of the ordinary education and studies of the most active class

of our opponents is one which they themselves cannot deny; nor can it be denied, on the other hand, that all those statesmen who have most considered the Question, and whose means of information have been the fullest, have, with an unanimity unparalleled on any other public measure, agreed in their judgment, that the claims of the Catholics should be granted. The accession of the Duke of Wellington and Mr. Peel to this distinguished band has given to the argument from authority a force which admits of no further increase. The leading ministers of the country who had for many years opposed concession, have exposed themselves, without any conceivable motive but the conscientious conviction of fuller knowledge to all the vulgar odium which attaches to every change of opinion, and have offended a powerful party, whose devoted attachment they had hitherto possessed, in order to add their voice to the consenting wisdom of all our other great statesmen, and to declare that the claims of the Catholics should be opposed no longer. Here then we find the warmest opponents of the Catholics to be men whose political knowledge is from education and profession greatly defective; while on the other hand those who have united the greatest natural abilities with the fullest information are unanimous in advocating their cause. And if it be urged that it is a religious question rather than a political one, and that on points of religion no authority can be superior to that of the clergy, I will answer, that this argument is either false or inapplicable. It is false that it is a religious question, in that only sense in which the clergy could be the best judges of it; namely, if the point at issue were, whether the doctrines of the Catholic or the Protestant Church were most agreeable to Scripture. A religious question indeed it is in another sense, inasmuch as every question of practice concerns our religious duty to God, and every act of injustice, every stumbling-block that is thrown in the way of our neighbour's spiritual improvement, is a sin for which we must

answer at God's judgment seat. But in the discernment of our duties as members of civil societies, the clergy assuredly are not the best judges; because the origin, rights, and successive revolutions of civil societies they avowedly neglect to study.

In the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to treat the Question as a religious one; to urge the granting of the Catholic claims as in itself a necessary act of Christian justice, and as the only means by which we may be enabled to perform to our Irish brethren hereafter our bounden duty of Christian charity, in advancing their physical, moral, and spiritual good. I have never forgotten that I am a Christian minister myself, and that those whose attention to my arguments I most wish to gain, are Christian ministers also. Earnestly, solemnly, would I entreat them to believe, that my love for our common faith is not less than theirs, and my desire to promote the kingdom of our common Master not less sincere; that the principles which I have maintained I believe to be those of Christ's Gospel, and that certainly the more often and attentively I have studied that Gospel, I have been the more fully satisfied of their truth.

POSTSCRIPT.

SINCE the foregoing pages were written, I have been informed that some Letters written by Mr. Faber, and published in the St. James's Chronicle, are considered by many persons to contain arguments against concession to the Catholics, which on religious grounds are unanswerable. I had seen the second of these Letters before, and it had not seemed to me to deserve any particular attention; I was besides unwilling to enter into controversy with an individual, for whose character as a Christian I had been accustomed to feel much respect. But as others, it appears, judge differently of Mr. Faber's reasoning, I would request their candid attention to the following attempt to reply to it.

Mr. Faber's views of the Catholic Question and mine differ at the very outset. He throws aside the argument from right as "a palpable folly," "because no individual possesses any abstract right to the possession of political power." And having thus decided that no man can urge concession to the Catholic claims as a point of duty, he considers that it can only be defended by arguments drawn from expediency, and from terror; meaning by expediency that same motive which is in private life called self-interest; and by terror, the feeling that weakly shrinks from difficulty and danger. He thus denies that any man can advocate the Catholic claims on the grounds of Christian principle, and using the terms "expediency and terror" in a sense which makes them synonymous with two of the very basest of human motives, he fastens a severe and uncandid imputation upon those who differ from him.

I on the contrary maintain, that the argument from right is perfectly decisive of the whole Question; because nations, and societies of men large and varied enough in their elements to form distinct nations, have an eternal right to possess political power over themselves; and if they unite with other societies, it follows that as each when separate had a right to the *whole* government of *itself*, so each when united has a right to *a share* of the government of *itself and its associate.*

I further maintain, that the argument from charity, or a regard to the general welfare of the society to which we belong, is no less decisive than the argument from right; that the welfare of this whole nation both temporal and spiritual will be highly advanced by the removal of a perpetual cause of discord between two important parts of it, and the consequent growth of "peace and happiness, religion and piety," as the natural fruits of an act founded on "truth and justice." And this argument from charity is in all national questions of internal policy another name for the argument from expediency. For where no foreign nation is concerned, the welfare of his country, or what is most expedient for the good of that country, is to a statesman precisely the object which as a member of it he is most bound to promote; and to aim at which is not selfishness, but comprehensive charity.

I maintain thirdly, that the dread of occasioning physical and moral evil to others, especially when we ourselves shall partake perhaps of the moral evil, but are not likely to be affected by the physical, is a most honourable and Christian terror; and that he who is without it is in a degraded state both intellectually and morally. And the terror of provoking a civil war in Ireland, the terror of sweeping slaughter, conflagration, massacres, and executions; the terror of letting loose without restraint all the worst passions of human nature, while they themselves would be living in peace, and would be certain of political victory without incurring any personal risk or suffering,

this is the terror which the legislators and ministers of England are reproached with, as if it were no other than the low and unworthy fear which shrinks from danger.

So much then for what Mr. Faber calls "the palpable folly" of the argument from right; and so much for his assertion that "the argument from expediency involves in its very nature a total disregard to moral honesty, if such moral honesty stand in the way of fancied convenience:" and "the argument from terror avowedly reposes on a disgraceful confession of the most degrading moral cowardice."

But having thus disposed of these arguments *for* concession, he proceeds to bring forward what he considers a decisive argument *against* it; namely, the argument from "religious responsibility." Of this, he says, he has never heard the slightest mention; but, on the contrary, "he has sometimes noted the objection that the question is purely political, and that it has no concern with religion." Now I agree so far with Mr. Faber, that I think we do hear too little "mention of our religious responsibility;" that is, that we are not enough accustomed to consider ourselves responsible to God for all our actions whether in private life or in public: and liable to his judgment alike for national and political as for individual injustice, when we make it our own act by instigating it, or trying to prevent its removal. In this sense therefore I think that the Catholic Question has a great deal to do with religion. But if those who say that it has no concern with religion mean, as Mr. Faber must know that they do mean, that in doing justice to our neighbour the consideration of his religious belief is wholly foreign to the question; and that a judge who were to make a lawsuit between a Catholic and a Protestant a religious question in Mr. Faber's sense of the term, and were to regard not the merits of the case but the religious belief of the parties, would not be more "religiously responsible"

for his unjust judgment, than the government which should decide a dispute between a Catholic and a Protestant people on these same grounds, then they mean no more than is perfectly true, and Mr. Faber has said nothing that can shake their statement.

Let us see however what his arguments *against* concession from "religious responsibility" is built upon. The members of both Houses of Parliament before they take their seats make an oath, in which is contained the following clause. "I do believe that the invocation or adoration of the Virgin Mary, or any other saint, and the sacrifice of the Mass, as they are now used in the Church of Rome, are *superstitious and idolatrous*." Therefore, says Mr. Faber, every Member of both Houses has sworn that he believes Popery to be idolatry: and to vote therefore "for a national union with the Romanists" is to vote "for a national union with those whom he has declared to be idolaters;" that is to say, it is to vote "for the perfect engraftation of idolatry" upon what Mr. Faber and others "have fondly deemed their exclusively Protestant constitution." And in order to extend this argument to those who are not members of the Legislature, he reminds all persons who have subscribed to the thirty-nine Articles, that is, all the clergy and all graduates at both universities, that "our national Church in her accredited Homilies (Homilies recognised in her Articles) has pronounced Popery to be idolatry."

I believe I have stated Mr. Faber's argument fully and fairly. Now although I have subscribed the Articles, in which the Homilies are recognised, yet I do not feel myself at all bound to think or to call the Roman Catholic religion "idolatry," in Mr. Faber's meaning of the term; nor should I feel myself bound to do so, if I had taken the oath imposed on all Members of Parliament. And if I did believe that Popery was idolatry, I should no less think that concession to the claims of the Roman

Catholics of Ireland was, in our circumstances, a positive Christian duty. These several statements I am now to endeavour to justify.

I have subscribed to the thirty-fifth Article of the Church of England, which declares, that "the second book of Homilies doth contain a godly and wholesome doctrine, and necessary for *these* times, as doth the former book of Homilies:" "and therefore," it proceeds, "we judge them to be read in churches by the ministers, diligently and distinctly, that they may be understanded of the people." In saying that a book "doth contain a godly and wholesome doctrine," do I pledge myself to maintain the justice of the exact degree of condemnation which it attaches to those who hold the opposite doctrine? nay, do I even pledge my assent to all the doctrine which it may itself contain? The Homilies do "contain a godly and Christian doctrine," for they contain the doctrines of the Gospel, and their predominant character is according to that Gospel. But may these doctrines never be stated with some exaggeration, and may they not be accompanied with too fierce a tone of condemnation against those who differ from them? Jewell's Apology contains a "godly and Christian doctrine," but do I, by saying this, pledge my approbation or assent to that passage which I have already extracted, in which he declares that the Church of England detests all whom it considers heretics, to the gates of hell, and punishes them by the secular arm wherever it can find them? Nay, with regard to the Homilies, I conceive, that the omission of the Bishops for many years past to enforce "the diligent reading of them in the churches" expresses their belief as well as that of the majority of the clergy, that although they were necessary for the times to which the epithet "*these*" was applicable when the Article was written, yet that the word "*these*" has not a perpetually varying application, so as to signify all times from the sixteenth century downwards. And for those who extol the Revolution of

1688 with a claim of such exclusive attachment to it, do they conceive themselves bound to admit all the doctrines of the "Homily against Rebellion?"

"But the Members of both Houses of Parliament have sworn that they believe Popery to be idolatry." They have sworn no such thing, but simply, "that the invocation or adoration of the Virgin Mary, or any other saint, and the sacrifice of the Mass, as they are now used in the Church of Rome, are superstitious and idolatrous." The *adoration* of any creature, that is to say, the putting any created being in the place of God, and worshipping him as the Author of spiritual good, would certainly be idolatry; but this adoration the Roman Catholic Church disclaims as earnestly as we do. "D. Peut on adorer les anges et les saints? R. Non, on ne peut adorer que Dieu seul; mais nous honorons et nous invoquons les anges et les saints comme les amis et les serviteurs de Dieu. D. Adorons nous les Tres-Sainte Vierge? R. Non il n'est pas plus permis d'adorer la Tres-Sainte Vierge que les autres saints; mais nous l'honorons d'une manière plus particulière que les saints et les anges." *Catechisme imprimé par Ordre de son Excellence Monseigneur l'Archevêque de Rheims, pour l'usage de son Diocèse. Rheims*, 1822. *p.* 112, 113. The *invocation* of creatures after they have departed from this world and no longer stand to us in any human relation, is so apt to border upon worship, and as it is now used in the more ignorant Roman Catholic countries, so often becomes worship, that it may justly be termed *in practice*, that is, *as it is now used in the Church of Rome*, superstitious and idolatrous. In practice it is idolatrous: but does it therefore follow that the whole Roman Catholic religion is to be branded as idolatry, that is, as an apostacy from the worship of God and the substitution of some creature or creatures in the place of God, because one of its doctrines is superstitious and of dangerous consequence, and leads amongst the ignorant to idolatrous practice, not necessarily or designedly, but

from its exceeding liability to abuse? If Popery be idolatry, it is not a true religion grievously corrupted, but a false religion altogether: nay it is worse than Mohammedanism, for even Mohammedans worship one eternal, invisible, and spiritual God, the Maker and Preserver of all things visible and invisible. Now if this has been the language of some individuals in the Church of England, it has certainly not been the general sense of her members: they have held that the Church of Rome was a true Church, although grievously corrupted; that the Church of Rome "has erred," to use the language of the nineteenth Article, "in matters of faith," like the Churches of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch; but that it has not therefore wholly forfeited the character of a Christian Church, any more than they. I need hardly remind my readers of the sentiments of Hooker, which exposed him indeed to the censures of the Puritans of those days, that the Church of Rome is a Christian Church, and holds the foundation of Christian faith, although some of her doctrines deny that foundation by consequence. Such in my judgment is the true construction of the clause in the oath taken by members of the Legislature; they swear that they believe one of her doctrines to be in practice idolatrous, not that her whole system is idolatry.

But now admitting, for the sake of argument, that Popery is idolatry in Mr. Faber's sense of the term, still his conclusion, that the Catholic Claims cannot be granted without sin, would not follow from this admission. Indeed the conclusion in his two first Letters is throughout assumed, without even an attempt to prove it; and it is only in his third Letter, when some friend had reminded him of this omission, that he endeavours to make out his case. He first of all appeals to the Old Testament, "in which an union of *any* description with idolatry is clearly forbidden to the Israelites, on the broad and general ground, that such union would infallibly seduce the people into the practices of their associates;" and "the ground

of this prohibition," he thinks, "is of universal application;" but as "it may be captiously said" that the case of the Israelites is peculiar, he forbears to press this argument, and "turns forthwith to the New Testament."

If I wished to avoid replying to any part of Mr. Faber's statement, I might content myself with observing, that the argument from the Old Testament is one which he does not himself press, although he still asserts that "it is of universal application." But his admirers will perhaps believe his assertion, although he does not urge the proof of it; and if they are candid, I ought not to leave them in error without attempting to lead them out of it. Now amongst the Jews, idolatry was a capital crime; and every one who was guilty of it was forthwith to be put to death. This was also ordered on the general principle, lest the Israelites should be seduced by evil example. Would Mr. Faber recommend this method of settling the Catholic Question, by a general massacre of all those whom he calls idolaters, after the example of Elijah and Jehu? The Israelites were told that the practice of idolatrous rites defiled the land, and union therefore was out of the question with those who were not even allowed to live. So that on this principle we should renew the scenes of 1780; burn all the Roman Catholic Chapels, and do as the mob then gladly would have done, put to death those who worship in them. We are already polluted, according to the Jewish law; and if I may without seeming irreverence state the conclusions to which Mr. Faber's reasoning leads, the curse of God can only be avoided by the perpetration of the most atrocious acts of persecution and murder.

The truth is, that the principles of the Old Testament are eternal, but the application of them wholly different under the Jewish and under the Christian dispensation. When we read the 109th Psalm in our Service, the application of the wishes of evil there contained must be wholly spiritual, otherwise our very prayer will be turned into sin.

Our "enemies" (v. 19.) are sin and Satan: for men, however sinful, are not to be so regarded by us, till Christ the Saviour shall come as Christ the Judge. Till that great day the most wicked man alive is our brother; and for him as well as for us Christ has died. Christians indeed when formed into commonwealths may use the sword as the ministers of God's moral government; that is, they may punish crimes against society which heathen governments may punish also: for the sword is committed to them not as Christians but as men. But Christ's spiritual government has no sword, and the arms which they may use as Christians are wholly spiritual. And as idolatry is a spiritual crime, it may be opposed by us only with spiritual weapons; the penalties and restraints which we may use as men against moral offenders, we may not apply as Christians against spiritual offenders without presumption. "The Son of Man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save."

I must now follow Mr. Faber to his argument from the New Testament: which is grounded, as one might have supposed, on the command of the Revelation to flee out of Babylon. Here he first assumes that Babylon means "a principle *or* a community manifestly idolatrous," that is, idolatrous in the literal sense, as worshipping others than God. Now in order to fix the interpretation of the commandment to "come out of Babylon," it makes some difference whether Babylon signifies a principle *or* a community; because if it means the former, the "coming out of her" must signify "*withdrawing ourselves from idolatrous principles:*" a duty certainly which no Christian ever disputed. But let it signify a community, and let the "coming out" be taken as a command to have no intercourse with such a community, because, as Mr. Faber says, "no penal plague or excision can descend upon the heads of the idolaters, which must not inevitably descend also upon the heads of the non-idolaters, their closely intimate and voluntary associates." That is, when idol-

aters and non-idolaters live in the same country, the visitations of war, pestilence, and famine cannot fall on the one without involving the other in their suffering. The conclusion from which is, that we should either separate locally from the Roman Catholics, or make them separate from us. Does Mr. Faber mean to recommend that we should migrate to America, or that we should adopt the milder alternative of the curse of Cromwell, and shut up all the English and Irish Catholics together, in Connaught? Or, to speak seriously, does he forget that we are nationally and politically associated with these idolaters already? that the Irish Catholics are already our countrymen, that they serve in our armies, man our fleets, practise in our courts of law, and pay taxes to our government? On his principle we should instantly banish them from amongst us: their presence must entail defeat on our armies, and shipwreck on our fleets; and their money certainly must be an accursed thing, which will bring down a judgment on us if we receive it. If this be his meaning, it would at least be honest. But to receive benefits from the society of idolaters, and yet to exclaim against the pollution of it; to get all we can from living with them, and only scruple about giving them any thing in return; is something like the piety of Saul, who destroyed utterly all that was vile and refuse of the spoil of the Amalekites, but spared the best of the oxen, and of the sheep, to sacrifice unto the Lord his God in Gilgal, —to keep up Protestant ascendancy.

Such are my answers to Mr. Faber's premises and his conclusion, so far indeed as I can make out what his conclusion is meant to be. My conclusion also shall be grounded on a precept in the New Testament, which, on the supposition that Catholics were idolaters, would be more to the purpose than the quotation about coming out of Babylon. We are united actually in civil society with Catholics, and the question is, how we are to deal with them? Now St. Paul directs, that where Christians were

married to unbelievers, that is, to idolaters, the Christian husband or wife should not propose to quit his or her unbelieving partner. "What knowest thou," is his truly Christian question, "whether thou shalt save thy wife or thy husband?" whether if you continue to live on affectionately with them, you may not be the means of converting them. But the parties thus continuing to live together, the terms of their union were settled not by their religious faith, but on principles of civil and social justice. The heathen husband must have had authority over his Christian wife, and must have had the supreme control over the education of his children; because natural and civil law declared that such were his rights as a man and as a citizen. So also should we be anxious to live on in peace with the Irish Catholics, as we are actually their countrymen. But this being so, our respective political rights must be decided on the universal principles of social and political justice, and not from the spiritual superiority which one party may possess over the other. Religion is not injured by our giving idolaters their rights as men and as citizens, but by our forgetting our own duty in either joining with them spiritually, or oppressing them politically.

I had purposed to make some comment upon the tone of Mr. Faber's Letters, and on the assumption which runs through them, that the advocates of concession to the Catholics are men who care little for religion. But instead of doing so, I have thought it better to look over my own answer, and carefully to erase every thing which might appear to be unkind or insulting in tone and expression there. Evil passions are never more apt to arise within us than when we are engaged in what we sincerely believe to be our duty; it shews strongly our corrupted nature, that it is so hard to keep our motives and feelings pure, even when our work is a good one.

Mr. Faber's opinions I think to be erroneous and mis-

chievous; and as such I have done my best to answer him. Whatever he may think of the force of the answer, I trust that he will allow my sentiments to be as consistent with a sincere affection for Christianity as his own: and that a man may advocate the Catholic claims with other arguments than those founded on his interests or his fears.

ON THE

SOCIAL PROGRESS OF STATES.

[ON THE

SOCIAL PROGRESS OF STATES[a].]

Thucyd. I. 13. *Τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο, τῶν προσόδων μειζόνων γιγνομένων· πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι.*

Of the natural periods or divisions in the history of nations.

THE change described in these words is so important, and bears so much on the right understanding of the history, not only of Greece, but of all other nations, that I have thought it deserving of a fuller consideration than it could receive in a note. Its importance consists in this, that it is a natural period in history, marking the transition of every country from what I may call a state of childhood to manhood. Now states, like individuals, go through certain changes in a certain order, and are subject at different stages of their course to certain peculiar disorders. But they differ from individuals in this, that though the order of the periods is regular, their duration is not so; and their features are more liable to be mistaken, as they can only be distinguished by the presence of their characteristic phenomena. One state may have existed a thousand years, and its history may be full of striking events, and yet it may be still in its childhood: another may not be a century old, and its history may contain nothing remarkable to a careless reader, and yet it may be verging to old age. The knowledge of these periods furnishes us with a clue to the study of history, which the continuous succession of events related in chronological order seems particularly to re-

[a] First Appendix to the first volume of the Edition of Thucydides, 1830.

quire. For instance, in our own history we are apt to take certain artificial divisions, such as the accession of the different lines of kings, or an event like the restoration, which is rather a subdivision of one particular period, than the beginning or termination of a period in itself. And in this manner we get no distinct notions of the beginning, middle, and end of the history of a people, and often appeal to examples which are nothing to the purpose, because they are taken from a different stage of a nation's existence from that to which they are applied.

I take then the words which I have quoted at the beginning of this essay, and shall proceed to notice the critical period described in them, the period, namely, when wealth begins to possess the ascendancy formerly enjoyed by nobility; and the contending parties in the state assume the form of rich and poor, the few and the many, instead of the old distinction of nobles and commons, of a conquering race and a conquered.

One of these periods here to be noticed. The transition from the ascendancy of birth to that of property.

This ascendancy, enjoyed in the earliest state of society by noble birth, has been traced in various countries, and its phenomena most successfully investigated by Giovanni Battista Vico[a] in his *Principi di Scienza nuova;* a work disfigured indeed by some strange extravagancies, but in its substance so profound and so striking, that the little celebrity which it has obtained out of Italy is one of the most remarkable facts in literary history. Vico's work was published in 1725, yet I scarcely remember ever to have seen it noticed by any subsequent writers who have touched upon the same subject even down to our own times.

This subject ably treated by Giov. Battista Vico, in his *Principi di Scienza nuova.*

[a] I mention Vico, particularly, because his work is not generally known. My obligations to the great writers of Germany, to Niebuhr, Müller, Wachsmuth, &c., it is almost unnecessary to mention, as, since the publication of their works, it would imply strange presumption or strange ignorance to write upon ancient history without having studied them.

The statement of Thucydides with respect to Greece, contains, it may be seen, no mention of any period of aristocratical government; but describes the transition as taking place from limited hereditary monarchies to tyrannies: it may appear therefore to a superficial observer that nobility enjoyed no such ascendancy as I have imagined, and that the very first case to which I apply my theorem disproves its truth. But the old Homeric monarchies were in fact an instance of power depending on blood, and therefore of the ascendancy of nobility. They were like the feudal monarchies of modern Europe, essentially aristocracies, in which the separation of all the chiefs or nobles from the inferior people was far more strongly marked than the elevation of the king above his nobles. Nay, if we consider Greece as a whole, and remember the small space included within the limits of the several kingdoms in the heroic ages, the kings, as they are called, resemble the feudal vassals of France and Germany, each supreme over a dominion as extensive as the Greek kingdoms, and forming together a body widely separated from the commons, and whose members were felt to belong to the same class, and to be on a level with each other in purity of blood, however great might have been the differences between them in power and connexions. It was virtually then the ascendancy of nobility, when all power and distinction were confined to the class of nobles, whether there was one individual elevated above the rest of his class with still higher power and distinction, or whether all the members of it exercised the sovereignty jointly and alternately. So in other countries the same state of society has varied more or less in its subordinate relations, and yet, if carefully examined, will be found everywhere to retain its essential character, and to mark the first period, or youth, of political existence. Some of these varieties it may not

The heroic monarchies in Greece were instances of the ascendancy of nobility.

It existed generally in other countries, though under subordinate varieties of form.

be uninstructive to notice, and to trace the causes which have led to them. The simplest and probably the earliest form was that in which the offices of chief and priest were united in the same persons, as in the heroic times in Greece, and in the well known instance of Melchisedek, king of Salem, at a far more remote period. This is the first transition from domestic or patriarchal to something like civil society; and if the several sons of a patriarch established themselves in separate habitations, they would each become the chiefs and priests of their immediate followers. But in the course of a few generations, if the united body of these little societies happened to settle in another country, and the dangers of their new situation forced them to choose some one chief for their common leader, yet still the other chiefs would remain as widely distinguished as before from the mass of the people, and would still retain their sacred and sovereign character, although its exercise was limited to their own particular tribe, and somewhat obscured by the greater elevation of the king of the whole nation. Nay, even when the posterity of these original nobles was so multiplied that many of them were necessarily excluded from an active share in the government, still they did not lose the distinction of their birth: they were naturally eligible to public offices, to priesthoods, and to commands in war, if they did not actually enjoy them; and their equality was maintained by their right of meeting in a general assembly, to control, if need were, those of their body to whom the executive authority had been delegated, and by being exempt from any judicial sentence of the greater chiefs, or kings, unless the free voices of their own equals, or peers, had first declared them guilty. This first form of aristocracy, in which civil and military command were united with the office of priest, existed, besides the instances already noticed, in Rome and in Etruria; in the former along with the habitual appointment of a king; in

1st form—where the offices of priest and chief were united in the same persons.

the latter, the purely aristocratic form generally prevailed, and a king, or chief of the whole nation, was only chosen in seasons of peculiar difficulty.

2d form—where the offices of priest and chief were distinct.

Another and later form of the ancient aristocracies was that in which the offices of priest and chief were distinct from one another, as in India, in Persia, in Egypt, in ancient Gaul, and in the feudal kingdoms of modern Europe. The origin of this separation of powers, was probably various. In some instances it may have been produced by the invasion of a ruder people, who while they took to themselves the possession of the land and the civil and military government, yet learned to respect the superior knowledge of the old inhabitants, and left to their chiefs the dignity and influence of the priesthood, while they deprived them of their actual power as rulers and leaders in war. This was the case in the foundation of the modern feudal kingdoms: the Gaulish or Roman clergy[a] preserved and increased their rank and influence under the Frank invaders, while the property of the soil, the sceptre, and the sword, were transferred almost entirely to the conquerors. Thus also the Median magi continued to enjoy their religious preeminence and immunities under the Persian kings, while all other classes of the Median nation were shorn of their supremacy, and held an inferior rank under the Persians. In other cases the separation of the two powers arose from the character of the national religion. In a rude people, religion, unless supported by the art of its ministers, holds but a low place in public estimation: he who was chief and priest would value himself upon the former character much more than upon the latter: his priestly duties would be in time devolved upon persons of an inferior class[b], to

Its various origin: —1st, from the conquest of a ruder people.

2nd, from the low character of the religion and the barbarism of the people.

[a] See Hallam, Middle Ages, vol. i. p. 146, ed. 8vo. Thierry, Conquête de l'Angleterre par les Normands, tome i. p. 32, &c.

[b] As in the story of the Potitii of Rome, whose family was supposed to have become extinct as a punishment for their profane-

spare himself the trouble of performing them; or, if retained, would be used as mere engines of state craft for the maintenance of his own civil superiority. Thus among the ancient Scythians we read of no priests at all; that is, the chiefs either performed the sacrifices themselves, or devolved them, as a menial duty, upon their servants: among the Anglo-Saxons there were priests, but as they formed no order in the state, as they were not allowed to carry arms, or to ride but on a mare, it should seem that they were only an inferior class, the mere ministers at the sacrifices, on whom the chiefs had thrown the performance of a duty which they disdained to execute themselves. The existence of prophets among both the Scythians and Saxons, as of certain prophetic families among the ancient Greeks, must not be mistaken for a priesthood. The priestly and prophetic character were not necessarily connected with one another; and the latter was not like the former held to be communicable only by descent. Besides, that impatience to penetrate into futurity, which has in every age and country encouraged pretensions to prophecy, is quite distinct from those feelings of reverence and devotion which are the salt of religion even in its worst corruptions. Prophets or fortune-tellers might exist among a people too brutish to have any conceptions of religion, as they have peculiarly marked the lowest tribes of negroes, and the degraded race of the gypsies. In these instances, then, the separation of the offices of priest and chief would arise from the rudeness of the people, and the want of any external or internal recommendations in the religion itself. But the more common form of separation arose from the very opposite cause. In proportion as religion was valued; as its ceremonies were more imposing; as the necessity of fixing the period of its festivals led to the study of astronomy; and as men's minds, thus saved from

3rd, From the higher character of the religion, and the great veneration paid to it.

ness in devolving their hereditary priesthood upon public slaves. Livy, i. 7.

sinking into barbarism, retained the traditions of older times, and preserved in their devotions something more worthy of Him who is the true object of all worship; so would the priest-chiefs of the people esteem their priesthood above their civil and military authority, and would especially prefer their peaceful and sacred duties to the exercises and combats of arms. Hence, whilst they ministered at the temples of the gods, presided at festivals, and perhaps awarded punishments and settled differences between man and man, as the representatives of the gods, they appointed persons less distinguished and less sacred to lead out the people to battle[a], and sometimes would fix upon some warlike stranger, whose adventures in arms had spread his renown, and who, living by his sword, was ready to offer his services to any who could hold out a worthy recompense. Military command thus conferred was sure to become ere long political sovereignty; but the king thus raised could not venture to invade the old privileges, or diminish the ancient dignity of the priestly order; the priests still remained the highest class in the state[b], and the military leaders and soldiers, who received for their services grants of land from the sovereign, on the tenure of joining his standard whenever he should summon

[a] It appears that one of the principal reasons which made the Israelites change their earlier government into a monarchy, was a wish that the leader of their armies should be the first man in the state, and not, as had been hitherto the case, subordinate to the religious authorities. For although Samuel was not a priest, yet still in his government the religious character predominated over the civil and military, as was naturally the case where the religion was so pure and elevated in its principles as amongst the Israelites.

[b] As in India, Egypt, Gaul, and Attica. The military caste in Egypt held their lands from the sovereign. (Compare Herodot. ii. 168, and Genesis xlvii. 20—22.) In Attica the Eupatridæ and Geomori corresponded to the priests and military class of Egypt; whereas in the colonies which were founded when society was more advanced, and when the distinctions of blood had yielded to those of property, the Geomori, or military landowners, formed the first and most aristocratical class. Compare Herodot. vii. 155. Thucyd. viii. 21.

them, and who thus became the founders of a new nobility, inseparably connected with territorial property, held notwithstanding only the second rank. Still, however, so general was the aristocratical spirit in early times, the territorial nobility adopted the feelings and institutions of the earlier priest-nobles in their earnestness to preserve their blood pure from any mixture with the classes below them; intermarriages were forbidden, and the mass of the community were as carefully excluded by the military nobles from all civil and military power, as they were by the priesthood from all religious authority, and from the knowledge of which the priestly order were then the sole possessors.

3rd form. Aristocracy of conquest where the conquerors become noble in relation to the conquered.

A third form of aristocracy, later perhaps than either of the two already noticed, retained some of their features, while in other points it resembled the most recent form of all, the aristocracy of colonies. The third form then I may call, by way of distinction, the aristocracy of conquest. An invading people occupies the country of a people of a different race: the old inhabitants either seek a refuge elsewhere, or are reduced to a state of vassalage; nor does even their religion survive the common wreck. The conquerors introduce their own institutions, differing in their internal relations according to the circumstances of their previous condition, but establishing always one and the same relation between them and their subjects, the relation of nobility and commonalty[a]. Inferior leaders, or even common soldiers of distinguished bravery, in the conquering army, acquired lands, and became territorial nobles with respect to the conquered people; while, on

[a] This was the case with the Dorians in Peloponnesus after the conquest, as also with the Normans in England. "Les valets de l'homme d'armes Normand, son écuyer, son porte-lance, furent gentilshommes; ils furent des hommes nobles et considerables auprès du Saxon autrefois riche, autrefois noble lui-mème, maintenant courbé sons l'épée de l'étranger," &c. Thierry, tome i. p. 343.

the other hand, the common interest and common dangers of the invaders drew them all more closely together, and diminished or destroyed those distinctions of rank which might have existed between them in their former country. A nobility of race succeeds to that of family; and is guarded from corruption by the same restrictions upon intermarriage with persons not noble, that is to say, not of the conquering people. It will be observed that in all these cases the ascendancy of blood is still the prevailing principle, insomuch that even when partially interrupted, in one case by the admission of a military leader and his followers to share the sovereignty of the priest-nobles, and in the other by the circumstances of the conquest naturally impairing all artificial distinctions between the conquerors themselves, still it soon recovered its force, and proved only to have formed for itself a new channel, in which it continued to flow with even an increase of strength and rapidity. In fact, nobility having taken property not so much into its alliance as into its service, strengthening itself with the real power of wealth, yet making noble descent a necessary qualification, without which political power was unattainable, established itself on a firmer basis, and opposed a barrier to the advance of popular principles which long delayed their triumph, and rendered it in the end incomplete.

The ascendancy of blood was sometimes just and natural in its origin, but was continued after it had ceased to be so.

The ascendancy thus enjoyed by noble blood was not merely the fruit of the natural respect which men feel for the sons, and even for the descendants, of those who have been illustrious in their generation. Two other powerful causes contributed to it; the one, a real superiority of military prowess or wisdom, such as at this day distinguishes the European from the Hottentots or the natives of New South Wales, and which has ever accompanied certain races of mankind as compared with others; the other may be found in the doctrines of a false religion, which, having first made to itself gods of men, taught, as a consequence of this doc-

trine, that the posterity of the men thus deified were themselves of a higher order than the bulk of mankind, and were more valued and loved by the god who in his mortal state had been their progenitor. Of these two causes, the one was wholly founded on falsehood; the other rested on what was true once, but it was a truth not eternal and necessary, but temporary and contingent; a truth the term of whose existence it became those who profited by it to do their best to abridge. Differences of race have not yet been proved indestructible, and the probability is that they might be removed or infinitely lessened, if the members of the superior race shewed half as much eagerness in elevating and enlightening the inferior, as they have generally done in degrading them. But the guilt of all aristocracies has consisted not so much in their original acquisition of power, as in their perseverance in retaining it: so that what was innocent or even reasonable at the beginning, has become in later times atrocious injustice; as if a parent in his dotage should claim the same authority over his son in the vigour of manhood, which formerly in the maturity of his own faculties he had exercised naturally and profitably over the infancy of his child.

The principle then of the ascendancy of noble blood necessarily marks the infancy of mankind; and wherever it has long continued to exist, it marks a state of infancy unnaturally prolonged by the selfish policy or criminal neglect of those who ought rather to have gradually trained it up to the independence of manhood. I now proceed to examine the course of circumstances by which this aristocratical dominion has been overthrown; by what untoward causes the critical periods of this overthrow have in many instances only led to a worse and more hopeless disorder; and how, in other cases, the purposes of God for the progress of the human race have been better answered, and the moral and political constitution, when recovered from the shock of its crisis, has gone on healthfully towards the full perfection

How this ascendancy has been overthrown. Of the origin of the COMMONS.

of its being. For this purpose then it will be necessary to trace the origin and progress of the estate of the COMMONS, noticing particularly those causes which influenced its condition, and which served in some cases to ensure and complete its victory, or in others impeded its natural growth, and have kept it in a state of perpetual insignificance.

1st form—where the commons were the slaves of the nobles.

The earliest form of the existence of the commons appears to be that in which they were no other than the slaves of the chiefs or nobles. This form appears in the numerous households of the heads of the pastoral tribes, almost before any thing deserving the name of a state was to be met with. At a much later period it prevailed in Parthia[a], and has been one of the characteristics of the Sclavonic nations in modern Europe. It naturally marks the infancy of society when the inferior occupations of life and all common trades were followed exclusively by slaves or by foreigners[b]; and by the former probably somewhat earlier than by the latter. The chiefs of a tribe, whether they were one or many, fixed their dwelling on the tops of isolated hills, or where a high table land terminated abruptly in precipitous cliffs: here they made their followers construct walls for their defence, and within this fortified precinct they lived with their families and their personal attendants, and here also they made a place of worship for the gods of their fathers. Below, at the foot of the hill, rose the dwellings of the rest of their dependents, the keepers of their flocks and herds, or the cultivators of their lands, who for their own security were glad to live under the protection of the castle of their chief. If several of these little tribes united to form one people, they would sometimes occupy a spot where several eminences were to be found, near to each other, yet distinct; and each of

[a] Justin. xli. 2.

[b] Παρ' ἐνίοις ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάνασσον ἢ ξενικόν. Aristotle, Politics, iii. 3.

these would form a separate κώμη, or village, appropriated to a separate tribe, while altogether composed the city of the united people. Sparta[a] was an instance of a city thus formed out of a cluster of distinct villages; and, according to some opinions, Rome was another. But in general the original city consisted properly of one fortified enclosure, on commanding ground, which contained the habitations of the chiefs and their immediate dependents, with the temples of their hereditary gods; while the dwellings of the rest of their dependents were built without the walls[b], either at the foot of the hill, or scattered over the surrounding country. And these men, not living in the town but around about it, not citizens but dependents, were the orignal περίοικοι of Grecian History. Their numbers in process of time increased, and their own condition improved. Their numbers increased by the number of strangers, who, in a rude and unsettled state of society, were constantly driven from their homes to seek a refuge elsewhere; the slaves or followers of another chief, who hoped to find an easier service; adventurers attracted by the military fame of the tribe to which they desired to join themselves; and men with blood on their hands, flying from the vengeance of the family of him whom they had slain. Persons of the last class, as being often of noble blood in their own tribe or country, were received as citi-

[a] See Thucyd. i. 10, and the note.

[b] This on a larger scale seems to have been the plan of some of the great eastern capitals. What was properly called the city of Ecbatana consisted of seven concentric fortified enclosures, the external circle being about the size of Athens; but all these were only the residence of the king, and apparently of the higher castes, the magi and principal warriors: the mass of the population lived without the walls. See Herodot. i. 98, 99. So in Babylon, the great external walls enclosed a district rather than a city, but within these were two smaller fortified enclosures, the tower of Belus, and the royal quarter or precinct of the court, which, as far as we can judge from the existing remains of it, extended along the Euphrates for about two miles. (See Mr. Rich's Memoir, in which the Mujelibé seems to answer to the βασιλήϊα of Herodotus, i. 181.)

zens in their new home[a]: but fugitives of the other two descriptions swelled the number of the περίοικοι, or commons. Sometimes also a whole people expelled from their own country, or led by some other cause to seek a new abode, solicited an asylum amongst the inhabitants of another city. They were admitted to dwell with them, (σύνοικοι ἐγένοντο,) like the Israelites of Egypt, and the Pelasgians in Attica[b]; and had a distinct quarter assigned for their residence: but neither were these considered as citizens, and either continued a distinct race, and were subjected to the dominion of the citizens till they were either driven or became enabled to emigrate once more: or if they blended with the old inhabitants of the land, it was with the commons, not with the citizens; and they swelled the mass of that already mixed population which was grown up around the city of the chiefs, and which made it now a citadel in the midst of a city, rather than the principal part of the city itself. Meantime, while the numbers of the commons thus increased, their condition improved also. In the middle ages the emancipation of the serfs of the nobility was largely effected by the influence of Christianity; nor was the church slow in urging in this instance a full compliance with the spirit of the gospel. But the gospel addresses itself in vain in our days to the proprietors of slaves; and this difference neither arises from any moral superiority in the noble over the planter, nor altogether from the diminished zeal of the church. It springs out of the different relation in which the slaves stood to their masters. The dependents of a feudal noble were the instruments of his pride and power rather than of his wealth: their numbers swelled his state, their swords maintained his quarrels; but if they were changed from serfs to tenants, their services in these

[a] See the story of Phœnix, Homer, Iliad, ix. 479, &c., and of Epeigeus, Iliad, xvi. 570. Compare also the famous story of Atys and Adrastus in Herodotus, i. 34, &c.

[b] Compare Herodotus, ii. 51, vi. 137. Thucyd., ii. 17. note.

respects would be nearly the same; so that it was no extraordinary sacrifice of selfishness to emancipate them. Thus also the followers of the nobles of a much more remote period were employed in war or agriculture much more than in household offices. Slaves of this latter description were extremely few[a]; they were bred up with the children of the family, and little distinction was made in the treatment of the one and the other. Meantime the agricultural vassals were suffered to make the most of their own industry, and portions of land[b] were sometimes granted them by their lords, in which they acquired in a few generations a sort of property: while those who lived nearer to the towns acquired wealth by following various branches of trade or handicraft employments. In this manner they grew comparatively rich and powerful; and when a change of circumstances took place, and the chiefs began to feel that wealth was an important means of power, it was too late then to reduce their vassals to the condition of our colonial slaves, and to make a profit of their labour, when they were on the point of asserting their complete equality with their lords.

The commons were not originally considered as citizens.

But before this change was effected, all but the chiefs, that is, all who were not of noble blood, whether they were born dependents on the nobles, or whether they were strangers who had been induced to settle amongst them, were alike comprised under the denomination of "commons," δῆμος, and were not considered members of the state, or πολῖται. The widely different feeling which existed towards them, and towards the citizens or members of the state, is best shown by the different language in which Homer makes Ulysses address them. (Iliad, book II.) They could neither command in war or in peace: they could not minister at the altars of the gods; nor were their voices admitted in the decision of state affairs. They were, in short, in the heroic times,

[a] Herodot. vi. 137, viii. 137. Juvenal, xiv. 168.

[b] Festus in "Patres."

what the slaves and resident foreigners were in the historic age, that is, inhabitants of the country, but not citizens. They could not possess land nor intermarry with the citizen nobility of the commonwealth: and if they were free from personal slavery, yet both politically and in private life they were liable to constant oppression; for the "limited prerogatives" of the kings of ancient Greece are to be understood only with respect to their nobles; over the commons both the kings and nobles were absolute. Still, as we have seen, if they could acquire any property, either in war or by commerce, it remained fully their own; they thus obtained consideration, and learned to feel their own power and rights; and were already sufficiently important to be courted as auxiliaries in the civil contests of the aristocracy, before they were strong enough to assert their claims in their own name, and enter as principals into the quarrel in their own cause.

Example of the origin and progress of the Commons, afforded by the history of AUGSBURG.

The outline here given, as far as relates to the ancient world, can be made out only from a careful comparison of various scattered passages in ancient authors; nor perhaps can every portion of it be supported by direct testimony, although in the main I have no doubt that all who have studied ancient history attentively will admit its correctness. But for the analogous period of society in modern times we have evidence full and direct; and a slight sketch of the Constitution of Augsburg[a] will at once illustrate and confirm what I have given as a picture of the origin of the commons generally under similar circumstances. On the conquest of Swabia by the Franks, a certain number of persons, free by birth, (Ingenui,) and enjoying in consequence of their birth the privileges of an aristocracy, such as the exclusive right of serving in war, of administering

[a] The whole of this account of the constitution of Augsburg is taken from Paul von Stetten's "Geschichte der adlichen Geschlechter in Augsburg." ("History of the Noble Families of Augsburg.") Augsburg, 1762.

justice, and of discharging the offices of religion, settled with their dependents in the town of Augsburg. In process of time there grew up around them a large population, chiefly formed out of the class of freedmen, that is, of the vassals or dependents of the free citizens who had been emancipated by their lords; and this population was settled not within the precincts of the city, but outside the walls in suburbs surrounded by a pallisade, whence they were denominated "Pfalburger," or "citizens of the palisade," the Greek περίοικοι, to distinguish them from the genuine citizens who lived within the walls. But the free or noble inhabitants of the inner town were alone called simply "citizens," (burger;) a "decree of the citizens of Augsburg" was synonymous with a "decree of the great council of the inhabitants of free blood," and by no means comprehended the Pfalburger, although these last formed the most numerous part of the population. The "citizens" of Augsburg, although living in a town, and not on their lands in the country, were yet in all respects accounted the equals of the Milites Agrarii, or country nobility, throughout Germany; they used all the distinctions of nobility, banners and armorial bearings, and they intermarried with the nobles, as belonging to the same class in society. They had their two Stadt-Pfleger, or burgomasters, their ordinary council of twelve citizens, annually chosen by the council of the preceding year; and their great council, (the Comitia Curiata of the early Roman constitution,) composed of the whole body of citizens. But about the beginning of the 14th century the commons found themselves sufficiently advanced in wealth and power to lay claim to their share of the rights of citizenship. They seem first to have been admitted into the great council, as the plebeians at Rome voted in the comitia before they were admitted into the senate, or eligible to the consulship: then the ordinary council was increased from twelve to four and twenty, the additional members being apparently chosen from the

commons; but the twelve patrician counsellors still formed a separate tribunal, to which cases were brought in the last resort, although on other occasions they formed one body with the counsellors of the commons. Still faithfully representing the same course of events which had marked the downfall of the old aristocracies of Greece and Rome, Augsburg had her noble family of popular principles, whose members, whether from ambition or true patriotism, asserted the rights of the commons, and exposed themselves to the persecutions of their own body; and Sibot Stolzhirsch and his kinsmen acted the part of Clisthenes and the Alcmæonidæ at Athens, of the Valerii and Manlius Capitolinus at Rome. Finally, in the year 1368, the companies of trades, or, in other words, the commons of Augsburg, succeeded without a struggle in gaining for themselves not only an equality of rights with the nobles, but an absolute ascendancy; and in the first moment of their triumph they proposed to destroy the political existence of the nobility altogether, and to oblige every citizen under the old constitution to become a commoner and a member of some[a] one of the companies. They listened however to the entreaties of the nobles, and allowed them to remain a separate order; they gave them also their share in the government, ordering that fifteen nobles should be chosen into the common council of the companies, and that one of these should be always burgomaster along with the burgomaster of the commons.

The value of this example, in shewing the natural tendency of society when not obstructed by disturbing causes.

This story of the gradual emancipation of the commons of Augsburg is particularly deserving of attention, because it exhibits a rare instance of society advancing in its natural course without the interference of any disturbing causes; and

[a] This was done from time to time at Florence as a reward of the liberal principles of particular nobles; for the nobility being disqualified from holding public offices, could only be rendered eligible to them by being made commoners. On the other hand, unpopular commoners were sometimes ennobled, in order to disfranchise them. See Hallam, Middle Ages, chap. III., part ii., p. 435.

the example therefore is well fitted to show what are to be considered as the general laws of a nation's progress, if left to itself, and what are merely accidental and forcible interruptions of them. For instance, the subsequent revolution in Augsburg in 1548, by which the aristocracy regained almost all their former ascendancy, was not produced by any internal and natural causes, but by foreign violence; the emperor Charles the Fifth, in his hatred of all free and just government, forcibly dispossessing the commons of their power. But even where the disturbing cause is certain in its interference, as in mechanics the resistance of the air always prevents a body from obeying the natural laws of motion, still the general principles of the science are universally held to be essential to the attainment of a true knowledge of it. Much more does this hold good in political science, where disturbing causes need not of necessity come into action, and what is true in principle may sometimes, as at Augsburg up to the year 1548, be no less true in practice.

The history of Augsburg down to the overthrow of its liberty by Charles the Fifth, shows the manner in which the aristocracy of blood is naturally overthrown by the ordinary progress of a people in wealth and civilization; it shows too with how little difficulty and danger this change may be effected, where no disturbing causes exist, and where the effort of the political constitution is neither hurried forwards, nor violently checked, external circumstances combining also to favour it. Spring is ever a critical period, and the fairest promise of blossom on the healthiest tree may be cut off by one of the sudden frosts or storms so incident to that changeful season. In the political spring also there are peculiar dangers internal and external, which in too large a proportion of instances have never allowed the blossom to ripen. These may be stated principally as three; 1st, The union of property, under peculiar local circumstances, with nobility; 2nd, The increasing influence of

But disturbing causes have in fact generally interfered with this natural course of things.

Three principal dangers which beset the transition from the ascendancy of nobility to that of wealth.

wealth leading to absolute monarchy instead of a free government; 3rd, an unfavourable state of foreign relations. I proceed to speak of these in their order.

1st danger; the union of property under peculiar local circumstances, with nobility.

1st, The union of property, under peculiar local circumstances, with nobility. This is a check upon the growth of liberty which peculiarly belongs to what I have called aristocracies of conquest: for in these cases the first settlement of the conquering people renders the distribution of property fearfully unequal, and the hostile relation long maintained between the conquerors and the conquered leads to fruitless insurrections, and subsequent confiscations, or to laws directly restraining the acquisition of property by the conquered people. But where the distinction between nobles and commons is not founded on conquest, the emancipation of the latter is checked by the local circumstances of the country, or the moral and physical constitution of the race of its inhabitants. Distance from the sea, the want of great rivers, the existence of large forests and deserts, the interposition of numerous chains of mountains or impracticable hills, any thing, in short, that impedes communication, and thus shuts out foreign commerce, necessarily tends to prevent the creation of any wealth but that arising from land, and the land is already monopolized by the aristocracy. Now where the land, as in Judea, is divided in the beginning amidst the whole people, the absence of foreign commerce, although incompatible with any high advancement in knowledge and general cultivation of mind, is not incompatible with a large amount of national virtue and happiness: but an agricultural country in the hands of an aristocracy is a state at once of physical, intellectual, and moral degradation, and which tends to exclude all opportunities of amendment. Again, the moral and physical constitution of different races of mankind produces results worth noticing. The lively and social temper of the Greeks and Italians led them to desire frequent intercourse with one

another, and could scarcely exist without the excitement of the theatre and the forum. Thus the chiefs resided in the towns, even while their main property was derived from the country; and they were far more accessible to the influence or power of the commons than if, like the territorial nobility of Germany, they had resided on their estates in castles, which were so many strongholds of their dominion. On the other hand, the strong passion for field sports which distinguished the Teutonic nations, and their little aptitude for social and intellectual enjoyments, made them in general abandon the towns to their vassals, and continue to keep themselves and their immediate dependents out of the reach of the humanizing influences of general society, as well as of the direct force of popular power. Under these circumstances, then, property is united with nobility in keeping down the progress of the nation; either because the commons are prevented from acquiring commercial wealth, by which alone they can hope to balance the territorial wealth of the aristocracy; or because the nobles find in the very situation of their property an advantageous military position, enabling them to escape the influence of the commons before an actual collision takes place, and to enter into the contest when it does come with superior means of resistance.

2nd. But the most fatal danger which threatens the political constitution, arises out of the very crisis of its state of transition from the ascendancy of blood to that of property, when monarchical despotism is the result instead of general liberty. Sometimes this despotism has been itself only transient, and after having been the instrument of good in plucking up by the roots the old aristocracy, has yielded in its turn to a free and liberal government; but in other cases it has realized the fable of the horse and the stag, and has established a worse and more enduring tyranny over the people than that which it supplanted. Of the

2d danger; that the change from aristocracy should end in despotism rather than in a free government.

first class were the despotisms noticed by Thucydides as springing up almost everywhere on the first overthrow of the old aristocratical monarchies: of the second, the history of modern Europe affords but too many examples. But in both, the evil arose from the imperfect distribution of wealth; commerce was confined to a few hands, and produced a rate of profit, proportionably large; and the increased attention paid to agriculture added to the wealth of a few only, because the land was engrossed by only a small portion of the community. In Greece a man who could purchase the services of a small body of mercenary soldiers, seized the citadel, and made himself tyrant. In modern Europe a king who was rich enough to substitute a small standing army for the feudal array of an earlier period, became at once independent of the support of his nobles, and powerful enough to crush them if they offered any opposition to his plans. In the famous revolution of 1660 in Denmark, the commons surrendered their liberties to the crown in order to purchase thus dearly the subversion of the aristocracy. And wherever a king has existed in modern Europe, the overthrow of the aristocracy has generally been effected by his means. Happy the people who have not suffered their liberties to be merely transferred from one spoiler to another, but have asserted their right to share in the victory of the crown. But in modern Europe, the size of the kingdoms, and the much more strongly monarchical spirit of the people, allowed the kings to consolidate their work; while in ancient Greece the tyrant of a single town was far more readily overthrown. It has been an aggravation to the evil in modern times, that the king, after he had once established his power, seemed to make common cause with the aristocracy against the people, and lent his support to maintain them in their many exemptions and prerogatives. At the same time, the means by which he has maintained his own despotism, a mercenary standing army, has rendered finance

a most important subject of attention, and has marked that second stage in society, in which money rather than birth confers the ascendancy.

3d. But if we look a little further we shall trace this unfavourable aspect of the great crisis in the progress of society to one cause above all others, to an unfavourable state of foreign relations, or, in other words, to foreign wars. Well has Thucydides, with his accustomed wisdom, denounced war as the great aggravation of the factions of Greece; it was this which hardened their hearts, and blinded their reason, till they were ready for the perpetration of any folly and any crime. And to the exemption from this curse, which Great Britain enjoyed during the latter half of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeeth century, the favourable termination of our political crisis is mainly to be attributed. In no country had it commenced with symptoms more alarming: the aristocracy were exhausted by the wars of the Roses; the clergy changed from an independent estate of the realm to the veriest slaves of the king's pleasure; the commons were daily advancing, it is true, in wealth and intelligence, but their strength was not yet matured, and was wholly incompetent to resist a vigorous military despotism. But providently was it ordered that the prudence and parsimony of Elizabeth, and the unwarlike temper of her successor, saved us from engaging deeply in the great continental wars. Most thankful should we be that their foreign policy was not more vigorous, their commanders not more wisely selected, their military operations not more fortunate. Leicester and Buckingham by their incapacity were far more useful to their country under the circumstances of that time than if they had possessed the genius of Marlborough or Wellington. Had the military spirit of the nation been more ably directed, had there been formed in the wars of Holland or the Palatinate such a band of disciplined soldiers

3d danger; arising out of foreign wars, and the union of two or more nations under one sovereign.

as those whose unrivalled exploits[a] in Flanders in 1658 were the admiration of their French allies, and the terror of Spain, the triumph of the crown in the civil war of 1642 must have been speedy and decisive, and before even the talents of Cromwell could have organized the parliament's armies, their total defeat, and the utter extinction of the national liberties, would have been inevitably consummated.

What England thus happily escaped, delayed for nearly two centuries the deliverance of France. The long contest with Spain and Austria produced effects infinitely more disastrous than the defeats of Pavia and St. Quentin. For these ample atonement was made at Rocroi and Fribourg; but what could remedy the prevalence of a military spirit, created by so many years of warfare; the distraction of the public mind from all schemes of internal improvement; and the absolute power acquired and secured by the crown? And within our own memory, when nature, recovered from her long check, made a second and happier effort to attain to maturity, the curse of war again interposed to mar the work, and the aggressions of the imperial armies provoked a reaction, by the consequences of which the deliverance achieved by the Constituent Assembly was again for a time placed in jeopardy.

Nor, while noticing the evils arising to the political constitution from an unfavourable state of its foreign relations, must we forget that abuse of the principle of hereditary succession which has placed the crowns of remote and uncongenial nations on the head of the same individual. This accumulation of dominion has been often regarded with jealousy by foreign nations, as threatening their own independence; but its dangers are still greater

[a] There is a most entertaining account of the exploits of this invincible army in one of the volumes of the Harleian Miscellany, written by major-general Morgan, who was its actual commander, although Lockhart was nominally the general.

to the people[a] thus unnaturally subjected to the same master. In this ill-omened union, each member of it is to the other like the dead corpse fastened by the tyrant of old to the living man; the strength and resources of each are employed in crushing the other's independence. So Charles the Fifth trampled upon the liberties of the Netherlands with the help of his Spanish soldiers, and upon Italy with the military force both of Spain and Germany.

Such are the dangers besetting that critical period of a nation's existence, when it is emerging from the dominion of its old aristocracy. If it escapes these, either originally or finally, it enters upon its state of manhood, and is exposed to a somewhat different succession of struggles. The contest then is between property and numbers, and wherever it has come to a crisis, I know not that it has in any instance terminated favourably. Such was the state of Greece in the time of Thucydides; of Rome during the last century of the commonwealth; and such has been the state of England since the revolution of 1688. Comparisons drawn from the preceding period are inapplicable to this;

If these dangers are surmounted, and the change takes place happily, the new state of things is very different from the old,

[a] What is here said applies, be it remembered, to the period when the commons are in the natural course of things ripe for political emancipation, and are strong enough to excite the jealousy of the aristocracy. But at an earlier period, while they are still entirely subservient to the nobility, the union of several crowns in the person of one sovereign, has been advantageous to the general liberty, because his great foreign power and resources have led the nobles to conciliate the regard of the commons for their own defence against the king; and a happy union of interests and feelings has been thus produced, whose effects in after-times are most beneficial. Such was the case in England, owing to the extensive continental dominion of the first Plantagenet monarchs: the Anglo-Norman barons became English in feeling, and favoured the liberties of the commons, because they were afraid of being ejected from their possessions by the Poitevins and other continental subjects of Henry the Third, as their ancestors had dispossessed the Anglo-Saxons.

while, on the other hand, as the phenomena of the second period arise out of causes connected with the earlier state of things, they cannot be clearly understood unless that former state be fully known to us. Thus to argue that the Romans were less bloody than the Greeks from a comparison between the factions of the Peloponnesian war and the struggles of the Roman commons against the Patricians, is to compare the two nations under very different circumstances; it is instituting a parallel between the intensity of our passions in manhood and in childhood. The bloody factions of Corcyra and Megara are analogous to the civil wars of Marius and Sylla, of Cæsar and Pompey, of Brutus and Cassius against the triumvirs: the harmless contests between the commons and patricians can only be compared to those which prevailed in Greece before the Persian invasion, when the party of the coast at Athens was disputing the exclusive ascendancy so long enjoyed by the eupatridæ or party of the plain. And the true conclusion is, that the second contest, between property and numbers, is far more inevitably accompanied by atrocious crimes than that earlier quarrel in which property and numbers were united against property and birth.

The causes of this difference are worth noticing. The distinction between the nobility and the commons was originally a real one; that is, it was grounded upon a real superiority either physical or moral. But every successive generation tended to make it more and more imaginary; till, at the moment of the final struggle between the two orders, it had no real existence at all. The commons were then become as well qualified as the nobles, both physically and morally, to conduct the affairs of peace and war; and thus the exclusive ascendancy of the nobility being become unnatural and absurd, now that it existed along with a real equality of the two parties in merit and in wealth, was resigned for very shame, and was in fact but the sacrifice of a shadow. Whereas in the contest between property and numbers, the course of

things is exactly the opposite. The final struggle here only takes place when the real differences between the contending parties have reached the widest point of separation; when the intermediate gradations of society are absorbed in one or other of the two extremes, and the state is divided only between the two irreconcilable opposites of luxury and beggary. This is no contest between men really equal, to do away with a fictitious distinction: it is a struggle between utter contraries; between parties who have absolutely no point in common, no knowledge of each other's feelings, no sympathy in each other's pursuits; and who are contending for a prize which one cannot gain without a proportional loss to the other. And in confirmation of this view of the subject, wherever difference of blood and race is so strong as even after the lapse of ages to constitute a real distinction, as in the case of white men and negroes, there the perfect amalgamation of the political body becomes exceedingly difficult, if not utterly hopeless; and the daily increasing negro population of the United States, a population excluded by a feeling of natural diversity from an enjoyment of the rights of citizenship, is perhaps one of the most alarming points in the future prospects of that great and growing people[a].

On the other hand, the position of parties in the later

[a] "The hostility existing between the free blacks and the whites in the United States is even more inveterate than that of slaves towards their masters; and in some of the states, Virginia especially, it has been thought necessary to enact laws, by which all manumitted slaves are compelled to quit the commonwealth." *Ward's Mexico*, vol. i. p. 38. In Mexico, on the contrary, where there is scarcely any thing of a pure negro population, so much more strongly distinguished than the native American race from the physical character of Europeans, the different castes have blended freely together, and the common feeling of hatred to the old Spaniards of Europe has drawn together all the natives of Mexico, whether of Spanish or of Indian extraction; and has even led the former, descended as they are from the first conquerors of Mexico, to identify themselves with the aborigines, and to speak of the atrocities of their own ancestors as committed by Spain against their countrymen. *Ib.* p. 34.

contest must be traced to causes connected with that one which preceded it. The enormous inequality of property at Rome, against which the Agrarian laws were particularly directed, arose out of the exclusive claim to the rights of citizenship formerly asserted by the patricians. They who were not citizens could have no title to a share of the national lands; and in early times none were citizens except the patricians. The principle that the land of the state should be equally[a] divided amongst all the citizens in the original settlement of the country, and that an admission of new citizens implied that they should share for the future in all public land not yet divided, was generally recognised by the nations of antiquity. But the Roman patricians, whilst they allowed the first part of this principle, objected to the second; and refused to admit the commons to any division of the unappropriated public land. So again in modern times, how much of the actual situation of our aristocracy of property is derived from our old aristocracy of conquest: the enormous landed estates of many of our nobility,—the great political influence conferred by land above all other kinds of property,—the law of primogeniture and the law of entails. Above all, the existence of an order of nobility communicated by descent, with separate powers, and

yet can only be understood from a clear knowledge of the state of things that preceded it.

[a] This appears from what we know of the first settlement of particular nations in the territory which they afterwards occupied; as, for instance, of the Israelites in Canaan, and the Dorians in Peloponnesus. It appears also from the practice observed in the planting of colonies, both among the Greeks and Romans, where equal shares of land were distributed to the several colonists. Hence when a number of new citizens were admitted, there was generally a demand for a re-division of the land, on the principle that it was a common stock, which ought to be equally shared among all the citizens. The philosophers also, in their proposed models of a commonwealth, proceed on the same notion: certain portions of the land are to be set apart for religious purposes, and the rest to be divided in lots amongst the citizens. See Plutarch, Lycurgus 8. Thucydid. V. 4. Dionysius Halicarn. II. 6, 7. Herodot. IV. 159. Aristot. Politic. VI. 4, VII. 10.

peculiar privileges, gives to the aristocracy of modern Europe much more of the character of the older aristocracy of blood than was retained after the corresponding revolution in Greece and Rome. In fact, if hereditary monarchy was to be retained, public liberty could scarcely have been achieved or preserved without a coexistent hereditary aristocracy.

This view of the periods of society tends to explain many seeming inconsistencies in history;

The view that has been here taken of the progress of society offers an explanation of many points, which without it have been sometimes misunderstood. It shows how the popular party of an earlier period becomes the antipopular party of a later; because the tendency of society is to become more and more liberal, and as the ascendancy of wealth is a more popular principle than the ascendancy of nobility, so it is less popular than the ascendancy of numbers. Thus the comitia centuriata of Servius Tullius, which in the times of Marius and Cæsar would have been an institution entirely aristocratical, were in their first creation a most liberal and popular measure, by admitting wealth to that supremacy which had before been monopolized by noble birth. Thus the house of commons, which was the popular part of our constitution so long as the struggle was between the nation and the crown, has been regarded since the accession of George the Third as a body predominantly aristocratical, because the parties in the state have resolved themselves into the advocates of property on one side, and of general intelligence and numbers on the other.

and to furnish us with more philosophical divisions of it;

We may learn also a more sensible division of history than that which is commonly adopted of ancient and modern. We shall see that there is in fact an ancient and a modern period in the history of every people; the ancient differing, and the modern in many essential points agreeing with that in which we now live. Thus the largest portion of that history which we commonly call ancient is practically modern, as it

describes society in a stage analogous to that in which it now is; while, on the other hand, much of what is called modern history is practically ancient, as it relates to a state of things which has passed away. Thucydides and Xenophon, the orators of Athens, and the philosophers, speak a wisdom more applicable to us politically than the wisdom of even our own countrymen who lived in the middle ages; and their position, both intellectual and political, more nearly resembled our own. We may learn also by the experience of other societies in an analogous state to ours, that having happily overlived the critical season of the transition from youth to manhood, what we should now most dread are accidents, or constitutional disease produced by external violence: that is, that the great enemy of society in its present stage is war: if this calamity be avoided, the progress of improvement is sure; but attempts to advance the cause of freedom by the sword are incalculably perilous. War is a state of such fatal intoxication, that it makes men careless of improving, and sometimes even of repairing their internal institutions; and thus the course of national happiness may be cut short, not only by foreign conquest, but by a state of war poisoning the blood, destroying the healthy tone of the system, and setting up a feverish excitement, till the disorder terminates in despotism.

and to draw from it conclusions really applicable to our own state of society.

Extending our view still more widely, and observing that in some parts of the world society seems never to have reached its natural manhood, but has either gone on in protracted infancy, or has received a shock at the moment of its transition, which has condemned it to a long living death; that either the old aristocracies have still existed, or have only been exchanged for despotism in its worst, and, humanly speaking, most hopeless form; we shall draw near with reverence to those higher causes, which proceeding directly

It teaches us also that there are causes beyond human control affecting the progress of society, such as,

from the inscrutable will of our Maker, seem designed to humble the presumption of fancying ourselves the arbiters of our own destiny. It is vain to deny that differences of national character apparently constitutional, and belonging to distinct families of the human race, have immensely influenced the greatness and happiness of each: it is equally clear, that the physical geography of the several parts of the earth has advanced or prevented the moral and intellectual progress of their respective inhabitants. The boundless and unmanageable mass of earth presented by the continents of Asia and Africa has caused those parts of the world, which started the earliest in the race of civilization, to remain almost at the point from whence they set out; while Europe and America, penetrated by so many seas, and communicating with them by so many rivers, have been subdued to the uses of civilization, and have ministered with an ever-growing power to their children's greatness. Well indeed might the policy of the old priest nobles of Egypt and India endeavour to divert their people from becoming familiar with the sea, and represent the occupation of a seaman as incompatible with the purity of the highest castes. The sea deserved to be hated by the old aristocracies, inasmuch as it has been the mightiest instrument in the civilization of mankind. In the depth of winter, when the sky is covered with clouds, and the land presents one cold, blank, and lifeless surface of snow, how refreshing is it to the spirits to walk upon the shore, and to enjoy the eternal freshness and liveliness of ocean. Even so in the deepest winter of the human race, when the earth was but one chilling expanse of inactivity, life was stirring in the waters. There began that spirit whose genial influence has now reached to the land, has broken the chains of winter, and covered the face of the earth with beauty.

1st, constitutional difference of national character, and,

2d, the physical geography of different parts of the earth.

But these distinctions between race and race, like those

between individuals, involve a duty which men have been unhappily very unwilling to practise. They who are most favoured by nature owe their best assistance to those whose lot is most unpromising; they who have advanced the furthest in civilization, are bound to enlighten others whose progress has been less rapid. But here that feeling of pride and selfishness interposes, which, under the name of patriotism, has so long tried to pass itself off for a virtue. As men in proportion to their moral advancement learn to enlarge the circle of their regards; as an exclusive affection for our relations, our clan, or our country, is a sure mark of an unimproved mind, so is that narrow and unchristian feeling to be condemned, which regards with jealousy the progress of foreign nations, and cares for no portion of the human race but that to which itself belongs. The detestable encouragement so long given to national enmities, the low gratification felt by every people in extolling themselves above their neighbours, should not be overlooked amongst the causes which have mainly obstructed the improvement of mankind. Exclusive patriotism should be cast off, together with the exclusive ascendancy of birth, as belonging to the follies and selfishness of our uncultivated nature. Yet, strange to say, the former at least is sometimes upheld by men who not only call themselves Christians, but are apt to use the charge of irreligion as the readiest weapon against those who differ from them. So little have they learned of the spirit of that revelation, which taught emphatically the abolition of an exclusively national religion and a local worship, that so men, being all born of the same blood, might make their sympathies coextensive with their bond of universal brotherhood.

Yet these causes, though not altogether to be removed, may be mitigated by human efforts, and it is the bounden duty of those nations which possess the greatest advantages, to do most for the elevation of others to their own level.

EXTRACTS

FROM THE

ENGLISHMAN'S REGISTER.

[The "Englishman's Register" was a weekly newspaper which Dr. Arnold undertook in 1831, during the alarm and agitation which prevailed throughout the country at the time of the passing of the Reform Bill; "more," he said, "to relieve his own conscience, than with any sanguine hope of doing good;" but "earnestly desiring to speak to the people the words of truth and soberness,—to tell them plainly the evils that exist, and lead them, if he could, to their causes and remedies." It died a natural death in a few weeks; partly from his want of leisure to control it properly, and from the great expense which it entailed upon him,—partly from the want of cordial sympathy in any of the existing parties of the country. (See Life and Correspondence, vol. i. c. vi.) The following Extracts consist of most of the leading articles which he contributed to it, and though of a more temporary and homely character than the other contents of this volume, have been inserted as the best illustration of the views on which he thought that a popular newspaper should be conducted.]

EXTRACTS

FROM THE

ENGLISHMAN'S REGISTER.

[From No. 1, May 7, 1831.]

(1.) OUR OBJECT.

THE country is filled with newspapers, and yet we are here offering to the public a new one. Of course we suppose therefore that something is wanted which other journals do not supply, or that there is some evil mixed with their good, which needlessly lessens their usefulness. We do think that an honest, a fair, and a high-principled journal is yet wanting—wanting for all classes of persons; but above all, for those who cannot afford time or money to read much, and who are therefore most apt to be influenced by the tone and sentiments of the little which they do read. We think that in a Christian country the tone of a public journal ought to be decidedly Christian; —we think that a publication professing to give a true impression of the state of things should not hold a certain set of opinions in a lump, because they are commonly found united in the same persons, but should pick out and admire the truth which may exist on one side amidst a mass of errors, and renounce and expose the falsehood which may be mingled on the other side with views in the main true. We think, above all, that a newspaper should be thoroughly independent—independent of all undue influence, whether aristocratical or popular; for it is as base and as wicked to pander to the violence and ignor-

ance of the people as to screen or palliate the follies and oppressions of the great. We wish our journal to be read; but we should be ashamed to purchase its circulation by omitting any thing which our conscience bids us publish, or by indulging in any unfairness or violence which, if lying on our death bed, we should look back upon with regret.

But these are mere general professions. To come to particulars—we see around us one vast and fearful struggle going on between the friends of things as they are and the advocates of change. Not in England only, but all over Europe, this contest is raging, and no man who loves his country or mankind ought to remain neutral in it. But the misfortune is, that they whose voices are heard the loudest on both sides in this quarrel are so foolish or so unprincipled as to make the triumph of either an object of just apprehension. Who can wish success to that blind ignorance which cannot see that all things are and must be for ever changing?—that it is worse than kicking against the pricks to oppose our vain efforts to an eternal and universal law of God's providence; and that by striving against change we do not prevent it from coming, but only render it violent and injurious, when it might have been natural and beneficial. England cannot remain what it has been; and the endeavour to detain a state of things which is passing away is, at the best, a waste of those efforts which might be better employed in preparing for the approaching and inevitable change, and in making the passage from the old system to the new as easy and imperceptible as possible.

To the anti-reformers therefore, both in church and state, we are decidedly opposed; but with a large party of the reformers we have quite as little sympathy. They cry for change as blindly as their adversaries oppose it; they overrate existing evils, and hope to cure them by remedies which are either wholly inadequate, or have nothing at all to do with the mischief complained of. They think too

highly of themselves and of their own times, while they despise that knowledge of former times which can alone make us wiser than our fathers by giving us the advantage of their experience. Above all, while professing to release men from unjust and absurd restraints, they have forgotten that there is yet a worse evil on the other side—an absence of any restraint whatever. Reformers are especially bound to enforce the authority of the laws of conscience and of God while they are exposing the weakness and corruption of the laws of men; for of all possible states of degradation and misery none can be so horrible as that religious and moral anarchy where men are the slaves of all their evil passions, hateful and hating one another.

We may be wrong, or our call may be too feeble to be heard with any effect; but our hope is to rally those, and we believe they are many, who feel in these tremendous times as we do—who are disgusted alike with the folly and iniquity that would keep all things as they are, and with the no less foolish and unprincipled violence that would destroy rather than reform, and which pollutes even reform itself by its unchristian spirit and sentiments.

Of the many evils which the anti-reformers have brought upon their country, none is so great as this—that the holiest things have been blasphemed through their fault—that Christianity itself has been represented as hostile to truth and liberty, because so many of those who have professed it most zealously, have used its authority in political matters rather for evil than for good. But, in spite of all this, infidelity is far from having deeply infected the people of England. Against this evil Englishmen possess the best preservative in the general circulation of the Scriptures throughout the country; for where the Bible is well known and commonly studied, all honest minds are sufficiently fortified against the poison of our English infidels. The contrast between the principles and spirit of the gospel and those of our most famous unbelievers

is quite enough to show which comes from God and which from the author of all evil.

As for the differences between Christians and Christians, their complexion is quite of another nature. In times of perfect peace soldiers may often quarrel amongst themselves about the merest trifle; but when the common enemy is near it is worse than folly if even serious causes of disagreement are not forgotten from a sense of their common danger. Now most of the disputes between Christians in this country are either about matters of little importance, or ought, at any rate, to sink into nothing when compared with the far greater points which we all hold alike, and the great need which we have of union amongst ourselves. For this reason, although we are ourselves members of the Church of England, yet, in the religious articles of this Register, we intend to avoid all notice of the differences between the Establishment and the great mass of Protestant Dissenters, except so far as to show how greatly both sides are apt to exaggerate their importance, and that, if a wiser spirit prevailed, they are no insurmountable obstacles to union.

In brief, then, our principles are those of *Christian Reform*. These two words comprehend every thing; and especially they include a sincere and hearty desire to promote the welfare of the poor; for nothing has any claim to the title of Christian, if it be indifferent to this most important Christian duty. We earnestly wish to see great improvements effected in the condition of the poor, both bodily and mentally—we wish to see them better fed and better taught—raised in comfort and independence, and knowing how to value these blessings and to improve them. We know that their actual state in many parts of the kingdom is most startling; and we know the difficulties which beset every attempt to benefit it. Here too, as in everything else, the opposite errors of those two most mischievous parties, the anti-reformers and the ultra-reformers,

have each, in nearly equal proportions, increased the evil. The anti-reformers have spoken as if all the sufferings of the poor were the result of inevitable necessity, and assert that the rich, far from being in any degree the cause of them, have done their best to relieve them. The ultra-reformers represent the rich as tyrants and the poor as slaves, and they speak of them as the natural enemies of each other, and tell the poor in plain terms that all their sufferings come from the oppression of the rich, and that it is their own fault if they do not at once remedy and revenge them. Thus one party tries to lull the consciences of the rich, and encourages them in their errors and neglect; while the other appeals to all the bad passions of the poor, and disposes them to regard with suspicion every attempt of the rich to do them good, as if it were the mere stratagem of an enemy.

Amidst all these difficulties we commence our undertaking, confident in nothing so much as in the force of simple truth, and feeling sure, whatever may be our ability to discover it, that our pursuit of truth will be to the utmost fearless and sincere. For those who may agree with us in our principles we either entreat their support to this attempt of ours, or if, while approving of the end, they judge the means to be too feeble to effect it, then we implore them, in the name of God and of their country, to use every endeavour to do that thoroughly which, rather than leave it undone altogether, we now, with a full consciousness of our many deficiencies, have assayed to accomplish.

(2.) ON THE SIN NOT TO BE FORGIVEN.

"Whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come."—Matt. xii. 32.

EVERY one who reads his Bible for the first time, when he comes to this passage, asks anxiously, what does it mean? —what is this sin which shall never be forgiven, either in this world, or in the world to come? Some who have tried to explain it have said that it is a sin which cannot be committed now; while others have made themselves very unhappy from the fear that they themselves have committed it. But both are mistaken; for it is a sin which is committed unhappily every day: but it is most certain that they who are afraid of having committed it are the persons, above all others, who must be innocent of it.

Christian reader! it can scarcely happen in these days but that you must have heard or read some things in the course of your life unfriendly to the Master whom you profess to serve. But it is of great consequence that you should be able to distinguish which of these things seem like blasphemies against the Son of Man and which appear to be blasphemies against the Holy Ghost.

By the Holy Ghost, or Holy Spirit of God, is meant God speaking to men in such a language that no honest mind can mistake who it is that is speaking. Thus miraracles wrought to confirm the doctrine of Christ are said to have been wrought by the Holy Spirit, because by them was shown a more than human power exerted in the cause of good; and much more may the Holy Ghost be said to be the author of all good desires, good thoughts, and good principles, inasmuch as these all bear most manifestly upon them the seal of God speaking in them. So the

Holy Ghost inspired the apostles to deliver those great truths which are contained in their epistles, and which also commend themselves to the thinking mind as the fruit of a wisdom and goodness not less than divine. It is manifest, therefore, that although miracles have long since ceased, yet that other works of the Holy Spirit still are being daily wrought, and that in these he may be still as much as ever blasphemed.

It is then a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit when any man speaks against Christianity because he cannot bear the purity of its spirit and the wisdom of its doctrines. It is a blasphemy against the Son of Man only when any one from ignorance, or prejudice, or carelessness, does not know what Christianity is, and speaks against it under a false impression of its being unfavourable to human virtue and happiness. For instance: in Roman Catholic countries, where the Scriptures themselves are not commonly read, a great number of persons speak against the Son of Man; and even in Protestant countries it may very often happen that men, not having been religiously brought up, and taking their impressions of Christianity upon trust, may confound it with the abuses of the Establishment, or with the errors, or bigotry, or servility, of some of its ministers, and thus dislike it, not for its good, but for its supposed evil. Such unbelief, although showing great unfairness, or at any rate, most blameable carelessness, is yet a very different thing from blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, because it does not of necessity show any dislike of goodness or love of evil.

But when a man knows what Christianity is, and hates it for that very reason—when he speaks against it, not from a mistaken impression that it favours evils which it in fact condemns, but because its spirit is pure and meek and self-denying, and he is lustful, and revengeful, and selfish, then he speaks not against the Son of Man only, but against the Holy Ghost: he has chosen to love evil and hate good, and if good triumph he must be for ever

miserable. This is not an imaginary case only—there have been, and are, too many instances of it; but in imputing guilt so dreadful and so hopeless, none but he who sees the heart can dare to fix on any particular individual.

Still there is a use in looking at a picture so terrible. In the first place, men who, while they attack Christianity, show that they really do hate it for its own sake; men who say that revenge is a virtue and sensual indulgence no sin, —such men are not to be feared as dangerous enemies, but rather regarded as awful witnesses to the truth of the gospel. Far from their unbelief making against Christianity, it confirms it: for the Christian Scriptures say, not only that such men as these may be unbelievers, but that they must be so, that they are of necessity blinded to the truth, and that this blindness is a part of their punishment, because "they had pleasure in unrighteousness." Take up a tract or a paper written by men of this kind, and if you find in one page that all your bad passions are roused and encouraged, that the book is putting you into a state of mind which is neither good nor happy, hope, rather than fear, that the next page may contain some open blasphemy against your Saviour and his gospel. It is all right and fitting that they who love evil should hate good; the only way in which such wretches can honour Christianity is by abusing it.

But for ourselves, Christian reader, we may draw this lesson, that any allowed carelessness of practice and much more any one unchristian principle cherished within us is sure to weaken and will in the end destroy our faith. A man may ruin his power of believing the gospel as surely as he may his power of relishing plain and wholesome food; indulged bad passions and neglect of God will as surely destroy the one as a course of drunkenness or gluttony will destroy the other. And the wickedness and unbelief help each other forward; the more wicked a man is, the less can he believe; and the weaker his faith, the more fearlessly does he plunge into wickedness. Let us

only love God and try to please him, and all the infidel books in the world cannot really hurt us; they may disturb our understandings and greatly affect our comfort but they will never overthrow our faith; for let all the doubts and difficulties that the most diseased scepticism has ever imagined be brought together, and what do they amount to? They may infinitely darken our prospects of happiness, but with the words of Christ and his apostles in our hands, so full of wisdom and goodness, so entirely claiming our admiration and love, we should still desire to live and die Christians, even if our hopes of eternal life were far more clouded and uncertain than, thanks be to God, they are in reality.

[From No. 2, May 14, 1831.]

(1.) REFORM.

It would not be honest in any public journal to shrink at the present moment from expressing its sentiments on the great question of Parliamentary Reform. Whether we speak of it or no, our readers will be sure to speak of it, and probably to act about it, and we therefore request their attention to the following considerations.

Every man who gives a vote, or canvasses for one, or who swells a crowd and joins in a cry either for or against Reform, ought to be able to give a reason for his conduct. It is but a fool's motive to do a thing because others do it; and it is a knave's motive to do it because you are bribed; and it is a coward's motive to do it because you are afraid to do otherwise.

For one man who is against the Reform Bill there are I suppose, taking all England through, at least ten who are in favour of it. Now then, speaking first to this more numerous class, let each man amongst them ask himself this plain question—"Why do I wish for the Ministers' Reform Bill to be carried?"

A general answer would be given readily enough—"Because the boroughmongers have oppressed us and usurped our rights; and because the House of Commons ought to be chosen by the People, and not by a small number of Peers or rich Commoners, without any regard to the choice of the People at all." Now I am not one of those who think that a right is to be despised, unless we can show some practical good derived from it. If it does no more, it removes the painful feeling of injustice which exists where right is denied; and so much of our happiness and misery depends upon our feelings, that I hold it to be no sign of wisdom to treat them lightly. But in political matters "Right" is a thing so hard to be defined, except when it means "a Right given by existing laws," that it is generally best to consider not what we have a right to, but *what will be for the good of the nation;* and a right that was likely to do no good to the nation, but a great deal of harm, would be a thing which we should do well to consider as no right at all. And, indeed, most people have a notion, whether clearly defined or not, that the Reform now so much talked of will do them a great deal of good—that it will not only be the recovery of a right but the obtaining of a benefit. The question then is, "What good will Reform effect for us?" And here I am afraid that some men look for a good from it which, I believe, never will come, and which, I am sure ought not to come. There are some persons who talk about "a Reformed Parliament removing the burdens of the People," by which they mean that the National Debt will be wiped off and the Public Creditor robbed of his property. Now so long as there is such a thing as a notion of right and wrong in the world, so long will such an act be reckoned by all good men a shameless villany; there is no lighter word to describe it; it would be as shameless a villany as any for which a common criminal was ever hanged at Newgate. We must speak plainly in this matter—we hold the Debt to be an enormous national burden—we hold the sys-

tem of getting into debt as morally and politically detestable. We hold farther that the contracting our present debt has been one of the greatest causes of all the distress of the country. Most earnestly do we hope that the system of making war at the expense of our posterity—that is, of supporting a war by loans, which will be a mill-stone round the necks of our children for ever—will never again be revived in England! But it is one thing to feel strongly the folly and the evil of running into debt, and another to object to pay a debt when once contracted. It is not the fault of those who lent their money to the government, in times past, that the government borrowed extravagantly and spent foolishly. The use or the waste of their money was our concern, not theirs—they lent it to us to do as we pleased with it, and no man can have a better title to his land, or to the profits of his trade or labour, than the fundholder has to the interest or the principal of his loans to the country.

There are other persons, again, who talk of "a Reformed Parliament doing away with the grievance of Tithes," by which they mean, not merely a change in the manner of payment, but a taking away the payment itself, and applying it to very different purposes. That the enemies of Christianity should rejoice in such a prospect is, of course, very natural; but that any Christian should be found to agree with them is hardly conceivable. For, setting aside all questions of abuses in the Church which require correction, the point to be considered is, whether we are all so well taught in Christianity, or so practically observant of it, as to require no regular provision for instructing us, or reminding us of its duties; and whether it is not, as in all other things, the best way of effecting this object, to make it the exclusive business of those who are entrusted with it.

Others, again, hope that a Reformed Parliament will not plunge the nation into unjust and expensive wars. Reform would then indeed be a blessing; but we fear that

a popular House of Commons would in this respect be no better than the unreformed one. It would go to war, perhaps, on different grounds and with different enemies; but he must be foolish indeed who supposes that a People are more peaceable and more conscientious in their dealings with foreigners than an Aristocracy or a King. At this very moment it is the popular party in France who are most eager to begin another general war, and who look back with the greatest fondness to the victories and glories of the reign of Napoleon.

"But a Reformed Parliament will make bread and other necessaries of life cheaper, and will thus improve the condition of the working classes." I have already said that the great burden which weighs down the country is the Debt—and if any one could find out a means of relieving us from this honestly, he would deserve the thanks of the whole nation. But how to get rid of a Debt honestly, except by paying it, it would puzzle the cleverest man in England to explain to us. To pay the interest of the Debt there must be heavy taxes; and an English farmer who is taxed heavily cannot sell his corn so cheaply as a Prussian or American farmer who is taxed lightly: yet, if we do not buy corn of our own farmers, how are they to pay their labourers, and how is the agriculture of the country to be kept up? I am very far from saying that nothing can be done to make bread cheaper; but if a Reformed Parliament consist, as I trust it will do, of wise and honest men, they will find that there is something more than corruption and covetousness to make the settlement of the Corn Laws difficult.

What then will Reform do for us? or are we to think that it is all a delusion, and that the people are crying out so loudly for what they fancy to be a cloud full of refreshing rain, but which will really yield them nothing but scorching wind and blight? I have said that more is expected from the Reform Bill than either can or ought to come from it; but it is still a measure of great necessity

and of very excellent promise, and if we use the opportunity rightly, it will be a very great and lasting blessing to the whole nation.

It is a measure of great necessity and great justice. At the beginning of things nations are generally very poor and very ignorant. The mass of the people are thus easily governed by the few who have knowledge and property, and these are very few indeed. In the course of time knowledge and wealth spread a little farther, and then a larger portion of the people come to have a share in the government. The same thing goes on more and more, if the natural course of events be left to itself, and thus the government becomes more and more popular—that is, a greater portion of the whole people take a part in it, either directly or indirectly. When attempts are made to stop this natural progress of things, Revolutions are the consequence; just as if you were to try to dam up a river you would lay the whole country under water. Thus, about two hundred years ago, when trade had enriched a great many persons in the middle classes of society, and books were more commonly read, and knowledge was therefore more generally diffused than ever it had been before, the House of Commons began to claim a greater share in the government of the country than it had before exercised, because the House of Commons consisted of country gentlemen, merchants, lawyers, and great tradesmen, or, in other words, of the richest and most enlightened part of the middle classes. The time was come for a change, and no human power could stop it; but attempts were made to stop it, and therefore the change was violent instead of peaceable, and was purchased at the price of nearly seventy years of violent contentions, of a bloody civil war, and of the death of thousands of good and brave men, including even one of our kings. This ought to be our warning now—when the time has become ripe for another change, and the only question is, whether we will have it peaceably, or whether it must come with confusion and

blood and all kinds of wickedness and misery. Another large portion of the people has so grown in wealth and knowledge within the last fifty years, that they claim a greater share in the government; and the present Reform Bill, by destroying what are called the rotten boroughs, and giving the elective franchise to many thousands of the lower portion of the middle classes, the very portion of the people that is ripe for political advancement, proposes to satisfy this claim fully and fairly.

There is a great deal of importance in seizing the happy moment of doing a thing, and not putting it off too long. Now this is just the case with the Reform Bill, if it be passed directly. In spite of a great deal of loud talking and violent writing, I am happy to think that the different classes of society are not yet wholly estranged from each other. A nobleman, a country gentleman, or a clergyman, if they do their duty in their several stations, are not only loved and respected, but are respected more for their very station's sake. There is a time, and a very long one, during which rank and riches cover all the vices of their possessors: this too often changes suddenly to the very opposite state, when they render virtue itself unpopular. We are at this moment just upon the turn—rank and station are fast losing all undeserved and excessive respect; a little more and they will weigh against a man instead of for him, and the evil spirit of levelling will be let loose upon us. Let the Reform Bill now pass—leading, as it surely will do, to a Reform in the Church—and the higher classes will have a spur to virtuous exertion which may be a double blessing to themselves and to the country. Influence must henceforth be deserved, not commanded: but desert can yet win it—and the world never yet saw a race of men better fitted to win it than the nobility and gentry of England, if once roused from the carelessness of an undisputed ascendancy. Let the higher classes be thus fully excited to their great and honourable duties, and the prospect presented by the Reform Bill is

bright indeed. The House of Commons will be purified from that worthless portion of the aristocracy who now enter it only from vanity or self-interest—to frank letters and write M.P. after their names—or to purchase by their vote places for themselves and their families. It is true that it might be filled with men even worse than these—with demagogues of low principles and coarse minds—with adventurers, as destitute of fortune as of honesty and knowledge—with all that variety of worthless pretenders to patriotism, who have ever imposed upon the people in moments of strong excitement, when all vileness and all folly was forgotten for the sake of a forward loudness in the popular cause. But this is a breed which flourishes only upon the folly of an aristocracy :—the people admire these counterfeits because their natural leaders retire in pride or in despair from the place which they ought to occupy. When this Bill is carried, and the present excitement subsides, other merits will be looked for in a candidate besides his willingness to support Reform ; and the services of many good and able men will be available in a Reformed Parliament whom, because of their avowed opposition to Reform, the people must in the present contest reject. Then there is good hope that the whole frame of our society may be examined with a firm and moderate hand, and its most glaring evils lessened, if not removed. The adjustment of the advantages and disadvantages of different kinds of property—the striking a balance between the political influence given by land, and the exemption from burdens enjoyed by the fundholder—the removal of the iniquity and insolence of the game laws—the improvement of our criminal code—the extinction of slavery abroad, and the bettering the condition of the poor at home ; these and other great measures may be looked for as likely to be discussed in a Reformed Parliament ; and if the present contest be speedily terminated, they will be discussed wisely and moderately. I conclude with an example which speaks volumes for the wisdom of speedy and

liberal concession to popular claims when the course of nature renders it at once impossible and unjust to refuse them long. The commons at Rome struggled long and resolutely with the nobles to obtain the right of being eligible to the highest offices of the state. They were successful, and the nobles yielded in time. But mark the consequence:—when the right was once obtained, the commons continued for a long time to elect only the nobles as before, their natural respect for birth and station resuming its influence, as soon as it was a tribute freely given to real nobleness, and not the subservience of a slave to his master.

(2.) THE BIBLE.—GENESIS.

"Understandest thou what thou readest?"—Acts viii. 30.

THE answer given to this question in the story from which it is taken must still be the answer of thousands and ten thousands of those who have the Bible in their hands, and read it with their eyes and their affections.—"How can I, unless some man would guide me?" How indeed can they understand a book written so many ages ago, in countries unlike to our own in every point of climate, productions, and manners, so little illustrated, in its earliest parts, by any other books of the same period, and, in many places, obscure in itself, and rendered much more so to an English reader by an imperfect translation, and by the faulty division into chapters now so universally adopted?

It is true that a great many commentaries and helps to the Bible have been published; but still the number of Bibles published is much greater, and therefore there may be many persons who may like even such short remarks

and explanations on different parts of the Bible as we can find room for in this Register.

No one needs to be told that the general and peculiar character of the Bible is *religious:* that is, it speaks of what God has done for man, and what man ought to do towards God. It is a religious book, just as a common history of England may be called a political book; but as in a common history there are parts which are not political, such as those which give anecdotes of particular individuals, or which speak of the state of religion or of the arts and sciences, so there are parts in the Bible which are not religious, but merely historical; that is, which contain stories of men and manners, such as might be found in any other book, without any particular reference to our relations with God.

Thus the book of Genesis is, in its general object and character, quite unlike any other history. It does not give an account of the most powerful kingdoms of the world, nor of the first settlement of different tribes of the human race in their several countries, nor of their progress in laws, arts, and civilization. Leaving all these things aside, as far as its main object is concerned, it looks through the earth only for the most manifest signs of God's presence, and regards only those persons with whom He has most vouchsafed to communicate.

It thus begins with the creation of the world—not its origin or coming into existence, which are mere matters of natural philosophy, but its creation—"In the beginning *God created* the heaven and the earth." It follows, therefore, that if it is He who has made us, and not we ourselves, that we are His people, wholly dependent upon Him, and in an unnatural state if ever we forget Him.

It records the destruction of the inhabited world by water, for the wickedness of the inhabitants. The great destructions of the earth's surface both by water and fire; the utter extinction of some species of animals; the revolutions in climate that have befallen our globe, and the

immediate or natural causes which have produced them—these are all matters of geology, considered in themselves, and as such the Bible says nothing about them[a]. But without telling us at all by what natural causes the deluge was effected, the Book of Genesis sees in it only the first and real cause, i. e. God. "I, even I, do bring a flood of waters upon the earth, to destroy all flesh."

[From No. 3, May 21, 1831.]

THE BIBLE.—Genesis.

(Continued.)

After the Flood, what may be called our present world began its existence. Whatever changes in the earth's surface have taken place since that time have been confined only to particular districts, or have been too gradual to produce a striking effect at any one period. No general destruction has since happened; but the order of nature has gone on, for the most part, regularly. The human race, as a body, have since received no special manifestation of God's will, or of his judgment, and therefore the Bible, as the history of God's revelations to mankind, confines its attention, after the Flood, only to particular nations or to individuals, with whom, alone, God did in a special manner communicate. In other words, after a brief notice of the dispersion of the descendants of Noah into the different countries of the earth, the Book of Genesis takes up the story of Abraham, and all the remaining part of it is occupied with the account of his life, and of the lives of his posterity for the three generations next following him.

Abraham is called the Father of the Faithful—in other words, he stands at the head of those who, in all ages and all countries, have had a revealed knowledge of God, as distinguished from that knowledge of Him which we gain

[a] [See Sermon I. vol. vi.]

by natural reason. This revealed knowledge was first given to his natural descendants, the nation of Israel; it is now given to those who are called the heirs of his faith, that is to persons, of whatever nation they may be, who believe in the God of Abraham, and consider themselves to be sharers in the promises which Abraham first received, although he was not destined to witness their fufilment.

Of these promises, the chief was this, "that in Abraham's seed should all the nations of the earth be blessed." It is a promise simple, short, and clear, of which we cannot mistake the meaning, nor dispute the fulfilment. Except a few fanatics in wickedness, all then, whether believers in Christ or no, will acknowledge that Christianity has done more to civilize the world than any other system, religious, political, or philosophical; and that it is literally and undeniably true that from an Israelite, a descendant of Abraham, all nations have derived the most signal blessings.

I believe, certainly, that we owe to Christianity something even better than civilization: but at any rate, even in its lower sense, the promise made to Abraham is fulfilled and fulfilling daily before our eyes; and thus, one of God's earliest revelations recorded in the Bible is to us at this day not a matter of faith, but of positive and certain knowledge.

It was thus declared, that at some future time some person of Abraham's descendants should be a blessing to the whole earth. It was also said that his descendants should become a great nation. This was fulfilled once, for they were at one time a very great nation;—and what has been often remarked, they are at this day *a nation*, though not a great one: which is more than can be said of any other people on the face of the earth who were a nation as early as the Jews, and have suffered so many strange revolutions of fortune.

The Jewish nation, Abraham's natural descendants, were set apart, above all other nations, to receive and keep the

revealed knowledge of God until the time when that one Person should rise up from among them through whom all nations were to be blessed equally. But it should be observed, that, while set apart to be the keepers of revealed religion, there was no special interference with their minds and characters to make them fully understand and improve it. Certain truths were told them and no more. Truths which *might* indeed have led them to a great many other truths, but which would not do so of necessity. And though from a right knowledge of God we *may* make out perfectly all our duties to one another, yet it by no means follows that we cannot help making them out. Therefore, Abraham and Abraham's descendants, not having a perfect revelation of their duties to their fellow creatures distinctly given to them, and not finding it so easy as we might fancy to *make them out for themselves* from what was revealed to them about God, were in fact no further advanced in many respects than other nations of the same period, and had no higher notions of moral duty in many points than the heathens around them. Nor is this to be wondered at, if we take the Bible as we find it, and do not spoil it by foolish suppositions of our own; if we observe *what is there said to have been revealed to the early patriarchs*, and do not *fancy that a great deal more must have been revealed to them, because it is now revealed to us.*

What has been here said is the key to all the difficulties in the Old Testament which have been made so much of; and with this remark I now leave my readers to think it over for themselves.

[From No. 4, May 28, 1831.]

(1.) THE ELECTIONS AND THE TORIES.

We are beginning at last to breathe freely after the intense excitement of the elections all over the kingdom. The contest has been sharp but short, and the victory of

Reform has been complete, even beyond the most sanguine hopes of its advocates. But it was a noble principle which forbade Romans to triumph over Romans: the pride of conquest and the ignominy of defeat, bad as they are in every case, are above all to be forborne when our adversaries are our countrymen. We have been delighted therefore to witness the honourable and kindly feeling which has been shown on both sides in some of the late elections. It was cheering to see that the manly and touching address of Mr. Bankes, when resigning the contest for the county, was not lost upon the electors of Dorsetshire; and that those of Cornwall, while resolute to give their votes only to a Reformer, could still respect and regard the ability and virtue of Sir Richard Vyvian. These things encourage the hope expressed in a former number, that, as soon as the struggle was decided, the people would distinguish between their honourable and conscientious opponents and the mere mercenaries of the anti-reform cause, and that they would gladly avail themselves of the services of the former as soon as the complete success of Reform should enable them to do it with safety.

Yet although many individuals of the Tory party will, as we hope and believe, be members of a reformed parliament, still it cannot be doubted that, as a party, the Tories are, politically speaking, from henceforth perpetually humbled. No man, indeed, can foresee what changes may be reserved for us in a course of years, and many of the elements of Toryism may again be seen in the ascendant: but the old form of common English Toryism, whether in its earlier shape of devotion to Church and King, or in its later character of an attachment to Aristocracy, is become now a thing of other days—it will influence the fortunes of this nation no more. We confess that this total overthrow of an enemy lately so formidable has wonderfully lessened our hostility towards it. One cannot strike a man when he is down: and it was difficult

not to be softened even towards Napoleon himself when he was a prisoner at St. Helena, and to think more of his actual degradation than of the fearful and systematic wickedness of his prosperous days. We can fully trust ourselves now to sketch the Tory Party of England with fairness; and as their political life is at an end, the following remarks may serve for their epitaph.

We have seen the Tories, at one period of our history, strongly opposing a war with France—and at another earnestly supporting one. We have seen them, in the time of the Stuarts, half coalescing with the Roman Catholics, and in our own days most strenuously resisting them: and yet they have been always perfectly consistent. But what they have never supported are Popular Principles—what they have always steadily resisted has been Reform, or, in their own language, "Change." When France was the great supporter of old established despotism, both civil and religious, they regarded her with favour;—when she set up a government founded on revolution, whether it were a republic or a tyranny, they struggled against her to the death. Thus again there was a period when they were friendly to the Roman Catholics; but never have they shown one spark of favour to the Protestant Dissenters. France has been, as we have seen at different times, their friend and their enemy; but towards America they have ever shown one uniform spirit of coldness and aversion. But two years ago, when the Russians were fighting against Turkey, and professing to assert the liberties of Greece, the Tories with one consent maligned their motives, undervalued their armies, and regretted their triumph:—now that these same Russians are fighting against the liberties of Poland, the Tories are magnifying their resistless power, and eagerly anticipating their victory.

The dislike of change which marks the Tories as a political party is in itself one of the most universal feelings in human nature. Some few nations may offer an excep-

tion; but, generally speaking, both nations and classes of men and individuals shrink from the trouble of alteration. Amongst the multitudes who cry so loudly for Political Reform, how many are there who dislike all changes by which their own habits and practices are altered! The change of the style—the change of the weights and measures—improvements in farming—improvements in machinery—nay, in many cases, improvements in health, cleanliness, and domestic comfort, are either rejected, or slowly and unwillingly received by the multitude, because it requires some trouble, some effort, some interruption to their old habits, to adopt them, or accommodate themselves to them. This common feeling the Tories apply to political matters for this further reason also:—because they belong mostly to that class of society who are well off under things as they are; and the indolence which shrinks from the trouble of change has, in their case, nothing but a liberal zeal for the good of others which could counteract it. But if men will endure rags, and dirt, and clumsiness, rather than make an effort to break their old habits, how much less will they desire any change, when their own actual condition is not one of suffering but of enjoyment?

Another point which marks the Tories as a party, and which no less marks a great proportion of those who abuse them the loudest, is their horror of general principles, and their adherence to what they call practical, straight-forward, common-sense notions. This indeed is closely connected with their dislike to change: but as it has formed a very striking feature of their public policy, it is as well to consider it apart. It is this feeling which has made them so long resist all amendments of our law, which has led them to detest free trade and political economy, and to delight in a paper currency. It is this same feeling which has made even the religious men amongst them so ill fitted to make our government and our institutions agreeable to the spirit of the Gospel.

They do not find it said in so many words in the New Testament that slavery is a wicked thing, and therefore they argue that Christianity does not condemn it. Rightly understanding that oaths are not in all cases unlawful to be taken, they have never made out the general principle of Christ's words, namely, that to require oaths of men has a tendency to make them careless about their bare word—and that therefore it is most blamable in persons in authority to impose a single oath without the strongest necessity; and that it is their duty to endeavour that in time none may be necessary at all. So with wars and with public measures in general; because from the situation of the first Christians the New Testament could not contain any direct rules upon these matters, and because the Tories are slow in catching the spirit of a system, and in applying general principles to particular cases, we have seen religious Tories maintaining the Lottery and the Game Laws; and we have not seen them alive to the wickedness of war, in ninety-nine cases out of every hundred; nor, while justly inculcating the duty of obedience on the part of the subject, have they been equally alive to the no less binding duty of a watchful, a self-denying, and a reforming attention to the public welfare on the part of the government.

In this love of the letter, rather than of the spirit, the Tories and the multitude strongly sympathize with each other. In fact, it is but a common weakness of our nature, and they are but exceptions who are free from it. The Tories are but another name for the multitude amongst the richer classes—the common run of human characters, with their faults and weaknesses, and also with a large portion of their virtues and respectable qualities. I have spoken of their faults—I will as fairly speak of their excellencies. As they are slow at improving upon general principles, so they are quick, dexterous, and decided, in practising the particular thing before them. They are good in administration and in action; so that if

we were living in a perfect world, or under a perfect political system, I should wish to see none but Tories in public stations, whether civil or military.

Again, as many of our natural feelings are great obstacles in the way of improvement, so there are many also which are far better and more ennobling than the mere hard intellect that despises them. Among these are a respect for noble birth, and the dignity which, even in very ordinary minds, is often derived from the consciousness of being born and bred a gentleman. Such also is local and patriotic affection, and an attachment to names, customs, and places, around which time or association has thrown a charm. Such too is the frank and cheerful love of sports—the entire abandonment of the mind at times to a state of childlike simplicity and enjoyment—the shrinking from the pride and pedantry of being eternally wise; these are all beautiful points in the character of the Tory country gentlemen, which redeem a large mass of ignorance and really blamable prejudice. In all these things the old Church-and-King men are a most delightful contrast to the hard and coarse intellectualism or fanaticism of their adversaries.

These elements of the Tory party are mixed, of course, in infinitely different proportions in the individual members of it. In some the good so preponderates, and the evil is so qualified by natural ability or moral goodness, or circumstances, that the dread of change is hardly more than a mere ballast to the zeal for improvement; the dislike to theories and general principles becomes only a safeguard against extravagant speculations, and against the fault of living in the clouds, instead of doing with an ardent spirit the world's daily business. Had men like these predominated in the Tory party, never should we have had our present Reform Bill, and for the best of all reasons—because we never should have needed it. Had those pious, wise, manly, and liberal Tories, of whom there happily still exist many in England, been able to give the

tone to the general character of Toryism, I could have wished their party to enjoy a perpetual ascendancy as heartily as I now rejoice in its defeat. But the comfort is, that the more we purify our institutions the more safely and usefully may we employ the Tories to administer them, as, while their good qualities will be as valuable as ever, their faults will be powerless to do mischief.

(2.) THE BIBLE.—GENESIS.

(Continued.)

I ENDED my last paper with saying that the key to all the difficulties in the Old Testament was to be found in one simple truth—namely, that the revelation made to the early patriarchs consisted of some particular points, only; that although much more *might* have been made out from these in the course of time, yet that it does not follow that it *must* have been, or *was* made out; and that in a great many points therefore the Patriarchs may have been no better informed than the Heathens around them. I call this the key to the difficulties of the Old Testament, because, as all our goodness must be judged according to our knowledge, we can well understand how men may be spoken of as good, who lived up to the best light of their conscience, even though that conscience might have still had much to learn. But if, on the other hand, the Patriarchs had the knowledge of Christians, then, unquestionably, nothing less than the standard of Christian excellence can be referred to in judging of their principles and practice.

It has been made an objection to Mr. Midman's History of the Jews, that he lowers our notions of Abraham by calling him a "Sheik," or "Emir." And indeed so far as these terms are associated in our minds with "Belief in a false Religion," so far they are unworthily and improperly applied to the "Father of the Faithful." But so

far as they lead us to think of a state of society very little advanced in its knowledge of the duties of man to man, and even in some respects of the duties of man to God, —a state of society in which slavery, polygamy, and private revenge were held to be perfectly lawful, and which was accustomed to make a very wide distinction between false speaking and false swearing, so far they give us not only the truest, but also the most favourable impression of the lives of the Patriarchs. It is by considering Abraham as an Eastern Emir, and as a man living in a state of society even less enlightened than that of the East at this moment, that we can best appreciate the excellence of his faith, and the power of the revelation of God. That unhesitating submission to God's command which led him to leave his country and pass all his days as the chief of a shepherd tribe; that noble sacrifice of all his dearest hopes at the call of his Maker, which made him consent to offer up his son; that mingled reverence to God and love to man which appear in his earnest intercession for Sodom; all these points, in which the most enlightened Christian cannot surpass him, become still more admirable when viewed as showing what the knowledge and love of God can effect upon the chief of a wandering tribe, surrounded by examples of the completest ignorance of all duty, both religious and moral[a].

Thus also in that most famous action of his life, when he was going to offer up his son as a sacrifice, the *principle* of this great trial was the same which has been applied to God's servants in every age, whether they were willing to part with what they loved best on earth when God's service called for it. But the *particular form* in which this principle was conveyed to Abraham was one suited to the imperfect religious knowledge of that early period. To sacrifice his son as a burnt offering to God would be to a Christian, not an heroic act of self-denying duty, but one of blasphemous fanaticism, which no evidence of its being

[a] [See "Essay on the Interpretation of Scripture," vol. ii. p. 446.]

a divine command could justify; because it is so contrary to the Gospel of Christ, that if an angel from Heaven were to bid us do it, we should be bound to reject it with abhorrence. Even after the Law of Moses had been given, which spoke of parents sacrificing their children as an abomination which God hated, we cannot conceive that such a mode of trial could have been chosen, since it is not so much a trial of our faith as an utterly maddening confusion of our notions of right and wrong, if we are forced to believe that God commands us to do what he has himself forbidden. But before the Law, before God had declared his abhorrence of human sacrifices, and in an age and country where they were resorted to as awful proofs of a wish to purchase the favour of Heaven by any sacrifice however costly, the command to sacrifice his son would be to Abraham distressing but not shocking; it would be the call of God to the performance of a most trying duty, not the dreadful delusion of a fanatic that revelation can be contrary to our uncorrupted conscience.

But if any one should think that the lives of the Patriarchs are rendered less instructive by being thus considered, or that it is lowering the early scripture history if we speak of the actors in it as of men possessing far less than a Christian's knowledge of right and wrong; nothing, as it seems to me, can be more unreasonable than such a fear. What can be more instructive than to trace the one great principle of faith in God existing in combination with the most different degrees of moral knowledge; yet always so ennobling the character in which it dwells as to raise it above the standard of its own times; and thus to witness in each successive generation that it is the true salt of human nature, the main element of its highest perfection? And as for lowering the Scriptures, it may indeed prevent us from superstitiously bestowing upon imperfect goodness that reverence which can be safely paid to One alone; but we can have learnt but little of the spirit of the Gospel, if because we know our duty

more fully than the Patriarchs we think ourselves better than they; not considering that as our clear light is our heaviest condemnation, so it is their greatest glory, that, so long before the sun had risen, they yet, amidst the twilight, could keep the right way so steadily.

[From No. 5, June 4, 1831.]

THE LABOURERS OF ENGLAND.

THE Reform Question has so taken hold of the public attention, that the newspapers have scarcely noticed some fresh causes of wilful fires that have taken place in Kent and Sussex, and some very painful instances of a malicious spirit shown towards the farmers in Wiltshire, by destroying or injuring various articles of their property in the night-time.

When the storm is raging no one can help noticing it; but the misfortune is, that so few people, when the sun is shining, watch for or think of the signs which warn us that the storm is going to rage. It is only the old and experienced seaman who observes every threatening appearance in the weather, and gets in all his sails in time; while the landsmen on board, seeing nothing but blue sky over their heads, wonder what the captain can be afraid of.

Will any man say that the causes of all the disturbances and crimes of last winter are now removed? Will any man say that the condition and feelings of the working classes are so thoroughly changed, that there is no more discontent or bitterness among them—or that the rich have been so thoroughly awakened that they are no longer guilty of neglecting or undervaluing the distresses of the poor?—or is the Reform Bill to work all these miracles for us,—and if so, *how* is it to do them?

Our object in setting up this Register was to get, if possible, to the root of this great evil—the unhappy situa-

tion in which the poor and the rich, the poorer and the richer classes, stand to each other. It is *the* evil, the great—I had almost said the only—evil from which we are suffering. We want the rich to open their eyes widely to the *fact;* we want the poor, who feel the fact but too keenly, to understand the *causes* of it. We want the rich to think of some real and good way of curing it; we want the poor to think whether the way which they are advised to try by their pretended friends is not a false and a wicked one.

When I call the great evil of England the unhappy situation in which the poor and the rich stand towards each other, I wish to show that the evil is in our feelings quite as much or more than in our outward condition. Much greater states of actual suffering have often existed in different parts of the world. War, pestilence, and actual famine have raged in former times through this very land of ours with a destruction which we now can hardly so much as fancy. In many parts of the world at this moment, even allowing for difference of climate, the poor are quite as ill fed as in England, and far worse clothed and lodged. But the great evil in us is, that there is so much suffering and so much enjoyment close alongside of each other: that although the poor in other countries may be as poor, yet the rich are nowhere so rich as in England; that if the one has elsewhere as much to suffer, yet the other has nowhere on the face of the earth any thing like as much to enjoy.

I have never had any patience at hearing persons in the rank of gentlemen in England complain of the burden of taxation. Undoubtedly our taxes are heavy, but they are but a cheap purchase-money for the unequalled civilization which we enjoy. Perfect freedom—perfect security—unrivalled means of communication—unequalled excellence in every article which can minister to the comfort of life—and the most abundant means of acquiring knowledge and of gratifying our taste and curiosity; these are

the blessings enjoyed in this country by all the higher and middle classes, and the lighter taxation of other countries would be but a poor exchange for the infinite superiority of civilization and comfort which the richer classes can command in England.

Together with this enjoyment—together with the extraordinary state of refinement which has flowed from it—there exists in the daily sight of it, and feeling the contrast of it at every turn, an enormous mass of poverty and ignorance. God forbid that I should speak of this ignorance proudly or reproachfully! In fact, it is a matter of the deepest shame and humiliation to those who have knowledge that so many of their fellow creatures should be left thus destitute of it. Nor by ignorance do I mean only an ignorance of what is called book-learning, but an ignorance of mankind and of many of those pleasures which men under happier circumstances can enjoy. They are ignorant of mankind, as all people must be who neither read, nor travel, nor see a great variety of persons at their own homes. The pleasures of poetry and music, of painting, of natural scenery, and of a knowledge of the common objects which we see every day around us, and of those laws by which they are governed, are either wholly unknown to many of the poor, or are at least most imperfectly enjoyed. And the consequence is, that while rich and poor all are born with one common nature, yet the tastes and faculties of each are so differently cultivated, that many things which the one most delights in, are not at all understood by the other, and are therefore ridiculed and despised.

Here then are two classes of people in the same country constantly coming in each other's way, yet with very little sympathy in each other's feelings, or views, or pleasures. They cannot understand each other, but yet they can see that the one class abounds, while the other is in want; that is, there are strong causes why one should, according to the well-known nature of man, envy and dislike the

other, and there are very few motives existing to draw them cordially together. And this is an evil which continually increases itself; for it is the natural effect of wealth to get more wealth, and of poverty to become still poorer, and the wider the distance is between the outward condition of the rich and poor, the wider also will be the difference between their notions of things and their feelings. This goes on for a long while with a daily increase of wickedness and misery, till the end is at last so dreadful that I gladly turn away my mind from the thought of it.

I lay a particular stress upon this separation of tastes and feelings between the rich and the poor in England, because I am sure it is the peculiar curse of our state of society. The most hurried view of the state of things on the continent must at once be struck with the great difference in this respect between the rest of Europe and ourselves. Abroad, the rich and the poor approach one another much more nearly in their habits, manners, and in many of their favourite amusements. The richer classes live more simply; the poor have opportunities afforded them of gaining a taste for the more refined pleasures. Nothing has given me more delight than to see the crowds of persons of every condition who frequent the great botanical garden at Paris. It is open freely to every body, with all its walks, plantations, museums, and menagerie; and the consequence is that the poor take a pleasure and a pride in it; and instead of disliking such things as the mere amusements of the rich, they enjoy them as much as the rich do; and common feeling prevents all that wanton mischief which is so complained of in England, and which is made the excuse for shutting up all our collections of pictures and other curiosities, and confining them to the rich alone. After what I had seen at the botanical garden at Paris, I was not surprised to hear that the people in the late revolution respected generally the works of art, and that such things were looked upon really as national

property which every man had a common interest in protecting.

This then, such as I have described it, is the state of the rich and poor in England. But what has led to it? —and what will cure or mend it? These are two great questions, which require a great deal of thought, and knowledge, and calmness to answer properly. And he certainly cannot have any one of these qualities who pretends that any single cause has brought about the evil, or that any single remedy can remove it.

I shall go on with this subject in a future number; in the mean time, if any reader of the Register, who takes an interest in it, and whose recollection of his own neighbourhood goes back a few years, would take the trouble to record and send to the Editor a notice of the principal changes which he has himself noticed in the relations of rich and poor towards each other, he would confer a service, not only on this publication but on the country at large, by helping to throw light upon the causes of the greatest of all evils under which it is labouring.

(2.) THE BIBLE.—GENESIS.

(Continued.)

HAVING set out at some length what I conceive to be a principle most important to the right understanding of the whole of the Old Testament, that the Revelations made to the Patriarchs were only partial, or limited to some particular points, and that their conduct must be judged of not according to our knowledge but to theirs, I now shall in a manner retrace my steps a little, and consider some of the particular events recorded in Genesis, beginning with the earlier part of it.

Considering the main object of the Scripture History to be that of tracing the religious progress of mankind, or their

successive relations towards God, the story of the first state of man, and of his fall, contains all that we could most expect to find in it. For leaving out a great many things which certainly we should be very glad to know, but which yet belong only to the subject of ordinary history, the story in Genesis, following man only in his relations to God, describes him as being first innocent, and then overcome by temptation—as being at first at peace with God, and afterwards afraid of Him and averse to Him—as being at first completely happy, and afterwards made subject to all those evils which we know to embitter the life of man at this day. It is very true that there are some things in the first chapters of Genesis which we cannot understand, and part of it possibly may be a sort of allegory or parable, of which we have not the key; yet, after all, there is much which is not only intelligible, but which speaks a language no less remarkable than valuable. It is most striking, and most original, that the first fault of man should be described as consisting partly, at any rate, in a desire after knowledge, and that this knowledge when gained made him feel more unfitted than before for communion with God, and more anxious to escape out of his presence. This is remarkable; for the whole tone and language of the Scripture is sensible and manly, and ignorance and superstition are continually combated and condemned. But unquestionably the Scripture, while encouraging to the utmost all knowledge that may help us to do our duty better, does seem habitually to discourage the cultivation of the mere intellect, as a thing unfitted to our present condition in this world. The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and for the mere indulgence of our intellectual appetite, seems to be regarded pretty nearly in the same light with an excessive desire of food for its own sake, for the gratification of our bodily appetite. There is indeed this great difference between the two, that whereas our bodily desires are too low for us, so the desires of our mind are too high: the one a good man has outgrown, but

for the other he is not yet grown enough; and he is told to wait with patience for that more perfect state of being when knowledge may not only be safely followed, but may be obtained in its full perfection. That this is a true representation of what is best for us in our present state is to my mind certain; if for this reason only, that no one can doubt whether the happiness of a family, of a neighbourhood, or of a nation, is best promoted by moral excellence or by intellectual; or, whether, in plain terms, he would rather have his son distinguished as a very learned man, or as a very good man[a].

All this may be misrepresented, and so rendered false and absurd, exactly in the same way as all sorts of superstitions have arisen from over straining the rules of common sense and of Scripture about our bodily appetites; instead of keeping them within proper bounds, men have tried to get rid of them altogether, and thus have made themselves very different beings from what God intended them to be. So, if a man were to destroy his intellectual appetite instead of regulating it; if he were to think ignorance was good, because knowledge may be pursued too keenly; if he were to trample upon his understanding, because some put it as it were in the place of God, then he too would act against God's purposes, and instead of becoming good and wise, his ignorance would certainly lead him into wickedness. Whereas what the Scripture teaches is, to have all our faculties and appetites in a healthy and vigorous state, but to take care that each keeps in its own proper order; for if our bodily appetites take the lead over those of our minds, we become no better than beasts; and if our intellectual appetites outgrow our affections, and make us forget that we are but put into the world to serve God, and do good to man, we are changing fast into the likeness of devils.

[a] [See Serm. Vol. vi. The Fall.]

(3.) "THE BILL, THE WHOLE BILL, AND NOTHING BUT THE BILL."

ANOTHER week, and Parliament will be assembling, and the great question of Reform will be on the eve of passing through it triumphantly. The tactics of the antireformers were so plainly exhibited before the dissolution, that the reformers would indeed be foolish if they were to be now unprepared to meet them. It was clear that the Tories would try to cripple the bill in its passage through the committee by altering its most effective clauses, or by adding others whose tendency would be to neutralize them. Thus the reformers were forced, in self-defence, to make their rallying cry "the Bill, the whole Bill, and nothing but the Bill;" and members have been in several places subjected to a close catechism on the part of their constituents, as to their sentiments on the particular clauses of the Bill, because a mere general profession of reform may be only a cloak for the most decided enmity; and a man while praising reform in the abstract may by partial objections defeat this and every other measure of actual reform which may be brought forward, and thus may try to keep things in their present state till we and all our generation shall be gathered to our fathers.

A double duty then is imposed upon the friends of reform; they must unite the tactics of parliamentary warfare with the enlarged and unimpassioned views of men legislating for posterity; they must be ready, to borrow an allusion from the sacred history, at once to fight and to build. No divisions amongst themselves must be suffered to give the enemy an opening; yet at the same time in enacting a great constitutional law it seems unwise to sacrifice a clear permanent benefit for the sake of winning a somewhat more decided victory at the present moment. They must therefore maintain to the death the great prin-

ciples of the present Bill, while they endeavour by certain salutary additions to obviate the most weighty objections to it.

In the first place, "Schedules A and B" must be most rigorously insisted on. Of course to correct unintentiona mistakes of detail is not to depart from them but strictly to fulfil them. The principle is that all existing boroughs whose population shall exceed 2,000 persons shall return at least one member to Parliament. If, owing to mistake or incorrect documents, a town containing more than 2,000 inhabitants has been entered on schedule A, or one con taining more than 4,000 on schedule B, it is clearly no alteration of the Bill, but a strict complying with its enactments, to correct such errors and to give to such towns the privileges which the Bill intended them to have. But beyond this point we must not yield a hair's-breadth. *The rotten boroughs must be clean cut off.* Proved or unproved corruption has nothing at all to do with the matter; for the very existence of these boroughs is, and in many cases always was, a gross corruption and absurdity. "*Nullum tempus occurrit Regi*" is a maxim of law never more justly pleaded than now, when the King, in behalf of himself and his people, is proceeding to challenge the boasted prescription of the rotten boroughs, and to remind them that no lapse of time can bar him from reclaiming his own and his people's lawful rights and properties.

With equal steadiness should we insist on the enfranchisement of the several places enumerated in schedule C, and on the proposed addition to the number of county members. Alteration here is not worth the risk of division. The antireformers have sneered at what they call "those overgrown watering places, Cheltenham and Brighton;" but why should not the natural advantage of possessing mineral waters raise a town as justly to political importance as the natural advantage of possessing a good harbour; or why should not Cheltenham derive the same

distinction as Bath from the same cause? Bath owes its corporation, its right of returning members, its abbey church, and its very existence, as a city, to its waters: why should those of Cheltenham be denied the same influence? I do not say that the Ministers may not fairly alter or add to their list, if by so doing they find that they will only the more effectually fulfil the principle of the measure; but any objection raised by the antireformers should be met by a decided opposition; because its motives must be suspicious and the chance of exciting differences between the friends of Reform is an evil far outweighing the possible advantage to be derived from yielding to it.

The third great point in the Bill is the giving the right of voting to the 10*l.* householders. It has been said that strong efforts will be made to raise the standard, and to fix it at 20*l.*, or at 15*l.*, rather than at 10*l.* Here again the friends of reform should strenuously resist such an alteration. It would not really improve the measure, but it would infinitely lessen its power in satisfying the minds of the people; as it would seem like an abandonment of a great popular principle in order to conciliate the friends of oligarchy. Besides, if the qualification be raised to 20*l.*, or even to 15*l.*, can the disfranchisement of the scot and lot voters be then fairly insisted upon? I would say hold fast to the 10*l.* qualification, but *give other qualifications besides.* Do not in any way narrow the liberality of the Bill, but rather extend it; and by so doing you will supply the only thing in which it seems to me to be deficient.

By the present scheme two great portions of the people appear to be unreasonably excluded from their just share in the national representation—the great body of agricultural and manufacturing labourers, on the one hand, and the great monied and commercial interests, including a large mass of the principle and intelligence of the country, on the other. By the old system, so far as the poorest classes enjoyed

the right of voting at all, they enjoyed it in the worst possible manner. The agricultural labourers, unless they happened to have a 40*s.* freehold, were universally deprived of it; whereas, in several instances where it was possessed by the populace of large towns, their numbers and their physical force gave them an undue influence, and there was as little freedom in an election for Preston as there used to be heretofore in one for Newark. It cannot be regretted then that the old scot and lot voters are to be disfranchised; but it by no means follows that the labouring classes are incapable of exercising any elective rights at all. Of all things in the world nothing certainly is more hateful than a mob, that is, an assemblage of persons at once numerous and tumultuous. But there may be a mob of noblemen as well as a mob of operatives; that is, it is the natural effect of a crowd, of whatever elements it is formed, to excite men's passions, and to drown their reason—to put, in short, the worst part of our nature uppermost. Bring the labourers of town or country together in large bodies, and let them be excited by one another and by the speeches of demagogues, and you might as well, or even better, trust the election of a member to chance, as to the votes of such an assembly. But let every five labourers give in writing to the constable of the parish the name of some one individual among those who enjoy the elective franchise, whom they or the majority of them think proper to fix upon as their elector; and let him give one vote for a member of parliament in the behalf of these five constituents, in addition to his own. It should be provided that no one individual should be thus entrusted with more than five votes besides his own; in other words, that he should not be the elector for more than twenty-five persons. The power therefore would not be great enough to tempt any man to bribe for it; and in general it would happen, when the choice was thus quietly and calmly made, that the labourer would choose as his elector the very man whom he ought to

choose: that is, the person whose judgment and kindness he had learnt most to respect and value in the common concerns of daily life.

With regard also to the great monied and commercial interests, it does seem to me that by the provisions of the Bill they are likely to be very inadequately represented. It must be a chance, for instance, whether there will be any man in Parliament capable of understanding and properly defending the interests of the India Company, the Bank, or the Colonies in general. And I cannot but think that it would be every way expedient to relieve funded property from the sort of outlawry under which it labours, to recall it within the pale of national society, to subject it to the burdens, and to invest it with the privileges to which all property is at once liable and entitled; in other words, to tax the funds on the one hand, and to give the fundholders the elective franchise on the other. It is true that the rotten boroughs sometimes enabled the great commercial and colonial interests to be represented; but then it was accidentally and unequally; and, as experience has shown, they were open to the nabob of Arcot as well as to the India Company—open, in short, to any one who could buy them. A better plan would be to allow the proprietors of Bank Stock and India Stock to choose a certain number of representatives for themselves, just as they actually choose their directors; and to extend this same right to such other great commercial bodies, whether actually incorporated or no, as from their importance and from the general ignorance and indisposition to their interests, may most require to be heard by their representatives in Parliament. This plan has a complete precedent in the constitution, in the case of the Universities, which return members not as mere local bodies, but as corporations for the maintenance of learning; and as Dublin, Oxford, and Cambridge send at once their local members and their University members, so London might return its members for the City, and its members for the Bank, the India

House, &c., without introducing any new principle into the Constitution, and with manifest benefit, as it appears to me, to the character of the national representation.

Thus would the Reform of the House of Commons be not only effectual, but would be freed from the only serious objections to which it is now liable,—that it will leave a large portion of the people unsatisfied, and some of our most important interests unrepresented. I would zealously uphold the present Bill, but I would add to it, and add to it in a manner that would make it at once more popular and more conservative, by giving to every Englishman such a participation in the elective franchise as he may fairly and usefully enjoy, and by providing that some of the most important elements in our national greatness should find members in the House of Commons who may duly appreciate and understand them.

[From No. 6, June 11, 1831.]

THE LABOURERS OF ENGLAND.

SINCE the publication of our last number, I have happened to meet with some other writings upon this subject which profess indeed to remedy the distresses of the poor in a manner sufficiently summary. According to them the land belongs to every body alike, and as the poor are the most numerous class, it will be perfectly easy for them to seize their due share of it, and they will have a perfect right to do so.

Now it is very true that every Christian, and indeed every man of common sense and honesty, feels instinctively that this is robbery, and that robbery can never be right. A poor woman gave me, a few weeks since, the best and simplest answer to all such wicked folly: when speaking of her landlord wanting his rent, she said quite naturally that she could not blame him—"*for own's own, whe-*

ther to rich or poor." And whether the writers who preach up these doctrines belong to some of those large gangs of pickpockets and thieves which infest London, and are thus only recommending to others what they are daily practising themselves—or whether they belong to those still more miserable wretches, who not only are doing the devil's service, but confess their master openly, and call themselves after his name—there is no serious fear of such preaching gaining many converts. But yet an honest man, when in great poverty himself, and when seeing others around him in great comfort, may be sometimes sorely troubled and perplexed at the sight, and his understanding may not find so ready an answer as his conscience to a doctrine which his distress renders so tempting. I should be glad therefore to lay the matter, if possible, clearly before the eyes of such men—to explain what the right of property is, and how it is neither just nor expedient to violate it.

It is said that the land belongs to every body. This is the original falsehood of the whole doctrine. Nothing belongs to *everybody;* but it either belongs to *somebody* or to *nobody at all.* The air belongs to nobody—the open sea belongs to nobody, and for this reason—because man has done nothing, and can do nothing, to make them better for his use than God made them from the beginning. The very first day after men were made upon the earth, the sea would carry ships, and the air would supply them with breath, just as perfectly as at this moment. Man has had nothing to do with them but to use them as he found them; and therefore over these God has given him no dominion—they are not his property at all. But with the earth or land, and with all things in it, it is quite different. Men were to *subdue* the earth—that is, to make it by their labour what it would not have been by itself; and with the labour so bestowed upon it came the right of property in it. Thus every land which is inhabited at all, belongs to *somebody*—that is, there is either some one person, or

family, or tribe, or nation, who have a greater right to it than any one else has: it does not and cannot belong to *everybody*. But so much does the right of property go along with labour, that civilized nations have never scrupled to take possession of countries inhabited only by tribes of savages—countries which have been *hunted over*, but never *subdued* or cultivated. It is true they have often gone further, and have settled themselves in countries which were cultivated, and then it becomes a robbery; but when our fathers went to America and took possession of the mere hunting grounds of the Indians—of lands on which man had hitherto bestowed no labour, they only exercised a right which God has inseparably united with industry and knowledge.

But you may say—we know that France does not belong to us, nor England to Frenchmen; all that we mean is, that England belongs to every Englishman, and France to every Frenchman. But all that I want to show is the right of property at all; that is, that some have a greater right to the possession of a thing than others; for if this be once allowed, we need not talk any longer about a state of nature, as it is foolishly called; we have done with beast's nature, and are living according to man's nature—that is, according to LAW and RIGHT, not according to BRUTALITY and MIGHT. It is LAW and RIGHT which say that although France produces wine and oil, and England can produce neither, yet that Englishmen must either get the wine and oil from France with the consent of Frenchmen, or else they must go without them. And it is just the same law and right, which say that although Northumberland has plenty of coal and Kent has none, yet that the men of Kent must either persuade the Northumbrians by fair means to let them have their coal, or they must go without it; or again, which say that although the soil of Bagshot Heath is very poor, and that round about Farnham is very rich, yet that the parishes on Bagshot Heath may not touch the hops of Farnham without the owners' leave; or again,

to come down a step lower, it is the self same LAW and RIGHT which will not let the man who has no land eat the corn of his neighbour who has land, unless he can persuade his neighbour, either for love or money, to let him have a share of it.

You may say however further, "we would have the law divide all England equally amongst Englishmen, and surely the law of the land may do what it likes with the land." But the law of the land and the law of property are as old as one another, and one of these cannot upset the other. The holders of property may doubtless make laws about their own property, but those who have none can never make a law about that of others, because the law of property is as old as society itself, and if this be done away with, we go back at once to the state of BRUTES, when every man got what he could, and kept what he could. As men in a savage state may not kill one another, because the right to life is as old as the very existence of man at all; so men in society may not take away property, because the right to hold property is as old as the very existence of society itself.

But are persons without property to starve rather than lay hands on the property of their neighbours? I will ask, in return, what do we think of those dreadful causes in which men in the extremity of famine have even killed one of their number to be food for the rest? We cannot judge of acts of the last dreadful necessity; but we do know that the extremest necessity is no rule for common cases, and that if absolute starvation be allowed to be stronger than the law of property, it does not follow that the same excuse should be allowed to distress and inconvenience. I will not speak of the right of a starving man, or a man with a starving family, to help himself to food if it is denied him, till I shall know that there are found to be any so wicked as to deny it him. But what is to the purpose to speak of, and what, with God's blessing, I hope to speak of, is the wickedness of those who would persuade

the poor that poverty, not starvation, may be relieved by robbery, and the equal wickedness of those, who being aware of the poverty of their neighbours, are yet disposed to make no sacrifices to relieve it by means at once rightful and effectual.

Meanwhile we may be assured of this, that as nothing less than absolute starvation could justify an attack upon the laws of property, so nothing less will ever successfully attempt it. It is very true that the poor are many, and the rich comparatively few, and that if all the poor were to combine they might not only rob, but murder also, if they chose it, all the rich. They might do this, *if they would;* but *they never will have the will to do it.* Any man might kill his neighbour if he chose, but he does not choose it; for God, although He suffers evil to exist in the world, does not allow it to exercise such dominion as this. God no more allows the majority of mankind to think evil good, and good evil, than He allows the beasts of the field to concert and combine together, to throw off the rule of man. As surely therefore as the horses will never use their strength to destroy men instead of serving them, because it is against God's law of nature, so surely will the mass of mankind never combine to rob and to murder, because it is against God's law of human society. The hearts of men are in His hand no less than the stars of Heaven; and He will no more permit the one to destroy the social system by their vices, than He will let the other derange the order of the universe by their irregular wanderings. Therefore, if the right of property be founded on justice, and is according to God's will, and necessary to the well-being of mankind, as I have shown that it is, it never will be overthrown; and although its abuses will and ought to be removed, yet it will in itself stand fast till the world itself shall perish.

[From No. 7, June 18, 1831.]

THE BIBLE.—Genesis.

(Continued.)

I have said that in the first chapters of Genesis there are some things which we cannot clearly understand; and that parts of them may possibly be a sort of allegory or parable, of which we have lost the key. Yet still I have always thought that what is called the Story of the Fall illustrates the actual state of the world in some remarkable points more than is commonly noticed.

The story literally taken represents the offence of the first man and woman to have consisted in eating of a certain fruit, which is called the Fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil; and it goes on to state, that one consequence of this offence was the sense of *personal shame*, that sense of decency which has induced almost all nations, except some of the most ignorant savages, to wear at least certain portions of clothing. The account further states, that a part of the punishment for this offence consisted in subjecting women to pain and danger in the birth of their children, and in imposing upon men the necessity of perpetual labour.

It is also mentioned—and this is a part of the history which is much more dwelt upon—that in consequence of having broken God's commandments, man became afraid of God, and wished to escape from His presence; and that he was driven out of the Garden of Eden, that he might not eat of the Tree of Life and live for ever; for now he was not only to labour while he did live, instead of enjoy, but his life was after a few years to be at an end, and he was to return to the dust out of which he had been made.

Now that there are things in this account very hard to be understood is plain to everybody. But looking at the whole carefully, it seems to show that man's first offence was a mixture of the desires of the body with those of the

mind or intellect; that it was longing after sensual pleasures and intellectual power. And our present condition in the world seems very much to throw light upon the particular nature of the punishment inflicted.

Mr. Malthus has said that men, if left to themselves, have a tendency to multiply faster than food can be raised to maintain them. Therefore, the population must be checked either by good means or bad; either by men's own prudence and sense of duty before the evil begins, or by distress and various kinds of misery in the end. But it has been objected that this is accusing God of mismanaging the course of nature, and of putting an evil in it which must render happiness here impossible. The account in the beginning of Genesis seems here to step in, and to show that this state of things was in fact intended as a punishment; that it was ordered on purpose that there should be no happiness here unpurchased by self-denial. The tendency to multiply faster than food can be produced, or in other words, to multiply *excessively*, seems to be itself a part of the corruption of our nature; it is the dominion of the animal appetite. It is an evil, doubtless, but one not of God's original design, but of man's bringing in afterwards. He chose to give his animal passions an *unnatural* strength and power, and he takes the consequence. Hence the sufferings of childbirth in women and the necessity of labour in man, were at once the punishment and at the same time the check upon this evil. If a man multiplied his children, he must multiply his labours; while, at the same time, he was not cursed to labour without fruit; but the support which he could not get without working, he yet might obtain if he did work for it—if not in one country, yet in another—that so, good might still be brought out of evil; and the very necessity of labour always existing, and growing out of the very midst of prosperity and increasing numbers, might be too powerful even for man's indolence and natural feelings,

and might force him from the land of his fathers to go and subdue and replenish other, even the most distant parts of the world.

So far then as man's first offence consisted in longing after *forbidden animal pleasures*, and so making his animal desires unnaturally strong, so far we see its punishment in that constant tendency to an excess of population which obliges him to constant labour and self-restraint. And so far as his offence consisted in longing after *forbidden intellectual pleasure*, and so making his intellectual desires, his curiosity, and thirst of knowledge in itself, unnaturally strong, so far we see its punishment in that sentence of death and bodily infirmity which of necessity humbles the pride and cuts short the inquiries of the wisest. On the very verge of strong intellectual excitement is madness, incurred too commonly by an absence of wholesome control over our passions, intellectual as well as bodily—the natural termination of restless and selfish desires, whatever be their particular kind. And this is a disease which increases with the increase of civilization; the greater the excitement produced by a strong competition in everything, and by an almost feverish activity both of body and mind, the more is our reason endangered.

Thus far then the twofold character of the original offence, as recorded in the earliest chapters of Genesis, corresponds with what we see now daily before us;—and what is described as having been adjudged as its punishment is, in fact, in daily operation, and rendering it impossible that this world should ever be a place of perfect bodily or perfect intellectual enjoyment. The other effects of the Fall, and what is meant by "Death," further than the mere extinction of our earthly being, I propose to consider hereafter.

[From No. 9, July 2, 1831.]

THE BIBLE.—GENESIS.

(Continued.)

IN my last paper I considered those parts of the punishment of man's first offence, as recorded in the Bible, which are matters of daily experience. We all see that we are born under a necessity to labour. We see too that all our plans and all our undertakings are cut short by bodily decay and death.

But there is something more in this word "death," according to the Scripture account of it, than the mere end of our life here: it is spoken of in darker terms than as a mere falling asleep for ever. And this farther sense of the term, this worst evil of our natural condition since the fall, I am now proposing to consider.

I said in my former paper, that as man's first fault seems to have consisted in an excessive indulgence of his bodily desires, and in an excessive indulgence of his intellectual desires, so the punishment was exactly fitted to the offence; inasmuch as this world can never be a place of perfect bodily or perfect intellectual enjoyment. But there are other desires in man besides those of his body and his intellect; there are the desires of his spirit, his wish to know God, and his desire to be happy with Him, and in Him. It is very true that in too many of us, as we now are, there seems to be no such wish or desire at all; we are too often what the Scripture would call, dead to God; yet if we argue upon it coolly, such wishes and desires are just and reasonable, and in the best men they do exist as a matter of fact. I call them, therefore, natural, as being required by our nature in theory, and actually existing in the best specimens of it; although in the common and imperfect specimens they are wanting. These desires then after God were, by the first sin of man, thrown down from being the strongest principles in us, to be the very feeblest: the

desires of the body and the mind quite overgrew them. This is what may be called the natural effect of the Fall, and it brought with it its own punishment; for having ceased to care about God, or to love Him, we shut ourselves out, in a manner, from the highest happiness of a created being, and that which at once ensured immortality —we undid the relation between us and our Maker and Preserver, withdrawing ourselves from the care of His providence, and subjecting ourselves to whatever fate may attend those for whom His protecting care watches no longer.

What seems intended then by the word "death," in the Old Testament, is principally "a state of final separation from God." He is no longer our God, and we are no longer the objects of His care. If there were no God, and if all things in the universe were to become at once a blank when this mortal life were over, death would then indeed be no more than an eternal sleep, and we might easily train ourselves to regard it with no terror; but as God lives for ever, and His power fills the whole universe, death is dreadful on two accounts, first, for what it deprives us of—an eternity of happiness with God—and next, for what it may subject us to in an eternity passed without Him.

The very ungodliness then which prevails so commonly in the world, is the actual seal and assurance of this most awful sentence of death. Men are too often separated from God actually—they believe not in Him, care not for Him, are, in short, living without Him in the world. They are, in the Scripture language, dead and condemned already, having shut their eyes, and closed their hearts against the fountain of light and life. They have denied Him, and are denied by Him. They look upon the universe as on a system without a governor; and to them it will be so for ever. They will probably never know any more of God than they do now: to them the universe will contain nothing wiser or better than themselves. And

this now for a few years, and with God's creatures given them to enjoy, they find to be sufficiently tolerable; but when these creatures are all taken away from them, when left to themselves, and to the society of such as themselves only, nothing can be conceived so miserable as such a state—a state of death to every thing good and happy, and of the full enjoyment of unmixed evil in themselves and others for ever.

(2.)

It is with considerable regret that we feel ourselves obliged to announce to our readers that we must, in this present Paper take our leave of them. Without troubling them with matters of no public concern, the Proprietor of the Englishman's Register may simply observe that the expense of continuing it unsupported, and under some unavoidable disadvantages, is too serious to be long defrayed by an individual, with a very uncertain prospect of ultimate success.

At the same time we have nothing to complain of in the reception which our Paper has met with, and sincerely thank our friends for the encouragement they have given us. Our main object will be abundantly answered, if, from this attempt, any thing on the same principles, but with better means of ensuring success, may be hereafter originated. And we earnestly hope to be able ourselves to do something still for the great work, on which we verily believe the existence of civilized society in this country does mainly, under God, depend.

The people want neither to be excited nor insulted—neither to be goaded on by the wickedness of the Revolutionists—nor to be disgusted with the suppressions and idle cant of those who call themselves the conservative party. Nor yet do they want the suppressions of another

party, who would impart to them all truth except the highest—who would give them all knowledge, except the knowledge of God. They want to be told the truth in the fullest sense of the word; and nothing else will ever be so pacifying or so enlightening.

But good men will not unite to tell it them, and the end will be that falsehood and error of one kind or other is likely to be predominant. In these divided attempts, however, to win the People's ear, the party which will be most successful, will, we fear, be that of the Revolutionists; inasmuch as the actual distresses of the poor are so powerful an ally to their reasonings. And neither the Conservative party nor the Liberals can singly cope with them; the former, from the suspicion attached to them on account of their seeming indifference to all the evils of the present system; and the latter, because they do not take that high ground, on which the direct and monstrous wickedness of the revolutionary school can alone be effectually combated.

The writings of this school have been noticed in Parliament this week, and Sir F. Burdett and Mr. Hume affected to speak contemptuously of their influence. No doubt they will have no effect on any good and well-informed mind; but how many amongst all classes are there who are neither good nor well-informed. What writings could be viler, in every point of view, than those of Marat and Hebert? And their influence certainly was short-lived, as may be expected in all similar cases; but yet it was no light amount of evil that they effected in the interval. Our children may outlive the storm, but we in the meanwhile, with some things perhaps more irreparable than any single one of the fleeting generations of mankind, may be swept away by its violence.

What may be done by fair discussion, by meeting, by growing intelligence of the poorer classes with real sympathy, and sincerely labouring to advance it, has been already beautifully shown by the impression produced on the

London Mechanics' Institute, last winter, by the Lectures of Sir R. Wilmot Horton. Whatever good this excellent person may do in Ceylon, he can ill be spared in England:—and in this, as in too many other instances, it is far easier to admire a good example than to imitate it.

Here, then, we take our leave of our Readers, in the earnest hope, that, if no one has been amused or instructed by the Englishman's Register, at least no one has been injured by it; and that others may make the same attempt that we have done, with greater ability and with better success.

LETTERS

CHIEFLY ON

THE SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE OPERATIVE CLASSES.

ADDRESSED TO THE SHEFFIELD COURANT.

[In July, 1831, after the discontinuance of the Englishman's Register, Dr. Arnold, on finding that some of its articles had been copied into the Sheffield Courant by the Editor, Mr. Platt, opened a communication with him, of which the following Letters, written in the latter part of 1831 and the early part of 1832, were the result. —See Life and Correspondence, vol. i. 285. 309.]

LETTERS

ON

THE SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE OPERATIVE CLASSES.

LETTER I.

Sir,—I have lately been travelling through the northern and midland counties of England;—and though I am ill qualified to give you an agricultural report, yet it was impossible not to be struck with the promising aspect of the crops, and the generally flourishing appearance of the country. But I find that views of this kind, whenever I see them, affect me with almost as much pain as pleasure. One cannot enjoy the beauty which one sees, because we know how much of suffering and how much of discontent and all evil passions are lurking beneath it. Even when I saw the work of harvest going on in full activity, and in the most favourable weather, I could not but think of the wickedness which out of pure fiendish malice had so often during the last winter destroyed the fruits of the earth which God had given us, and which perhaps is now preparing to repeat, on a larger scale, the same atrocities again.

I confess to you, Sir, that when I think on this great subject,—on the moral and physical state of the English labourers, whether employed in agriculture, in manufactures, or in trade, I grow somewhat impatient of those long discussions upon the Reform Bill, which are engrossing the time, if not the attention, of Parliament. And so

widely are these discussions spread by the public press, that this same question engrosses the attention not of Parliament only but of the nation at large:—it delays inquiry into other matters, and prevents those measures of precaution or of palliation, which it is dangerous, which it may be fatal to postpone. What have we learnt from the experience of last autumn and winter? Nothing, I fear, in the way of preventing the recurrence of such scenes;—the wise and good, they who could and would better the present state of things, seem to have learnt nothing at all from it; but the authors and instruments of evil have learnt much. Upon them, if I am not greatly misinformed, the lesson has been any thing but thrown away. At any rate this much is certain, that while nothing has been done within the last six months to enlighten and improve the poorer classes, much has been done and is daily doing to mislead and to excite them; clubs, unions, and associations, the eternal curse of society in every age and country that has witnessed them, are more active and more audacious than ever; and the foundations of all moral and social good are assailed with a vehemence which, unhappily, is only to be equalled by the supineness or ignorance with which they are defended.

Meanwhile, Sir, there is in action one instrument from which I hope much, and that is the Provincial Press.—Most of the country newspapers which I have seen, seem to me to be really independent; to be free from aristocratical influence, and at the same time to be above pandering to the popular passions and follies, like too large a portion of the newspaper press of London. There is a soberness in their tone which is the thing most essential to the directors of public opinion. The people are just as much slaves, when they follow blindly the violence and faction of an unknown writer in a newspaper, as when they are bribed or overawed by property and political influence. I wish the people to be really independent;—that is, to think and to judge calmly for themselves; not

to be agitated, and to clamour without thinking, just as their favourite newspaper sets them on. I am a thorough friend to knowledge, and, therefore, I detest excitement and violence; for these utterly obscure the truth, and make a man ready to talk and act upon every thing, while he knows nothing.

If you agree with me in these principles, you will, perhaps, be disposed to second my endeavours to put them in practice. I care not whether people agree with me or not in all my conclusions, if I can but persuade them really to think for themselves, and to consider freely and fairly those questions on which they are now no better than the veriest parrots and slaves. Far be it from me to fancy that I can see my way through all the difficulties of our social condition; so absurd a vanity would make me unworthy to occupy the humblest and smallest corner of any of your columns. But if I can only set an example of fair and calm inquiry, concealing nothing, palliating nothing, exaggerating nothing—if I can lead men to consider their grievances wisely, as well as to feel them keenly—to look into the causes of them, and so to dismiss that soreness and fierceness with which they now regard their supposed authors;—if, in short, I can but in any degree improve the temper and sober the judgment with which men now study political questions,—neither shall I have written in vain, nor will you, I am sure, repent of the space in your paper which you will have allowed me to occupy.

I propose to begin then in my next letter with giving a sketch of the several causes which have brought about the present relations of the rich and poor towards one another, both with regard to their mutual feelings, and to their outward condition.

LETTER II.

Sir,—Allow me to thank you for the readiness with which you have received my first communication, and for the kindness with which you have expressed your willingness to forward my views.

If it should please God that the Cholera should reach this country,—if it were to spread through our thickly peopled towns and parishes with its usual virulence,—if suffering and death were preying upon thousands of our population,—you can conceive, Sir, amidst all the panic that would undoubtedly prevail, how much we should witness also of active and judicious inquiry, and of self-denying charity. But above all, great as would be the evil, it would not be embittered by angry and revengeful passions amongst ourselves. It would arise so clearly from causes utterly beyond human power to counteract, that the sufferers themselves could attribute their calamity to no other source than the inscrutable will of God:—it would be so great and manifest a scourge that all persons would use their best and most vigorous endeavours to get rid of it.

Such is the case with the visitations of sickness; such is the case also with the visitations of famine, when they arise clearly from unfavourable seasons. But unluckily it is far otherwise with the visitations of poverty. Here the sufferers attribute the evils which oppress them to the faults of other men; and as passion is blind, they are apt to try any means rather than those which can really effect their object, to deliver themselves from their burden. On the other hand, they who are exempt from the visitation, instead of regarding it as an evil calling aloud for palliation, if not for total cure, are tempted to view it too much as coming in the natural course of things,—as resembling the fevers of autumn, or the agues of marshy districts—inconveniences which have happened and will continue to

happen—against which it is vain to struggle, and they who escape them have only to enjoy their good fortune and congratulate themselves that *they* are not the victims.

The object, then, of every honest public writer at this moment should be to calm and to enlighten the poor; to interest and to arouse the rich. We are afflicted by a great evil, not certainly brought on solely by the hand of God—like the visitations of pestilence or famine,—yet brought on so far as men have been the authors of it, partly by a sort of chance medley, partly through ignorance, and partly from the mere indulgence of feelings so universal, and usually visited with so little blame, that no man has a right to impute them as a crime to his neighbour. On the other hand, the evil is so great, and ignorance and carelessness, however excusable at first, become so deeply blameable after warning given, that it will not do to regard the actual state of the poor as an unavoidable drawback upon national prosperity,—a drawback which *must* be paid, and which it is the best way to think of as little as possible.

If I do but state ever so briefly the various causes which have brought on our present distress, the number of matters thus crowded together within a few lines will be almost enough to bewilder some readers. But if they can scarcely see their way through the subject when laid at once before them, how could others, while seeing only the unconnected parts of it, and without the aid of experience to enlighten them, be expected to see beforehand to what their conduct was leading? Our present distress is owing—

First—To the long war which raged through Europe for more than twenty years, everywhere deranging the state of society, and in England forcing suddenly the increase of our population and of our commerce and manufactures to an unnatural and therefore mischievous excess.

Second—To the natural tendency of wealth to become richer, and of poverty to become poorer; by which trade

carried on on a large scale has driven trade on a smaller scale out of the market; by which the rich have been enabled to buy property to a large extent, and often at a great advantage; while men of small fortunes have been led to sell, often at a great disadvantage; so that, while a larger portion of the community has been forced to depend wholly on their labour, that labour itself, owing to the effect of great wealth in encouraging human invention, and thus leading to the discovery and use of machinery, has become far less valuable.

Third—To the effect of wealth in making men more alive to, and more able to procure, intellectual pleasures; while poverty renders the same pleasures at once undesired and unattainable; so that the different classes of society have been removed to a greater distance from one another, have sympathized with and understood each other less, and thus have become strangers to each other, too ready, I fear, to become enemies also.

Fourth—To the Poor Laws, a beneficent institution,—harmless and even salutary—in a wholesome state of society; but fearfully aggravating its evils when once it becomes diseased, by encouraging a want of forethought and exertion in the poor, and accustoming them not to look higher than the bare necessaries of life; while, on the other hand, the rich are galled by a burden of a compulsory charity, their feelings are hardened, and, accustomed to look on their neighbours as on paupers supported at their expense, they lose towards them all sense of equality and brotherhood.

Fifth—To the excess of aristocracy in our whole system, religious, political, and social; an evil arising from causes which run back to the earliest period of our history; and which have tended silently and unconsciously to separate the higher classes from the lower in almost every relation of life. For instance, it is an enormous evil, yet one for which no one is to blame, that the rich and poor in England have each what is almost a distinct language; the

language of the rich, which is of course that of books also, being so full of French words derived from their Norman ancestors, while that of the poor still retains the pure Saxon character inherited from their Saxon forefathers.

Now, Sir, in this brief and compressed statement there is matter enough to think upon, for those who are able and willing to think instead of clamouring and indulging mere ignorant abuse. These are real and intelligible causes of the present distress; but because they do not serve the ends of agitators, they are passed over in silence, whilst the changes are wrung upon the vague words—"Corruption," "Misgovernment," "Tyranny," "Pampered oligarchy," Boroughmongering faction," &c., &c. Truly it is hard to decide whether they who use this language are more wicked or more ignorant; for though their tone and spirit abundantly show that truth is not their object, yet their excessive shallowness must wholly acquit them of having discovered it and then wilfully suppressing it. But popular principles are too sacred to be abandoned in disgust because of the vileness of their advocates; and I hope to labour unceasingly in the great work of social reform, notwithstanding the baseness and the folly by which it is obstructed under pretence of advancing it.

LETTER III.

Sir,—In the month of November last, a paper was found one morning, affixed to the church in a small parish in one of the midland counties, which was at that time, and afterwards, perfectly free from any disturbance. The paper was of some length; and from some particular circumstances, as well as from internal evidence, it was known to be the genuine production of one of the labourers

in the village. It was so striking, both in matter and manner, that the clergyman of the place read it aloud immediately to the farmers in the vestry-room, and carried it about afterwards, to shew it to several persons in the neighbourhood. Amongst the rest he shewed it to me, and I read it with very great interest and attention. It seemed to me to be clearly genuine—that is, it expressed the real grievances of the labourers of that neighbourhood, just as they were likely to feel them of themselves, without having been influenced and corrupted by the falsehoods of the Jacobin press. Its complaints, therefore, appeared to me to be well worth our serious attention, and they certainly confirmed the views which I had long been accustomed to entertain as to the real evils of the labourers' condition and their causes.

This paper said nothing about rents, or tithes, or taxes: it complained neither of the squire, nor of the parson, nor of the government: neither did it cry out against the aristocracy, nor speak of the rich as the enemies and oppressors of the poor. It set out with saying, that God had intended that there should be both rich and poor in the world, but not that the poor should be so wretched and degraded as they were at present. It complained that cottages had been pulled down, and cottage gardens thrown together and ploughed up, to increase the size of the large farms. It dwelt particularly upon the distance which there now was between the farmers and the labourers: the farmers, it said, do not now call their labourers into their kitchen, and give them a draught of beer, but "take no more notice of them *than if they were dumb beasts*, and let them eat their crust by the ditch side, with nothing to drink with it but water." And it spoke of the fires which were then frequent in so many counties, as of great acts of wickedness; but that the farmers might certainly expect such a judgment on their hard-heartedness, if they still persisted in it. It concluded with praying for a blessing

upon the clergyman of the parish, whom it described as "the good shepherd," who worked in the Church and out of the Church to do the people good.

Now we see, Sir, that in this paper the grand grievances of the labourer are described as twofold: his absolute want of comforts, in getting only the poorest food, and a crowded and miserable dwelling; and his degradation in society, in being left to eat his meal in the open air, as if he were a dumb beast. The latter of these seemed to have made quite as deep an impression on the writer's mind as the former, and very deservedly; for a want of kindness is as bad as a want food, and to society at large it is far more mischievous; for it spreads mutual suspicion, and fear, and hatred, and makes men ascribe the evils of their outward condition to the faults of their neighbours, and thus to think themselves not unfortunate, but aggrieved. There is no saying how much mischief is thus created, and the consequences cannot be better shewn than by what was said in the paper about the fires. The writer, it seems, would on no account have taken any part in them, yet he could not be altogether sorry if they were to break out in his parish; because those who suffered from them seemed to him to deserve punishment. Even a good man could go as far as this; and how many are likely to be found in every parish who would gladly go much farther?

I will go any lengths with any man in acknowledging the enormity of this evil, and the urgent necessity of correcting it. But still I know that it has not been brought about intentionally, and that it would not have been easy, unless they were far better than they are, to have avoided it. It is the consequence of the violent stimulus or spur given to the progress of society in our days, by various causes, some good and some bad:—by the long war in which we have been engaged, on the one hand; and by the increased activity of the human mind on the other. We have been living, as it were, the life of three hundred years in thirty. All things have made a prodigious start

together,—or rather all that could have done so, and those that could not, have, therefore, been left at a long distance behind. When an army makes a forced march, every one knows how impossible it is to make all the parts of it advance equally.

The process in its details has been this. The war created a great demand for every thing; and the other countries of Europe, feeling the actual miseries and the distractions of war far more than we did, and being cut off by our great naval power and Bonaparte's decrees from foreign commerce,—left us to supply much more than our fair share of it. Large fortunes were made, and enormous sums of money brought into circulation; activity and extravagance were the order of the day. Every man in the richer and middling classes saw around him examples of greater enterprise in all sorts of ways, and of greater luxuries enjoyed in consequence, than he or his father had ever known. We know how contagious such examples are, and that in these matters no man likes to be left behind his neighbour. Accordingly, rents were raised, wastes were inclosed, farms thrown together, small properties bought up, new branches of trade opened, new manufactories set up, new machines invented, and every hand that could be found was pressed into the service of capital, either to make it, or to increase it. All was busy and all was thriving; and of the quantity of national wealth thus created, you and I, Sir, and all the higher and middling classes are tasting the benefits;—some, it is true, with more or less of a drawback in their increased taxation, but still we are enjoying many more comforts, or luxuries if you will, than were enjoyed by our fathers. Nor is it to be denied that the poor also are deriving some benefit from it. Earthenware has succeeded to wood or pewter; their wives and daughters can dress better and cheaper; and cheap publications are much more numerous. But with the poor it has taken away with one hand more than it has given with the other. It is an universal rule, whe-

ther in morals, in knowledge, or in money matters, that "*much will make more*," and that "*little is apt to become less*." The small farmer was driven out of the market by the large farmer; the small tradesman by the great one; the small home manufacturer, who eked out the produce of his farm or of his labour in the fields, by the spinning, or straw platting, or lace making, of his wife and daughters in the winter evenings, could not stand against the united powers of capital and machinery. Deprived of the means of selling any thing else to advantage, they were forced to increase the class, already too large, of those who had nothing to sell but their labour. But here the market was becoming overstocked, for the war ended, and the demand for every thing lessened, and other nations were bestirring themselves to supply their own wants; so that there was getting less to be done, with more hands, and those wholly without other means of support, vying with one another to do it. Of course labour fell, for who could expect a farmer to pay more for work when he could get it done for less? But what was even worse was this, that while one half of society was moving forward, and the other half sinking backward, the distance between them in feelings and habits was continually becoming greater. I have often heard gentlemen speak with much indignation of the changed habits of farmers and tradesmen: the farmer, they say, keeps his hunters, and his wife and daughters dress as finely as ladies, and learn music instead of making pies and puddings, as formerly; and hence it is, they go on, that the labourers are turned out of doors to eat by the ditch side, and are treated like "*dumb beasts*." I have never heard such language without feeling quite as much indignation as those who used it; but it was directed not against the farmers, but against themselves. What insolence is it, when we ourselves are so changed from the manners of our fathers, when we are so much better educated, and enjoy so many more comforts than they did, to complain of others for having made a similar

advance. I rejoice most heartily in the changed habits of the farmers,—if the fact be true,—and I only wish that the habits of the labourer had been raised also. The high Aristocrat is but echoing the language of the worst Jacobin; except that the Jacobin is the more consistent of the two. Both would pull down the higher of two unequal classes, instead of raising the lower; but whilst the Jacobin would reduce all ranks to the lowest level, the high Aristocrat would reduce all but his own. To both is the doctrine of the good and the wise utterly opposed. Our business is to raise all, and to lower none. Equality is the dream of a madman, or the passion of a fiend. Extreme inequality, or high comfort and civilization in some, coexisting with deep misery and degradation in others, is no less also a folly and a sin. But an inequality where some have all the enjoyments of civilized life, and none are without its comforts,—where some have all the treasures of knowledge, and none are sunk in ignorance, that is a social system in harmony with the order of God's creation in the natural world,—and which can alone fulfil His purposes for man as a reasonable and a spiritual being, as capable of serving and glorifying his Maker here, and of enjoying with Him hereafter an eternal communion.

LETTER IV.

Sir,—My last letter has brought me very nearly to the threshold of the grand difficulty which besets the whole matter of our inquiries; the difficulty of knowing *how things are to be mended.* There are mistakes enough afloat as to the causes of our present evils, and yet here we have actual facts to investigate; they may be tangled and confused, it is true, yet we know that as the result is before our eyes, a careful tracing of things backwards will

bring us at last to the true cause or causes of it. But in projecting remedies we are in a manner bridging chaos: we start from firm ground, but we instantly lose our footing, and all becomes uncertain; we may hope, we may suppose, fairly argue, and reasonably conclude; but with regard to the future we cannot *know*.

I wish that this view of the case were as vividly present to the minds of all political writers, as it must be to theirs who know the most and think the deepest. To read the arrogant language of many a journalist, one would suppose that they were the very wisest men of their species, whose clear sight could carry them with a firm step through intricacies where ordinary persons must grope on their way darkling. But the truth is, that they walk confidently only because they are so short-sighted as to see no obstacles in their path till they actually stumble over them.

Good sheer thorough ignorance is indeed apt to be presumptuous and violent, for its only chance of gaining credit is by preventing its readers from exercising their own reflection and judgment. Whereas, he who understands something of his subject, and is really anxious to know more, desires nothing so much as a fair and full examination of his statements. He knows that there is something at least in them worth attending to; he is aware also that there may be much that is mistaken; but truth being his object, he wants the question to be fairly worked out, and he cares very little whether himself or any one else be the lucky man who shall first discover the vein of the precious ore. If nine-tenths of all that I have said, or may say, were to be entirely mistaken, I should yet be perfectly satisfied if its tone and manner had invited my readers to think for themselves, and so enabled them to correct my errors.

I may seem to be going a little out of the way, but it is bad economy of time in the end to set out on a journey unprepared. Every newspaper, every tract, every pam-

phlet, nay I dare say every active member of a club or an union, has got a remedy at hand for the evils of the times. There is Mr. Owen, formerly the proprietor of the great cotton factory at New Lanark, who would begin with society from the very beginning, and make us all men of a different nature from what we are now. There is Mr. Carlile, of the Rotunda, who would make all things straight by merely persuading every man to get rid of his conscience, and labour, talk, write, and fight, if needful, to advance his own interest, and gratify his own passions; a doctrine, in short, which says in plain English, "every man for himself and the devil for us all." Others talk only of attacking "the drones of society;" of making those who live in idleness disgorge the wealth which they are daily sucking out of the poor man's labour: and especially of stripping parsons, pensioners, and stock-jobbers, by which last term Mr. Cobbett means "*those who have got any money in the funds.*" Then again others of a different party cry out for war and a paper currency, to give employment to the poor: they sigh for fresh issues of country bank notes, for long credits, and high rents: they think, in short, that the process of getting drunk is far pleasanter than that of getting sober; so they want to apply again to the dram bottle.

It may perhaps be worth while, therefore, to detain your readers a little while with a few simple reasons, to show the groundlessness of those notions which are entertained by many rash and inconsiderate talkers.

In the first place I would protest against the extravagant expectation of a remedy for all evils, which some entertain from parliamentary reform. Not that I would disparage the utility or the importance of improvements in our representative system; but, in the first place, it is absurd to expect that any *system* should of itself bring about beneficial changes. The most perfect plan of representation can only enable the people, to choose, if they *will*, the fittest persons to represent them; but if the electors are

influenced by private and personal considerations, and not by public spirit,—if they elect with a view to individual interest, or the interests of their own particular class, in opposition to that of the country, a reformed parliament is likely to be as corrupt as an unreformed; and if the members of parliament show themselves selfish and unprincipled, they will in fact only be the fitter representatives of such electors. But, in the next place, supposing that members are elected on the purest principles, and prove worthy of the trust reposed in them, they can do much indeed, but they cannot do all that is desirable towards remedying many of the national evils. There is a great part of them which, though time and wisdom combined may, I trust, gradually remove, will not admit of a sudden cure by any human skill; and there are, I fear, many objects contemplated by some, which no human means can ever possibly accomplish. No parliamentary wisdom, for instance, can at once sweep away the burden of the national debt. It is a debt contracted for money which was borrowed and *spent* in the course of a long and costly war; the money is gone and lost for ever. We might by wiping off the debt with a wet sponge, ruin the fundholders, and enrich the rest of the nation at their expense; but this would be no benefit to the community, because the fundholders are a part of the community; and it can be no benefit to any nation that one half of it should be robbed, and the other half robbers.

We may, however, by judicious frugality, gradually diminish the debt; and we can resolve never to increase it by resorting to the ruinous practice of borrowing.

But in order to avoid increasing the national debt, we must above all things endeavour to avoid a war. Those who honestly (and I believe there are some such) regard war as beneficial on account of its *furnishing employment*, are under the most mischievous of all delusions. Those whom war maintains and enriches, it enriches at the expense of the rest of the community, and at a far greater

loss to the one party than gain to the other. And yet destructive as it is both of life and of capital, I am persuaded that its disordering and demoralizing effects are far the greatest part of the evils of war.

Let it not again be supposed that it is in the power of any legislature, however enlightened and upright, and zealous to fulfil the expectations of many among the labouring classes, who seem to think that regulations might be established which should secure to every labourer—to all that now exist and shall hereafter come into existence, —*i. e.* to an indefinite number,—wages sufficient at all times to enable them to maintain their families comfortably. The funds for the support of labourers, whether greater or less, cannot in any country be infinite; and a law which professes to insure to *all* who demand it, whether they worked well or ill—whether they were few or many, a comfortable subsistence, would profess an impossibility. To compel a farmer to employ a certain *fixed number* of labourers at a certain rate of wages, whether it answered or not, would be only *unjust;* to compel him to maintain *all* that offered, would be impossible. I *ought* not to be made to part with all I have; I *cannot* be made to part with *more* than I have.

But I do think that a wise and active legislature may do much towards mitigating, and in time doing away the sufferings to which the labouring classes are, and long have been exposed in many parts of England.

The practice of making up wages out of the poor rates, which, in the southern parts of England especially, has for some time been very prevalent, is, in fact, under the mask of kindness to the poor, one of the most degrading systems of oppression. When men are paid, not according to their industry and skill, but according to their wants,—when for the same species of labour one man receives only half the weekly wages of the other, not because his work is worth less, but because he is a single man,—we are so far advanced towards a state of

slavery. The slave (like one of the domestic animals) being his master's property, receives, whether the profits of his labour be small or great, as much, and *only as much* as is sufficient to support him in tolerable condition: his maintenance is proportioned to his need, not to his exertions; and as a *necessary consequence* of this want of a stimulus, he is kept to work by the *fear of punishment*.

On this, and several other evils connected with the mal-administration of the poor-laws, I am happy to say I feel confident that the attention of the present Ministers is strongly fixed.

LETTER V.

Sir,—It has given me great satisfaction to observe, that several of the provincial papers, and amongst the rest the *Voice of the People*, have thought my statement of the causes of the existing distress and bad feeling amongst us, worthy to be copied into their pages. It is a sincere pleasure to me, quite independent of any personal vanity, to find what I really believe to be truth received as such, at least to a considerable extent, by others; and it encourages me to think, that in suggesting remedies or palliatives for our actual evils, I may also hold a course in which other writers, with greater means of doing good than I possess, may be disposed to go along with me.

But, Sir, if I was right in attributing the evils of our social relations to various causes, it cannot be probable that the remedy is to be sought for in any single measure. I may have my own notions, like other men, as to the measure most especially called for in the first instance; but I am quite satisfied that any one by itself will be totally inefficient towards working any substantial improvement. Neither Reform in Parliament, nor emigration, nor lowering the interest of the debt, nor church reform, nor giving the poor allotments of land, nor spreading know-

ledge and a taste for intellectual pursuits among them, nor yet the abolition of the corn laws and of the tithes, for which many call so loudly,—none of all these things will do us any great or real good, unless, as the waters of bitterness have flowed in by so many different channels, we set vigorously to work at stopping up *all* the inlets of mischief, on one great system, clearly and comprehensively devised, and steadily and perseveringly executed.

For, if I may be allowed to refer to my former statement of the causes of our distress,—the increase of our population and of our manufactures to an unnatural excess, which I have put at the head of these causes, might perhaps be relieved by emigration, or by home colonies, as they are called, or as some think by the abolition of tithes and corn laws; but how will these things affect the moral evils of our condition? how are they to raise the moral and intellectual character of the poor, to bring them and the rich nearer to one another? or how will they prevent the return of the same evils, or of others even still worse, in the course of a few years, if circumstances should again favour their revival? Or, again, capital and machinery have, in the way I have stated, and when combined with other causes, helped to depress the condition of the labourer; and it may be thought that to fix a maximum of property or a minimum of wages, or to destroy steam engines and machines of all other descriptions, might at least cure this evil. But here we should be further still from our object; for though I believe that capital and machinery have, *under actual circumstances*, done much harm, yet the fault is not in them, but in those unfavourable circumstances which have drawn evil out of what is in itself good. And thus, to destroy what is good in itself, and yet not to meddle with the circumstances which alone have made it in part injurious, would only leave us in a worse state than we are in now. So, again, the ignorance of the poor might be removed by education: but how can you really educate a man, unless he and his equals in society

go along with you, and appreciate the good which you would give them? And who can be expected to desire general knowledge and intellectual pleasures, while his mere bodily wants are ill satisfied? Yet again—the Poor Laws are and have been injurious, *owing to other unfavourable circumstances.* Should we mend the matter by striking off the Poor Laws at one sweep? Or would not this be an act as wicked as it is utterly impracticable, and should not we by so doing deserve all the horrors of that general convulsion, for which we should ourselves have given the signal? Lastly, for the evils produced by a spirit of ultra aristocracy prevailing throughout our social system, many, I fear, would think that, for this at least, they knew a short and effectual remedy. To overthrow the peerage and the church, to divide great properties, or, in short, to do away with such a thing as a gentleman altogether, would strike home, they would say, to the root of this mischief, once and for ever. It is waste of time to talk of wickedness to a Jacobin, for it is the very essence of his nature. But setting aside the guilt of such a scheme, and granting its practicability, I say boldly that on the lowest notions of utilitarian morality *it would not answer.* It might if we had as much elbow room as in America, *and a population of slaves to do all our hardest and most irksome work for us:* but conceive our population of fifteen millions pent up in the narrow limits of this island, with society in an utter chaos, all its former landmarks gone, all hitherto respected principles of order utterly rooted out, all property submitted to a scramble, and the best restraints of our ferocious passions snapped into a thousand pieces. No living man can tell, and God forbid that we should have any real cause to speculate, when such a sea of troubled waters would ever grow calm, in what direction a volcano so fraught with all elements of destruction might discharge its fury. Whether foreign war with all its evils might come as a welcome relief to the

utter miseries of domestic anarchy,—whether England might renew the career of Napoleon, and, after spreading the curse of its conquests over Europe, might provoke, as he did, a bitter revolution on her own head; or whether, from very weariness after civil war, want of employment, and their consequences, famine and pestilence, had effectually reduced the superfluous population, the people might fly for relief to despotism: this much is certain, that the moral and physical condition of the poor (and who would then be other than poor?) would be ten times more miserable and degraded than it is now.

All these considerations show the enormous difficulty of the subject, and should teach us that a great deal of knowledge, and a great deal of good judgment, and very comprehensive views, and good principles and good temper, are all required in the public men who would help us out of our present evils. For instance, to take only one question out of many, that of our population, how many various opinions exist about it: first as to the fact, whether it be excessive or no; and then as to the remedies, whether emigration or home colonies are preferable, or whether some mere political changes would effect all that is wanted. On some of these points, I doubt whether any one is sufficiently well informed; and happy should I be if I could direct the attention of some of your readers, who may be far better qualified than I am, to the importance of gaining and communicating information upon them. I know how much I have to learn about them myself, and I see that some writers of great name and much pretension are exactly in my own situation, although they do not appear to be aware of it. My next letter, on population, therefore, will be very like an honest map of an imperfectly surveyed country; it will exhibit great blanks by the side of spots laid down in full detail; but how much better is this than to do like some of the old geographers, who filled up from imagination the parts

for which they had no real authorities; and thus, as far as in them lay, perpetuated to posterity the ignorance of their own generation.

LETTER VI.

Sir,—It is more than two thousand years ago that a Greek philosopher, Phaleas of Chalcedon, impatient, like Mr. Owen in the present day, of the existing evils of society, proposed to remedy them by an equalization of property and of education. Upon the first of these remedies Aristotle remarks, that a limit set to property is inefficient, unless you also set a limit to population. Otherwise, says he, your system in the first place cannot last, and besides you will in the course of a few years have as much poverty as ever. Within our own memory, Mr. Godwin, better known perhaps as the author of "Caleb Williams" than from his work on "Political Justice," repeated the complaint of Phaleas, and again maintained that the evils of society arose from misgovernment, and especially from the unequal distribution of property. Mr. Malthus replied to him as Aristotle more than two thousand years before had replied to Phaleas. He said that there was another cause at work quite independent of political misgovernment, and as powerful in producing evil;—namely, *the tendency of population to outgrow the means of subsistence.* So that, to use Aristotle's words, a limitation of property is nothing, unless you can also limit within proper bounds the increase of population.

Here, Sir, you have in a few words what is called the Malthusian theory of population; but which, in fact, was known to Aristotle and to the philosophers of ancient Greece, quite as well as to Mr. Malthus. The doctrine, however, had long been forgotten in modern Europe, because, since the days of the Roman Empire, Europe had never been fully peopled, and therefore the advantages of

a large population were much more an object of desire, than its inconveniences were matter of alarm. It had become a habit with literary men to retail the complaints of the Roman writers upon the decay of the true strength of a state, a free and hardy population, and the growth of overgrown luxury among the rich in its stead.—And in them this complaint was reasonable; for, partly owing to long and bloody civil wars, partly to the general buying up of small properties by the rich, and the employment of slave labour instead of that of free men, and partly to an unequalled profligacy of manners, the free population in Italy was, even as early as the Christian era, exceedingly scanty, and every encouragement was given to the rearing of a family, both to increase the number of citizens, and, by opening a field for the domestic affections, to bring back a more wholesome state of public morals.

I have stated thus much to account for the alleged novelty of Mr. Malthus's theory when he first published it; although it had been well known in Greece two thousand years earlier. People are not apt to think of the evils of one extreme, when they themselves are actually suffering from those of the other; and therefore while Europe was under peopled, and labour was sure to find a good market, because there was constant demand for it, no one was inclined to anticipate the time when the tide would turn, and when, instead of wanting men to do the work, work would be often sought for in vain to employ the men.

But though our fathers may well be excused for not anticipating an evil which they did not feel, I cannot extend the same indulgence to those who would persuade themselves that the evil which they do feel is not an evil, because their fathers never complained of it. There are generally, it seems, two periods in the history of a nation, at which its population is found to press too hardly upon its means of subsistence. The first takes place when its most obvious and first-found resources become insufficient; when the slovenly farming and careless enjoyment

of the earliest stage of a nation's existence are exchanged for a harder industry, a more careful search after other and more hidden sources of wealth, and the calling in of science to quicken the somewhat enfeebled powers of nature. And this period occurred in England towards the middle of the sixteenth century; when landlords began to understand the value of their land, and to employ it in the manner which would return them the greatest profit; when commerce began to be followed up with unaccustomed vigour, and when, as the sure mark of a great change working in the state of society, the distress and numbers of the poor increased beyond all further example, and rendered the hazardous experiment of the Poor Laws welcome and necessary, as they deemed it, to the statesmen of that generation. Then begins a second period—the period of systematical improvement, so far as the physical resources of a nation are concerned, but, unhappily, by no means of equal improvement in the higher points of national wisdom and national virtue. And, therefore, a crisis is hastened which otherwise might never have arrived: national wealth is enormously increased; but because great moral ignorance generally prevails, national poverty increases also. The population thus goes on increasing too rapidly; because, whilst the high state of commercial activity on the one hand offers it constant encouragement, the poor, as no pains are taken to elevate them, become less and less thoughtful, less and less desirous of a high state of comfort, and therefore ready to marry and to raise a family, if they have a prospect of the bare necessaries of life. Thus, however skilfully and vigorously a nation's whole resources may be called into action; however much its agriculture may be improved, its commerce extended, its manufactures multiplied; still the population is increasing too fast, because there is a large portion of the community whose habits belong rather to the first state of society than the second, who marry and have families as if the earth were still yielding

its first luxuriant abundance for its handful of original settlers, instead of being come to that point, when civilization being necessary to call forth its powers, men are ill fitted for the state in which they are living if they are content to multiply as savages.

To this second period we are come, and to the time when its crisis is most threatening. The great point on which I would insist is this;—that let railways be multiplied as they will, or new markets opened for our manufactures, or still further improvements introduced into agriculture, still our population will continue to be excessive so long as the wages of labour are low, and the bulk of the people depend solely on their labour. And this will continue to be the case, until the habits and tastes of the poor can be raised, and they can be taught to look for better prospects for their children than merely keeping them from starving. I come to the conclusion, therefore, that our population requires to be lessened: and I propose, in my next letter, to consider the different means of effecting this great object thoroughly and permanently.

LETTER VII.

Sir,—The storm, I trust, has blown over, and has spent its violence upon Nottingham and Derby. Your own townsmen, I am glad to see, have kept up their usual character for good sense and a regard to justice in abstaining from such disgraceful outrages as have been perpetrated in the neighbouring counties. Disgraceful and atrocious outrages indeed they are, and almost more disgraceful to that portion of the public press which excited them first and then tried to palliate their guilt, than to the miserable ruffians who perpetrated them. If the friends of liberty and the people would save their cause from utter disgrace, they should not gently regret such crimes and half excuse them, but denounce them with disgust and ab-

horrence, and try to bring the actors and abettors of them to condign punishment.

Meantime, what additional interest is thrown by all these disgraceful scenes upon the subject on which I am addressing you? What can more plainly show how insufficient any one remedy would be to bring things to a better state? An increase of work or a rise in wages would do nothing for these Derby and Nottingham rioters in the way of making them better members of society: so long as they continue in their present state of ignorance and demoralization, they would but eat and drink the more for the time, without doing any thing to raise their condition permanently. And yet, whilst they continue in their present poverty, how are they to be enlightened and humanized?

Since I wrote the last letter of my series, I have read a very able pamphlet by Mr. Richardson, of Haydon, in Norfolk, on the general question of the poor laws and the employment of the agricultural population. Mr. Richardson thinks that there is no excess of population in the agricultural districts; but that many more hands might be profitably employed. He proposes that every county should constitute one entire parish, thus making the market of labour perfectly free within the bounds of each county: he would simplify the laws of settlements, and make them settlements on counties, not on parishes: he would provide for the employment of the principal part of the labourers by allotting a certain number to every rate payer, according to his assessment, giving him, however, the choice of his men: and for the employment of the remainder he would provide by what he calls district farms, to be hired by the county; and which he supposes would cover their own expenses by the sale of their produce.

It seems to me that there is much good in these suggestions, and particularly in the plan for doing away with parish settlements, at present a frightful source of misery. Mr. Richardson is a practical man, and his opinions are re-

commended by a large experience. I should be very glad to see his reforms adopted, but still I am clear that the mischief lies deeper than his plan alone would reach. For granting that more hands than are now employed might be set to work with advantage, yet still the evil is not only that many men are now out of employment, but that those who do work are under paid; and no man can imagine, when he takes into the account the population, not of the agricultural districts only, but of the manufacturing, and above all of Ireland, that the wages of labour can materially rise while there is so great a competition at hand to keep it down.

The evil, Sir, lies deeper; and it is this. Freedom and property are things so essentially united, that to have a large free population *wholly* dependent on their labour, when that labour is of a sort which every man can perform, is of itself a state of things fraught with mischief. Perhaps some of your readers may not be aware that this state is one of rare occurrence in the history of the world; because, generally speaking, either the great mass of labourers have been slaves, or else their numbers have been much below the resources of the country, and their market has been so good that industry has enabled them to acquire property. Now when the labourers were slaves, their welfare as little entered into the consideration of statesmen as that of the brute creation; the happiness of the *nation* was never thought to be affected because its *slaves* were oppressed and miserable. In truth this was the readiest way of solving the problem, how to ensure the happiness of civil society—shut out from society those whom it is most difficult to render happy, and you can then effect your object easily.

Slavery, Sir, is justly looked upon with abhorrence; but it would have been well if, when priding ourselves upon its extinction, we had considered the new and most difficult duties which then devolved upon us. It is very easy to say, "we will not tolerate slavery," but it is a very

different matter to know how to untie that knot which the system of slavery cut in twain summarily.—Society, if it deserve the name, must provide for the welfare of all whom it receives into its pale; and we have truly learnt from Christianity that it should receive every human being. We cannot and we ought not to go back, but neither can we remain as we are; for our poor at this moment have the name and rights of freemen, while their outward condition is that of slaves. And this is the case, because we have transferred to our free population the notions which were entertained of a population of slaves: because labourers, when slaves, had and could have no property, we have thought it no evil that labourers when citizens should be equally destitute.

It is on this view of the case that I call our present population excessive. I do not doubt that a much larger population could be maintained in a state of slavery; but the question is, whether our present numbers are not so great as to make it impossible for the labourer to acquire property by his labour,—in other words, whether they are not so great as to hinder the labourer from becoming what a freeman ought to be. I may be told that they are not too great, if the property be fairly divided: but to this I answer that a division of property is no more a just proposal on the part of the poor, than it would be just on the part of the rich to bring back the poor to their original state of slavery. Either of these measures would, no doubt, remove the particular inconsistencies of our present state, but it would be only by introducing far greater injustice and greater misery in the room of it.

By the law of the land as it now is, every poor man may claim from society the maintenance of a slave: he has a right to be kept from starving, as a slave would be kept; and in return society may justly claim his work, as it would the work of a slave. But according to my notions, society should do more than this; it should put the poor man, being a freeman, into a situation where he

may live as a freeman ought to live: and I see not how this can be done, except in one of two ways, either by what are called home colonies, or by emigration. This was the course regularly pursued in ancient times, when our present difficulty presented itself. When a large population who had formerly been slaves or conquered in war, grew up to the condition of freemen and citizens, they were provided for by being settled on the unappropriated lands of the state, or when none of these were to be found, they were sent out to be settled in a colony. And this was the only way of avoiding one of two evils, each of which was then considered intolerable; the existence on the one hand of a free population in beggary; and on the other, a total overthrow of society, by dividing the property of the old citizens, in order to satisfy these new partners in the political firm, who wanted to come into a share of its profits for nothing. But my limits warn me to conclude, and what has been here stated may afford sufficient matter for reflection.

LETTER VIII.

Sir,—When I spoke in my last letter of the evil of having the bulk of our population dependent wholly upon labour, when that labour was of a sort which every man could perform, I said that in our present circumstances I could see no other remedy for this evil except in what are called Home Colonies, or in emigration. I am willing, however, to take the expression "Home Colonies," in the widest possible sense, and extend it to every measure for giving the labourer an interest in the soil, whether as a tenant or as a proprietor. And I do believe that if these and emigration, accompanied with other measures, to be specified hereafter, were fairly tried, there is nothing in our present condition which forbids our entertaining lively

hopes for the restored and much improved welfare of our country.

But I am told that the people cannot bear to hear that our population is excessive; they say, that before any are turned out for the general good, the resources of the country should first be more equally divided; that it is only because some have too much that others have too little. Why, Sir, no one talks of *turning out* any body: I never heard any man dream of *forcing people to emigrate*, which would be in plain English to *transport them;* neither is it doubtful that if all persons fared alike, and we could persuade one half of the community peaceably to share their property with the other, that there is food enough in the island to maintain us all till next summer. But it is one thing to encourage the poor to emigrate, and another to force them to do it—it is one thing not to be overpeopled if an utterly impossible change in society were to take place, and another not to be overpeopled as society now exists. No doubt human beings might be packed much closer in Great Britain than they are now: but the real question is, whether such a crowding is practicable under actual circumstances, and whether also it is desirable; whether, in short, England *could* make itself like Judæa in the time of Solomon; and whether, if it could, this would be the best means of mending our actual condition.

I am at a loss to understand how it can be unjust or inhuman to say to a man who is here barely able to keep himself from starving, that we will assist him to go to another country, where he may live in comfort, and provide sufficiently for himself and his family. I know that such a proposal made to persons in the richer classes is not thought a hardship or an insult, but a great favour; that fathers are glad to get situations for their sons in India, even though they part with them for such a number of years, that they cannot expect to live till they return. No doubt a parent would rather be able to pro-

vide for his son comfortably at home than send him to India; but he would much rather send him to India than see him live in beggary at home; and it does not occur to him to ask his neighbour to give him a piece of his estate, rather than that he should have to bear the pain of parting. Or if any particular trade be overstocked in any town, the man who finds himself best able to support himself by capital previously acquired, does not think himself injured if he be advised to go and look for an opening in his trade elsewhere.—It is, indeed, a shocking thing that poor men should be persuaded to emigrate without knowing anything of the country to which they are going, and without having any one to advise them when they get there. And this ignorance, I am inclined to think, is one of the greatest obstacles to emigration. No man likes to take a leap in the dark; and emigration is nothing better than a leap in the dark, when a man has never before been ten miles from his own village, when he has no notion of distances, and knows not a single particular about the climate, productions, customs, and manner of living in foreign countries. A mere elementary knowledge of geography would instantly dispel the vague fears which many of the poor now feel unreasonably: emigration would thus lose its terrors, and their knowledge would not only make them cease to fear it, but would teach them how to derive the full benefit of it.

This is a subject which the Government have taken up, and on which I hope they will proceed to act on a large scale, as soon as the Reform question is once settled. You will observe too, Sir, that here, as everywhere else, the importance of increasing the knowledge of the poor forces itself upon us most strongly. Ignorance, indeed, meets us at every turn, as one of the greatest difficulties which we have to encounter.

What I am next going to notice is one proof of the mischiefs of ignorance. Nothing is more common than to hear people talk of the millions of unproductive acres

which are to be found in this island, on which they tell us our whole labouring population might be advantageously settled. It is impossible that persons who talk thus can know much about these unproductive acres. There are enough of them doubtless in point of extent between Cornwall and Northumberland; your own county, as you well know, Sir, possesses its full share of them. I have sometimes thought that the Railways hereafter may do a great deal for your moors, by enabling you to get lime and manure in sufficient quantities to make a completely new soil in such parts as may be brought into cultivation. In this way the enclosure of Hounslow Heath, and the other wastes within ten miles of London has been found to answer tolerably well. But the moors offer three obstacles which I do not believe all the Railways in the world would ever effectually overcome: the three obstacles of great extent, an impracticable soil, and a bad climate. Some people seem to fancy that because a great many new enclosures have taken place within the last fifty years, that therefore the waste lands still remaining may also be enclosed with advantage. They forget that what has been left was naturally the most impracticable part of the whole country; and I speak upon a general knowledge of every extensive tract of waste now remaining in England, when I say that almost all present difficulties either of soil or climate, or both, such as to render their cultivation on a large scale in our present state of science a matter practically hopeless.

This is quite a sufficient answer to the mere idle talk about our millions of unenclosed acres, which some indulge in who ought to know better. At the same time I do not doubt that much may be done on a small scale in different parts of the country, by allotting portions of reclaimable waste to the poor of particular parishes and districts. And I should like to know whether there does not often exist great abuse as to the employment of what is called the *poor's plot;* that is, the ground which was

awarded to the poor of the parish at the time of an enclosure, in compensation for the loss of their rights of common. I am afraid that in some instances this land is let by the parish officers to a farmer, and even the rent of it, instead of being given to the poor, goes partly to eke out the poor rates.

Besides the enclosure of wastes, there is another way of giving property to the labourer, namely, by allotting him a portion of land for a garden. This is a measure which every one seems to approve of; which I know in practice to be a source of great benefit to the poor, and of great comfort; which, I believe, is daily becoming more and more adopted, and which I heartily hope will spread over the whole country.

But, what is to be done meanwhile for the manufacturer? He cannot be set to enclose wastes,—and where, in the midst of a crowded town, can he get the pleasure and the profit of a garden? How can he be put in a condition to acquire property,—or how can life be rendered to him something more befitting a man and a Christian than it too often is at present? This is a question, Sir, which, I doubt not, has frequently occurred to your mind as well as to mine; and what is more to the purpose, it is become perfectly familiar to the manufacturers themselves; and if a good and fair answer be not given to it by others, they are but too likely to answer it themselves in a manner ruinous and disgraceful alike to them and to their neighbours.

It cannot be answered, however, without touching upon various points, both moral and political, in which the evil is plain enough, but the remedy seems beyond the power of any legal enactment, and to rest mainly with the people themselves. But the urgency of the crisis may make men listen to a statement which would have found them deafer than the deaf adder, if uttered in the season of apparent prosperity.

LETTER IX.

SIR,—It has been often said, that there are some prophecies which tend to ensure their own fulfilment; and the language which I see and hear used every day by persons perfectly well-intentioned, seems likely to furnish another instance of the truth of this. People talk as if they were arrived at a period when every thing is to be thrown, as it were, into the crucible, and come out again in a new form. Not only the details of Government, but the very principles on which society is held together, are spoken of as likely to be questioned: not only the mere external constitution of the Church Establishment, but the foundations of our duty to God and man are considered as on the point of being subjected to a rude inquiry. Now, if men accustom themselves to hold this language, they are assuredly helping to bring about the very thing which they fear. There never have been, and never will be wanting some few wretches, or madmen, who, in their folly or their wickedness, would be glad to get rid of every law and every principle. There are always some to be found who have strong personal reasons for thinking gaols a nuisance, and who would be glad to make converts to their opinions. But are honest men really to stand and discuss such questions as this?—or would it not be the greatest possible encouragement to pickpockets and thieves, if we were gravely and mournfully to regret the prospect of having soon to examine the right of enacting laws against them, and to dread the possibility of the speedy repeal of all such restrictions, after they had been fully subjected to the scrutiny of public opinion?

I proposed to speak of the state of the manufacturer; and great need there is of speaking plainly about it. It is in the manufacturing towns that we are told to look for the seeds of all these wonderful changes—in the increased knowledge and improved organization of the working classes. I am heartily glad to think that their know-

ledge is increased; and if it were increased a little more, I should think their improved organization a great blessing also. But will any man in his senses tell me that the working classes in any town in Britain have acquired knowledge enough to put us all at sea again as to the very main principles of social, nay even of human life? Mr. Loudon tells us (I quote from an extract in your last week's *Courant*) that the intelligence of the Birmingham workman is particularly remarkable. This, he says, is owing partly to the peculiar skill which their manufacture requires, and partly to the prevalence of school education in that neighbourhood. The former cause, no doubt, makes them remarkably intelligent in matters connected with their own manufactures, and gives them a great facility of turning their hand from one sort of work to another, as the state of the market may require; and it is owing to this that the distress in Birmingham has never equalled that which has been felt occasionally in the cotton districts in Cheshire and Lancashire. It gives them an intelligence in matters connected with their own business, which I have noticed with high admiration, not without some shame at my own inferiority to them. But skill in the working of metals will not give an acquaintance with the far more difficult working of society: and as to their school education, Mr. Loudon knows, as I know, that neither the nature of the instruction given at what are called English schools, nor the time that any workman can spend at them, are such as to give him much moral and political knowledge. Or, are they to get this knowledge in after life from newspapers? I am sure you yourself would be the first man to laugh at the utter absurdity of such a notion. Do newspapers pretend, or is it their business, to give a general view of the principles of any science? To tell us of past times, or of the state of foreign countries? It is true, they give us an account of passing events in other countries, but they cannot do more, and how little is this towards giving us an accurate

knowledge of what is really thought and done in them! And supposing that newspapers could teach a great deal more than they either do or can,—what are the working man's opportunities for reading it calmly, and for thinking it over, and properly digesting it in his own mind? And what previous cultivation has his mind received to enable it to turn any fresh information to the best account? When, therefore, I hear so much said of the intelligence of the working classes, and of the enlightened state of public opinion, I feel very much as I should do if any ill judging friends were to overwhelm a clever and intelligent child with compliments, and make him think himself as wise as his teachers. I should say that these friends were taking the very way to hinder him from ever being as wise as his teachers,—by teaching him to think so too soon, and thus to slacken his efforts, or to misdirect them. I am, indeed, indignant at the insolent language in which some persons depreciate both the capacities and the knowledge of the working classes, and treat them as if they knew nothing and were unable to think for themselves. I have known quite enough of the working classes to make me justly impatient of such foolish and impertinent language as this. But it is one thing to speak of them as ignorant and incapable of judging about politics, and another to suppose them capable of disproving principles established by the general consent of the best and wisest of men, or to say that they can possibly judge as well upon subjects which they have not fully studied, as those who have a hundred times greater knowledge and experience. Assuredly we may learn a great deal, even on political subjects, from the working classes: I never talked with an intelligent man amongst them, I never read any of their speeches at public meetings, or of their writings, without deriving some instruction from them. But take even Mr. Cobbett, with all his extraordinary natural abilities, and the great advantages which he has had in later life; and who can only be put on the same grounds with

the working classes as far as regards his original defects of education. We all know how cleverly Mr. Cobbett writes; but to talk of him as an oracle of political or moral wisdom would be ludicrous. And he is so violent, and, I fear, so little scrupulous, that some may attribute many of his most absurd assertions,—such for instance, as that England was formerly more populous than it is now,—to a wilful intention to deceive. But, in truth, I do believe that it is sheer ignorance; not indeed honest or excusable ignorance, for no man ought to write about a question without learning the facts of it,—but yet a very natural ignorance in a clever man who has been ill educated;—who has read little, and has never been taught how to digest and appreciate properly what he has read.

I do not know whether the mechanics of Sheffield are likely to do me the honour of reading this letter. I wish they may, for I am sure that they will have the sense to allow the truth of my statement, and I am not afraid of their suspecting me of any aristocratical pride in saying it. God knows that I have not a particle of any such feeling,—and that my most earnest wish is to see the working classes raised in every thing, that there may be one hearty feeling of brotherhood between us all. But to flatter them is to insult them, and we seem now to be in some danger of overvaluing their knowledge and judgment, just as, for a long time, they were undervalued. As long as they listen readily to any one who appeals to their passions, and turn away from him who addresses their reason, so long must they necessarily remain half instructed; for truth can only be attained by overcoming prejudice, just as virtue can only be attained by the conquest of our selfish passions.

I have been led on by my subject, for it is an important one, and one which falls directly in my way. It will not do to be run down by the cry of ignorant men, merely because they have a numerous body of hearers and disciples. And as to mere physical force, I have no more fear of its

triumphing over truth and justice, than I have of the brute creation rising in rebellion against mankind, and trying the force of horns and hoofs against reason and the laws of God's creation.

LETTER X.

SIR,—I wrote my last letter in the full confidence that the truth spoken in sincerity would not generally offend. Had any covert object lurked behind the language which I used, had I secretly desired to uphold or palliate existing abuses, or to keep the working classes in their present degraded state, I should have been ashamed to have written it. But as it is, I should be ashamed not to have written it: I should be ashamed of nothing more heartily than of speaking the truth on one side only: a practice, I am sorry to say, quite as common amongst the professed friends of the people as amongst their supposed enemies.

If any principle or general statement be founded on truth, the course of events will serve continually to bear witness to it. In one of the earliest of my letters I stated "that the different classes of society have been removed to a great distance from each other—have sympathized with and understood each other less, and thus have become strangers to each other, too ready, I fear, to become enemies also." How dreadfully has this fear been verified by the riots at Bristol, how boldly has the fact been affirmed by Mr. Dyer, at the Cripplegate Ward meeting, when he said there could be no union between the employer and the employed; and by another person at the same meeting, who asserted "that it was as impossible to effect a union between the high and the low classes of society, as to mix oil and water; *there was no reciprocity of feeling between them.*" If this be true, that is, if it is

"impossible to effect a union between the higher and the lower classes," then indeed the Reform Bill is too late—all the efforts of individuals and of public bodies are alike too late, and a sort of Jacqueline war throughout the country is the only thing to be looked for.

But, Sir, I utterly deny that it is impossible to effect a union between the rich and the poor. Wretches whose only hope of distinction consists in preventing such a union, may well wish to make us believe it impossible, and the less hateful wretches who carried on the work of plunder and burning at Bristol, would no doubt be happy to have it believed also. But good and honest men, of whatever rank or fortune, from the richest peer to the poorest mechanic, will feel that it is a doctrine as false as it is wicked.

Yet even this Mr. Dyer, whoever he may be, tells us something from which we may take a lesson. "There can be no union," he says, "between the employer and the employed." Why not? "*Because*," he goes on, "*it is the interest of every employer to get as much work as he can done for the smallest sum possible.*" Truly, Sir, this is a text on which there might well be preached an awakening sermon.

Where is the Church most hated? Where is the aristocracy most hated? Where is the alienation of the poor from the rich most complete? The answer will always be, wherever the relation between them has been most exclusively that of employer and employed: in other words, where the relation has been most purely mercenary, I do not say, like that of master and slave, but actually worse.

I say "actually worse than that of master and slave," and I say it advisedly. West Indian slavery is the relation of employer and employed: the use of the slaves is merely to make them work in the plantations, and they may be sold like the hoes with which they work. But the old system of English slavery called villainage, was absolutely a far kinder relation. There the villain was a fixture

on the land, and could not be sold away from it. Belonging to his lord, from his cradle to his grave, he was thought of not only as a living and moving tool, but as a human being. Affection often subsisted between him and his master,—of which there is this decided proof, that the system of villainage chiefly wore out by the master's voluntarily giving his villains freedom. This never would have happened, had the relation between them been only one of profit and loss:—of employer and employed.

Or look, Sir, to agricultural parishes, and to private families. A farming labourer, a domestic servant, were once considered members of the household; they lived in the same family for years, and a mutual attachment subsisted between them and their masters. But how is it now? The relation of employer and employed has come into full action; farmers will not keep their labourers, masters sometimes will not and sometimes cannot keep their servants; they are afraid of letting them get a settlement in the parish, if they stay over the year, and so completely is this understood in some places, that a servant leaves his situation naturally at the end of a twelvemonth, unless something be expressly said about his remaining longer.

Now, Sir, our great manufacturing towns have risen solely with a view to this relation of employer and employed. The very name shows this, that they are places where men have assembled together, not for the purposes of social life, but to make calicoes, or hardware, or broad cloths. A man sets up a factory, and *wants hands:* I beseech you, Sir, to observe the very expressions that are used, for they are all significant. What he wants of his fellow creatures is the loan of *their hands;*—of their heads and hearts he thinks nothing. These *hands* are attached to certain mouths and bodies which must be fed and lodged: but this must be done as cheaply as possible;—and accordingly, up starts a miserable row of houses, built where ground is cheapest, that is, where it is least

generally desirable to get it;—built as close as possible, to have the more of them on a given space, and for the same reason without any sort of garden or outlet attached to them, because the comfort and enjoyment of the human being is quite independent of the serviceableness of his *hands*. But further, Sir, these *hands* are not only attached to mouths and bodies, but to reasonable minds and immortal souls. The mouths and bodies must be provided for, however miserably, because without them the hands cannot work; but the minds and souls go utterly unregarded. And is this any other than a national crime, a crime in the civil government, a crime in the church, a crime in all the wealthy and intelligent part of the English people, that while *hands* have been multiplying so enormously during the last forty years in every corner of the kingdom, no greater efforts have been made to provide for the welfare of the human beings who have multiplied with them; beings born not for time only but for eternity.

Hear the cry with which the bishops in particular are now assailed in every part of the kingdom, and most loudly in the great manufacturing districts. Whence comes the especial bitterness with which they, above all the other anti-reforming peers, are everywhere attacked? Whence the hatred with which the whole order of the clergy is sometimes pursued? Is it not because the people have never been made to feel the full amount of the good which an Established Church may and ought to effect, and therefore are the more ready to complain of its endowments? Is it not because in our large manufacturing towns the Church has allowed thousands and tens of thousands of its members to grow up in misery and in ignorance; and that a step-mother's neglect is naturally requited by something of a step-mother's unpopularity.

I am not blaming individuals,—nor have I in my mind a single personal allusion to any one either dead or living. But the reproach attaches itself to the body. What worse than folly was it to talk of delicacies, and difficulties, and

the danger of Parliamentary interference, and the mischief of interfering with Church property, when the very end for which the establishment existed was left unattained? Was it fit to wait for money enough to build an expensive church, rather than license the first room, or the first court-yard that could be found, wherever the inhabitants of the parish became too numerous or too remote to attend the parish church? Was it even decent to leave many thousand persons to the instruction and care of one minister, rather than apply to Parliament for power to make a new allotment of the Church property, such as the new state of things required?

But these things were neglected; neglected by the Church, neglected by the government, neglected by the master manufacturer, and by the rich generally. Thousands of men grew up devoid alike of physical comforts, and of intellectual and moral culture; and now we are reaping the fruits of it. Having no property of their own they hate property,—having no means of intellectual enjoyment, they are driven to seek the pleasures which we have in common with brutes,—having never been made Christians, their undisciplined natures are incapable of valuing Christianity, and their evil passions teach them to hate it.

Still it is not too late now to remedy the evil; it is not too late *now,—but in five years it will be.* Enough of individual kindness still exists, enough of individual goodness, to ensure the success of measures carried into effect by well combined exertions of men co-operating with each other. Mr. Dyer, and men like him, may yet be silenced; and the two orders of society may be brought together, each feeling too deeply their own faults to dare to reproach those of the other. But I am insensibly running into thoughts and feelings, which I shall find it hard to check, if I once allow myself to indulge in them. Meantime let me congratulate you on the honourable contrast which Sheffield presents, and has long presented, to so

many other manufacturing towns; so that in what I have said above, other places have always been present to my mind; when I think of the remedies to be applied, Sheffield always occurs to me, to fill me with hope and encouragement.

LETTER XI.

Sir,—If my last letter but one was likely to give offence to some of the working classes, my last, I suspect, would be viewed with as little favour by those who call themselves the conservative party—but who, if we may name them from the tendencies of their conduct rather than from their intentions, may be well called ultra-revolutionists. I have, however, been always of opinion, that the whole truth, when not spoken in malice, can never be inflammatory—that all the mischief is done either by giving half the truth, or by throwing round the whole truth a violent, and therefore an unfair expression. At any rate, if my two last letters have been disliked by two different classes of readers, I trust that my present one, while it explains and justifies its predecessors, will at least give offence to none, even if none are convinced by it.

Take the facts of my two last letters, if so I may be allowed to call them, and place them by the side of each other. On the part of the working classes, there is a mass of imperfect and ill-digested knowledge, which has just succeeded to deep and general ignorance. On the part of the rich, there is a mass of half informed and half awakened attention to the poor, newly risen, after a long continuance of great neglect. Surely, here are the elements of a most happy state of things, if this imperfect knowledge on one hand, and partial attention on the other, are by all means brought to assist in improving each other—if the past, instead of being for ever appealed to to inflame angry passions, be forgotten as if by common con-

sent, like an evil dream, from which we are most thankful to have been awakened. But if the poor, instead of looking to be helped on by the rich, think to get on faster by plundering and pulling them down—or if the rich, instead of increasing their efforts a hundred fold, and in a wiser spirit, now stand aloof in fear or in disgust, the consequence will be, that both rich and poor will suffer, or rather that all good men will suffer, whether rich or poor; while they who profit by the general ruin will be the dregs of either party, perhaps of both; the treacherous, lawless, greedy, profligate, and cruel; that class of wretches who, whether they have called themselves aristocrats or democrats, have been always alike in their tyranny, alike in their contempt of every law of God and man, and in their exclusive love of themselves, and their own interests and passions.

It has been a great evil that the relations between the rich and the poor have been so much confined to the single one of employer and employed. But is not this a very natural state of progress between the time when they stood to one another as master and slave, and that when they will stand to one another as citizen to citizen? The matter is now to hasten forwards as quickly as possible to this last state; and in order to do this, we must make efficient those great means of blessing whose inefficiency has been the cause of so much evil, but whose destruction would render the matter utterly hopeless.

I say plainly,—and I beg not to be cried down unheard,—that those great means of blessing are the *Aristocracy* and the *Christian Church*. No man alive is more aware than I am of the evils of an Aristocracy, or of an Established Church, when there is nothing to balance them; no man is more aware than I am of the quantity of good which they have left undone. But I should not blame them for their neglect, if it was not that their active exertions are capable of rendering us such enormous services. No man wishes more earnestly to see them reformed; and

I hesitate not to say, that no man would more deeply grieve to see them destroyed. When I have been travelling in your beautiful neighbourhood, and looking over the magnificent domain of Lord Fitzwilliam, I have often heard my companions exclaim against the steam engine chimneys which in various parts of the view were sending up into the air their columns of smoke; but I have always said in answer, "Those unsightly chimneys, and that disfiguring smoke, are a most wholesome balance to the palace, and the gardens, and the woods of Wentworth. Were it not for them, England would be no better than Russia or Poland,—we should be the mere serfs of a territorial aristocracy." And what if a companion of another sort were to exclaim against the aristocratical pride of Wentworth House, and against the useless costliness of keeping up the Churches of Ecclesfield and Rotherham? I should say to him as heartily and truly,—"That park and mansion, and those churches, are a most wholesome balance to the chimneys of the iron furnaces. Were it not for them, we should be without two of the greatest means of elevating and purifying mankind, nobility, and religion;—we should be in danger of becoming what the French sometimes falsely call us, a nation of buyers and sellers. But as it is, let all work together, and all do their duty, and we have the means of arriving at the happiest and highest state of society that the world has ever yet witnessed."

The perfection of Parliamentary Reform would be one which so raised the working classes, as to oblige the aristocracy to treat them more liberally, without throwing in their hands an exorbitant power before they are instructed, and softened enough to use it wisely. I wish the aristocracy in every place to come forward manfully, to join the political unions, or any other lawful and honest societies of the working classes, to state fairly the amount of their past neglect, and their hearty wish to make up for it. They may then meet the mere agitators boldly face to

face, and indignantly deny their outrageous and shameless falsehoods. While confessing their great and most blameable neglect, that they have too long suffered their poorer brethren to live in a state of suffering and ignorance, they may most truly say that from wilful oppression and injustice they are, generally speaking, clear. The laws have, hitherto, by carrying to excess the principle of non-interference with a man's private concerns, allowed him unintentionally to cause great public mischief. As it is the business of civil society to defend property, so it is no less its duty to limit the exorbitant exercise of its power. The famous Thellusson Act has already decided the principle, that a man may not do all that he will with his own: —he may use it, but not capriciously abuse it. Undoubtedly it is a matter of public concern that our great towns be not injured at the discretion of every individual speculator, who runs out street after street, and row after row of houses, till the working man in the heart of the town can neither breathe fresh air, nor find any open ground within his reach on which he can venture without being guilty of a trespass. It would be no slight benefit, if public walks and gardens, and still more public places of exercise, so laid out as to be ornamental as well as useful and agreeable, were of necessity attached to every great town in the empire. And it might be fairly imperative on every man who builds a certain number of houses, to annex to them a certain portion of ground which might never be built upon, and which should serve in various ways for the sports and recreation of the inhabitants.

I know it is said that the poorer people have no respect for works of art, nor for public property: that if indiscriminately admitted to museums, libraries, churches, or gardens, their greatest pleasure would be to do mischief. True it is, that the poor do not respect these things in England as much as they do abroad; and why? because, Sir, they have never been thought capable of enjoying them, and therefore have been carefully denied access to

them. Certain it is, that they never will respect them, till they are allowed to have an interest in them; but, I should think it well worth while to risk the injury or destruction of a great many works of art, that the people might at last, as they surely would, become fond of these things, and feel that it was indeed a public injury to misuse them. And as a step to this, I have thought that advantage might in the first instance be taken of any societies actually formed amongst the working classes, such as benefit clubs, self-supporting dispensaries, political unions, or the like: and that it would be well worth the while of benevolent individuals to assist in the formation of libraries, or museums, or if possible in renting ground to serve for a public garden and place of amusement, not to be open at first to all the working classes, but to be placed under the management of one or more of these societies for the benefit of their own members. I say "placed under the management of these societies," perhaps with the addition of one or two honorary members of the richer classes, who might advise without being able to control their poorer associates; for it is most important to put the poor in authority, to intrust them with the care of property, and with the making and enforcing of regulations for its protection and improvement. The true and only way to make civil society really deserving of its name, is to give its members an active and not merely a passive part in the management of its concerns.

It will be said that all this is easy to talk of, but not so easy to execute. True it is that no single individual can execute it,—but a number of individuals may do a great deal towards it themselves, and still more may be done if plans of this sort are pressed forward on the public attention, till from being at first only noticed, and discussed, they end with being generally adopted. Nor does it signify if any one particular plan be objectionable; the principle of raising the working classes in their bodily, in their intellectual, and in their spiritual condition, is the great thing

that should be for ever inculcated on every man possessed of any influence in society. Of the truth and importance of this principle I am sure; whether the suggestions that I have thrown out in this letter be the best means of carrying it partly into effect, many of your readers can judge better than I can; only if my plan be not a good one, it is essential that some one should devise a better, otherwise I am sure it is far better to try mine than to try nothing.

In my next letter I shall speak of what can and ought to be done by the church. This is a vast subject,—and on none has there been poured forth a greater quantity of audacious ignorance,—to use the very gentlest term. But it is a matter far too momentous to be left to such writers as Mr. Beverley.

LETTER XII.

Sir,—It is now about 120 years ago since a Tory clergyman was impeached by the House of Commons for preaching a sermon full of the most violent doctrines of Toryism. During his trial the popular feeling ran so strongly in his favour, that as he passed backwards and forwards from his lodgings to the House of Lords, the populace obliged all persons to take off their hats to him: the members of the House of Commons who conducted the impeachment, were abused and insulted, the houses of the Whig ministers were attacked, and the Queen, who was supposed to have no great affection for her ministry, was greeted with shouts of "God bless Your Majesty *and the Church.*" Nor was this feeling confined to London: I read in the history of those times that *Birmingham*, *Bristol*, Norwich, and many other places were the scene of riots, in which the popular cry was "Down with the Whigs! High Church and Sacheverel for ever."

But this was more than a hundred years ago. Well then, Sir, it is only just forty years since "Church and King" was again the war cry of a riot. In the year 1791, the Birmingham mob, with this cry in their mouths, committed the same or even worse atrocities than those which have been lately committed at Bristol; and as a dinner given to an Anti-Reforming Recorder was the excuse for the Bristol riots, so those at Birmingham were excited by a dinner given by a number of eminent liberals and reformers, to celebrate the anniversary of the first French Revolution.

This last event was noticed the other day in your paper, and it appears that a bishop has been lately burnt in effigy at Birmingham, on the very spot where Paine, the noted author of the "Age of Reason" and the "Rights of Man," had received the same tribute forty years before. But it is paying far too great a compliment to the actors in either of these burnings to call their acts an instance of the change of *public opinion*. They are merely an instance of the ease with which ignorant men are excited to violence, without knowing why or wherefore. The populace of 1709 shouted "God bless the Church" with just as much reason as the populace of 1831 are shouting "Down with the Bishops." And if there is any one fact undeniably certain, it is that the clergy of the English Church, far from having fallen off since the days of Dr. Sacheverel, were never so enlightened, never so zealous, never so generally exemplary in their lives, as they are at this present hour.

The Church has always had the fortune to be defended and attacked with equal violence and equal unreasonableness. At this day, when the cry is all against it, there is no subject of which popular writers are so profoundly ignorant. The writers for the public press, whether lawyers, or men in trade, or young men who live by their writings, know and can know next to nothing of the clergy. They seldom fall in their way, their habits and views of

things are so different as to preclude much intimacy when they do meet, and while, from residing in large towns, they see a quantity of the evil which the Church has not prevented, they know little of the many thousand country parishes where it is daily more or less effective in doing direct good.

Again, when men attack the Church it is very desirable to know for what reasons they dislike it. Many excellent men amongst the dissenters are unfriendly to it because they think it a hindrance to religion; but a greater number I fear hate it for the very opposite reason, namely because it recommends religion. Many good men complain of its total want of discipline among its own members; but a notorious declaimer against it in an adjoining county has been annoyed by what he thinks its over strictness. He is violent against Church abuses, because his moral character in one particular is such, that the clergymen of his parish will not visit him. I am always anxious, therefore, when I hear any attacks against the Church, to know what sort of a man they come from; for though a great deal that is said against it may be very true, yet considering the principles of many of those who say it, I should exceedingly object to any remedy of their proposing.

The most general complaint against the Church turns upon the excessive amount, and the unequal distribution of its property, and especially upon the burdensome and impolitic nature of the tithe system. There is also a strong popular feeling against the political opinions of the clergy, particularly of the bishops and other dignitaries among them; and this, together with the evils of the tithe system is, I believe, the main cause of their unpopularity among persons who are not ill affected to religion itself.

My conviction of the benefits of a Church Establishment arises from this: that thus, and thus only, can we ensure the dispersion of a number of well educated men over the whole kingdom, whose sole business is, *to do good of the highest*

kind; to enforce, in their public teaching, the purest principles and practice that mankind have ever yet been made acquainted with; and to exhibit these in their own persons in all their daily intercourses with their neighbours, instructing the young, visiting the sick, relieving, advising, and maintaining the cause of the poor;—and spreading amongst all ranks the wholesome influence of a good life, a cultivated understanding, and the feelings and manners of a true gentleman.—For these reasons, I most earnestly admire and love a Church Establishment; and because it has in it the means of doing all this better, I think, than any other sect of Christians, therefore I value and would most rigorously reform *the actual* Church Establishment. Nor are the needful Reforms so difficult as many persons imagine.

I will state them, Sir, even at the risk of seeming to dogmatize, because I have not space to state at length the arguments on which they rest.

1st. A commutation of tithes, even if it can only be effected at a great loss to the Church, because it is far better that the Church should be somewhat poorer, if at such a price it can remove what is at present a great cause of offence.

2nd. An entire remodelling of the Episcopal Order, that many scandals may be removed, and the Church obtain an efficient government.—For this object it seems essential,—

1st. That Translations should be made illegal.

2nd. That the incomes of the smaller Bishoprics be so increased out of the larger ones, as to supersede the necessity of annexing to them Deaneries, livings held in commendam, or any other ecclesiastical preferment whatsoever.

3rd. That the Dioceses be divided, so as to give the Church an efficient government.—For this purpose all Deaneries should be made Bishoprics, retaining their pre-

sent incomes, and of course with no seats in Parliament. The Prebends should be annexed to underpaid livings in large towns, and the largest Church in all such towns should be erected into a Bishop's See; so that there should be no great town throughout England without its resident Bishop, who, without being raised to any undue elevation in rank and fortune, would yet in both be sufficiently respectable to maintain the just influence of the Church with the higher classes as well as with the poor.

4th. That in all large towns and populous districts a sufficient number of new parishes be created, with a resident minister to each. Funds might be provided by annexing, for the future, every one of these new parishes to some valuable country living, if possible in the same neighbourhood or county. Any incumbent accepting such living for the time to come being bound to reside in his town parish nine months in the year, and to keep a resident curate on his benefice in the country.

5th. The Church government being thus rendered efficient, by reducing the size of the dioceses to what would be within the power of an individual to manage, a system of ecclesiastical jurisdiction should be framed, for the prompt punishment, not only of scandalous vice in the clergy,—which is, happily, very rare,—but of what may be called unclerical conduct and neglect of duty; so that the class of "sporting clergy," as they are called, should be gradually weeded out of the establishment.

These reforms would, I am persuaded, work a change in the usefulness of the Church, and in the state of feeling towards it, especially in the manufacturing districts, which would be well worth purchasing at the cost of far greater innovations. Of reforms of a more strictly religious character,—such, I mean, as relate to the liturgy and articles of the Church, I have purposely said nothing; because I think that a newspaper is not the best place for such discussions. But there are some other points of a less serious nature,

such as the relations of the Church with dissenters, and its excessively aristocratical character, which, perhaps, I may be allowed to notice in a following letter.

LETTER XIII.

Sir,—It happened to me some years since to be visiting at the house of a Scotch clergyman, the number of whose parishioners amounted to nearly five thousand souls. I asked him how he found it possible to look after so large a population without assistance. His answer was, that he *had* assistance: that there were three or four dissenting congregations in the town, and that the ministers of these were very useful auxiliaries to him, in providing both for the physical and spiritual wants of his parishioners.

The words of this answer, as well as the simple and natural manner in which they were spoken, have often recurred to my memory when I have noticed the totally different light in which the Dissenters are regarded even by some of the best of the clergy in England. With us, the notion of an opposition of interests between the Church and the Dissenters seems always paramount; and I have heard it said over and over again, when people were giving the highest praise to the zeal and general excellence of a Minister of the Establishment, that such a man would soon thin the meeting houses, and bring back the people to the Church.

Now, Sir, at first sight we cannot doubt that the Scotch clergyman's feelings with regard to Dissenters is a far happier one than that generally entertained in England. It is a great misfortune that Christians should not all heartily co-operate with one another; and a still greater that they should actually look on one another as rivals—almost as enemies. It is a most tremendous evil at a time when their most vigorous efforts, if strengthened by

the closest union, would not be in any degree too great to meet the dangers which threaten them both in common.

But it is an evil which must be laid as much to the fault of the dissenters as of the Church. They have been quite as intolerant, and talked quite as foolishly about the superstition of the Church Services, as their antagonists on their side have talked of the sin of schism. And at this moment, if the government should attempt to effect an union between the Church and the Dissenters, there would be found quite as many obstacles to such a plan on the part of the latter as of the former. Nor is this wonderful, if we remember that the Dissenting Ministers, generally speaking, are men of inferior education, and inferior rank to the Established Clergy, and have thus a less share of the two great antidotes to bigotry—a large acquaintance with the wisdom of ancient times on the one hand, and with various classes of living men, viewing things in many different lights, on the other.

But it is far from my purpose to throw blame either on Churchmen or Dissenters. Thus much, however, is clear, that from the Church, as holding the vantage ground, ought to proceed the first advances to a reconciliation. Now, if uniformity be insisted on, reconciliation is of course out of the question: two men of different habits cannot live together on friendly terms, if either be called upon to conform to the fashions of the other; and a compromise of our own opinions has always something about it so bordering upon meanness and insincerity, that no good fruit can be looked for from a seed so rotten.

One great cause of Dissent has been the utter inefficiency of the Church in populous towns, as a religious society. Men's feelings of Christian union, all their social propensities as Christians, desire some better satisfaction than to be members of a parish of 10,000 or 20,000 souls, half of whom must necessarily be strangers to the other half. It is impossible that they can have much personal

knowledge of their Minister under such circumstances; and what sort of a society is it in which the members neither know one another, nor him who, in some respects, is their head? In forming themselves into a distinct religious society when so situated, the Dissenters acquired a bond of charity more than they had before, but I know not what bond it was which their conduct violated.

This cause of Dissent would cease if the parishes in our large towns were properly subdivided; and the same measure would remove another cause not less powerful, the actual want of room in the churches of the Establishment for the population which that Establishment professes to instruct. But other causes would still remain, and could not be so easily obviated. Some, however worldly their character, are in practice among the most difficult to overcome. I mean the property vested in the different Dissenting chapels, and the incomes actually enjoyed by their ministers. It would not be easy to purchase these, and this alone, therefore, would seem an indissoluble bar to such an union with Dissenters as should merely merge them in the Church Establishment, supposing that by some compliance with their religious objections the Establishment might become such as they would not on religious grounds alone object to join.

There is yet another cause of Dissent very deeply rooted. The established clergy must belong generally to the richer classes, because so long as a residence at the university is a necessary passport to ordination, none but the rich can afford to enter the Church. But separated as the richer and poorer classes are from one another in England, separated not only in manners, habits, and feelings, but actually in language also, who can wonder if the poor desire a religious instructor with whom they can more nearly sympathize than with their regular clergyman, —an instructor who by birth, station, language, and manners, is more nearly one of themselves. True it is that when the regular clergyman is at once a good man and a sen-

sible man, his being a gentleman is all so much in his favour; for though a gentleman parson be a very bad thing if the gentleman be the predominant element in the compound, yet a good parson who in education and feeling is a thorough gentleman beside, in the best sense of the word, inspires justly a degree of respect and confidence as well as of affection which the poor never can feel towards a man of coarser manners and less education. But in the nature of things there will be always a great many of the clergy in whom the gentleman, *not in the best sense of the word*, is predominant over the parson; and then as far as the poor are concerned, the salt that had lost its savour was not more worthless than they find such a minister.

Besides these causes of Dissent there is yet another, which, however, I am inclined to rank among the least really powerful of all: I mean the actual differences of opinion on matters of religion. I cannot enter into particulars on this point, for the same reason which made me abstain in my last letter from considering the expediency of some reform in our liturgy and articles. But when I think *what* the points are on which we and the Dissenters disagree, except in the case of the Unitarians, I am fully satisfied that they ought not to hinder good men, while keeping firmly to what they themselves think the truth, from co-operating in the great cause common to all Christians with those who hold the opposite opinions.

I see then some cause of Dissent existing which a needful reform in our own Establishment would remove; others again are independent of any conceivable extent of reform; while a third class are indeed invincible obstacles to *uniformity*, but ought to be none to *union*. And he who knows the history of the Christian Church has too good cause to remember how fatally the pursuit of this foolish phantom uniformity has lured men from the attainment of the real and substantial blessing, union. Let us leave the Dissenters in the undisturbed enjoyment of their own or-

ganization, and government, and doctrines; but let us cease to call or think them schismatics or enemies. By reforming ourselves in those points which manifestly need it, we shall probably bring over many to our communion in the most honourable manner; and for those who remained, if we treated them as allies more valuable in their own independent manner of fighting, than if forced against nature to adopt ours—capable of meeting the wants of the poorer classes in the very points where the Establishment can least satisfy them, and affording an exercise for that natural and commendable desire after social organization, which a national Establishment has less room for,—we should find the Dissenters most valuable friends and co-operators in that great work of Christian improvement which is, or ought to be, the one great object of every Christian society.

[The following Letters are on miscellaneous subjects.]

EDUCATION OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES.

LETTER I.

April, 1832.

Sir,—Four months have elapsed since I last addressed you; and the course of events has certainly not slumbered during the interval. Would that I could see less cause for deep anxiety in the present state of affairs than there was four months ago; but it cannot be pretended that the most alarming symptoms have as yet suffered any abatement. Wickedness is no less active, and folly no less loud. I fear, too, we must add that honesty and wisdom are no less supine and silent.

We are all aware of the growing power of the middling classes of society, and we know that the Reform Bill will at once increase this power, and consolidate it. But power, like every other gift bestowed upon us by God's Providence, is not a mere gratuity, but a trust: it is given

us to do good with it; and, therefore, it is far better both for ourselves and others that we should not possess it at all, than that we should not know how to use it.

There is one party in the country who wish the mass of the people to be shut out from political power, and who maintain, their belief agreeing with their wish, that the people will never be fit to exercise it. Another party triumphs in the prospect of the increased power of the mass of the community, without seeming to care whether it be fitted to discharge so important a trust or no. Now, Sir, I am earnestly desirous that the people should grow jointly in power and true knowledge; but at the same time I should regard their power as the worst of evils, if true knowledge were not to accompany it.

It seems to me, then, that the education of the middling classes at this time, is a question of the greatest national importance. I wish exceedingly to draw public attention to it; and at the same time, if I may be allowed to do so, to impress most strongly on those engaged in conducting it, the difficulty of their task, as well as its vast importance; how loudly it calls for their very best exertions, and how nobly those exertions, wisely directed, may hope to be rewarded. And on this, as on other subjects, feeling sincerely that my own information is limited, I should be very glad to be the means of inducing others to write upon it, who may be far better acquainted with its details than I am.

The schools for the richer classes are, as it is well known, almost universally conducted by the clergy; and the clergy, too, have the superintendence of the parochial schools for the poorer classes. But between these two extremes there is a great multitude of what are called English, or commercial schools, at which a large proportion of the sons of farmers and of tradesmen receive their education. In some instances these are foundation schools, and the master is appointed by, and answerable to, the trustees of the charity; but more commonly they

are private undertakings, entered upon by individuals as a means of providing for themselves and their families. There is now no restriction upon the exercise of the business of a schoolmaster, and no inquiry made as to his qualifications: the old provision which rendered it unlawful for any man to teach without obtaining a licence from the bishop of the diocese, has naturally and necessarily fallen into disuse; and as the government for the last century has thought it right to leave the moral and religious interests of the people pretty nearly to themselves, an impracticable restriction was suffered to become obsolete, but nothing was done to substitute in its place one that should be at once practicable and beneficial.

Now, in schools conducted by the clergy, the parents have this security, that the man to whom they commit their children has been at least regularly educated, and generally speaking, that he must be a man of decent life. And, if I mistake not, it is merely the prevalence of the feeling that this is so, which has in point of fact given to the clergy nearly the whole education of the richer classes. A man who was not in orders might open a school for the sons of rich parents, if he chose, but he would find it very difficult to get pupils. This state of things has been converted into an accusation against the clergy, by some pretended liberal writers; but it is evidently a most honourable tribute to that union of intellectual and moral qualifications, which, in spite of individual exceptions, still distinguishes the clergy as a body. A layman, who had obtained academical distinctions, would have the same testimony to his intellectual fitness, that a clergyman could boast of, but these distinctions prove nothing as to a man's moral character, whereas, it is felt, and felt justly, that the profession of a clergyman affords to a great extent an evidence of moral fitness also: not certainly as implying any high pitch of positive virtue, but ensuring at least, in common cases, the absence of gross vice; as affording a presumption in short that a

man is disposed to be good, and that his faults will be rather those of deficient practice than of habitual carelessness of principle.

But the masters of our English or commercial schools labour under this double disadvantage, that not only their moral but their intellectual fitness must be taken upon trust. I do not mean that this is at all their fault; still less do I say, that they are not fit actually for the discharge of their important duties: but still it is a disadvantage to them that their fitness can only be known after trial,—they have no evidence of it to offer beforehand. They feel this inconvenience themselves, and their pupils feel it also; opportunities for making known their proficiency are wanting alike to both. It has long been the reproach of our law, that it has no efficient *secondary punishments:* it is no less true that we have no regular system of *secondary education.* The classical schools throughout the country have Universities to look to: distinction at school prepares the way for distinction at college; and distinction at college is again the road to distinction and emolument as a teacher: it is a passport with which a young man enters life with advantage, either as a tutor or as a schoolmaster. But any thing like local Universities,—any so much as local distinction or advancement in life held out to encourage exertion at a commercial school, it is as yet vain to look for. Thus the business of education is degraded: for a schoolmaster of a commercial school having no means of acquiring a general celebrity, is rendered dependent on the inhabitants of his own immediate neighbourhood;—if he offends them, he is ruined. This greatly interferes with the maintenance of discipline; the boys are well aware of their parents' power, and complain to them against the exercise of their master's authority;—nor is it always that the parents themselves can resist the temptation of showing their own importance, and giving the master to under-

stand that he must be careful how he ventures to displease them.

It is manifest that this disadvantage cannot be overcome by the mere efforts of those on whom it presses: the remedy required must be on a larger scale. That the evil occasioned by it is considerable, I can assert with confidence. Submission and diligence are so naturally unwelcome to a boy, that they whose business it is to enforce them have need of a vantage ground to stand upon: they should command the respect of their scholars, not only by their personal qualities but by their position in society; they should be able to encourage diligence, by pointing out some distinct and desirable reward to which it may attain. For this the interference of Government seems to me indispensable, in order to create a national and systematic course of proceeding, instead of the mere feeble efforts of individuals; to provide for the middling classes something analogous to the advantages afforded to the richer classes by our great public schools and Universities. Meanwhile it may not be amiss to consider what is the course of education actually followed in the generality of commercial schools, and what are the improvements of which it is susceptible. If you, Sir, or your readers, agree with me in the importance of the subject, you will allow me, perhaps, to resume it in a future letter.

EDUCATION OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES.

LETTER II.

May 4, 1832.

Sir,—I propose in this letter to pursue the subject of commercial schools, and to state what is the course of study actually pursued in them. And I shall not be sorry to call the attention of your readers to certain general

truths connected with education, which, though very obvious and very important, are yet very apt to be neglected.

I believe it often happens, that boys in the lowest form of a commercial school require absolutely to be taught to read. They have been neglected at home in their earliest years, till, when they come to eleven or twelve years of age, their friends find themselves obliged to send them to school; forgetting, however, that owing to their own neglect, what ought to be the work of seven or eight years has now to be completed as it can within three or four. But supposing a boy able to read and write, his education, properly so called, then commences. He receives instruction in arithmetic, history, and geography; in English grammar, and in composition. The rudiments of physical science, carried on to a greater or less degree of advancement, are also taught him; and with a view to his particular business in life, he learns land surveying, if he is to be brought up to agricultural pursuits; or book-keeping, if he is intended for trade. His religious instruction varies probably more than any thing else, according to the personal character of his instructor, the line of study here being much less clearly marked out, except to a man who is himself in earnest as to its importance. Sometimes the boys are required to analyse grammatically any sentence in an English book, and to give the derivations of the several words in it, just as boys at classical schools are called upon to do in Greek and Latin. And doubtless there may be many commercial schools, especially in the manufacturing districts, where the course of study far surpasses what is here given, and where the instruction on scientific subjects, in chemistry, and in mechanics, is carried to a high degree of proficiency.

But I confess that this is not the point upon which I feel much anxiety. I have little doubt that boys will be sufficiently taught all that they require for their particular calling; and scientific knowledge is so generally valued, and confers a power so immediately felt, that I think its

diffusion may safely be reckoned on. This, however, has nothing to do with the knowledge which the Reform Bill calls for. A man may be ever so good a chemist, or ever so good a mechanic, or ever so good an engineer, and yet not at all the fitter to enjoy the elective franchise. And if we call a people educated who possess only scientific or physical knowledge, we practically misapply the term; for though such knowledge be a very good education, as far as a man's trade or livelihood is concerned, yet, in a political sense, and as a qualification for the exercise of political power, it is no education at all. The distinction requires to be stated more fully.

Every man, from the highest to the lowest, has two businesses; the one his own particular profession or calling, be it what it will, whether that of soldier, seaman, farmer, lawyer, mechanic, labourer, &c.—the other his general calling, which he has in common with all his neighbours, namely, the calling of a citizen and a man. The education which fits him for the first of these two businesses, is called professional; that which fits him for the second, is called liberal. But because every man must do this second business, whether he doe sit well or ill, so people are accustomed to think that it is learnt more easily. A man who has learnt it indifferently seems, notwithstanding, to get through life with tolerable comfort; he may be thought not to be very wise or very agreeable, yet he manages to get married, and to bring up a family, and to mix in society with his friends and neighbours. Whereas, a man who has learnt his other business indifferently, I mean, his particular trade or calling, is in some danger of starving outright. People will not employ an indifferent workman when good ones are to be had in plenty; and, therefore, if he has learnt his particular business badly, it is likely that he will not be able to practise it at all.

Thus it is that while ignorance of a man's special business is instantly detected, ignorance of his great business

as a man and a citizen is scarcely noticed, because there are so many who share in it. Thus we see every one ready to give an opinion about politics, or about religion, or about morals, because it is said these are every man's business. And so they are, and if people would learn them as they do their own particular business, all would do well: but never was the proverb more fulfilled which says that every man's business is no man's. It is worse indeed than if it were no man's; for now it is every man's business to meddle in, but no man's to learn. And this general ignorance does not make itself felt directly,—if it did, it were more likely to be remedied: but the process is long and round about; false notions are entertained and acted upon; prejudices and passions multiply; abuses become manifold; difficulty and distress at last press on the whole community; whilst the same ignorance which produced the mischief now helps to confirm it or to aggravate it, because it hinders them from seeing where the root of the whole evil lay, and sets them upon some vain attempt to correct the consequences, while they never think of curing, because they do not suspect the cause.

I believe it is generally the case, at least in the agricultural districts, that a boy is taken away from school at fourteen. He is taken away, less than half educated, because his friends want him to enter upon his business in life without any longer delay. That is, the interests of his great business as a man are sacrificed to the interest of his particular business as a farmer or a tradesman. And yet very likely the man who cares so little about political knowledge, is very earnest about political power, and thinks that it is most unjust if he has no share in the election of members of the legislature. I do not blame any one for taking his son from school at an early age when he is actually obliged to do so, but I fear that in too many instances there is no sense entertained of the value of education, beyond its fitting a boy for his own immediate business in life: and until this be altered for the

better, I do not see that we are likely to grow much wiser, or that though political power may pass into different hands, that it will be exercised more purely or sensibly than it has been.

"But the newspapers—they are cheap and ready instructors in political knowledge, from whom all may, and all are willing to learn." A newspaper writer, addressing a newspaper editor, must not speak disrespectfully of that with which they are themselves concerned; but *we* know, Sir, and every honest man connected with a newspaper would confess also, that our instruction is often worse than useless to him who has never had any other. We suppose that our readers have some knowledge and some principles of their own; and adapt our language to them accordingly. I am afraid that we in many cases suppose this untruly; and the wicked amongst our fraternity make their profit out of their readers' ignorance, by telling them that they are wise. But instruction must be regular and systematic; whereas a newspaper must give the facts of the day or the week,—and if it were to overload these with connected essays upon general principles, it would not be read. I fear that my own letters tax the patience of some of your readers to the utmost allowable length: and that many, perhaps those who might find them most useful, never think of reading them at all. And yet my letters, although the very least entertaining things that could be tolerated in a newspaper, cannot and do not pretend to give instructions to those who are wholly ignorant. All my hope is to set my readers thinking; and my highest delight would be that any one should be induced by them to suspect his own ignorance, and to try to gain knowledge where it is to be gained. But assuredly he who does honestly want to gain knowledge, will not go to a newspaper to look for it.

No, Sir, real knowledge, like every thing else of the highest value, is not to be obtained so easily. It must be worked for,—studied for,—thought for,—and more than

all, it must be prayed for. And that is education, which lays the foundation of such habits,—and gives them, so far as a boy's early age will allow, their proper exercise. For doing this, the materials exist in the studies actually pursued in our commercial schools; but it cannot be done effectually, if a boy's education is to be cut short at fourteen. His *schooling* indeed may be ended without mischief, if his parents are able to guide his *education* afterwards; and the way to gain this hereafter, is to make the most of the schooling time of the rising generation,—that finding how much may be done even in their case, within the limited time allowed for their education, they may be anxious to give *their* children greater advantages, that the fruit may be proportionably greater.

It may be that this is impracticable, to which I have only to say that I will not believe it to be so till I am actually unable to hope otherwise; for if it be impracticable, my expectations of good from any political changes are faint indeed. These changes might still be necessary, might still be just, but they would not mend our condition; the growth of evil, moral and political, would be no less rapid than it is now.

REFORM, AND ITS FUTURE CONSEQUENCES.

May 28, 1832.

Sir,—The events of the last fortnight have so advanced us in our political career, that like men who have nearly reached the top of the hill, we find the prospect of the country on the other side of it beginning to open upon us. We are not coming to, indeed, but have actually reached a great era in our existence as a nation. Practically speaking, the Reform Bill is passed, the new Constitution of 1832 (I use the term advisedly) is already achieved;—and now let us see what are likely to be our fortunes under it.

I have much to lose by revolution; I have nothing to

dread from reform. I have much to lose by revolution;—not in point of rank or fortune, but because having been long used to, and accustomed deeply to love, the habits and feelings and society of English gentlemen, I have little wish to see foreign manners and feelings introduced here, or to be forced to live amongst them abroad. And I know, moreover, that there is no character on earth which contains the elements of so much national virtue and happiness as the old national character of England, notwithstanding the many defects with which both it and our institutions are chargeable.

And I have nothing to dread from reform. On the contrary, as an enemy of revolution, I have every thing to hope from it. I wish it to be deep, searching, and universal: I wish it to extend to church and state, to army, navy, law, trade, and education; to our political and social institutions; to our habits, principles, and practice, both as citizens and men. God grant that reform may so have its perfect work as equally to crush and bring to nothing the Conservatives and the Jacobins, those equal enemies of all good, whose alternating crimes and follies have, between them, been the curse of mankind from the very beginning of its history.

Now, Sir, considering the Reform Bill as already passed, it is of the last importance that the first workings of the new constitution be watched and directed by a popular government. All violent and disastrous revolutions have been brought about by *suspicion:* because, though the acts of the government were popular, yet its real sentiments were thought to be different: because though it had made abundant concessions, yet it had done nothing good and liberal except *as a concession:* it had been honest only upon compulsion. And, therefore, the only safe government in seasons of popular agitation, is one which notoriously sympathizes with the people, which professed and acted upon popular principles from conviction, when such conduct was neither prompted by interest nor fear:

which is not dragged along reluctantly and helplessly by the movement of the times, but heading it frankly and voluntarily, can restrain its excesses and ensure its final progress, by not letting it run itself out of breath at first in the intemperance of its haste, or waste its strength in wild and unprofitable deviations from its true line of advance.

Such a government will know how to seize for the public good, the advantages which the Reform Bill offers it. Hitherto the ascendancy of the conservative party has obliged those who were fighting for reform to accept the aid of some not very worthy associates. It is not the least curse of Toryism that it persists in keeping the door fast shut against the voice of reason, till passion takes part in the dispute and breaks it open. But now that the Tories are rendered incapable of doing mischief, except by playing into the hands of the Revolutionists, these last are the party most to be dreaded. As yet, happily, they are but a small minority, and they may be made continually smaller and smaller if the government act manfully and honestly, and by fearlessly reforming whatever is bad in every existing institution, leave those who wish for *more than reform* without a single supporter, except the unprincipled and the desperate.

For instance, there is a party in the country whose real object is to destroy Christianity, simply and purely because they hate God. One of this sect fairly confessed what lies at the bottom of their atheism, by saying, "that it would make him miserable to think that there was any being in the universe superior to himself." These men would be very sorry to see the church reformed;—because so long as it retains its abuses they have so much the greater hope of seeing it destroyed. They now hope for the aid of all the Dissenters, of all who dislike the tithe system, of all who are vexed at the conduct of the Tory Bishops. Meanwhile they familiarize the people to hearing the ministers of religion reviled and sneered at, and

to hearing it without alarm or displeasure, because it is their political and not their religious character which is the avowed object of attack. But there is no doubt that an irreligious feeling is thus excited, even unconsciously to those who entertain it; and it comes to this with the mass of the community, that their political hatred to the Establishment and the Clergy is a great deal stronger than their religious affection for Christianity. And in this state public opinion will tolerate, as was shown in the case of the Hebertists in France, any degree of irreligion, even amounting to an actual persecution of those who profess religion. The majority of the French people were not atheists, but were lukewarm as to Christianity, and so they preferred even Hebert, and Robespierre, and Marat, with the Revolution and national independence, to Lesaue and Larochejacqueline, with the old regime and the dismemberment of France. And although we think ourselves a very religious people, yet I am convinced that if the present state of feeling about the Church continues, the majority of the nation would ere long be ready to make a similar choice in England.

Again, there is a party in the country exceedingly desirous of trying experiments upon property, in the way of making a more equal division of it. This is so far from being a catching madness in itself, that even amidst the worst violences of the French revolution no nearer approach to it was made than the Law of the Maximum;—that is, the law which fixed the price at which provisions were to be sold. But in England it will gain proselytes yearly, unless the condition of a large proportion of the community be improved. When a man has property of his own, although it may be very small in comparison with his neighbour's, he prefers holding what he has got on the old tenure to the risk of gaining somewhat more by breaking society to pieces. But he who has nothing cannot be worse off than he is,—and he feels too little indebted to "the World's Law," to entertain any scruples

about destroying it, whenever it may suit his purposes. He will listen to the Owenites or the Saint Simonians, or any other set of political fanatics; just as a man with a painful disorder which the regular practitioner does not relieve, applies eagerly to all the quacks who advertise their "infallible remedies."

If religion and property be thus exposed to danger, it is needless to speak of the risk to which our peculiar political institutions, our monarchy and aristocracy, must necessarily be subject. Nor will I allude to the ultimate process by which these changes will be effected; *that*, however dreadful, may be the misery of one single generation only. But let us look beyond, and see the promised land at which our children will have arrived, after the storms of the journey have blown over. A people three parts atheists and the remaining part wild fanatics; —with no humanizing amusements, for our countrymen are not like the French in their fondness for the drama or the fine arts, for picture galleries and museums;—with no capital, for the law of equal property will effectually prevent this,—with no public or private credit,—with manufactures vainly struggling against that competition in the market, which the great crash of credit and property at home will have enabled foreigners to create,—and with our sixteen millions and a half of human beings so morally and politically disorganized, pent up together within the narrow bounds of this island.

Into this gulph we may be about to be plunged; and there are not wanting wretches who would be happy to plunge us into it. Now then, Sir, more than ever is the time for a liberal government to step forward,—to state broadly and clearly the line between reform and revolution,—to rally all the honesty and spirit of the nation in support of the first, and to denounce in no hesitating language the promoters of the second, as the worst enemies of their country, for whose wickedness no degree of exe-

cration can be too intense, no punishment inflicted by the laws of God or man can be too severe.

THE ELECTIONS.

LETTER I.

August 10, 1832.

SIR,—In travelling, lately, through some of the great manufacturing towns of Lancashire, I was struck by the various placards on the walls in every quarter, relating to the ensuing election; and if one opened a newspaper, its columns were full of the same subject: one read of meetings to consider the propriety of supporting such and such candidates—of the catechism to which the candidates had been subjected, in order to discover their views on various political questions, and of the pledges proposed to be demanded of them, in order to secure their adherence to the wishes of their constituents.

I do not wonder at all this excitement. The elective franchise, now for the first time to be enjoyed by many of these great towns, is indeed a trust of no light importance. It *is* a great matter to support the best candidates: it *is* most desirable that we should not give our votes in the dark, but should know accurately who and what a man is, before we send him to Parliament as our representative.

And truly, Sir, I believe that if the people were left to themselves, they would discharge their great trust admirably: they would return a House of Commons which would be a noble vindication of the Reform Bill, confounding the prophecies of its opponents, and more than realizing the fondest hopes of its supporters. What they *will* return, under actual circumstances, is unhappily far less certain, though my hopes even now outrun my fears.

Who is it that will not leave the people to themselves?

Who are the new boroughmongers whose influence threatens the real liberty of election as much as it was ever threatened by the old ones? Who are now setting up to be tyrants over us, with pretensions new in our own days and in our own country, and likely therefore to deceive those who know nothing beyond the present; but old, stale, and threadbare, even to utter nakedness, to all those who are acquainted with the history of the past? They are the agitators of the Political Unions, and of the newspaper press—the brazen, shallow, and insolent speakers—the ignorant, lying, and malignant writers, known for nothing but their turbulence and their libels, and without a hope of rising to distinction but by the confusion of order, and the general overthrow of truth and goodness.

It was the last humiliation of the dying lion in the fable, that he was kicked by an ass: and surely the bitterest enemies of England could desire no worse shame to befall her, than that she should have broken to pieces the iron sceptre of Napoleon, only to be trampled to pieces by the brute feet of demagogues and libellers—the shallowest, the vilest, and the falsest of their tribe, who have ever yet arisen to be the curse of their own times, and the mingled scorn and detestation of posterity.

I am very far from saying that all speakers at Unions, or all political writers, deserve this character. Of course, this cannot be the meaning of one who has written much for a newspaper himself. But I am sure that it would be a safe rule to give to every elector—"Vote for no man whatsoever, who is known to you *solely* or *chiefly* from his speeches or his political writings." He *may* be honest, he *may* be trustworthy, but his speeches and writings are no sufficient warrant for it. But vote for men whom you know by their lives and actions—for men well spoken of as good Christians, good husbands and fathers, good neighbours—men who have minded *their own* business or calling well, and whom you may therefore safely trust with *yours*—men who are upright, and sensible, and liberal in

their private relations—whose advice you would be glad to ask in any private difficulty—on whose word and on whose kindness you would rely with perfect confidence in any private embarrassment or distress. Happily for our country, such men are not yet scarce amongst us; they may be found in every large town, not confined to any one religious denomination, to any one political party. Let these be your candidates, and then ply them with your questions—scrutinize as narrowly as you will their opinions: choose from amongst them that man whose political notions most agree with your own, and you will have exercised your elective franchise well—you will have sent to Parliament a worthy representative—a representative of your conscience, your judgment, and your principles, not of your folly, your prejudices, and your passions.

Your readers will naturally apply these doctrines to the approaching election for Sheffield. Undoubtedly they are applicable to it, and are very unfavourable to the pretensions of Mr. B——. I neither say nor insinuate any thing *against* him; but what do the inhabitants of Sheffield know of him at all, except as a political writer? It is to the *class* which I object, not to the individual specimen of it. Mr. B—— is a stranger, known to us as the editor of a newspaper in the East Indies, who was sent home from India by the Government there, and has ever since been a violent opponent of that Government. He is known as the author of an entertaining book of travels, and as a lecturer upon the state of the oriental nations. He is a clever and active man, who is trying what he can do for himself: but do we know any thing more of him? Do we even know the real merits of his quarrel with the Indian Government? But much more: have we known him in youth and in manhood—in all the various relations of private life, apart from that which is merely addressed to the public eye and ear—writings, and speeches, and lectures? Adventurers may be honest: but in so serious

a matter as the choice of our representative, we want to see them in another state than when full dressed to act their part on the stage.

You, Sir, know with certainty that in saying this I neither have, nor can have, by possibility, any personal or party motives. You know, that so far as concerns the Sheffield election, I neither have, nor can have, any particular interest in favour of any of the candidates or against them. Nor should I have mentioned the name of Mr. B——, had not his case furnished me with a very striking and uninvidious example whereby to illustrate my general meaning. If I had known any thing against him —had he been a notorious libeller, false and worthless, like some individuals whom I might have named, the character of my letters would have suffered from introducing him, as they might then have become chargeable with personality: but as it is, I take him merely as a political writer—as belonging to a class of persons whom I wish to see carefully excluded from Parliament—*men who are strangers to their constituents, except from what they have said or written on political subjects, without being officially engaged in the public service.* And my rule applies to men of all parties and of all characters; for my objection is not that persons of this description are not honest, but simply that we have no means of knowing them to be so.

I wish it also to be distinctly observed, that I say nothing, and mean nothing, against men who are known for their speeches and writings, so long as they are not known *solely* or *chiefly* on this ground. If a man, in addition to a high private and professional character, is known *besides*, as taking an active interest in public affairs, of course it is all so much in his favour; for what he has spoken and written then becomes a very valuable security that he will not be an indolent and inefficient member. But as politics are not the main business of any private man's life, so it is a bad symptom when his opinions about

them are the most prominent part of his character; to those who know him at all, he ought to be known for something better.

It is very easy to shew, moreover, that an elector cannot exercise his franchise so independently, and safely to himself, as by following the rule which I have given. And as I wish for elections to be really free and independent, I shall venture, with your permission, to enlarge a little upon this matter in a future letter.

THE ELECTIONS.

LETTER II.

August, 1832.

Sir,—I concluded my last letter by saying, that if an elector wishes to exercise his franchise in the most independent manner, he will beware of all political adventurers; of all stranger candidates, whom he knows more by their speeches and writings than by their actions. I call this the most independent way of voting, because it leaves a man most entirely to the judgment of his reason, and takes him away from the influence of his passions, whether of hope or fear.

I know of no worse symptom of the state of a country than the estimating a man's political opinions above his moral principles and practice. We know a man's opinions, it may be said, and that is all that we want: if they agree with ours, then he is the best man whom we can choose. But if we cannot trust a man's honesty we never can be sure that he will not back out of his opinions whenever his interest may tempt him to do so; still less can we depend on what his opinions may be on points respecting which we have not expressly questioned him. We can put no general confidence in him, and we shall be lucky if we can even hold him always to the direct pledges which he has given. Who can dare to speculate

upon the nature of Mr. Cobbett's opinions upon any given topic, should he be returned to Parliament, except so far as it may be conjectured what party will have it in its power to bid highest for his support?

Moreover, Sir, in the concerns of this great nation there must be a variety of questions on which it is the merest folly in the world for the mass of the electors to entertain a decided opinion at all. I will just instance the question of the Currency, on which it seems that writers and speakers are positive, exactly in proportion to their ignorance. Undoubtedly I have my own opinions about it, but still I am well aware of the immense difficulty of the subject, and therefore I should be very sorry to vote for any candidate merely because he had pledged himself to support what in my present state of knowledge I conceive to be the truth on this point. I should much rather suspect his honesty, or his wisdom, in pledging himself at all on a question hitherto so far from decided, than I should confide in him because his present views happened to coincide with mine.

Again, with respect to the slavery question, the corn laws, the East India question, the tithes, the taxes on newspapers, &c., it is perfectly impossible for the great majority of the people of this country to form a decided judgment on all these points which shall be worth any thing. We, Sir, who are obliged to attend to our own particular business or profession, have not time to follow up all these enquiries thoroughly. We want our representatives to do this for us; it is their business to do it; but we are actually disabling them for discharging it, if we bind them down beforehand to abide, in spite of clearer knowledge, by the decisions, if I may so call them, of our half informed judgments.

Now here is the great blessing of the Reform Bill, that it enables us safely to choose the best men for our representatives, without looking for the pledged supporters of such and such opinions. Under the old system so many

members were returned who were sure to support one particular side, that wherever there was a popular election, the people were anxious, in self-defence, to look out for a member equally bound to the opposite side. But now that the rotten boroughs are destroyed, and the undue influence on one side done away with, we are no longer under the necessity of choosing one violent partizan to oppose another, but may look merely to a man's intrinsic merits, and have no occasion for any partizans at all. Even so infamous a profligate as Wilkes, might be the object of the popular choice for his profession of popular principles, when Luttrell, with a character no less profligate, was brought forward by the anti-popular party, for the avowed object of keeping popular principles down. This was a state of constant warfare, in which each party looked out, not for the purest heart or the wisest head, but for the strongest arm, and for the most inveterate spirit to direct it.

The salvation of the country depends, I am sure, on our preventing this state from ever again reviving amongst us. The Reform Bill has freed the commonwealth from the undue preponderance of a portion of the people over the rest; but if it only leads to the preponderance of another portion, I do not see how the commonwealth as a whole is likely to be benefited. If the working classes speak of the Bill as of their victory, and look to it as to an engine of their own exclusive advancement, and of the humiliation of the rich, what is this but saying we are not one people, but two irreconcileable factions, and that we are just as far from the triumph of justice, and liberality, and mutual kindness, and national happiness, as we have ever been before.

Undoubtedly the Reform Bill is a means, and not an end: on this we are all agreed. I wish it to become the means of thoroughly reforming what is amiss in the country, by enabling us to choose the best and wisest men amongst us for our legislators; by giving us the power of

looking out for a member of Parliament as deliberately and independently as we choose the members of a committee for any local object. We look around us on such occasions, and see who of our neighbours best understands, and is likely best to fulfil the duties committed to him. And if we look round us fairly and calmly, we shall be as sure to find men who understand and will honestly fulfil the great duties of Members of Parliament.

One thing is certain, that the Reform Bill can never be taken away from us; that is, the rotten boroughs never can be restored, nor the qualification for the elective franchise narrowed. Indirectly, indeed, it may be rendered useless, if we choose to surrender our judgments to party feelings, or, still worse, to the dictation of the managing members of the Political Unions. There will then be needed a new sort of *Black Book*, to lay open the names and private history of these radical boroughmongers; to shew who and what they are who pretend to direct the votes of the people of England.

The object of the people is to be relieved from their actual state of distress. And does any one believe that the thousands of honest and intelligent individuals with whom this country abounds,—men excellent in all the relations of private and domestic life, active in business, and respected for their general benevolence and sound judgment,—are really insensible to the distress of their country; or, that they would not relieve it far more effectually than a set of adventurers who are known for nothing but their professions and their virulence? Every one is aware how much requires to be amended in our state of society; but common sense, as well as the universal experience of history, assures us that high principle, impartiality, and moderation are the qualities most likely to effect the amendment thus needed.

One word I may venture to address to the Dissenters. No union can be more unnatural—none more disgraceful, than that between Christians, of whatever denomination,

and the enemies, not of this sect or of that, but of Christianity itself. They do not love the actual Establishment, and for this I have no quarrel with them; but they should consider that Church property is, in the strictest and highest sense, the property of the nation, and that every Englishman has an interest in its remaining so for ever, and not being plundered or squandered for the profit, or supposed profit, of one generation. What would we now give if the public were still in possession of the estates of the monasteries, which, in an hour of true jacobinical brutality, were iniquitously robbed, and wastefully and corruptly lavished! What a host of magnificent and useful institutions, colleges, schools, institutes, hospitals, asylums for orphans, asylums for the aged, might have been furnished to the country out of the Abbey lands, had Henry VIII. been a true reformer instead of a selfish and coarse-minded revolutionist! So it is with Church property now; the clergy are not a caste, like the priests and Levites of the Jews—they are severally but life tenants, and their children have no more interest in their benefices after their deaths, than the children of every other man in England. But it is for the common interest of the whole nation, that there should be some property in every small subdivision of the kingdom set apart for ever for public purposes, providing on the one hand for the performance of services of the most important kind, and furnishing on the other a prospect of an honourable station in society, a respectable maintenance, and great moral advantages, to which the son of the poorest parents may hope to raise himself. The Dissenters would do well to endeavour to make the benefits of the national Church more comprehensive than they are at present, and to render its institutions more efficient: they would act consistently and could not be blamed, if they laboured to obtain for themselves a larger share of its advantages; but they will act at once foolishly and wickedly if they lend their aid to those who would destroy it altogether.

PREFACE

TO

POETRY OF COMMON LIFE.

[This Essay was written in 1831, as the Preface to a Collection of Poems for the Poorer Classes, made by Mr. Platt, Editor of the Sheffield Courant, and entitled "The Poetry of Common Life."]

PREFACE

TO

POETRY OF COMMON LIFE.

THERE is a ridiculous character in one of Molière's French plays, who is represented as going to school in his old age to acquaint himself with the very first rudiments of learning. He is particularly struck with the explanations given him of the words "Verse" and "Prose," and cannot enough express his astonishment that he should have been talking "Prose" all his life, without ever being aware of it.

This feeling, caricatured as it may seem, is exactly what many persons entertain with regard to poetry. They look upon it as a thing quite remote from common life and common people, and would be utterly surprised to hear that they themselves have most certainly been many times in a state of mind completely poetical; and, in all probability, have often, like Molière's *Monsieur Jourdain*, spoken in poetical language without being aware of it, just as he had been talking prose.

Much mischief has arisen from this false impression. The most natural thing in the world has been regarded as the most artificial; and one of the most ennobling pleasures of the human mind, and, at the same time, one most within the reach of every one, has been thought to belong almost exclusively to the rich, like the luxuries of the table, or the splendour of a great establishment. Nor is this merely owing to aristocratical pride in the richer

classes, or to their wish to keep a monopoly of enjoyment to themselves. It arises out of a real honest ignorance of the nature of poetry, and of the almost universal capacity of taking delight in it; for there is no doubt that Mr. Cobbett would go along with the highest aristocrat in laughing at the notion of the poor reading poetry; not because he would think them not fit to enjoy it, but because he would consider it as not fit to be studied by them: he would regard it as a mere rich man's toy, which none but the idle, or the silly, would hold it worth their while to study.

No error has ever arisen without something to make it less absurd than we might at first sight suppose it. In the present case it has accidentally happened that the language of poetry for many years in this country *was* quite unnatural, and the subjects to which it was confined were not capable of exciting general interest. And not in this country only, but in many others, as the rich had most means of rewarding the writers of poetry, so it was naturally made suitable to their tastes; and the subjects chosen, and the style in which they were treated, were both adapted to the turn of mind of the richer classes; and for that very reason—such has been the unhappy separation between the different parts of society — they have been less agreeable and less intelligible to the mass of the community.

But this does not make it less true that poetry, in itself, may be one of the most universal pleasures of mankind. By *poetry* we mean certain feelings expressed in certain language. *Poetical feelings* are merely, in other words, all the highest and purest feelings of our nature,—feelings, therefore, which, considering what we generally are, cannot but be of rare occurrence. It has been truly said, that

> "Our better mind,
> Is like a Sunday's garment, then put on
> When we have nought to do,—but at our work
> We wear a worse for thrift."

Our common temper, therefore, which is but too generally cold, and selfish, and worldly, is altogether unpoetical; but let any thing occur to put us above ourselves, any thing to awaken our devotion, our admiration, or our love—any danger to call forth our courage, any distress to awaken our pity, any great emergency to demand the sacrifice of our own comfort, or interest, or credit, for the sake of others, then we experience for the time a *poetical temper*, and *poetical feelings;* for the very essence of poetry is, that it exalts and ennobles us, and puts us into a higher state of mind than that which we are commonly living in.

Such, then, being *poetical feelings*, we shall soon see what is meant by *poetical language.* Our words, our style, nay, our very tone of voice, naturally vary according to the temper of our minds. When we are feeling any strong passion it instantly alters our manner of speaking from that which we practise on common occasions. It clears away all that is mean and vulgar, all that is dull and tiresome in our language; and renders it at once spirited, noble, and pithy. The mind being highly excited, becomes more than usually active; it catches with great quickness every impression given by surrounding objects; it seizes rapidly every point in which they may seem to express sympathy with its own feelings. Hence its language is full of images and comparisons; it is unusually rich and beautiful, that is, it crowds together a number of ideas in a short space, and expresses them in the most lively manner, because its conception of them is keen and vivid. Again, the very tone of the voice is altered, it becomes more rapid and animated, and the flow of our words is less broken, and more measured and musical, than in common unexcited conversation. This will be understood in a moment by just turning to the poetical parts of the Bible: for instance, let any one observe the difference between the two first chapters of the Book of Job, which contain the mere story, and those which immediately follow them. He will find his tone and manner of

reading, if he be reading aloud, change instantly in going from the second chapter to the third. *Poetical language* is, in truth, the language of excited feeling; and this is what was meant by saying that as every man has been in a poetical state of mind at some time or other of his life, so almost every man must, in some degree, however imperfect, have expressed himself on such occasions in poetical language.

This is what may be called the natural history of poetry, showing the elements in nature out of which it arose. Here, as in all other cases, art came into imitate nature: the pleasure of excitement is notorious to every one; and poetry, in the common sense of the word, is an artificial means of producing this pleasure, by presenting us with exciting feelings expressed in exciting language. Hence arose the invention of verse, partly, in imitation of that flowing and harmonious language which is natural to us when speaking under the influence of strong feeling; partly to create an additional excitement by the effect of an harmonious arrangement of sounds. But the oldest known poetry, which is that contained in the Old Testament, was not written in any regular metre or verse; nor is verse essential to the nature of poetry, although the almost universal practice of later times has made us think it so.

It is manifest, from what has been said, how the various sorts and styles of poetry have arisen. For, though all men have the same feelings, yet at different times, and in different classes of society, some feelings will be predominant over others: nor will the same feelings always be excited exactly in the same way. For instance, a very rude people will be most delighted by the poetry which tells of the warlike actions of their fathers; a religious people will be most fond of devotional poetry; a people in a very high state of refinement will enjoy a poetry which goes deeply into the workings of our minds and affections, and awakens feelings absolutely unintelligible

to men in a less advanced condition. But although all persons may thus be unable to enjoy the same poetry, yet every one would enjoy poetry of some kind or other, if he could meet with any of the kind suitable to his own case —that is, if it was addressed to those feelings which are most alive within his own breast, and expressed in language which he could understand.

The more extensive our knowledge of men and things, and the greater the activity of our minds and the liveliness of our feelings, so much the more universal will be our pleasure in poetry; inasmuch as we shall be able to enter into the notions, and to sympathize with a greater number of poets of different descriptions, ages, and countries. For to like only one sort of excellence is the sure mark of an imperfectly educated mind; it likes one sort only, because it only knows and understands one sort.

Meanwhile, the object of the present collection is at once to gratify the taste of a large class of readers, and to improve it. The poetry here presented to them speaks to those universal feelings which we all have in common, as men and as Englishmen. None can find it too hard for them; while at the same time, the poems here selected are the productions of minds at once so vigorous and so cultivated, that every reader will find in them something to strengthen his understanding, and to enrich it—something whose beauty will rise on his contemplation of it, at once exciting greater efforts of mind on his part and rewarding them.

One thing more may be added: the works of great poets require to be approached at the outset with a full faith in their excellence: the reader must be convinced that if he does not fully admire them, it is his fault, and not theirs. This is no more than a just tribute to their reputation; in other words, it is the proper modesty of an individual thinking his own unpractised judgment more likely to be mistaken than the concurring voice of the public. And it is the property of the greatest works of

genius in other departments also, that a first view of them is generally disappointing; and if a man were foolish enough to go away trusting more to his own hasty impressions than to the deliberate judgment of the world, he would remain continually as blind and ignorant as he was at the beginning. The cartoons of Raphael, at Hampton Court Palace—the frescoes of the same great painter in the galleries of the Vatican at Rome—the famous statues of the Laocoon, and the Apollo Belvidere—and the Church of St. Peter at Rome, the most magnificent building perhaps in the world—all alike are generally found to disappoint a person on his first view of them. But let him be sure that they are excellent, and that he only wants the knowledge and the taste to appreciate them properly, and every succeeding sight of them will open his eyes more and more, till he learns to admire them, not indeed as much as they deserve, but so much as greatly to enrich and enlarge his own mind, by becoming acquainted with such perfect beauty. So it is with great poets: they must be read often and studied reverently, before an unpractised mind can gain any thing like an adequate notion of their excellence. Meanwhile, the process is in itself most useful: it is a good thing to doubt our own wisdom, it is a good thing to believe, it is a good thing to admire. By continually looking upwards, our minds will themselves grow upwards; and as a man, by indulging in habits of scorn and contempt for others, is sure to descend to the level of what he despises, so the opposite habits of admiration and enthusiastic reverence for excellence impart to ourselves a portion of the qualities which we admire; and here, as in every thing else, humility is the surest path to exaltation.

PRINCIPLES

OF

CHURCH REFORM.

[For the circumstances which occasioned the publication of the following pamphlet, see Life and Correspondence, Vol. I. c. vii.]

PREFACE.

I HAVE called the following pamphlet, "Principles of Church Reform," because I thought it better to try to establish these, than to lose myself and my readers in a mass of minute details. For if the principles be true, there are persons of much greater experience and knowledge than myself to contrive the best way of carrying them into effect; while, had I proposed any particular arrangements which might have been ill-judged or impracticable, this error in the details might have been transferred by unfairness or ignorance to the main principles of the argument, and they would have been called impracticable also. These principles I believe to be irrefragable; that a Church Establishment is essential to the well-being of the nation; that the existence of Dissent impairs the usefulness of an Establishment always, and now, from peculiar circumstances, threatens its destruction; and that to extinguish Dissent by persecution being both wicked and impossible, there remains the true, but hitherto untried way, to extinguish it by comprehension; that different tribes should act together as it were in one army, and under one command, yet should each retain the arms and manner of fighting with which habit has made them most familiar.

But as to the manner of carrying these principles into effect, I am far from proposing any thing with equal confidence. Nor am I anxious about any particular measure, which I may have ventured to recommend, if any thing can be

suggested by others, which may effect the same great object more completely. But practical ability, of which we have no lack in the country, must labour not merely for no good, but for absolute mischief, unless it clearly understands the principles of the question. And the numerous plans of Church Reform already before the public, have also the same bad effect, that they lead their readers off on a false scent, and make them fancy, that by their adoption the Church would be reformed and secured, when its great defects and dangers would remain in fact untouched. But the natural tendency of mankind to reform by patching rather than effectually, gives great reason to fear that some one or other of these plans will be adopted; and that the matter will then be considered by the Government to be set at rest. Whereas, in fact, it will not be at rest; but will be agitated with more violence than ever, and with less hope of a favourable settlement;—because one party will be exasperated at what they will call a mere mockery of Reform, and the other will complain that their concessions have given no satisfaction, and will therefore be disposed, for the time to come, to fight out the battle to the last.

RYDAL,
January 9th, 1833.

PRINCIPLES

OF

CHURCH REFORM.

Every man who talks, writes, or votes in favour of Church Reform, would do well to ask himself, why he wishes for it. And in like manner the Government, when legislating to satisfy the general call for Church Reform, would do well to consider with what motives it is called for; to see, first, whether they who call the loudest are persons who ought to be satisfied; and, secondly, what it is that truth and wisdom demand; for their call ought certainly to be listened to, though it is generally preferred in a voice so gentle, that they who care not for it may easily avoid hearing it at all.

Now Church Reform being a very vague term, it is of great consequence to know what they, who use it, mean by it. It is impossible that a man can care, properly speaking, about the reform of any institution, if the objects of the institution are of no interest to him. If then a man, without being a Dissenter, is one who seldom or never goes to Church, and appears to have very little value for Christianity personally; the main object of the institution of the Church is clearly of no interest to him; and his anxiety for its reform can only be for the sake of certain subordinate objects which he may suppose to be promoted by it. Still, if he be a man of enlarged and liberal views, and capable of desiring the intellectual welfare of his countrymen, and their moral improvement also so far as it affects society, he may sincerely wish to see the Church reformed in the proper sense of the term, although he

may not be a religious man; because the social improvement of man is one of the direct objects of a Church establishment, although not its highest object; and it is properly to wish an institution reformed, if we wish it rendered more capable of effecting any of its proper objects. But men of another stamp, who neither value the social nor the religious benefits conferred by an establishment, cannot rightly be said to desire its reform; they merely wish to see it destroyed; and destruction is so very different from reform, that it is a gross fraud to call ourselves friends of the one, when what we really desire is the other.

Here then is one class of Church Reformers, and another class who call themselves by the same name, but whose proper title is Church Destroyers. A third, and a very numerous class, must however be added; men who have no value for the objects of the Church, nor yet any antipathy to it; who in point of fact neither wish for its reform nor for its destruction. They merely look upon its revenues as affording the means of lessening their own outgoings in money, by being made in part available to public purposes. These men are in truth Church destroyers, only they are restrained by temper or by some scruple of conscience from going the full length of their own principles. Their object in short is wholly and entirely selfish, and if we might borrow the language of the seventeenth century, we might fitly distinguish them by the name of the "Self-seekers."

The avowed Dissenters join also in the call for Church Reform; and they again use the term with singular impropriety. They can hardly care about the reform of an institution from which they have altogether separated themselves. They belong, in fact, either to the class of Church Destroyers, or of Self-seekers: to the former, if being convinced that an establishment is an evil, they wish to see it altogether put down: to the latter, if their object be simply to be relieved from Church rates, Easter

dues, and tithes, because they support a ministry of their own. But I have heard as yet no language from the Dissenters which could entitle them justly to the name of Church Reformers. That they may, and ought to become so, I shall endeavour to show hereafter.

Now it is manifest, that if we take all these classes of persons to the letter of their present,—perhaps I ought to say, their yesterday's language,—if we do reform the Church, by ridding it of the evils most loudly clamoured against, three out of four of them will still be unsatisfied. It is quite idle to think that the Destroyers, or the Self-seekers, really care about pluralities and non-residence, and the inequality of Church benefices: still less are they concerned about alterations in the Liturgy, or the introduction of a more effective clerical discipline. The real question with them is one of money,—they want a cheap religion,—and they lay the more stress upon the epithet, in proportion to their ignorance of the value of the article for which they are bargaining: about religion they know and care little,—about money they know and care much.

We are told that there is now an universal wish for Church Reform. This, as I have shown, is not true; on the contrary, I doubt exceedingly, whether the friends of Reform are powerful enough to get their object effected. There is on one side a great wish for Church destruction and Church robbery; and on the other side a great unwillingness to correct Church abuses: but the generality of the wish for Church Reform is a fact which I should exceedingly rejoice to see established.

It is not enough, in times like these, to stand battling about a few points of detail. We must take up the whole question from the beginning, that we may know on what grounds we are going to legislate. Before I discuss any scheme of Church Reform, I must state why I am utterly opposed to all schemes of Church destruction.

I will not insult even the most violent Church destroyer, so far as to suppose him to contemplate the ejectment of

the present holders of benefices. As the law declares that a man's benefice is his freehold, it is precisely the same thing to deprive an incumbent of the income arising from his church preferment, as to deprive any other individual of the rents of his land, or of the profits of his trade. If, therefore, such an act could be committed, it would be neither more nor less than literal robbery; and we should be far advanced on our way towards that happy consummation, when every man will keep what he can, and take what he can.

But, saving all existing interests, why should not the Establishment expire with the present generation? Why should not the tithes, in every parish, revert, on the next vacancy, to the several owners of the soil; and all Church lands be sold for the payment of the national debt; leaving the next generation of ministers, if there be any, to be maintained by the voluntary contributions of their hearers?

I am so anxious to get to the very principles of the whole question, that I am contented to pass over all the particular and practical objections which might be made to such a scheme;—such as its invasion of the rights of the patrons of Church benefices; and the question how far episcopal or chapter lands, which certainly were never granted by the state, could justly be taken by the state for its own purposes. These are all very substantial objections, and would, I hope, be fully insisted upon by all friends to law and right, if ever the proposal of Church destruction should come before the legislature in its plain form: but I hold it much more satisfactory, to rest the case simply on general principles; and to show that if the Establishment could be subverted, without the least individual injustice or illegality, still it would be the greatest possible folly in the nation to subvert it.

It is quite manifest, that the whole amount of Church property in England, including under that name, both tithes, so far as they are in clerical hands, and Church

lands of every description, is so much saved out of the scramble of individual selfishness, and set apart for ever for public purposes. Now there are few things from which society in England has suffered greater evil, than from the want of property so reserved: it is apparent in every town, and in every village, in the absence of public walks, public gardens, public exercise grounds, public museums, &c., in the former; and in most instances, of even so much as a common green, in the latter: let a man go where he will, he is beset on every side by the exclusiveness of private property; the public has kept nothing. This has arisen very much out of the false and degrading notions of civil society which have prevailed within the last century. Society has been regarded as a mere collection of individuals, looking each after his own interest; and the business of government has been limited to that of a mere police, whose sole use is to hinder these individuals from robbing or knocking each other down. This view of society, alike unphilosophical and unchristian, has largely counteracted the good which the world, in this advanced stage of its existence, has derived from its increased experience; and its pernicious effects have been abundantly shown in the actual state of the poor throughout England. For their physical distresses, their ignorance, and their vices, are the true fruits of the system of "letting alone;" in other words, of leaving men to practise for their own advancement, all arts, save actual violence; of allowing every natural, and every artificial superiority, to enjoy and push its advantages to the utmost, and of suffering the weaker to pay the full penalty of their inferiority.

Thus, even before I consider the particular application of Church property, I hold it to be an enormous benefit that it is so much secured for ever to public uses;—a something saved out of the scramble, which no covetousness can appropriate, and no folly waste. Again, it is not only a considerable mass so saved;—but it is so happily

divided, that every portion of the kingdom, with certain wretched exceptions, shares in the benefit. The sight of a church tower, wherever it is met with, is an assurance that every thing has not been bought up for private convenience or enjoyment;—that there is some provision made for public purposes, and for the welfare of the poorest and most destitute human being who lives within the hearing of its bells. In the most unattractive districts of the country, no less than in the most inviting, this same beneficent provision extends itself:—or if it does not, it is owing wholly to the neglect of these later times, when all things have been left to find their own level; and the result has been, as might well have been expected from the inequalities of the bottom, an alternation of some deep pools here and there with huge wastes of unmoistened sand and gravel.

But what are the particular public purposes for which this property is set apart? Alms-houses are an admirable provision for the poor and aged;—hospitals for the sick;—schools for the young;—a public garden furnishes amusement to all;—a public library gives instruction to all. But this property is designed to provide a benefit higher and more universal than any of these,—to secure for every parish the greatest blessing of human society, that is, the constant residence of one individual, who has no other business than to do good of every kind to every person. Men in general have their own profession or trade to follow; and although they are useful to society, yet it is but an indirect benefit—not intended for society in the first place, but for themselves; so that no one feels obliged to them for their services, because there is nothing in them which partakes of the nature of a kindness. Those again who possess an independent fortune, are not only raised too high to be in perfect sympathy with the majority of their neighbours, but are exposed to moral temptations of a peculiar kind, which often render them an inadequate example to others. Whereas, it is impossible

to conceive a man placed so favourably for attaining to the highest perfection of our nature, as a parochial minister. Apart from all personal and particular interests; accustomed by his education and habits to take the purest and highest views of human life, and bound by his daily business to cherish and sweeten these by the charities of the kindest social intercourse: in delicacy and liberality of feeling on a level with the highest; but in rank and fortune standing in a position high enough to insure respect, yet not so high as to forbid sympathy:—with none of the harshness of legal authority, yet with a moral influence such as no legal authority could give;—ready to advise, when advice is called for, but yet more useful by the indirect counsel continually afforded by his conduct, his knowledge, his temper, and his manners;—he stands amidst the fever and selfishness of the world, as one whom the tainted atmosphere cannot harm, although he is for ever walking about in it, to abate its malignant power over its victims.

Now I wish it to be observed, that all this good results simply from the circumstance, that here is a man of education, relieved from the necessity of following any trade or ordinary profession in order to maintain himself, and placed in the most improving of all situations,—a life of constant intercourse with men, of which the direct and acknowledged business is to do them good physically and morally. Thus much is independent of religion:—and had there been a resident sophist stationed in every village of the Roman empire, with such a general commission to improve in every way the condition of the people, the amount of crime and misery would have been enormously lessened. But to all this, how much is superadded in the Christian ministry! How great is the difference of the notions conveyed by the terms "lecturer" and "preacher;" by the names of "sophist" and "pastor!" The truth is, that men bear impatiently the teaching of men, unless it comes with more than man's authority:

the beneficent relations in which a minister stands towards his people, derive much of their power from this very circumstance, that he is a minister of *religion*. And Christianity, whilst it fully invests him with this character, yet has provided in the strongest manner against superstition and priestcraft; for a minister can speak with no authority beyond his commission, and this commission lies open for all men, to judge whether he adheres to it or no. It gives him power unspeakable, so long as he faithfully discharges it: but deserts and condemns him the very moment that he would pervert it to selfish purposes, to make his own word a law, and himself an idol. But in this commission there is contained indeed the very food, and more than the food of man's life: the remedy for all troubles and sorrows, from the simplest physical suffering of the rudest nature, up to the mental conflicts which are the inevitable portion of the loftiest and most sensitive: the medicine for all moral evil, from the mere bodily appetites of the most grossly ignorant, to the most delicate forms of pride or selfishness in minds of the highest intelligence: the light to clear up every perplexity of practice, strengthening the judgment through the purified affections: the most exalted hope inseparably united with the deepest humility; because we believe in Christ crucified—because we trust in Christ risen [a].

Now an appropriation of a certain portion of property to secure for ever to a whole people so invaluable a blessing

[a] I shall not be suspected of meaning this high character of the benefits of a national Christian ministry to apply in its full perfection to the actual state of the Church amongst us. The faults of human nature will always make the practice of an institution fall below its theory. But it is no less true that all the tendencies of the ministerial office, as such, are wholly beneficial; and if the actual good derived from it be not so great as it might be, this is owing to counteracting causes, some remediable—such, for instance, as faults produced by imperfect education and inefficient church discipline; others, arising out of the mere weakness of human nature, admitting only of palliation, not of complete removal.

as a resident Christian ministry dispersed over every part of the country, will naturally be objected to by those who hate the very names of God and of goodness. And persons who arrive from mere brutishness at the same practical conclusion to which the godless party are led by deliberate wickedness,—men who can neither look before nor after, but limit their notions of political good to the mere physical welfare of their own generation, because they can understand nothing higher,—such persons may consistently think that hand work is more useful than head or heart work, and that no elements in society can be so well spared as piety, and charity, and moral wisdom. It is no wonder, then, but a just tribute to the excellence of the Christian ministry, that it should be hated by the sublimed and systematic wickedness of the godless party, and by the brute ignorance and coarseness of the dregs of the democracy. But that men who, though not religious, are yet admirers of much that is noble, and much that is excellent;—still more, that men who really fear God and love Christianity, should be found to doubt the wisdom of a national provision for the moral and intellectual improvement of the people, for giving them the knowledge of that truth which is life eternal,—this is on the face of it a phenomenon so strange, nay, so monstrous, that we cannot but eagerly desire, for the honour of human nature, to explain the causes of it.

It has arisen from that worst reproach of the Christian name,—the spirit of sectarianism. For Christians having become divided into a thousand sects, and refusing to join in each other's worship, a national establishment is regarded as an unjust preference of one sect over another; —and, as it is considered impossible to establish all, and unfair to establish any other rather than another, there remains no alternative but to establish none; and, to use a phrase much in fashion, to look upon every man's religion as an affair between God and his own conscience only.

That the objection to a national provision for the minis-

ters of religion arises, amongst thinking men, solely out of the difficulties created by sectarianism, is manifest from this;—that where sectarianism has not existed, or only in an insignificant degree, the wisdom of such a provision has been allowed with remarkable unanimity. For, not to speak of the ancient world, where it was a thing unheard of for a state to be without its national worship, its temples, its festivals, and its priests; the whole Christian world, from the time that governments have become Christian, has acted uniformly on the same principle, with the single exception of the United States of America, where the evil spirit of sectarianism has wrought his perfect work. And what is still more to our purpose, the French people, even while declaring that they will have no established religion, have yet retained the great benefit of an establishment, namely, a national provision for the religious instruction of the people, inasmuch as they keep up the churches, and pay the ministers who officiate in them. This they do, because the clear wisdom of the principle is not obscured to their minds by the perplexities which rise out of religious dissent;—the Catholics are so great a majority, and in most parts of France so nearly the whole of the population, that Catholic and Christian are convertible terms, and the state's wish to instruct its people is not frustrated by the endless discussions of contending sects, each objecting to all forms of instruction but its own.

This evil of religious dissent is so enormous,—is so fraught with danger at this moment to our highest interests, national and spiritual,—and has been to my mind so unfairly and unsatisfactorily treated by men of all parties, that I shall make no apology for entering fully upon the consideration of it. Unless it be duly appreciated, and in some measure remedied, it is perfectly needless to talk of Church Reform.

Whoever is acquainted with Christianity, must see that differences of opinion amongst Christians are absolutely

unavoidable. First, because our religion being a thing of the deepest personal interest, we are keenly alive to all the great questions connected with it, which was not the case with heathenism. Secondly, these questions are exceedingly numerous, inasmuch as our religion affects our whole moral being, and must involve, therefore, a great variety of metaphysical, moral, and political points;—that is to say, those very points which, lying out of the reach of demonstrative science, are, through the constitution of man's nature, peculiarly apt to be regarded by different minds differently. And thirdly, although all Christians allow the Scriptures to be of decisive authority, whenever their judgment is pronounced on any given case, yet the peculiar form of these Scriptures, which in the New Testament is rather that of a commentary than of a text;—the critical difficulties attending their interpretation, and the still greater difficulty as to their application:—it being a constant question whether such and such rules, and still more whether such and such recorded facts or practices, were meant to be universally binding;—and it being a farther question, amidst the infinite variety of human affairs, whether any case, differing more or less in its circumstances, properly comes under the scope of any given Scripture rule;—all these things prevent the Scriptures from being in practice decisive on controverted points, because the contending parties, while alike acknowledging the judge's authority, persist in putting a different construction upon the words of his sentence.

Aware of this state of things, and aware also with characteristic wisdom, of the deadly evil of religious divisions, the Roman Catholic Church ascribed to the sovereign power in the Christian society, in every successive age, an infallible spirit of truth, whereby the real meaning of any disputed passage of Scripture might be certainly and authoritatively declared; and if the Scripture were silent, then the living voice of the Church might supply its

place,—and being guided by that same spirit which had inspired the written word, might pronounce upon any new point of controversy with a decision of no less authority.

With the same view of preventing divisions, the unity of the Church was maintained, in a sense perfectly intelligible and consistent. Christians, wherever they lived, belonged literally to one and the same society,—they were subject to the same laws and to the same government. National and political distinctions were wholly lost sight of; the vicar of Christ and his general council knew nothing of England or of France, of Germany or of Spain; they made laws for *Christendom*—a magnificent word, and well expressing those high and consistent notions of unity, on which the Church of Rome based its system. One government, one law, one faith, kept free from doubt and error by the support of an infallible authority—the theory was in perfect harmony with itself, and most imposing from its beauty and apparent usefulness; but it began with assuming a falsehood, and its intended conclusion was an impossibility.

It is false that there exists in the Church any power or office endowed with the gift of infallible wisdom; and therefore it is impossible to prevent differences of opinion. But the claim to infallibility was not only false, but mischievous; because it encouraged the notion that these differences were to be condemned and prevented, and thus hindered men from learning the truer and better lesson, how to make them perfectly compatible with Christian union. Doubtless it were a far happier state of things if men did not differ from each other at all;—but this may be wished for only; it is a serious folly to expect it. For so, while grieving over an inevitable evil, we heap on it aggravations of our own making, which are far worse than the original mischief. Differences of opinion will exist, but it is our fault that they should have been considered equivalent to differences of principle, and made a reason for separation and hostility.

Our fathers rightly appreciated the value of church unity; but they strangely mistook the means of preserving it. Their system consisted in drawing up a statement of what they deemed important truths, and in appointing a form of worship and a ceremonial which they believed to be at once dignified and edifying; and then they proposed to oblige every man, by the dread of legal penalties or disqualifications, to subscribe to their opinions, and to conform to their rites and practices. But they forgot that while requiring this agreement, they had themselves disclaimed, what alone could justify them in enforcing it—the possession of infallibility. They had parted with the weapon which would have served them most effectually, and strange were the expedients resorted to for supplying its place. At one time it was the Apostles' Creed; at another, the decrees of the four first general councils; or, at another, the general consent of the primitive Church, which formed an authoritative standard of such truths as might not be questioned without heresy. But though the elephant might still rest upon the tortoise, and the tortoise on the stone, yet since the claim to infallibility was once abandoned, the stone itself rested on nothing. The four first councils were appealed to as sanctioning their interpretation of Scripture by men who yet confessed that the decisions of these councils were only of force, because they were agreeable to the Scripture. Turn which ever way they would, they sought in vain for an *authority* in religious controversies; infallibility being nowhere to be found, it was merely opinion against opinion; and however convinced either party might be of the truth of its own views, they had no right to judge their opponents.

With regard to the ceremonies and practices of the Church, a different ground was taken. It is curious to observe the contradictory positions in which the two parties were placed:—the Church of England enforcing a tyranny upon principles in themselves most liberal and most true;—the Dissenters accidentally advocating the cause of liberty,

while their principles were those of the most narrow-minded fanaticism. One feels ashamed to think that the great truths so clearly and so eloquently established by Hooker, in the earlier books of his ecclesiastical polity, should have served in practice the petty tyranny of Laud and Whitgift, or the utterly selfish and worldly policy of Elizabeth. The Church of England maintained most truly, that rites and ceremonies, being things indifferent in themselves, might be altered according to the difference of times and countries, and that the regulation of such matters was left wholly to the national Church. But inasmuch as the government of the national Church was a mere despotism—the crown having virtually transferred to itself the authority formerly exercised by the popes—its appointments were made with an imperious stiffness, which was the more offensive from the confessed indifferent nature of the matters in question; and while one ritual was inflexibly imposed upon the whole community, in direct opposition to the feelings of many of its members, and too simple and unattractive to engage the sympathies of the multitude, this fond attempt to arrive at uniformity, inflicted a deadly blow, according to Lord Falkland's most true observation on the real blessing of Christian union.

I am well aware that if it be a mere question of comparative faultiness, the opponents of the Established Church in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are at least as much to be condemned as its rulers. That coarse-minded ignorance, which delighted to isolate itself from all the noble recollections of past times, and confounded all the institutions and practices of the Christian Church during several centuries, under the opprobrious names of superstition and idolatry; that captious superstition which quarrelled with the form of a minister's cap, or the colour of his dress, deserved indeed little consideration, if the principles of government are to be made dependent on the merits of particular parties or individuals. But the cause of truth, and the welfare of mankind, have been for

ever sacrificed to the paltry triumphs of personal argument:—if a party can show that its opponents have been more blameable than itself, it looks upon itself as standing clear in the judgment of posterity and of God. The provocation given may indeed lessen our estimate of the guilt of individuals; but it ought not to affect our sentiments of the wisdom or evil tendency of their conduct; and though the virulence and ignorance of the puritans may dispose us to excuse Whitgift and Laud, as individuals, yet their system is not the less to be condemned, as in itself arbitrary and schismatical, and tending to aggravate and perpetuate the evils which it professed to combat.

Thus within fifty years of the overthrow of the Roman Catholic religion in England, the spirit of Protestantism, followed up only in one half of its conclusions, had divided the nation into two hostile parties, each careless of union, and looking only to victory. The religious quarrel blending itself with the political struggle at which society in its progress had then arrived, became thus the more irreconcileable; each party boasted of its martyrs, and exulted in the judgments which had befallen its enemies; the royalist churchman consecrated the 29th of May as a day of national thanksgiving; the puritan, who had deemed popery and prelacy crushed for ever by the arms of God's saints, now bewailed the new St. Bartholomew of 1662, and the vindictive oppression of the Five Mile Act.

There succeeded an age of less zeal, but scarcely of more charity. Time had reconciled men to the monstrous sight of a large proportion of a Christian people living in a complete religious separation from their fellow-Christians; of a numerous portion of the children of the State, living as aliens from the national worship. And the means hitherto adopted for preventing such a division were so odious in themselves, and had so signally failed to effect their object, that none could wish them to be continued any longer. Hostilities were accordingly sus-

pended, and the Toleration Act was passed;—a strange measure, by which the nation sanctioned the non-observance of its own institutions, and relaxed by one half the bond of national communion. Yet at the very same period an attempt to effect, not a peace, but an union with the Dissenters, totally failed: those true Christians who wished to make the national Church more comprehensive, were unable to carry their point: persecution first—toleration afterwards—any thing seemed preferable to Christian charity and Christian union.

Then followed one of those awful periods in the history of a nation, which may be emphatically called its times of trial. I mean those tranquil intervals between one great revolution and another, in which an opportunity is offered for profiting by the lessons of past experience, and to direct the course of the future for good. From our present dizzy state, it is startling to look back on the deep calm of the first seventy years of the eighteenth century. All the evils of society were yet manageable; while complete political freedom, and a vigorous state of mental activity, seemed to promise that the growth of good would more than keep pace with them, and that thus they might be kept down for ever. But tranquillity, as usual, bred carelessness; events were left to take their own way uncontrolled; the weeds grew fast, while none thought of sowing the good seed. The Church and the Dissenters lived in peace; but their separation became daily more confirmed. Meanwhile the uniformity, and the strict formality, which the Church had fondly adopted in order to extinguish Dissent, now manifestly encouraged it. As the population increased, and began to congregate into large masses in those parts of the country which before had been thinly inhabited, the Church required an enlarged machinery, at once flexible, and powerful. What she had was both stiff and feeble; her ministers could only officiate in a church, and were compelled to confine themselves to the prescribed forms of the liturgy; while the Dissenters,

free and unrestricted, could exercise their ministry as circumstances required it, whether in a mine, by a canal side, or at the doors of a manufactory; they could join in hymns with their congregations, could pray, expound the Scriptures, exhort, awaken, or persuade, in such variety, and in such proportions, as the time, the place, the mood of their hearers, or their own, might suggest or call for.

Thus, by the very nature of the case, the influence of the Dissenters spread amongst the poorer classes. It was a great good, that the poor and ignorant should receive any knowledge of Christianity;—but it was a mixed good, because the evil of sectarianism was at hand to taint it. The minister at the meeting-house rejoiced to thin the church;—the minister of the church rejoiced in his turn, if he could win back hearers from the meeting. As if their great common cause had not required all their efforts, much of their zeal was directed against each other; and if there was not hostility, there was an increase of rivalry and of jealousy. It might have been thought that the many good and active men who were now daily rising up amongst the ministers of the Establishment, would have been struck by the evils of their position, and have laboured to remove them. But some had been so used to the existence of Dissent, that they were insensible to the magnitude of its evils;—others, with the old party spirit of the High Churchmen, imagined that all the blame of the separation rested with the Dissenters; they talked of the sin of schism, as if they were not equally guilty of it; they would have rejoiced in the conformity of the opposite party, that is to say, in their own victory; but they had no notion of any thing like a fair union. Others, again, fully occupied with their own individual duties, and feeling that they themselves were usefully employed, never directed their attention to the inadequacy of the system to which they belonged, considered as a whole; while a fourth set argued against reforming the Church now, from the fact of its having gone unreformed so long; and because

the crisis was not yet arrived, they were blind to the sure symptoms of its progress, and believed that it would only be brought on by the means used to avert it.

But the population outgrew the efforts both of the Church and of the Dissenters; and multitudes of persons existed in the country who could not properly be said to belong to either. These were, of course, the most ignorant and degraded portion of the whole community,—a body whose influence is always for evil of some sort, but not always for evil of the same sort,—which is first the brute abettor and encourager of abuses, and afterwards their equally brute destroyer. For many years the populace hated the Dissenters for the strictness of their lives, and because they had departed from the institutions of their country; for ignorance, before it is irritated by physical distress, and thoroughly imbued with the excitement of political agitation, is blindly averse to all change, and looks upon reform as a trouble and a disturbance. Thus the populace in Spain and in Naples have shown themselves decided enemies to the constitutional party; and thus the mob at Birmingham, so late as the year 1791, plundered and burnt houses to the cry of "Church and King," and threatened to roast Dr. Priestley alive, as a heretic. But there is a time, and it is one fraught with revolutions, when this tide of ignorance suddenly turns, and runs in the opposite direction with equal violence. Distress and continued agitation produce this change; but its peculiar danger arises from this, that its causes operate for a long time without any apparent effect, and we observe their seeming inefficiency till we think that there is nothing to fear from them; when suddenly the ground falls in under our feet, and we find that their work, though slow, had been done but too surely. And this is now the case with the populace of England. From cheering for Church and King, they are now come to cry for no bishops, no tithes, and no rates: from persecuting the Dissenters, because they had separated from the Church,

they are now eagerly joining with them for that very same reason; while the Dissenters, on their part, readily welcome these new auxiliaries, and reckon on their aid for effecting the complete destruction of their old enemy.

This being the state of things, it is evident, that the existence of Dissent has divided the efforts of Christians, so as to make them more adverse to each other than to the cause of ungodliness and wickedness; it has prevented the nation from feeling the full benefits of its national Establishment, and now bids fair to deprive us of them altogether. Dissent, indeed, when it becomes general, makes the Establishment cease to be national; there being so large a portion of the nation whose religious wants it does not satisfy. Yet we have seen, on the other hand, that differences of religious opinion, and of religious rites and ceremonies, are absolutely unavoidable; and that since there exists on earth no infallible authority to decide controversies between Christians, it is vain for any one sect to condemn another, or in its dealings with others to assume that itself is certainly right, and its opponents as certainly in error.

Is it not, then, worth while to try a different system? And since disunion is something so contrary to the spirit of Christianity, and difference of opinion a thing so inevitable to human nature, might it not be possible to escape the former without the folly of attempting to get rid of the latter; to constitute a Church thoroughly national, thoroughly united, thoroughly Christian, which should allow great varieties of opinion, and of ceremonies, and forms of worship, according to the various knowledge, and habits, and tempers of its members, while it truly held one common faith, and trusted in one common Saviour, and worshipped one common God?

The problem then is, to unite in one Church different opinions and different rites and ceremonies; and first,

let us consider the case of a difference of religious opinions.

Before such an union is considered impracticable, or injurious to the cause of Christianity, might we not remember what, and how many, those points are, on which all Christians are agreed?

We all believe in one God, a spiritual and all-perfect Being, who made us, and all things; who governs all things by His Providence; who loves goodness, and abhors wickedness.

We all believe that Jesus Christ, His Son, came into the world for our salvation; that He died, and rose again from the dead, to prove that His true servants shall not die eternally, but shall rise as He is risen, and enjoy an eternal life with Him and with His Father.

We all believe that the volume of the Old and New Testaments contains the revelation of God's will to man; that no other revelation than what is there recorded has been ever given to mankind before or since; that it is a standard of faith and a rule of practice; so that we all acknowledge its authority, although we may often understand its meaning differently.

We all have, with very few exceptions, the same notions of right and wrong; or, at any rate, the differences on these points do not exist between Christians of different sects, but between sincere Christians of all sects, and those who are little better than mere Christians in name. We all hold that natural faults are not therefore excusable, but are earnestly to be struggled against; that pride and sensuality are amongst the worst sins; that self-denial, humility, devotion, and charity, are amongst the highest virtues. We all believe that our first great duty is to love God; our second, to love our neighbour.

Now, considering that on these great points all Christians are agreed, while they differ on most of them from all who are not Christians, does it seem unreasonable that

persons so united in the main principles of man's life, in the objects of their religious affections, and of their hopes for eternity, should be contented to live with one another as members of the same religious society?

But they differ also in many important points, and cannot therefore form one church without seeming to sanction what they respectively believe to be error. Now, setting aside the different opinions on church government, which I shall notice presently, is it true that there are many important points of pure doctrine on which the great majority of Christians in England at this moment are not agreed? The Presbyterians, the Methodists of all denominations, the Independents, the Baptists, the Moravians, can hardly be said to differ on any important point, except as connected with church government, either from one another or from the Establishment. The difference with the Baptists as to the lawfulness of Infant Baptism, may perhaps be thought an exception; but, if I mistake not, one of the highest authorities among the Baptists has expressly maintained the lawfulness of communion with Pædobaptists; and the question is not which practice is the more expedient, but whether Infant Baptism on the one hand, or the refusing it to all who cannot understand its meaning on the other, be either of them errors so fatal as to make it impossible to hold religious communion with those who maintain them.

There remain the Quakers, the Roman Catholics, and the Unitarians, whose differences appear to offer greater difficulty. And undoubtedly, so long as these sects preserve exactly their present character, it would seem impracticable to comprehend them in any national Christian church; the epithet "national" excluding the two former, and the epithet "Christian," rendering alike impossible the admission of the latter. But the harshest and most offensive part of the peculiarities of every sect has always arisen from the opposition of antagonists. Extravagance in one extreme provokes equal extravagance in

the other. If, then, instead of devising forms so positive and controversial, as to excite mistrust of their accuracy in the most impartial minds, and vehement opposition from those whose opinions lean to a different side, we were to make our language general and comprehensive, and content ourselves with protesting against the abuses which may follow from an exclusive view of the question, even when it is in itself substantially true, it is probable that those who differ from us would soon begin to consider the subject in a different temper; and that if truth were the object of both parties, and not victory, truth would in fact be more nearly attained by both. In this respect, the spirit of the Seventeenth Article of the Church of England affords an excellent model, inasmuch as it is intended to be comprehensive and conciliatory, rather than controversial. And the effect to be hoped for from assuming such a tone, would be the bringing reasonable and moderate men to meet us, and to unite with us; there would of course be always some violent spirits, who would maintain their peculiar tenets without modification; but the end of all wise government, whether in temporal matters or in spiritual, is not to satisfy every body, which is impossible, but to make the dissatisfied a powerless minority, by drawing away from them that mass of curable discontent whose support can alone make them dangerous.

That there is this tractable disposition in the majority of mankind, experience sufficiently proves. And we should remember that at present the spirit of sectarianism binds many men even to the extravagancies of their own party, because they think it a point of honour not to be suspected of lukewarmness. But even as things are, we know that many Quakers conform, in their dress and language, much more nearly to the rest of the world, than the stricter members of their sect approve of. Would not this temper be carried still further if those needless assertions of the lawfulness of war and of oaths were expunged from our Articles, and if we showed ourselves more sensible to that

high conception of Christian perfection, which breathes through their whole system, and which, even when perverted into extravagance, ought not to be spoken of without respect?

Again, with the Roman Catholics;—as long as we indulge in that scurrilous language respecting them, which is almost habitual to one party amongst us, we shall assuredly do nothing but confirm them in all their errors, and increase their abhorrence of Protestantism. It is perfectly idle to attack their particular tenets and practices, till we can persuade them, that they may lawfully judge for themselves. Nor shall we effect this by calling the Pope antichrist;—and his claim to infallibility the blasphemous fruit of ambition and avarice. We dare not analyse too closely the motives of our best actions;—but if ever grand conceptions of establishing the dominion of good over evil may be allowed to have concealed from the heart the ignobler feelings which may have been mixed with them, this excuse may justly be pleaded for Gregory VII. and Innocent III. The infallibility of the Church was the fond effort of the human mind to believe in the reality of the support which its weakness so needed;—its unity was a splendid dream, beautiful but impracticable. We might sympathize with the Roman Catholics in the wish that we could find any infallible guide—that there existed on earth the wisdom and the goodness capable of exercising an universal dominion;—and then we might urge them to consider whether indeed our wishes are enough to warrant our belief—whether experience does not forbid the fulfilment of our hopes;—and whether the lesser, but certain good, be not a surer stay to our infirmities, than an image of perfection which we cannot realize.

If ever the Roman Catholics of England could be convinced that universal empire is equally impracticable in religious matters as in temporal; and that no bond of society, using the term in the strict sense of a body of men living under the same government, and bound by the same laws, can be more extensive than that of the political

society or nation to which every man belongs by birth, they would then feel that they were members naturally of the Church of England, and not of the Church of central Italy. And then they would acknowledge further, that as the Parliaments of our ancestors could not preclude their posterity from making such alterations as the altered circumstances of a future generation might demand; so neither could the councils of our ancestors debar their successors from a similar right; that the national Church in every generation is equally invested with sovereign power to order such rites and forms of worship as it may deem expedient; and that though necessarily unable to command conviction in matters of opinion, it may yet lawfully regulate matters of practice. And if our Church were made truly national in point of government, if the king's supremacy were made what it was intended to be in principle, the substitution of a domestic government instead of a foreign one, and if our ecclesiastical constitution were rendered definite and intelligible, is it beyond hope, that many who are now Roman Catholics, would ere long unite themselves religiously as well as politically with the rest of their countrymen?

Lastly, with regard to the Unitarians, it seems to me that in their case an alteration of our present terms of communion would be especially useful. The Unitarian body in England consists of elements the most dissimilar; including many who merely call themselves Unitarians, because the name of unbeliever is not yet thought creditable, and some also who are disgusted with their unchristian associates, but who cannot join a church which retains the Athanasian creed. Every means should be taken to separate these from their present unworthy society, that they who are really Christians might join their fellow-Christians, and they who are really unbelievers might be known by all the world to be so. I know that many good men draw a broad line of distinction between errors respecting the Trinity, and errors on any other point. They cannot unite, they say, with those who are not Trinitarians; and

Lord Henley, while advocating an union with Dissenters in general, especially excepts those who, to use his own language, "deny the divinity of our Lord, or the mystery of the triune Jehovah." The last expression is worthy of notice, as affording a specimen of that irritating phraseology which has confirmed so many in error. Is it the way to reclaim any man from Unitarianism, to insist upon his believing in "the mystery of the triune Jehovah?" The real question is, not what theoretical articles a man will or will not subscribe to, but what essential parts of Christian worship he is unable to use. Now, the addressing Christ in the language of prayer and praise, is an essential part of Christian worship. Every Christian would feel his devotions incomplete, if this formed no part of them. This, therefore, cannot be sacrificed; but we are by no means bound to inquire, whether all who pray to Christ entertain exactly the same ideas of his nature. I believe that Arianism involves in it some very erroneous notions as to the object of religious worship; but if an Arian will join in our worship of Christ, and will call him Lord and God, there is neither wisdom nor charity in insisting that he shall explain what he means by these terms; nor in questioning the strength and sincerity of his faith in his Saviour, because he makes too great a distinction between the divinity of the Father, and that which he allows to be the attribute of the Son.

It seems to have been the boast hitherto of the several sects of Christians, to invent formulæ both of worship and of creeds, which should serve as a test of any latent error; that is, in other words, which should force a man to differ from them, however gladly he would have remained in their communion. May God give us, for the time to come, a wiser and a better spirit; and may we think that the true problem to be solved in the composition of all articles and creeds and prayers for public use, is no other than this; how to frame them so as to provoke the least possible disagreement, without sacrificing,

in our own practical worship, the expression of such feelings as are essential to our own edification.

If it be said that this is contrary to the uniform example of the Christian world, it is unhappily too true that it is so: and let history answer how the cause of Christianity has prospered under the system actually adopted. Or let those answer who, in attempting to acquaint themselves with ecclesiastical history, have groaned inwardly for very weariness at its dull and painful details. What ought to be more noble, or more beautiful, than the gradual progress of the Spirit of light and love, dispelling the darkness of folly, and subduing into one divine harmony all the jarring elements of evil, which divided amongst them the chaos of this world's empire? Such should have been the history of the Christian church; and what has it been actually? No steady and unwavering advance of heavenly spirits; but one continually interrupted, checked, diverted from its course, nay, driven backwards, as of men possessed by some bewildering spell—wasting their strength upon imaginary obstacles—fancying that their road lay to the right or left, when it led straight forward—hindering each other's progress and their own by stopping to analyse and dispute about the nature of the sun's light till all were blinded by it—instead of thankfully using its aid to show them the true path onward. In other words, men overrated the evil of difference of opinion, and underrated that of difference of practice; and their efforts were thus diverted from a cause in which all good men would have striven together, to one where goodness and wickedness were mere accidental adjuncts, equally found on one side as on the other. Or to take a much narrower view of the question, we should consider that the very notion of an extensive society implies a proportionate laxity in its points of union. There is a choice between entire agreement with a very few, or general agreement with many, or agreement in some particular points with all; but entire agreement with many,

or general agreement with all, are things impossible. Two individuals might possibly agree in three hundred articles of religion; but as they add to their own numbers, they must diminish that of their articles, unless they can prevent their associates from exercising their own understandings. Nor is this only applicable to a national church; it holds good of the smallest districts, where there are assembled men of different habits, different abilities, different degrees of knowledge, different tempers, and it may be almost said different ages. If agreement of *opinion* on a number of points be required as the condition of communion, there must be many different churches in every town; and these will be continually multiplying, for exclusiveness grows by indulgence; and men will form select societies among the select, till the church of Christ will become almost infinitely divisible. Infallibility or brute ignorance can alone prevent differences of opinion. Men, at once fallible and inquiring, have their choice either of following these differences up into endless schisms, or of allowing them to exist together unheeded, under the true bond of agreement of principle.

I may be pardoned, perhaps, for some repetition in dwelling again on points already noticed; as this perversion of the term unity, from a practicable and useful sense to one at once impracticable and unimportant, has been the great mischief both of the Christian church in general, and of the Church of England in particular, and has brought about in the latter that monstrous state of things in which a total Reform can alone save it from total destruction. We now proceed then to consider the practicability of uniting in one national church men attached to various forms of church government.

In proposing any alterations in this part of our system, we have at least this advantage;—that the present state of things is acceptable to no one. It is in fact a confessed anomaly, at once weak and unpopular; and has come to such a point of actual dissolution, that it has been made

a question what the government of the Church of England is. Yet there exist prejudices which would be more shocked, perhaps, by any change than they are by the present system; and these prejudices should be consulted as far as is possible, without interfering with the substantial ends of all government.

It is the fashion to complain of the great inequality which prevails in the Established Church; but it is not very difficult to prove that there is not inequality enough; —that the Church is like an army destitute of non-commissioned officers, and therefore incapable of acting with sufficient effect, through this defect in its organization. In other words, as all classes of society require the services of the ministers of religion, the ministry should contain persons taken from all; and in a national church, all the great divisions of the nation should have a share in the government. The Scotch Church fails in not reaching up to the level of the aristocracy;—the English Church, as Wesley saw, fails in not reaching down to the level of the poor:—the Roman Church, embracing in the wide range of its offices every rank of society, from the prince to the peasant, offers in this respect a perfect model. And if the scale of ascent be sufficiently gradual, the Christian ministry thus furnishes a beautiful chain to link the highest and the lowest together through the bond of their sacred office, without the absurdity of attempting to bring both to the same level.

But when we propose such a scale, we find that its highest and lowest points are vehemently objected to by opposite parties. On one side we have the old cry against prelacy, strengthened at this moment by a foolish political prejudice, and by the natural impatience of the lovers of evil at seeing Christianity advanced, as such, to situations of honour and influence. And on the other side, there is a dread of low-minded and uneducated teachers; combined, perhaps, with some Jewish and Pagan confusion of the Christian ministry with the caste and

family priesthoods of antiquity. The cry against a wealthy and dignified episcopacy, is, where it is honest, the fruit of a whole series of mistakes and misconceptions. It is ridiculous to suppose, that the rulers of a society could ever have been, as a body, taken from the poorer members of it. The relation of the Apostles to the rest of the Church was wholly peculiar: men, so divinely gifted, had a claim to authority, which set aside all considerations of wealth or poverty; but the instant that these gifts ceased, wealth would be in itself a title to power; and where merit was equal, a rich man would have made a more efficient bishop than a poor one. St. Paul requires a bishop to be "given to hospitality;" he must therefore have wherewith to exercise it. There is a great deal said in the New Testament against covetousness and self-indulgence; but this is addressed to all Christians equally; and if a layman does not conceive himself to be violating these commands by possessing a considerable property, with what assurance can he press such an interpretation of them upon his neighbour, because he is a minister? Some who inveigh against the wealth of the Church, meaning by that term the clergy, and yet express great satisfaction in the wealth of the nation, which in this country is the Church, betray an ignorance and an inconsistency truly surprising: but an argument from misapplied texts of Scripture would be called superstition and folly, if it were urged in defence of tithes; and truly it is no less fanaticism and folly, or folly and something worse, when it is used against the riches of the clergy, than when it is used in support of them.

Equally unreasonable are the arguments against an order of ministers chosen from the poorer classes of society. That they must be generally less educated than the ministers of a richer class is clear; and so far they would be inferior to them: nor is it intended that an uneducated man should in any case be the principal minister in a parish, as that would undo one of the chief

benefits, so far as moral and social improvement is concerned, of a national establishment. But there is an enormous advantage in giving all ranks of society their share in the administration of the Church: they would think that they had an interest in a system which provided a place for them as well as for the rich; but no man cares much about a system in which he is wholly passive; in which he never acts himself, but is always the object of the care and regulations of others. The difference of the gifts possessed by the first Christians, applies entirely, by analogy, to us now: "those members of the body, which seem to be more feeble, are necessary;" and more is gained by the variety of qualifications, than is lost by their inequality.

But it is said that uneducated ministers would spread the most mischievous fanaticism. I ask, what is the case as things are now? Have we no fanatical teaching at present? Now, if an uneducated man of serious impressions feels that he can be useful to persons of his own sort, by pressing on their minds the truths which have improved and comforted his own, he finds no place for himself in the Established Church. The clergyman of his parish would tell him to go to church and learn himself, instead of setting up to teach others. And no doubt he has enough to learn, but so have we all: and it does not follow that he should be unfit to teach some, because there are others who could teach him. But, meanwhile, the result is, that whether fit, or not, he *does* teach: the Toleration Act has settled this point. He may teach where and what he chooses, so long as he does not belong to the Establishment. And of what use is it to say that the *Church* does not suffer from his ignorance, and is innocent of encouraging it? The *nation* suffers from it, so far as it is ignorance, and the National Church is therefore concerned in remedying it. At present it exists unchecked and undirected, because the Church abandons it to itself: but if it were incorporated into its

system, it would become immediately subject to control, and whilst all, and more than all, of its present usefulness was derived from it, its mischiefs would in a great degree be obviated.

But the most essential step towards effecting this and every other improvement in the Church, consists in giving to the laity a greater share in its ordinary government.

The Bishop stands alone in his diocese, the Minister in his parish; and so little are the laity associated with them officially in their operations, that the very word Church has lost its proper meaning, and is constantly used to express only the clerical members of it. The worst consequence of this, no doubt, is the unchristian distinction thus created between the clergy and the laity, to the equal injury of both; but one considerable evil resulting from it is the annihilation of Church discipline. As long as the clergy have the whole administration of the Church in their own hands, their power over other men must be neutralized, or else we incur all the dangers of a system of priestcraft; and for the same reason, if a Bishop be the sole ruler of his diocese, he must be so shackled to prevent him from becoming a tyrant, as to be actually divested of the powers essential to government. And so from a superstition about what men fancy to be the divine right of Episcopacy, the Church has practically all but gone to pieces, from the want of any government at all.

This want of government or of social organization in the Church, has been one main cause of the multiplication of Dissenters. Men's social wants have not been satisfied;—and a Christian Church which fails in this particular, neglects one of the most important ends of Christianity. Consider the case of one of the parishes in a large manufacturing town; there is a population of several thousand souls often comprised nominally within the same subdivision of the whole Christian society of the nation;

but what is their organization and bond of union? Perhaps one parish church, utterly unable to contain a fourth part of their numbers;—and one minister, who must be physically incapable of becoming personally acquainted with even so much as a smaller proportion of them. The other officers of the parochial society are the parish clerk, the churchwardens, the overseers of the poor,—how little like the deacons of old,—the beadle, and the constable! What an organization for a religious society! And how natural was it that men should form distinct societies for themselves, when that to which they nominally belonged performed none of the functions of a society. And even in those cases where by the exertions of the incumbent in providing one or more curates to assist him in his duty, by the endowment of chapels of ease, or the institution of lectureships, the visitation of the sick in the parish is tolerably provided for;—still the want of a social organization remains the same. The parishioners, except in questions about rates, never act as a body, nor feel as a body. They have no part in keeping up any religious discipline; those amongst them who are qualified for instructing or exhorting their neighbours can do it only as individuals. The very church itself, closed during the greater part of the day, perhaps of the week, is opened only for the performance of one uniform service, never to be added to, never to be varied. Even the singing, where alone some degree of liberty has been left to the congregation, is in some dioceses brought down to the same uniformity, and nothing may be sung but the old and new versions of the Psalms of David. Thus the people are, as members of the Church, wholly passive;—the love of self-government, one of the best instincts in our nature, and one most opposite to the spirit of lawlessness, finds no place for its exercise; they neither govern themselves, nor is there any one else to govern them.

In order to an efficient and comprehensive Church system, the first thing necessary is to divide the actual dio-

ceses. A government must be feeble where one bishop, as is the case in the diocese of Chester, has the nominal superintendence over a tract of country extending in length above a hundred miles, and over a population of nearly two millions of souls. Every large town should necessarily be the seat of a bishop, the bishopric thus created giving no seat in Parliament;—and the addition of such an element into the society of a commercial or manufacturing place, would be in itself a great advantage; —for as in small cathedral towns, the society is at present much too exclusively clerical, so in towns like Manchester and Birmingham, the influence of the clergy is too little; they are not in a condition to colour sufficiently the mass of a population whose employment is to make money. The present dioceses might then become provinces, or if it should be thought desirable to diminish the number of bishops in the House of Lords, the number retained might correspond to the number of provinces which it might be found convenient to constitute, so that metropolitan bishops alone should have seats in Parliament. And for the new bishoprics to be created, the deaneries throughout England would go a long way towards endowing them;—while in many cases nothing more would be required, than to change the name and office of the incumbent of the principal parish in the town; so that instead of being the minister of one church he should become the bishop of the diocese, the income of his office remaining the same as at present.

The several dioceses throughout England being thus rendered efficient in point of extent and population, it would be next required to organize their government. Episcopalians require that this should be *episcopal;* the Dissenters of almost every denomination would insist that it should not be *prelatical.* But it may be the first without being the last. Episcopacy may be regulated in two ways, so as to hinder it from being tyrannical; either by withdrawing almost every matter from its jurisdiction,

according to the system now pursued in England, or by uniting and tempering it with an admixture of more popular authorities. But of these two expedients the first is equally destructive of the power of a bishop for good as for evil; the last would leave him at liberty to do good, but would merely restrain him from using his authority amiss. For instance, a bishop should be incapable of acting without his council, and this council should consist partly of lay members, and partly of clerical, to be appointed partly by himself, and partly by the ministers and lay elders of the several parishes in his diocese. A court would be thus formed, to which the maintenance of discipline might be safely entrusted, and ministers of scandalous life might be removed from their benefices without the tedious and ruinous process now imposed upon the bishop, if he is anxious to do his duty in such cases. Probably, too, it would be expedient to create something like a general assembly of the Church in each diocese, to meet at a certain time in the year, under the presidency of the bishop, and to enact such general regulations as might from time to time be needed. A meeting of this kind, even were its sittings ever so short, would be useful in the mere sensation that it would excite among the people; as it would present the Church to them in a form at once imposing and attractive, and would destroy that most mischievous notion which the present visitations rather tend to encourage—that the Church is synonymous with the clergy. Again, either this general assembly, or the bishop and his ordinary council, should have the power of increasing or reducing the number of church officers in any particular parish, and of settling the limits of their respective ministrations. Where one man's constant ministry is sufficient, the occasional assistance of more may yet be desirable; or if not a public, yet a domestic ministry, in addition to the public one, may be useful; that is, even in small country parishes there are often found men of serious character, who would be able

and willing to preach to their neighbours, and who do preach, as things are at present, but with this evil, that they preach by their own authority, and are unavoidably led to feel themselves in opposition to the Establishment. Now, it is an obvious principle of every society, that men should not take its offices upon themselves without authority; and many persons who are now self-constituted teachers, would gladly obtain a sanction to their ministry, and would consent to put it under the regulation of the government of the Church, if such a recognition were rendered a thing easily obtainable. But in large towns, all the Christian ministers of every denomination actually employed in them are certainly not more than adequate to the wants of the population. That these could not be all maintained out of the funds of the present Establishment is manifest; it is possible that some might be; and it is also possible that some gratuitous assistance might be rendered by persons who, having another trade or profession, were not wholly dependent on the ministry for support. But as the *dissenting* ministers are actually maintained by voluntary contributions, so the *assistant* ministers of a more comprehensive system, whether their opinions were in exact agreement with the present articles or not, would be easily, and I believe most cheerfully maintained by Easter offerings, levied upon all the members of the Church, and divided according to the qualifications and labours of the respective ministers. And as these would all be equally ministers of the National Church, they would have their share in the election of the clerical members of the bishop's council, and would be effectually secured against any lurking spirit of sectarian hostility which might be supposed to survive the overthrow of the present sectarian system.

But it may be said that a difficulty would arise as to the manner in which these ministers should be appointed; their election by their congregations being as odious to one class of persons, as it is dear to another. It seems

to me desirable that a national Church should comprehend in itself many various ways of appointment; and that whilst the patronage of the existing benefices should on no account be disturbed, whether it be vested in the crown, or in corporate bodies, or in private individuals; yet, that where there is no endowment, and the minister is paid by a general contribution, the principle of election may fitly be allowed. But the actual abuses of all patronage, whether individual or popular, might easily be obviated by certain general regulations. It is a great evil, that a worthless individual, whether nominated by a private patron, or chosen by a misguided majority, should immediately and without further question enter upon his ministry. All patronage should be strictly recommendatory, and no more: the patron or electors should send the object of their choice to the bishop and his council, or, if it were thought fit, to another distinct tribunal, appointed by them; and here his qualifications should undergo a most rigid scrutiny. If he were rejected, the patron should recommend another candidate; but never should his recommendation, or the election of the inhabitants, be deemed equivalent to an actual appointment. And even when confirmed by the Church authorities, it should still be, in the first instance, only provisional, for one year; that during that time he might be tried in actual service, and if any just ground of objection existed against him, which might well happen without supposing any such misconduct as should warrant his removal from an office conferred for life, the appointment might be either wholly cancelled, according to the nature of the case, or the term of probation extended to a longer period.

In suggesting that the qualifications of every person recommended to a benefice should be rigorously scrutinized, I am far from meaning that he should be subjected to an examination. Examinations can only be fitly applied to young men, and their proper place is previous to

ordination, not when a man, after having been ordained, is to be appointed to some particular cure. Yet, in a matter of such importance, every security is needed; and more is required than the present system of testimonials, not only from their proved insufficiency, but because the people should have a more direct check than they have at present on the nomination of their ministers. It should be the duty of the parish authorities, both lay and clerical, to report fully to the bishop's council, all that they can collect as to the character and general fitness of the person recommended by the patron. For instance, a senior fellow of a college, however irreproachable in his character, may, from his inactive and retired habits, be an unfit person to be appointed minister of a populous parish in a large town. It would be the duty of the parish authorities to represent this to the bishop's council; and in some cases the objection might be so strong, owing to local circumstances, as to render it proper to reject the person proposed altogether. But in every case it would be desirable that the appointment should, in the first instance, be only temporary, that it might be seen how the individual could accommodate himself to a life so different from his past one, whether his previous habits were or were not alterable. And we may be sure that the working of every system will be so much more indulgent than the theory, that we never need fear an excess of strictness; do what we will, considerations of good-nature and kindness to an individual, will always prevail in the long-run over the sense of public duty.

The Church government then would be made more efficient, and at the same time, more popular than it is at present; 1st. By reducing the size of the dioceses: 2nd. By giving the bishop a council consisting of lay members and of clerical, and partly elected by the officers of the respective parishes; which officers should themselves also be lay and clerical, and for the most part elected directly by the inhabitants: 3rd. By the institution of diocesan general as-

semblies: 4th. By admitting into the Establishment, persons of a class much too poor to support the expense of an university education; but who may be exceedingly useful as ministers, and who do preach at present, but under circumstances which make them necessarily hostile to the National Church, and leave them utterly at liberty to follow their own caprices: 5th. By allowing in many cases the election of ministers, and by giving to the inhabitants of the parish in every case, a greater check over their appointment than they at present enjoy: and 6th. By constituting Church officers in every parish, lay as well clerical, who should share with the principal minister in its superintendence; and thus effect generally that good, which in London and elsewhere is now being attempted by individual zeal, in the establishment of district visiting societies. Whilst by rendering the Articles far more comprehensive than at present, according to what was said in the earlier part of this sketch, those who are now Dissenting ministers might at once become ministers of the Establishment, and as such, would of course have their share in its government.

It will be observed, that the whole of this scheme supposes an episcopal government, and requires that all ministers should receive episcopal ordination. The Establishment is entitled surely to this concession from the Dissenters, especially when Episcopacy will have been divested of all those points against which their objections have been particularly levelled. Besides, there are many members of the Establishment who believe Episcopacy not expedient only, but absolutely essential to a Christian Church: and their scruples are entitled to quite as much respect as those of the Dissenters. And when experience has shown that Episcopalians will be satisfied if the mere name of a bishop is preserved—for nothing can be more different in all essential points, than our Episcopacy and that of the primitive Church—and as this name is recommended not only by its ancient and almost uni-

versal use throughout Christendom, but by its familiarity to ourselves, and its long existence in our own constitution, there seems every reason why it should be retained, —and why those who may have objected to a prelate lording it over Christ's Church with absolute authority, may readily acknowledge the limited authority of a bishop, the president of his council of elders, supreme in rank, but controlled effectually in power.

This, perhaps, may be the fittest place to notice the clamour in which the Dissenters have blindly joined the unbelievers, against the bishops holding seats in the House of Lords. Never was there a question on which fanaticism and narrow-mindedness have so completely played into the hands of wickedness. The very notion of the House of Lords, is that of an assembly embracing the highest portions of the most eminent professions or classes of society. Accordingly, it contains, speaking generally, the most considerable of the landed proprietors of the kingdom, the most distinguished individuals in the army and navy; and in like manner a certain number of the heads of the clerical profession, and of the law. It is not that the Lord Chancellor and the Bishops are the representatives of their respective professions, in the sense of being placed in Parliament to look after their particular interests; nor is it at all for the sake of the clergy or the lawyers that they sit in the House of Peers, but for the sake of the nation; that the highest national council may have the benefit of their peculiar knowledge, and peculiar views of life. Now it is manifest, that all of what are called the liberal professions, exercise a certain influence over the minds of those who follow them both for good and for evil;—for evil, so far as they lead to exclusiveness—for good, inasmuch as they foster particular faculties of the mind, and give an especial power of appreciating and enforcing one class of important truths. As then, in an assembly consisting of men of one profession only, the evil influence becomes predominant, and pedantry and

narrow-mindedness are sure to be its characteristics; so when men of different professions are mixed, the evil of a professional spirit is neutralized, while its advantages remain in full force; and in proportion to the greater number of professions thus brought together in one assembly, will be the universality of its tone, and at the same time the soundness of its particular resolutions.

Lord Henley, therefore, labours under a double error when he supposes that the revival of any sort of ecclesiastical synod or convocation could be a substitute for the sitting of the bishops in Parliament, and when he talks of allowing the bishops to vote only on such questions as concern the *Church*. A synod or convocation might look as effectually after the interests of the clergy; but how would it compensate for the removal of one important element from the constitution of our highest national assembly? And again, when he speaks of questions which concern the Church, he means questions about the duties and payment of the clergy — an important part certainly of Church questions — but by no means the most important, still less the only ones. According to this narrow view of the meaning of the word Church, the bishops may vote upon a curate's salary bill, or a church building act; but the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and truth, are questions which affect the Church no more than the Royal Society. In other words, it concerns not the Church whether its members are involved in the guilt and misery of an unnecessary war,—whether their laws are regardless of human life, and multiply temptations to crime; —whether, in short, their institutions and form of society are favourable to their moral advancement, or tend, on the contrary, to debase and to harden them.

But, says Lord Henley, the Divine Founder of the Church has declared that his kingdom was not of this world, and he "refused to give sentence in a criminal cause of adultery, and in a civil one of dividing an inheritance," p. 49. It might make Lord Henley and other

good men a little suspicious of the applicability of our Lord's words to the present question, if they would remember how favourite a text they are with men who scarcely know any single declaration of our Lord's besides this, and who clearly and almost avowedly fear nothing so much as that the world should really become his kingdom. But first of all, if Christ's kingdom be not of this world, in the only sense which applies to the present question, if his Church may have nothing to do with making and repealing laws, approving of peace and war, imposing taxes, and other such matters, it follows distinctly, not that every clergyman, but that every Christian, should instantly be excluded from the Throne, from Parliament, and from every public office whatever, whether civil or military. We should require from members of Parliament no declarations against transubstantiation,—but simply a protestation that they did not belong to the kingdom of Christ, but were, and would remain so, faithful subjects of the kingdom of the world, and bound to do the god of this world true and undivided service. It is perfectly inconceivable how a man like Lord Henley can go on, page after page, using the word "Church" to signify the clergy, when he must know it is never used so in the New Testament; and that every passage which he quotes against mixing in secular affairs, applies exactly as much to the Lord Chancellor and the Commander-in-Chief, if they are Christians, as to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Lord Henley objects to "the example of such Jewish precedents as Eli and Ezra," p. 49. By what strange perversity does it happen, that the party to which Lord Henley seems to belong, should refuse to acknowledge the authority of Old Testament precedents, in the very case where they are really applicable, and yet should be for ever appealing to them where they are not applicable at all? Eli and Ezra are in this matter far more to the purpose than Paul, or Peter, or John; because, in their

days, as in ours, the kingdom of God was a kingdom of the world also; whereas, in the days of the apostles it was not so. It is absolutely ridiculous in a country where Christianity is said to be the law of the land,—where all our institutions acknowledge it, and our kings are actually anointed before the altar,—to quote as applicable the state of the Christians of the first century, whose religion necessarily drew them away from all public duties, because heathenism and heathen principles were so mixed up with all the institutions of Rome, that every public office involved some compliance with them.

It is again a most groundless superstition, and one which at once occasioned and has been increased by the mischievous confusion of the Christian ministry with a *priesthood*, that any thing can be lawful for a Christian layman which is unlawful for a Christian minister. As the ministers are in a manner picked out from the whole Christian body, it may be within possibility to exact from them a higher standard of practice than can be enforced generally; but this is no more than saying, "what *all ought to be*, we will take care that *some* at least *shall be*." If any one looks at the qualifications required by St. Paul in the ministers of the Church (1 Tim. iii. 1–10. Titus i. 6–9), he will find amongst them no esoteric purity of life or fulness of knowledge; but the virtues of a good man, a good public officer, and a good Christian;—the virtues which become, and are to be expected of, every one invested with authority in the Church of God, whether his peculiar ministry be on the seat of justice, or at the altar, or in the general government of the whole society.

But because these virtues are now become rare, because there may be found in the other ministries of the Church, men who do not acknowledge their obligation, therefore it is the more important that they who are called ministers in a peculiar sense, the ministers at the altar, should be put forward in situations where they can most loudly and most efficiently enforce them. And this is the great

reason why the clergy ought to sit in both houses of Parliament, and why the enemies of Christianity, who well understand the interests of *their* Master, would gladly exclude them from both. It is because they are not priests, but Christians; because they hold and know no esoteric doctrine; because they are required to practise no virtue beyond the rest of their brethren, but yet because their profession obliges them to know what Christianity is, and public opinion, to take the lowest ground, hinders them from utterly casting it off in their practice, that therefore they are wanted in the national assembly of a professedly Christian nation. What we ought to calculate on in every member of the legislature—namely, that he should speak and act on Christian principles—we are obliged now to look for from those who are bound to be Christians by a double profession, by their ordination as well as their baptism. In proportion to the proved insufficiency of one of these securities singly, is the need of applying to the combined strength of both.

But what if the salt has lost its savour; if in point of fact the bishops have not thus diffused the influence of Christianity through the House of Lords: whose has been the fault, and what is its remedy? Was not the fault theirs, who for so many years, I may almost say so many generations, made the appointment of a bishop a mere matter of patronage; or, at the best, the reward of ability and knowledge displayed on some mere abstract question of theology? Was not, and is not, the fault theirs, who, some in fraud, and others in simplicity, adopting Lord Henley's confusion about the word Church, would confine the bishops to speaking on merely professional subjects, and would accuse them of meddling with secular matters, if they were to endeavour to christianize the laws or the measures of the government? Is not the fault, above all, theirs, who, retaining the system of translation for the sake of their own patronage, place the bishops in a situation of certain suspicion, and of unfair temptation? And

is it not the most obvious remedy to do away at once and entirely with the system of translations, and thus to make the bishops the most independent of any men in the House of Lords. For a lay lord, if he is an able and active man, may hope to rise to power by displacing an existing ministry, or by supporting them; a bishop, if translations were at an end, would have nothing to hope for from courtliness or from faction: he could gain nothing by basely voting for the government,—nothing by ambitiously and unfairly molesting them.

This digression, if such it can be called, has somewhat interrupted the main divisions of my argument; but it is naturally connected with the question of Church government, and no part of the whole subject has been so mistakenly and so mischievously handled. I now return to the third division of my inquiry: whether it be not possible to unite in one Church great varieties of ritual,—in other words, whether uniformity of worship has been wisely made the object of our ecclesiastical legislation.

The friends of the Established Church justly extol the substantial excellence and beauty of the liturgy. It can indeed hardly be praised too highly as the solemn service of the Church, embodying one of the best representations of the feelings and language of a true Christian, in his confessions, his thanksgivings, and his prayers. But as, while we reverence the Bible above all other books, we yet should never think of studying it to the exclusion of all others, so, and much more, may we say of the liturgy, that, even allowing it to be the best conceivable religious service in itself, still it ought not to be the only one. The liturgy of the Church of England, with some few alterations, which I need not here specify, should be used once on every Sunday and every great Christian holiday throughout the year, in every parish church in England. But I doubt whether there are not many, even amongst its most sincere admirers, who, in a second service on the same day, would be glad of some variety,—still more who

would wish to vary the service according to the time and circumstances, when the church was opened on week days. Indeed, I hardly know a more painful sight than the uninterrupted loneliness in which our churches are so often left from one Sunday to another. The very communion table and pulpit are dismantled of their coverings and cushions; the windows are closed; the doors fast locked, as if a Protestant church, except on a Sunday, were like the Pelasgicum at Athens, "best when unfrequented."[a] Now this has arisen partly, no doubt, from other causes; but the necessity of reading the Liturgy, and nothing but the Liturgy, both at morning and evening prayer, is an invincible obstacle to the opening of the churches generally with any effect, except on a Sunday. It is doubtful whether our arrangement of our time, and the universal pressure of business, would allow of the attendance of a large congregation at church on week days, under any circumstances; but it is certain, that in order to overcome these disadvantages, something more attractive is needed than the mere uniform reading of the same prayers, and going through the same forms day after day, both in the morning and the evening. Nor should I think it an evil, but a great good, that different services should be performed at different times of the day and week, within the walls of the same church. Not only do the various tastes and degrees of knowledge amongst men require varieties in the form of their religious services; but the very same men are not always in the mood for the same things: there are times when we should feel most in unison with the deep solemnity of the Liturgy; there are times also, when we should better enjoy a freer and more social service; and for the sake of the greater familiarity, should pardon some insipidity and some extravagance. And he who condemns this feeling, does but lose his labour, and can but ill appreciate one great attribute of God's works,—their endless variety. Our sight, our

[a] Τὸ Πελασγικὸν ἀργὸν ἄμεινον.—Thucyd. II. 17.

hearing, and our taste, are furnished with subjects of gratification, not of one kind only, but of millions; the morning song of the lark is not the same with the evening song of the nightingale: the scenery which we most enjoy in the full brightness of a summer day, is not that which best harmonizes with the solemnity of an autumn evening.

Now, considering that some persons would like nothing but the Liturgy, that others, on the contrary, can endure no prayers but such as are extemporaneous,—that many more have a preference for one practice or the other, but not so as to wish to be confined to the exclusive use of it, there seems to be no reason why the National Church should not enjoy a sufficient variety in its ritual, to satisfy the opinions and feelings of all. In a parish where there was but one minister, he might read the Liturgy on Sunday mornings, while on Sunday evenings, and on week days, he might vary the service according to his discretion and the circumstances of the case. But where there were several ministers, as there would be wherever there are now ministers of different denominations, the church might be kept open nearly the whole of the Sunday, and we may hope, during some part at least of every week day;—the different services being fixed at different hours, and performed by different ministers. And he judges untruly of human nature, who does not see that the peculiarities which men now cling to and even exaggerate, as the badge and mark of their own sect, would then soon sink into their proper insignificance when nothing was to be gained by dwelling on them. Good men, feeling that they might express their opinions freely, and that their silence could not be misconstrued into fear or insincerity, would gladly listen to their better nature, which would teach them how much they had in common with one another, and how infinitely their points of agreement surpassed in importance their points of difference. And instead of an unseemly scene of one minister preaching against another, we should probably have an earnest union in great mat-

ters, and a manly and delicate forbearance as to points of controversy, such as would indeed become the disciples of Him who is in equal perfection the God of truth and the God of love.

It may appear to some a point of small importance, but I believe that it would go a long way towards producing a kindly and united feeling amongst all the inhabitants of the parish, that the parish church should, if possible, be the only place of public worship; and that the different services required, should rather be performed at different times in the same spot than at the same time in different places. In this respect, the spirit of the Mosaic law may be most usefully followed, which forbade the multiplication of temples and altars, but fixed on one spot to become endeared and hallowed to the whole people as the scene of their common worship. Besides the parish church has a sacredness which no other place of worship can boast of, in its antiquity, and in its standing amidst the graves of so many generations of our fathers. It is painful to think that any portion of the people should have ever broken their connexion with it; it would be equally delightful to see them again assembled within its walls, without any base compromise of opinion on either side, but because we had learned a better wisdom than to deprive it of its just claim to the affections of all our countrymen, or to exclude any portion of our countrymen from the happiness of loving it as it deserves. Nor is it a light thing in the judgments of those who understand the ennobling effects of a quick perception of what is beautiful and venerable, that some of the most perfect specimens of architecture in existence should no longer be connected, in any man's mind, with the bitterness of sectarian hostility; that none should be forced to associate, with their most solemn and dearest recollections, such utter coarseness and deformity as characterize the great proportion of the Dissenting chapels throughout England.

The appointment of various services in the same church,

would not only be desirable in itself, but would also obviate the necessity of altering our own Liturgy, in order to enable the Dissenters to join in it; for even if we could overcome their objections to any Liturgy whatever as such, still the differences of mere taste between different classes of people are so great, as to render it impossible to contrive any one service such as should be satisfactory to one party without a needful sacrifice of what is a great source of pleasure to the other. For instance, some of the Dissenters object to an organ, and to all but the simplest kinds of church music: yet it would be very unreasonable to pull down our organs, and to banish our anthems, and all the magnificence of our cathedral service, without considering that numerous class who feel as much delighted and edified by these things as others are offended at them. On the other hand, it is quite as unreasonable, and much more unchristian, to make a difference of taste a reason for continuing divisions in the Church of God. There is no reason why all should not be gratified without quarreling with each other; why the organ should not sound at the morning service, and be silent in the evening: why the same roof which had rung at one part of the day with the rich music of a regular choir, should not at another resound with the simpler but not less impressive singing of a mixed congregation.

Such, as it seems to me, is the reform really needed;—to make the Church truly and effectually the "Church of England." Many points, about which there is the loudest clamour, I have passed over without notice;—partly, because for these there have been remedies proposed by other writers,—and partly, because I hold them to be utterly subordinate grievances when compared to the monstrous evil of sectarianism. The evil of pluralities is like that of sinecures and unmerited pensions in the state;—it should be removed, because it is unseemly and discreditable; but it is only folly or bad faith which would rank it amongst the most serious practical mischiefs of our ec-

clesiastical system. The inequality of ranks and emoluments in the Church, like that existing also in the whole frame of our society, is probably excessive; but is a far less evil than the platform of equality to which some would reduce it. Even non-residence itself,—by which I mean the non-residence of any minister of the Establishment, whether incumbent or curate, happens accidentally to be only of inferior importance, because it generally exists in country parishes, where the amount of population is small. Destroy it altogether, and the efficiency of the Church would be increased in a scarcely perceptible degree; for its great inefficiency as a national establishment arises from other causes,—from the enormous population of the towns, where the minister of the parish *is* generally resident, but utterly incapable of doing the work which he is nominally set to perform,—and from that other large masses of population, to whom the ministers of the Establishment are nothing, whether resident or not, because they have separated themselves from the national communion. With regard to the cry about the bishops, translation is certainly indefensible,—and its utter extinction highly needful: some means also should be taken to increase the revenue of the poorer bishoprics; and for this object something probably might well be spared from the revenue of those that are richest. But the sitting of the bishops in Parliament is a great national good; and a multiplication of their number, with a remodelling of their power, so as to give the Church a real episcopal government, is the reform of their order most needed and most effectual.

Nor have I said a word on the great question of Tithes, because I have reason to believe that that question is in other and far abler hands. All acknowledge the odiousness of the present manner of payment;—but the problem hitherto has been, how to provide for it an adequate substitute.

But, suppose Tithes to be commuted,—the revenues of the Clergy equalized,—residence universally enforced,—

and pluralities done away with, the efficiency of the Establishment, as a great social engine of intellectual, moral, and religious good, will still be incomplete,—and for this very reason its stability will be precarious. There will still remain that vast mass of the dissenting and of the godless population, who, not sharing in its benefits, will labour to effect its destruction. These two parties are leagued together; and unless their league can be dissolved, the long continuance of a national Church in this country is a thing impossible. The cry which is destroying the Protestant Establishment in Ireland is already beginning to be echoed here: the Dissenters repeat the complaint of the Catholics,—"Why should we be obliged to contribute towards the maintenance of a Church which is not ours?" All the inherent evils of our detestable sectarian system will presently be brought to light, and will derange the very frame of society. Church rates have been already resisted;—that is to say, the noblest and most useful of all our public buildings will be suffered to go to ruin, or to be maintained by private munificence. Marriage, the most important of all social ordinances, will be made a private ceremony;—for such must be the character of a rite performed without the intervention of any public officer; whether that officer be a magistrate or a clergyman, may be a question of comparative indifference; for in either case society sanctions, and in a manner presides at the celebration of its holiest contract; but a Dissenting minister is a mere private individual, or rather an alien from the national society, to whose acts society lends no authority. The registration of births, marriages, and deaths, a thing essentially of national concern, and to be placed under the control of public officers, is already claimed by the Dissenters as a right to be enjoyed by their own communities separately. Our universities, the great seats of public education, are in danger of becoming odious, because they are practically closed against so large a portion of the community;—while the evils of Dis-

senting colleges, pledged by their very name to narrow-mindedness, will continue to multiply. The end of all this will be, what the godless party are earnestly labouring to effect, the dissolution of the Establishment altogether; —that is, in other words, the public renouncing of our allegiance to God; for, without an Establishment, although it may happen that the majority of Englishmen may still be Christians, yet England will not be a Christian nation; —its government will be no Christian government;—we shall be wholly a kingdom of the world, and ruled according to none but worldly principles. In such a state the establishment of paganism would be an absolute blessing; any thing would be better than a national society, formed for no higher than physical ends;—to enable men to eat, drink, and live luxuriously;—acknowledging no power greater than its own, and by consequence, no law higher than its own municipal enactments. Let a few generations pass over in such a state, and the missionary, who should preach the worship of Ceres, or set up an oracle of Apollo, or teach the people to kindle the eternal fire of Vesta on the common altar hearth of their country, would be to that degraded society as life from the dead [a].

[a] I cannot resist the pleasure of copying here the beautiful lines in which Mr. Wordsworth sympathizes so entirely with the feeling expressed in the text:—

"The world is too much with us; late and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers;
Little we see in nature that is ours;
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon!
This sea, that bears her bosom to the moon;
The winds, that will be howling at all hours,
And are up-gathered now like sleeping flowers;
For this, for every thing, we are out of tune;
It moves us not. Great God! I'd rather be
A pagan suckled in a creed outworn;
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea,
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn."

But we are told to look at America; the United States have no national religion; but yet we are assured that they are as religious a people as ourselves. When a man of science hears a fact asserted in direct contradiction to the known laws of nature, he cannot but suspect some misrepresentation or confusion in the statement. To assert that the irregular efforts of individual zeal and courage will oppose an invading enemy as effectually as a good regular army, would be little better than insanity; and yet it may be true, that in the last war the Spanish guerillas did more service to their country than the Spanish regular armies. We know, however, that the guerillas did not, and could not deliver Spain; it was an efficient regular army which achieved that work. So, if it could be shown that under any circumstances Christianity was flourishing as much without an Establishment as with one, it would merely prove that the particular Establishment in question was in a state of deplorable corruption, as it had so completely forfeited its inherent advantages. But in the alleged instance of the United States, we forget that "America" is, in the first place, a very vague word, and that in those parts of the union in which religion is in the healthiest state, there is what is almost equivalent to an Establishment; that is, every man is obliged to contribute to a fund for religious instruction, but he has his choice as to the particular sect to which his quota is to be paid. Again, the Episcopal Church in New York is an endowed church; it still possesses the lands assigned to it by the British government, previously to the revolution. It may well be then that in New York, and in some of the New England states, the people may be more religious than in the great towns of England; but this concludes in favour of an Establishment, not against one; because there is an Establishment, or what amounts to nearly the same thing, in these parts of the United States, whereas there is virtually none in our great towns; so utterly inadequate is the supply of ministers to the demands of the ever-growing

population. But if it be asserted, that in the southern and western states, society is in as healthy a state morally and religiously as in those parts of England where the Church is enabled to be efficient, then I should deny the fact altogether. With all the advantages enjoyed by America, as to the physical condition of her people, with her prodigious extent of available land, and her as yet comparatively scanty population, rendering the temptation to offences against property far less than it can be in an old and fully peopled country; still the world has as yet produced no instance of society advancing under a less promising aspect, intellectual, moral, and religious, than in the new states and territories of the American union.

But if we with our overflowing population and narrow limits were wilfully to plunge ourselves into the moral and religious state of southern and western America, the evils of their condition would be multiplied a thousand-fold here. Crowded together as we are, we cannot afford to be disorderly; it is well if, with all the aid of the most powerful and the purest institutions, we can organize and keep from taint the unwieldly masses of our population. And as the best of all institutions, I am anxious to secure a truly national Church, which, uniting within itself all Christians who deserve the name, except perhaps the mere handful of the Quakers and Roman Catholics, would leave without its pale nothing but voluntary or involuntary godlessness. We should hear no complaints then of the burden of supporting a Church to which men do not belong. Such language in a Dissenter's mouth is forcible; but who would heed it from a man who belonged to no church, who paid no minister of his own,—but hating God altogether, was consistently averse to contributing towards his service? Truly we may wait a long time before we shall find the thieves of a country willing to pay for the building of gaols, or the maintenance of an efficient police.

But, it may be said, admitting the soundness of the principles put forward in these pages, that the National Church should be rendered thoroughly comprehensive in doctrine, in government, and in ritual, by what power are they to be carried into effect? To whose hands, in partilar, should be committed the delicate task of remodelling the Articles, a measure obviously essential to the proposed comprehension, yet presenting the greatest practical difficulty? It seems to me, that this is a question more properly to be answered by the Government, than by an individual; only, I may be allowed to express an earnest hope, that if ever an union with Dissenters be attempted, and it should thus become necessary to alter our present terms of communion, the determining on the alterations to be made should never be committed to a convocation, or to any commission consisting of clergymen alone. It is the more needful to express this opinion strongly, because Lord Henley, while himself looking forward to an extension of the pale of the Church, declares that this is "exclusively a theological and ecclesiastical duty, and that no layman can take, or should desire to take, any part in the execution of it." So completely does his confused notion of what is meant by the Church pervade and vitiate every part of his work. Well has Mr. Hull[a] observed, with reference to this notion, that "it breathes too little sense of Protestant responsibility." "We cannot be justified," he adds, "in neglecting the public service of our Creator, our Redeemer, and our Sanctifier; and must, therefore, at our own peril, look well to the method in which that public service is conducted and maintained." Laymen have no right to shift from their own shoulders an important part of Christian responsibility; and as no educated layman individually is justified in taking his own faith upon trust from a clergyman, so neither are the laity, as a body, warranted in taking the national faith in the same way.

[a] "Thoughts on Church Reform." London: Fellowes, 1832.

If ever it should be thought right to appoint commissioners to revise the Articles, it is of paramount importance, in order to save the plan from utter failure, that a sufficient number of laymen, distinguished for their piety and enlarged views, should be added to the ecclesiastical members of the commission. Professional learning, if not sufficiently tempered with the straight-forward views of a plain and sensible piety, would be absolutely mischievous; as it would lead men to retain the language of former controversies, where it is most important, both for the sake of truth and charity, that the statement should be general, and should adopt no technical terms whatever in declaring doctrines, beyond such as may be used in the Scriptures themselves.

As for the proposed constitution of the government and ritual[a] of the Church, this would be naturally and in the first place the subject of legislative enactment; nor would it be more difficult to draw up the necessary details in this case, than it was found to be in the case of the Reform Bill. Care and attention would of course be requisite; and information on many points must be sought from persons locally or professionally qualified to furnish it; but there is nothing in the subject-matter itself which can render the previous report of any other authority necessary, before the question is submitted by the king's Government to the consideration and decision of Parliament.

In venturing even to suggest so great a change in the constitution of our Church, I may probably expose myself to a variety of imputations. Above all, whoever pleads in favour of a wide extension of the terms of com-

[a] By "ritual" I do not mean to include the alterations to be made in the Liturgy, and which would be the proper business of the commission appointed to revise the Articles; but only the repealing those laws which permit nothing but the Liturgy to be read in the Church, and enjoin that it shall be read itself both at Morning and Evening Prayer.

munion, is immediately apt to be accused of latitudinarianism, or as it is now called, of liberalism. Such a charge in the mouths of men at once low principled and ignorant, is of no importance whatever; neither should I regard it if it proceeded from the violent fanatical party, to whom truth must ever remain unknown, as it is unsought after. But in the Church of England even bigotry often wears a softer and a nobler aspect; and there are men at once pious, high minded, intelligent, and full of all kindly feelings, whose intense love for the forms of the Church, fostered as it has been by all the best associations of their pure and holy lives, has absolutely engrossed their whole nature; they have neither eyes to see of themselves any defect in the Liturgy or Articles, nor ears to hear of such when alleged by others. It can be no ordinary church to have inspired such a devoted adoration in such men;—nor are they ordinary men over whom the sense of high moral beauty has obtained so complete a mastery. They will not, I fear, be willing to believe how deeply painful it is to my mind, to know that I am regarded by them as an adversary; still more to feel that I am associated in their judgments with principles and with a party which I abhor as deeply as they do. But while I know the devotedness of their admiration for the Church of England, as it is now constituted, I cannot but wish that they would regard those thousands and ten thousands of their countrymen, who are excluded from its benefit; that they would consider the wrong done to our common country by these unnatural divisions amongst her children. *The Church of Christ* is indeed far beyond all human ties; but of all human ties, that to our country is the highest and most sacred: and *England*, to a true Englishman, ought to be dearer than the peculiar forms of *the Church of England.*

For the sake, then, of our country, and to save her from the greatest possible evils,—from evils far worse than any loss of territory, or decline of trade,—from the

sure moral and intellectual degradation which will accompany the unchristianizing of the nation, that is, the destroying of its national religious establishment, is it too much to ask of good men, that they should consent to unite themselves with other good men, without requiring them to subscribe to their own opinions, or to conform to their own ceremonies? They are not asked to surrender or compromise the smallest portion of their own faith, but simply to forbear imposing it upon their neighbours. They are not called upon to give up their own forms of worship, but to allow the addition of others; not for themselves to join in it, if they do not like to do so, but simply to be celebrated in the same church, and by ministers, whom they shall acknowledge to be their brethren, and members no less than themselves of the National Establishment. The alterations which should be made in their own Liturgy should be such as, to use Bishop Burnet's words, "are in themselves desirable, though there were not a Dissenter in the nation;" alterations not to change its character, but to perfect it.

"But it is latitudinarian not to lay a greater stress on the necessity of believing the truth, and to allow by public authority, and sanction by our own co-operation, the teaching of error." I will not yield to any man in the strength of my conviction of truth and error; nor in the wish that the propagation of error could be prevented. But how is it possible to effect this? How many of the sermons and other writings of our best divines contain more or less of error, of foolish arguments, of false premises, of countervailing truths unknown or neglected, so that even the truth on the other side, being stated alone, becomes virtually no better than falsehood! How many passages of Scripture are misinterpreted in every translation and in every commentary! But are we to refuse to co-operate with our neighbour because of these errors; or shall our own love of truth be impeached because of our

union with him? Every one knows, that it is a question of degree and detail; but with a discipline watching over a man's practice, and with a sincere acknowledgment of the authority of the New Testament, although much and serious error may yet be maintained and propagated, yet it is better even to suffer this, than by insisting on too great an agreement, necessarily to reduce our numbers, and bring upon our country the fearful risk of losing the establishment of Christianity altogether.

Men are alarmed by the examples of Germany and Geneva. But what do they prove? The latter proves admirably the mischiefs of an over-strict creed; and ultra-Calvinism was likely to lead to ultra-Socinianism, with the change of times in other respects. But at this moment the mischief in Geneva consists in the enforcement of the exclusive principle, not in its abandonment: the Church is now exclusively Arian or Socinian, as it was once exclusively Calvinistic; and Trinitarian ministers are not allowed to teach to their congregations the great and peculiar doctrines of Christianity. And with regard to the Germans; had the Protestant Churches there retained ever so exclusive a body of articles, yet the strong tendency of the national character would probably have led to the same result: with no other difference than the addition of the evil of hypocrisy to that of ultra-rationalism. For let any man observe the German literature in other branches besides theology; and he will see the same spirit of restless inquiry everywhere pervading it. Nor is it confined in theology to the German Protestants; the Catholics are not exempt from it; only there, from the nature of their Church, it is displayed less sincerely, and therefore, I think, much more painfully. As an instance of this covert rationalism, I should name a book which has been translated into English, and has had some circulation in this country, "Hug's Introduction to the Study of the New Testament."

For us, on the other hand, critical and metaphysical questions have but small attractions; we have little to fear from the evil of indulging in them to excess. Unbelief, with us, is mostly the result of moral and political causes; to check which, nothing would be so efficient as a well-organized and comprehensive National Church, acting unitedly and popularly, and with adequate means, upon the whole mass of our population. The widest conceivable difference of opinion between the ministers of such a Church would be a trifling evil compared with the good of their systematic union of action.

Lastly, if it be said that the changes proposed are too great,—that the scheme is visionary and impracticable; I answer, that the changes proposed are great, because the danger threatening us is enormous; and that although the scheme very probably will be impracticable, because men will persist in believing it to be so without trial, yet that it remains to be shown that it is impracticable in itself. But if the Reform of the Church be impracticable, its destruction unhappily is not so, and *that* its enemies know full well. It may be that a patchwork reform will be deemed safer, as assuredly it is easier; it may be, too, that after such a reform has been effected, and has left the great evils of the Church just where it found them, so that its final destruction shall be no less sure, the blame of its destruction will be laid by some on the principle of reform, and we shall be told that had no pretended improvements been attempted in it, it would have stood for ever. So it is, that no man is ever allowed to have died from the violence of his disease; but from the presumption of his physician, whose remedies, tried at the eleventh hour, he was too weak to bear. If I have seemed to speak confidently, it is not that I forget the usual course of human affairs; abuses and inefficient institutions obstinately retained, and then at last, blindly and furiously destroyed. Yet, when interests of such surpassing value

are at stake, it may be allowable to hope even against hope; to suppress no plan which we conscientiously believe essential to our country's welfare, even though no other result should follow than that we should be ridiculed as theoretical, or condemned as presumptuous.

POSTSCRIPT.

SINCE the first publication of this pamphlet I have heard and read a great many objections against its principles and details. But a very recent work on Church Reform, by the Rev. C. Dickinson, Domestic Chaplain to the Archbishop of Dublin, has particularly determined me to add some explanation and defence of what I have written; for Mr. Dickinson's objections are levelled against that part of my pamphlet which rests on principles most commonly misunderstood; and the tone of his remarks is at the same time so friendly, that it is impossible for any acrimonious feelings to mingle with my re-statement of my argument.

The substance of what I endeavoured to show was this, —that a Church Establishment is one of the greatest national blessings; that its benefits have been lessened, and are now in danger of being forfeited altogether, by its being based on too narrow a foundation, and being not so much the Church of England, as of a certain part only of the people of England; and that in order at once to secure it from destruction, and to increase its efficiency as an instrument of national good, it should be made more comprehensive in its doctrines, its constitution, and its ritual.

The first proposition, namely, that a Church Establishment is a great national blessing, is disputed sufficiently in many quarters, but not in those from which most of the objections to my pamphlet have proceeded. Nor have I

met with any attempt to disprove the most important part of my second proposition,—that is, the actual jeopardy in which the Establishment as at present constituted is placed, from the strength of the several parties who are working together to effect its overthrow. And yet this is the main ground on which I urge the necessity of so extensive a reform: for although it might be an improvement upon our present system under any circumstances, yet if the Church, as it now is, were in no danger, I am quite ready to allow that it would be unwise to risk, supposing the proposed change to be a risk, the great benefits which the country even now derives from it, merely in the hope of making them greater.

But against my third proposition, that the Establishment should be made more comprehensive, a surprising outcry has been raised. Some, as I expected, have ridiculed it as impracticable, while others have protested against it as latitudinarian [a] and contrary to the truth of Christ's Gospel; and the whole argument connected with it has been assailed on various grounds, and with various degrees of understanding, of good feeling, and of knowledge.

"The proposed comprehension is impracticable." It may possibly be so, and it is not only possible, but very likely, that I may have spoken too sanguinely of its *immediate* practicability in its full extent. I have supposed it impossible to include at present the Roman Catholics, the Quakers, and the Unitarians: it may be, that other

[a] "A considerable cause of our divisions hath been the broaching scandalous names, and employing them to blast the reputation of worthy men; bespattering and aspersing them with insinuations, &c.;—engines devised by spiteful, and applied by simple people;—latitudinarians, rationalists, and I know not what other names, intended for reproach, although importing better signification than those dull detractors can, it seems, discern."—*From an unpublished and unfinished Treatise, "relating to the Dissenters," by Dr. Isaac Barrow.*

bodies of Dissenters whom we might be willing to admit, would themselves object to the union, and would prefer their present independence, especially if they can succeed in obtaining relief from what they consider the burdens of their actual condition. Undoubtedly if they do obtain this relief, they will have so much less inducement to become members of the Establishment; yet if the Establishment make no efforts to unite them to itself, how can this relief be refused them? But if the Establishment were to set its doors widely open, do we doubt that within fifty years the great mass of the dissenting population would gladly enter them? Supposing that habit made the majority of the existing generation of dissenting ministers prefer their own chapels and their own separate society; yet how many of the rising generations, who will now be Dissenters, would eagerly enlist as ministers of the Establishment, if an opening were made for their services by our employing ministers of different stations in society, and exacting from them a less rigid conformity?

I would have no renewal of the Savoy or Hampton Court Conferences; some of the leading Dissenters might be privately consulted, but the alterations to be made in the Liturgy and Articles should be marked out by a Commission [a], appointed by the king in the first instance, and

[a] And above all, I must repeat what I have said before, that this Commission should not consist solely, nor even principally, of Clergymen. The failure of the Commission in 1689 is a warning on this point, as well as against the notion of submitting any plan of Church Reform to the judgment of a Convocation. Previously to this unsuccessful attempt, it had been moved in the House of Lords, "that a number of persons, both of the clergy and laity, should be empowered to prepare such a reformation of things relating to the Church as might be offered to King and Parliament, in order to the healing our divisions," (I am quoting Burnet's words,) "and the correcting what might be amiss or defective in our constitution." Burnet, giving the clergy credit for a sincere desire to promote such a design, wished to leave the matter wholly in their hands, and therefore warmly opposed the motion, which was accordingly rejected.

then submitted to Parliament; and the alterations in the administration of the Church should be decided by an act of the legislature, drawn up under the direction of the Government. That the improvements thus effected would at once reconcile many of the Dissenters, and convert many merely nominal Churchmen into hearty friends of the Establishment, appears to me little less than certain. That within fifty years they would nearly extinguish all dissent throughout the kingdom, or reduce it so greatly as to destroy its importance as a national evil, I hold to be in the highest degree probable.

"The proposed comprehension is unchristian." Surely not, as far as the mass of the Protestant Dissenters are concerned, or how could three attempts have been made, in the course of the seventeenth century, to effect it? It matters not whether the ruling party was sincere in its professions; the mere fact of the Hampton Court and Savoy Conferences, to say nothing of the abortive Commission of 1689, is an admission on the part of the Church that a comprehension with those who are called the orthodox Dissenters, cannot be in itself unlawful. I would go farther, and include all who will agree in τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα,—in those points, a denial of which absolutely excludes a man from the Church of Christ. And I hold with Bacon, that the bonds of Christian communion are laid down to be, "One faith[a], one baptism,"

"But I was convinced soon after," he says, "that I had taken wrong measures, and that the method proposed was the only one like to prove effectual."—*History of His Own Times*, Vol. III. p. 11. 8vo edit. London, 1818. Unless we profit, as Burnet did, by his experience, we are likely to meet with a repetition of the same disappointment now.

[a] "Vincula enim communionis Christianæ ponuntur, *Una fides, unum baptisma*, &c. non unus ritus, una opinio."—"His itaque perpensis, magni videatur res et momenti et usûs esse, et definiatur, qualia sint illa et quantæ latitudinis, quæ ab ecclesiæ corpore homines penitus divellant, et a communione fidelium eliminent. Quod si quis putet, hoc jam pridem factum esse, videat ille etiam

not "one ceremonial, one opinion." And further, I think that what Bacon found wanting in his time is wanting still; namely, "a declaration of the nature and magnitude of those points which utterly divide men from the Church, and expel them from the communion of the faithful." "And if any man think that this has been done long since," either in the decrees of the four first councils, or in any creeds or articles of any existing Church, "let him observe again and again," as Bacon most justly adds, "how much truth and how much moderation have been shewn in the doing of it." For instance, a false criterion of "fundamental errors" has been set up, in measuring the importance of the error to us by the excellence of the object to which it relates. This has caused men to lay so much stress on all opinions that relate to God. And, indeed, opinions of his moral attributes are of the last importance, because such as we suppose him to be morally, such we strive to become ourselves; but opinions as to his nature metaphysically may be wholly unimportant, because they are often of such a kind as to be wholly inoperative upon our spiritual state: they neither advance us in goodness, nor obstruct our progress in it.

On the other hand, that is *to us* a fundamental error which directly interferes with our own edification. That is to say, we cannot worship with a man who insists upon our omitting some religious exercise which we feel to be important to our own improvement. I laid the stress therefore on the *worship* of Christ, not on the admission of his proper divinity. If a man will not let me pray to and praise my Saviour, he destroys the exercise of my faith altogether;—but I am no way injured by his praying to him as a glorified man, while I pray to him as God.

atque etiam, quam sincerè et moderatè. Illud interim verisimile est, eum qui pacis mentionem fecerit, reportaturum responsum illud Jehu ad nuntium, '*Numquid pax est, Jehu? Quid tibi et paci? Transi et sequere me.*' Cum non pax sed partes plerisque cordi sint."—*Bacon, De Augmentis Scientiarum*, IX. 1. § 2.

The conclusion to be drawn from the known fallibility of human judgments, is, not that we should be sceptical ourselves, or compromise our own practice, but that we should bear with our neighbour's thinking as he judges right, so long as he will bear with our acting as we judge right. Conformity to our Liturgy therefore is a much better test to require than subscription to our Articles. In other words, if the public prayers of a Church be enough to satisfy a Christian's devotion, and to be an effectual means of grace to him, and if the sacraments be duly administered, we have every thing that is essential to our own improvement; and what has been imagined to afford a greater security to our faith, has, in fact, rather tended to weaken and perplex it.

Of course I am aware that Articles are regarded as a security against erroneous preaching. Now, certainly it would belong to the common discipline of the Church that a minister should not preach against the Liturgy,—he should not contradict the prayers in which he had just before joined. And gross ignorance, and violence, or any indecency of language or manner, might and ought to be noticed by the Church authorities, whose superintendence, if the Church were reformed, would be much more complete and efficient, we might hope, than it is at present. But as to differences of opinion, they exist actually, in spite of the Articles, and all the inconveniences which would arise on that score may be thoroughly appreciated already. We have at this moment the extremes of Calvinism and Arminianism united within the pale of the Establishment;—it is difficult to conceive how any greater differences of opinion could exist, so long as the Liturgy was a Christian Liturgy, and no man was allowed to preach against it.

With respect to Church government, the principal points which I urged were, first, the admission of the laity to a larger share in it;—secondly, that its constitution should be rendered more popular; and, thirdly, that the

power of the bishops should be rendered more efficient by the institution of such checks as might allow of its exercise without danger.

I am not aware that on these points Mr. Dickinson's views would differ from mine. He speaks of "the bishop of the diocese, *aided by his proper council*," as if he had no idea that such a limitation of a bishop's power were either unlawful or inexpedient. He is probably not ignorant that in the primitive Church [a] "the bishop did nothing of importance without the advice of his presbyters and deacons," and that "frequently he took the opinion of the whole people." He remembers, that one of the circumstances in the administration of bishops in England, with which Bacon never could be satisfied, was, "the sole exercise of their authority;" that "the bishop giveth orders alone, excommunicateth alone, judgeth alone;"—"a thing," he adds, "almost without example in good government." [b] Nor is Mr. Dickinson, so far as appears, one of those extraordinary persons who gravely maintain that primitive Episcopacy, and Episcopacy as it now exists in England, are essentially the same. I was well aware that many persons did maintain this, and I spoke purposely in my pamphlet of the great difference between the two institutions, in order to draw their attention to the grounds on which their belief rested. But as it seems

[a] "En chaque église l'Evêque ne faisoit rien d'important, sans le conseil des prêtres, des diacres, et des principaux de son clergé. Souvent même il consultoit tout le peuple quand il avoit interêt à l'affaire, comme aux ordinations."—*Fleury, Discours sur l'Histoire des Six Premiers Siècles de l'Eglise*, prefixed to the eighth volume of his *Ecclesiastical History*. This and the other discourses of the same writer, scattered through the volumes of his history, can hardly be recommended too strongly. I know of nothing that at all approaches to them in excellence on the subjects to which they relate. Sir J. Mackintosh has done justice to their merit, in a note in the first volume of his *History of England*, p. 146.

[b] "Of the Pacification of the Church."—*Bacon's Works*, Vol. IV. p. 436. Folio edit. 1730.

that they are not apt to think out the question for themselves, they are requested to consider the following points.

An office may be said to be essentially the same so long as it is calculated to fulfil equally well the object for which it was originally instituted. Thus, if the object be to perpetuate the dignity and authority of one particular family or race, the office may be called the same, so long as it is hereditary in this family or race, even though its powers in the course of years may undergo considerable alteration. Thus in an hereditary priesthood, as long as the blood was preserved pure, the office would retain its most essential character of identity, although at one period the priests' power were independent of the civil magistrate, and at another completely subservient to him.

Again, if the object were to secure the continued efficiency of some highly valuable gift, which the possessor for the time being could communicate to any one whom he might fix upon, then the office would be substantially the same so long as the possession of this gift remained annexed to it, although in other matters its powers might be increased or diminished.

But, if the object be simply to provide for the general ends of good government, then the office loses its essential identity so soon as it is altered in those points which affect its operation upon the commonwealth. For instance, the powers of the office may remain the same, but its operation for good or for evil may be wholly different according to the different hands in whom the appointment is vested. No man would call the House of Commons essentially the same, if its members were to be nominated by the crown instead of elected by the people. And, on the other hand, the mode of appointment may remain unchanged, but the character of the office may be essentially changed, by extending its powers or abridging them. The tribunes were still chosen by the tribes as formerly, but the people felt that it was no longer the same office when

Sylla deprived it of the right of originating any measure, and made it a disqualification for attaining to all the higher honours in the commonwealth.

Now Episcopacy was clearly not instituted for the sake of maintaining the ascendancy of any one family or race; and therefore it has never been hereditary. It is the second case which has given rise to the prevailing confusion on the subject. For the Apostles were possessed of certain most valuable gifts, and could communicate them to others;—and had these gifts been capable of perpetual transmission, the office with which they were transmitted would have remained essentially the same, however much its ordinary powers might have been changed from what they were originally. Now if any gift be thus transmitted in the case of Episcopacy, what is it, and where is the proof of its existence? When men say that the power of ordaining ministers is thus transmitted, there is a confusion in the use of the word *power*. Bishops confer a legal qualification for the ministry, not a real one, whether natural or supernatural. They can give neither piety, nor wisdom, nor learning, nor eloquence;—nothing, in short, but what the laws or constitutions of the Church empower them to give,—that is to say, a commission to preach and to administer the sacraments in the Church of God, according to the measure of the gifts which the person ordained has received, or may receive hereafter, not from them, or through their medium, but from God, and the blessing of the Holy Spirit on his own prayers and exertions.

Episcopacy then was instituted for the general ends of good government; and like ordinary civil offices, its identity depends on its continuing to exercise an equal influence on the welfare of the body connected with it. If then its mode of appointment be wholly changed, and its relation to the Church greatly circumscribed; still more, if the whole society to which it belongs has assumed a different aspect, it is hard to conceive how it can be said to continue essentially the same. Now the primitive

bishops were appointed by the members of their own order, with the approbation of the people of the diocese: —bishops in England are appointed solely by the crown. The primitive bishops could legislate for the Church, laity as well as clergy:—the bishops in England can legislate for no one without the consent of the crown,—and if they are allowed to meet in synod, they can legislate only for the clergy,—over the laity their canons have no authority whatever[a]. The primitive bishops fixed the doctrine of their churches, and ordered their ceremonies:—no single bishop, nor all the bishops in England united, can order a single prayer to be added to or taken from the Church service, nor can they so much as alter a single expression in its language. No bishop can ordain any man unless he will take certain oaths imposed by act of parliament, and subscribe to the articles of religion as required by act of parliament. No bishop can refuse to institute any man regularly ordained to any cure of souls in his diocese, to which he may be appointed by the patrons; nor can he, except as patron, and not as bishop, confer the cure of souls on any one. Finally, in the primitive times the bishops were judges in civil matters amongst their people, and thus possessed a temporal influence and authority as well as a spiritual:—whereas in England they are accounted solely the governors of the clergy, and the bulk of the people are hardly aware of their possessing any authority at all.

It will not be supposed that I am dwelling on these differences for the purpose of depreciating our present Episcopacy. Whatever be the faults of our system, it is no reproach to it that it differs from that of the primitive Church. With every thing changed around us, it would be most extraordinary if the same forms of government could continue to suit our altered condition: and to imagine that any one form was intended by the Apostles to be binding upon all Christians, in all times and in all

[a] See Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. I. p. 83. Edit. Coleridge, 1825.

countries, seems to me to betray equal ignorance of the spirit of Christianity, and of the nature and ends of government.

But the change which has taken place in the relations of the Church with the civil power since the first beginning of Christianity, has been a fruitful subject of dispute. The pretensions of the popes, and of the Roman Catholic clergy in general,—the fanaticism of the Puritans,—and, in later times, some practical inconveniences in our actual system in England, have all helped to embarrass the question. I have charged others with using the word "Church" in a vague or improper sense; and Mr. Dickinson brings the same charge against me. He complains that I have identified the Church in this country with the nation. I plead guilty to the charge, for I do believe them to be properly identical.

The Church, using the word now as synonymous with "Christian society," was instituted for the promotion of man's highest possible perfection and happiness. It did not neglect even his physical wants and sufferings,—but its main object was to improve him morally and spiritually; —to bring him to such a state of goodness and wisdom that his highest happiness would be no longer an unattainable dream.

Now this is precisely the object of civil society also: that is, of the State. Our physical wants may have [a] led to its actual origin, but its proper object is of a higher nature;—it is the intellectual and moral improvement of mankind, in order to their reaching their greatest perfection, and enjoying their highest happiness. This is the object of civil society, or "the State" in the abstract; and the object of any particular civil society or state is still the same, but limited to certain local boundaries which mark the particular subdivisions of the society of mankind.

[a] Πόλις—γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.—*Aristotle, Politics*, 1, 2.

Civil society aims at the highest happiness of man according to the measure of its knowledge. Religious society aims at it truly and really, because it has obtained a complete knowledge of it. Impart then to civil society the knowledge of religious society, and the objects of both will be not only in intention but in fact the same. In other words, religious society is only civil society fully enlightened: the State in its highest perfection becomes the Church.

When then the individuals of any nation have been converted to Christianity, they see that they had in many instances entertaiend false and imperfect notions of their highest perfection and happiness. Their mistakes are now corrected; what they thought was the summit of the mountain, they now find to be a point of inferior height: but their object is still the same as it was before,—to reach the top of the mountain. Institutions may be modified, laws amended, wars may become less frequent and less bloody, the practice of the nation may be substantially changed, but still it is pursuing the same object as before; only with the advantage of discerning it more clearly, and following it more steadily.

But the case has been perplexed, by its being supposed that civil and religious society have necessarily two distinct governments; that the magistrate is at the head of the one, and the priest of the other; and that these two offices have a different tenure; the one deriving its authority from human law, from custom, from mutual agreement, or from superior force, while the other was derived from the express command of God, and handed down in an unbroken succession from those whom God first invested with it.

Of two powers with such pretensions neither could be expected to yield to the other. And the alleged distinctness of their titles hindered them from coalescing; the State not choosing to take its rulers from those who boasted to possess already a higher title to authority than

the State could give them, while the Church regarded it as a profanation to place rulers made by man on a level with those appointed by God. Offices so distinct naturally kept up the belief that the societies to which they respectively belonged were essentially distinct also.

But the error consisted in ascribing to Christianity an office which it does not recognize on earth,—that of the priesthood. Grant that there is a priesthood, that is, an order of men deriving their authority from God only, through the medium of one another, and you introduce at once into the relations of civil and religious society an element of perpetual disunion. It will for ever be a question whether the State is to rule the Church, or the Church the State, or if they are supposed to meet as allies with one another, yet one or the other party will be for ever complaining that the terms of the alliance are not strictly kept to.

The New Testament, amongst a thousand other proofs of that divine wisdom in which Christianity originated, offers this most remarkable one,—that alone of all the religions of civilized man it disclaims any earthly priesthood. The Christian society had its ministers of various ranks and various offices; but nothing was definitely and universally commanded with regard to their number, jurisdiction, or mode of appointment. As far as related to its external constitution, it was left from age to age in full possession of the right of regulating its own government.

Now, whilst the civil society was distinct from the religious one, it is manifest that the civil offices belonging to the latter must have held a very subordinate place, because those of the highest dignity and importance were exclusively in the hands of the former. The highest earthly ministers of God's moral government, that is to say, those persons who were invested with the supreme executive and legislative power, could not be ministers of His spiritual government also, because they were not yet

acquainted with it. Yet as their jurisdiction, and the benefits of their functions, extended to the members of the religious society, the exercise of similar functions by these last was at once unnecessary and impossible. The great work of civil society was already done for them by others; not perfectly indeed, because it proceeded from men who had not the benefit of their wisdom, but yet so as to preclude them from attempting to do it for themselves.

But no sooner had civil society become enlightened, and learned aright what was the destiny of man, what his greatest perfection, and what his highest happiness, than it became at once a religious society, but armed with powers, and grown to a fulness of stature, which religious society till now had never known. The civil offices which it now had to discharge were no longer subordinate and municipal, but sovereign and national; nor did they lose their inherent supremacy, because they were administered on higher principles. The King had been the head of the State, he was equally the head of the perfected State, that is, of the Church; with him rested the duty of disposing and superintending all the details of the society's government, so as to make them most effective towards the attainment of its great object, the highest perfection and happiness of the community. And the "King," in this statement, is merely another name for the supreme power in society; so that what is true of the individual sovereign in a pure monarchy, is true equally of the bodies of men, be they more or less numerous, by whom the sovereignty is exercised in an aristocracy or a democracy.

When this sovereign power then directs and controls its inferior ministers, the clergy, and legislates for the great objects of the society, by providing for the highest instruction of its members, and taking care that it be at once pure and effective; it is not that the State is governing the Church, but that the Church, through the medium

of its supreme government, is ruling itself. The confusion has arisen from the notion, that the highest ministers of the Church must *always* be bishops or presbyters, because they were so in the days of its existence as a subordinate and municipal society. Even had the Christian ministers of religion been a priesthood, yet the example of the Israelites might teach us that Moses is greater than Aaron,—that he who rules God's people to direct them in the ways of judgment, mercy, and truth, is greater than he who ministers at the altar. Much more are Christian rulers greater than the Christian clergy, inasmuch as the functions of the latter, not being definitely fixed by any divine law, are far more subject to the control of the supreme government of the Church than were the offices of the Jewish priesthood.

What I have here stated are the true principles of the Church of England, upon which she asserted, in opposition to the Roman Catholics and to the Presbyterians,—that the King is the supreme head of the Church on earth. "It was certainly designed at one time," says Mr. Dickinson, "that the Church and the nation should be co-extensive." I should rather say that the founders of the Protestant Church of England considered them as identical:—the Christian nation of England was the Church of England;—the head of that nation was for that very reason the head of the Church;—the public officers of the nation, whether civil or ecclesiastical, were officers therefore of the Church;—and every Englishman was supposed to be properly a member of it,—baptized into it almost as soon as he was born,—taught its lessons in his early childhood,—required to partake of its most solemn pledge of communion [a],—married under its sanc-

[a] "And note that every parishioner shall communicate at the least three times in the year."—*Rubrick at the end of the Communion Service.*—See also the Prayer for the Church militant, and the second Collect for Good Friday, as beautiful instances of the extensive sense in which our reformers used the word "Church." In the former, the

tion and blessing,—and laid in the grave within its peculiar precincts, amidst its prayers and most affectionate consolations. And is it indifference or latitudinarianism to wish most devoutly that this noble, this divine theory, may be fully and for ever realized? [b]

It is owing to the existence of religious dissent that not only is it not realized in practice, but its very truth and excellence are disputed. And that dissent has arisen out of faults and errors on both sides, on the part of the Dis-

King's Council, the Judges, &c., are prayed for as officers in the Church, before even the Bishops and Curates.—See also Romans xii. 6—8.

[b] It is objected to this doctrine, that it implies the exclusion of those who are not members of the Church from the civil rights of citizens. I think it does imply such an exclusion in the case of those who are not members of the Church of Christ: nor should I consider a Christian nation justified in forming a legislative union with a nation of Jews, or Mahometans, or Heathens. If the citizens of the same nation are in nearly equal proportion Christians and Heathens, the State in that country is not yet sufficiently enlightened to become a Church;—and it is here that our Lord's words apply, that "his kingdom is not of this world:"—Christians have no right, as such, to press the establishment of their religion to the prejudice of the civil rights of others. Yet if the two religions happened to be for the most part locally divided, it would be a reason why such a nation should separate itself into two, and the Christian and Heathen portions of it form each a state distinct from the other. But when the decided majority of a country become Christians, so that the State may justly become a Church, then the Heathen part of the population ought to be excluded from the legislature, and encouraged, if it be possible, to emigrate to other countries, if they complain of not participating in the full rights of citizenship. At present, in England, I should earnestly deprecate the admission of the Jews to a share in the national legislature. It is a principle little warranted by authority or by reason, that the sole qualification for enjoying the rights of citizenship should consist in being locally an inhabitant of any country. But all professing Christians, of whatever sect, as being members of the Church of Christ, must be supposed to have much more in common with each other, as far as the great ends of society are concerned, than they have points of difference. Their peculiar tenets, therefore, need form no ground for their exclusion.

senters no less than on that of the Church, is a fact which no impartial man can doubt. It may be too late now to remedy the mischief entirely; but surely if it be remedied even in part it will be no light benefit,—and it is absurd to suppose that it can be remedied at all without an alteration, or rather an enlargement, of our present ecclesiastical constitution and ritual. Therefore I earnestly desire such an enlargement, and I look to the supreme government of the Church,—the government of this still Christian nation,—as the only power by which it can or ought to be effected. Let it be supposed chimerical to expect any extensive comprehension of the Dissenters; even then the relaxing uniformity of the Liturgy, the reduction of the size of the dioceses, and the increase of their number, the appointment of additional orders of ministers, which might include members of the poorer classes, and, above all, the conferring on the lay members of the Church a greater share in its ordinary administration, would be productive of the greatest benefit, inasmuch as it would interest many in the welfare of the Church, who now, without being Dissenters, feel that they have little to do with it, and habitually look upon it as the concern of the clergy, and not their own. Such a reform, too, might make the Church effective, where its exertions are most needed, and where they are at present necessarily most inefficient; I mean, amongst the masses of our manufacturing population. Indeed, when we consider the utter inadequacy of the Establishment, as it now stands, to meet the wants of the great manufacturing towns and districts, it may be said that in those portions of the kingdom our business is not so much to reform the Church, as to create one.

Undoubtedly if that large part of our population, who are at present neither Churchmen nor Dissenters, could be really attached to the Established Church, the danger arising from the existence of avowed dissent would be greatly lessened. We might then hope to save the Esta-

blishment; which must always be a great blessing, however much its usefulness and excellence may be impaired by exclusiveness. But as things now are, in any attempts to attach the people to the Church, we find that the Dissenters actually oppose us; and this, it is to be feared, will always be the case, unless a more comprehensive system be adopted. If this fear be ill-founded; if the Church, without any alteration of its Articles, or Liturgy, or government, can succeed in working its way amidst the manufacturing population; can improve them physically and morally, and make them sensible of the benefits which they receive from it; there is not a man alive to whom this proof of its inherent vitality will be more grateful than to me. Were it even more exclusive than it is, its preservation would still be earnestly to be desired, as one of the greatest national blessings. Most heartily do I wish to see it reformed, at once for the sake of its safety and of its greater perfection; but, reformed or not, may God, in His mercy, save us from the calamity of seeing it destroyed.

RUGBY SCHOOL.—USE OF THE CLASSICS.

[This and the following article were contributed by Dr. Arnold to the Quarterly Journal of Education in 1834, 1835, and are here inserted by the kind permission of the publisher.

The account of Rugby School, in the first part of this article, was written in compliance with a plan for a description of the different Public Schools by their several head-masters. In some respects the arrangement of the School, which is here given, underwent considerable modifications.]

RUGBY SCHOOL.—USE OF THE CLASSICS.

This school was originally a simple grammar school, designed for the benefit of the town of Rugby and its neighbourhood. Any person who has resided for the space of two years in the town of Rugby, or at any place in the county of Warwick within ten miles of it, or even in the adjacent counties of Leicester and Northampton to the distance of five miles from it, may send his sons to be educated at the school without paying any thing whatever for their instruction. But if a parent lives out of the town of Rugby, his son must then lodge at one of the regular boarding-houses of the school; in which case the expenses of his board are the same as those incurred by a boy not on the foundation.

Boys placed at the school in this manner are called foundationers, and their number is not limited. In addition to these, there are 260 boys, not on the foundation; and this number is not allowed to be exceeded.

The number of masters is ten, consisting of a head-master and nine assistants. The boys are divided into nine, or practically into ten classes, succeeding each other in the following order, beginning from the lowest: first form, second form, third form, lower remove; fourth from, upper remove, lower fifth, fifth, and sixth. It should be observed, to account for the anomalies of this nomenclature, that the name of sixth form has been long as-

sociated with the idea of the highest class in all the great public schools of England; and, therefore, when more than six forms are wanted they are designated by other names, in order to secure the magic name of sixth to the highest form in the school. In this the practice of our schools is not without a very famous precedent: for the Roman augurs, we are told, would not allow Tarquinius Priscus to exceed the ancient and sacred number of three, in the centuries of Equites; but there was no objection made to his doubling the number of them in each century, and making in each an upper and a lower division, which were practically as distinct as two centuries. There is no more wisdom in disturbing an old association for no real benefit, than in sparing it when it stands in the way of any substantial advantage.

Into these ten classes the boys are distributed in a three-fold division, according to their proficiency in classical literature, in arithmetic and mathematics, and in French. There is an exception made, however, in favour of the sixth form, which consists in all the three divisions of exactly the same individuals. All the rest of the boys are classed in each of the divisions without any reference to their rank in the other two: and thus it sometimes happens that a boy is in the fifth form in the mathematical division, while he is only in the third or fourth in the classical; or, on the other hand, that he is in a very low form in the French division, while he is in a high one in the classical and mathematical. During the two first lessons on Wednesday, the school is arranged according to its classes in French; and on Saturday, according to its classes in arithmetic and mathematics.

The masters also have different forms in the three different divisions. The masters of the higher classical forms may teach the lower forms in mathematics or French; and the masters of the higher forms in either of those two departments may have the care of the lower forms in the classical arrangement.

The general school hours throughout the week are as follows:—

Monday.—First lesson, seven to eight. Second lesson, quarter-past nine to eleven. Third and fourth lessons, quarter-past two to five.

Tuesday.—First and second lessons, as on Monday. Eleven to one, composition. Half-holiday.

Wednesday.—As on Monday.

Thursday.—As on Tuesday.

Friday.—As on Monday.

Saturday.—As on Tuesday and Thursday, except that there is no composition from eleven to one.

There are various other lessons at additional hours for different classes, but it is needless to trouble our readers with such minute details.

Each half year is divided into two equal periods, called language time and history time. The books read in these two periods vary in several instances,—the poets and orators being read principally during the language time, and history and geography being chiefly studied during the history time. This will be more clearly seen from the following Table of the general work of the school for a whole year.

	Classical Division.			Mathematical Division.	French Division.
	Language Time.	Scriptural Instruction, &c.	History Time.		
First Form	Latin Grammar, and Latin Delectus.	Church Catechism and Abridgment of New Testament History.	Markham's England, Vol. I.	Tables, Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, and Division, simple and compound Reduction.	Hamel's Exercises up to the Auxiliary Verb.
Second Form	Latin Grammar and Latin Delectus. Eutropius.	St. Luke. Genesis.	Markham's England, Vol. II.	The work done in the first form repeated; Rule of Three, Practice.	Hamel's Exercises, Auxiliary Verbs, regular Conjugations, and some of the irregular. Gaultier's Geography.
Third Form	Greek Grammar (Matthiæ Abridgement). Valpy's Greek Exercises. Valpy's Greek Delectus. Florilegium. Translations into Latin.	Exodus, Numbers, Judges, I. and II., Samuel, St. Matthew.	Eutropius. Physical Geography, U.K.S.	Rule of Three. Practice. Vulgar Fractions. Interest.	Hamel's Exercises, first part continued, Irregular Verbs. Elizabeth, ou Les Exilés in Sibére.

	Classical Division.			Mathematical Division.	French Division.
	Language Time.	Scriptural Instruction, &c.	History Time.		
Lower Remove	Greek Grammar, and Valpy's Exercises. Rules of the Greek Iambics. Easy Parts of the Iambics of the Greek Tragedians. Virgil's Eclogues. Cicero de Senectute.	St. Matthew in Greek Testament. Acts in the English Bible.	Parts of Justin. Parts of Xenophon's Anabasis. Markham's France to Philip of Valois.	Vulgar Fractions. Interest. Decimal Fractions. Square Root.	Hamel continued and repeated. Jussieu's Jardin des Plantes.
Fourth Form	Æschylus Prometh. Virgil, Æn. II. and III. Cicero de Amicitiâ.	Acts in the Greek Testament. St. John in the English Bible. Old Testament History.	Part of Xenophon's Hellenics. Florus, from III. 21. to IV. 11. History of Greece, U.K.S. Markham's France, from Philip of Valois. Detailed Geography of Italy and Germany.	Decimals, Involution and Evolution, Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication, and Division of Algebra. Binomial Theorem. Euclid, Book I., Propos. I. to XV.	Hamel's 2nd Part, chiefly Syntax of the Pronouns. La Fontaine's Fables.
Upper Remove	Sophocles' Philoct. Æschyl. Eumenid. Homer's Iliad, I. II. Virgil Æn., IV. V. Parts of Horace, Odes I. II. III. Parts of Cicero's Epistles.	St. John in Greek Testament. Deuteronomy and Ep. of St. Peter. Selections from the Psalms.	Parts of Arrian. Parts of Paterculus, Book II. Sir J. Macintosh's England.	Equation of Payments, Discount, Simple Equations. Euclid, Book I. from XV. to end.	Translations from English into French. La Fontaine's Fables.

	Classical Division.			Mathematical Division.	French Division.
	Language Time.	Scriptural Instruction, &c.	History Time.		
Lower Fifth	Æschyl. Sept. contra Thebas. Sophocl. Œd. Tyr. Homer's Iliad, III. IV. Virgil's Æn., VI. VII. Extracts from Cicero's Epistles. Parts of Horace.	St. John. Epistles to Timothy and Titus. Bible History, from 1 Kings to Nehemiah, inclusive.	Parts of Arrian. Herodotus III., 1, 38, 61, 67, 88, 116. Livy, Parts of, II. and III., Hallam's Middle Ages, France, Spain, Greeks, and Saracens. Physical and Political Geography of all Europe.	Exchange, Alligation, Simple Equations, with two unknown Quantities and Problems. Euclid, Book III.	Syntax and Idioms. A Play of Molière, to construe and then turn again from English into French.
Fifth Form	Æschyl. Agamemn. Homer's Iliad, V. VI. Odyssey, IX. Demosthenes' Leptines in Aphobum. I. Virgil's Æn., VIII. Parts of Horace. Cicero in Verrem.	Epistles to the Corinthians. Paley's Horæ Paulinæ.	Parts of Herodotus and Thucydides. Parts of Livy. Hallam's Middle Ages. State of Society.	Quadratic Equations. Trigonometry. Euclid, to the end of Book VI.	Pensées de Pascal. Translations from English into French.
Sixth Form	Various parts of Virgil and Homer. Some one or more of the Greek Tragedies. One or more of the private Orations of Demosthenes. Cicero against Verres. Part of Aristotle's Ethics.	One of the Prophets in the Septuagint Version. Different Parts of the New Testament.	Parts of Thucydides, and Arrian. Parts of Tacitus. Parts of Russell's Modern Europe.	Euclid, III.—VI. Simple and Quadratic Equations, Plane Trigonometry, Conic Sections.	Parts of Guizot's Histoire de la Révolut. de l'Angleterre, and Mignet's Histoire de la Révolut. Franç.

Every year, immediately before the Christmas holidays, there is a general examination of the whole school in the work that has been done during the preceding half-year. A class-paper is printed containing the names of those boys who distinguish themselves; and in order to gain a high place on this paper, it is usual for the boys to read some book in one or more of their several branches of study, in addition to what they have read with the masters in school. In this manner they have an opportunity of reading any work to which their peculiar taste may lead them, and of rendering it available to their distinction in the school.

There are exercises in composition, in Greek and Latin prose, Greek and Latin verse, and English prose, as in other large classical schools. In the subjects given for original composition in the higher forms, there is a considerable variety. Historical descriptions of any remarkable events, geographical descriptions of countries, imaginary speeches and letters, supposed to be spoken or written on some great question or under some memorable circumstances; etymological accounts of words in different languages, and criticisms on different books, are found to offer an advantageous variety to the essays on moral subjects to which boys' prose composition has sometimes been confined.

Three exhibitioners are elected every year by the trustees of the school, on the report of two examiners appointed respectively by the vice-chancellors of Oxford and Cambridge. These exhibitions are of the value of £60 a year, and may be held for seven years at any college at either university, provided the exhibitioner continues to reside at college so long; for they are vacated immediately by non-residence.

One scholar is also elected every year by the masters, after an examination held by themselves. The scholarship is of the value of £25 a year, and is confined to boys under fourteen and a half at the time of their election. It

is tenable for six years, if the boy who holds it remains so long at Rugby. But as the funds for these scholarships arise only from the subscriptions of individuals, they are not to be considered as forming necessarily a permanent part of the school foundation.

In any statement of the business of a school, such as has been given above, there will be an unintentional exaggeration, unless the reader makes due allowance for the difference between the theory of any institution and its practical working. But on the other hand, a reader unacquainted with the real nature of a classical education, will be in danger of undervaluing it, when he sees that so large a portion of time at so important a period of human life is devoted to the study of a few ancient writers, whose works seem to have no direct bearing on the studies and duties of our own generation. For instance, although some provision is undoubtedly made at Rugby for acquiring a knowledge of modern history, yet the History of Greece and Rome is more studied than that of France and England; and Homer and Virgil are certainly much more attended to than Shakspeare and Milton. This appears to many persons a great absurdity; while others who are so far swayed by authority as to believe the system to be right, are yet unable to understand how it can be so. A journal of education may not be an unfit place for a few remarks on this subject.

It may freely be confessed that the first origin of classical education affords in itself no reasons for its being continued now. When Latin and Greek were almost the only written languages of civilized man, it is manifest that they must have furnished the subjects of all liberal education. The question therefore is wholly changed, since the growth of a complete literature in other languages; since France, and Italy, and Germany, and England, have each produced their philosophers, their poets, and their historians, worthy to be placed on the same level with those of Greece and Rome.

But although there is not the *same* reason now which existed three or four centuries ago for the study of Greek and Roman literature, yet there is another no less substantial. Expel Greek and Latin from your schools, and you confine the views of the existing generation to themselves and their immediate predecessors: you will cut off so many centuries of the world's experience, and place us in the same state as if the human race had first come into existence in the year 1500. For it is nothing to say that a few learned individuals might still study classical literature; the effect produced on the public mind would be no greater than that which has resulted from the labours of our oriental scholars; it would not spread beyond themselves, and men in general after a few generations would know as little of Greece and Rome, as they do actually of China and Hindostan. But such an ignorance would be incalculably more to be regretted. With the Asiatic mind, we have no nearer connexion or sympathy than that which is derived from our common humanity. But the mind of the Greek and of the Roman is in all the essential points of its constitution our own; and not only so, but it is our own mind developed to an extraordinary degree of perfection. Wide as is the difference between us with respect to those physical instruments which minister to our uses or our pleasures; although the Greeks and Romans had no steam-engines, no printing-presses, no mariner's compass, no telescopes, no microscopes, no gunpowder; yet in our moral and political views, in those matters which most determine human character, there is a perfect resemblance in these respects. Aristotle, and Plato, and Thucydides, and Cicero, and Tacitus, are most untruly called ancient writers; they are virtually our own countrymen and contemporaries, but have the advantage which is enjoyed by intelligent travellers, that their observation has been exercised in a field out of the reach of common men; and that having thus seen in a manner with our eyes what we cannot see for

ourselves, their conclusions are such as bear upon our own circumstances, while their information has all the charm of novelty, and all the value of a mass of new and pertinent facts, illustrative of the great science of the nature of civilized man.

Now when it is said, that men in manhood so often throw their Greek and Latin aside, and that this very fact shows the uselessness of their early studies, it is much more true to say that it shows how completely the literature of Greece and Rome would be forgotten, if our system of education did not keep up the knowledge of it. But it by no means shows that system to be useless, unless it followed that when a man laid aside his Greek and Latin books, he forgot also all that he had ever gained from them. This, however, is so far from being the case, that even where the results of a classical education are least tangible, and least appreciated even by the individual himself, still the mind often retains much of the effect of its early studies in the general liberality of its tastes and comparative comprehensiveness of its views and notions.

All this supposes, indeed, that classical instruction should be sensibly conducted; it requires that a classical teacher should be fully acquainted with modern history and modern literature, no less than with those of Greece and Rome. What is, or perhaps what used to be, called a mere scholar, cannot possibly communicate to his pupils the main advantages of a classical education. The knowledge of the past is valuable, because without it our knowledge of the present and of the future must be scanty; but if the knowledge of the past be confined wholly to itself, if, instead of being made to bear upon things around us, it be totally isolated from them, and so disguised by vagueness and misapprehension as to appear incapable of illustrating them, then indeed it becomes little better than laborious trifling, and they who declaim against it may be fully forgiven.

To select one instance of this perversion, what can be more absurd than the practice of what is called construing Greek and Latin, continued as it often is even with pupils of an advanced age? The study of Greek and Latin, considered as mere languages, is of importance mainly as it enables us to understand and employ well that language in which we commonly think, and speak, and write. It does this because Greek and Latin are specimens of language at once highly perfect and incapable of being understood without long and minute attention: the study of them, therefore, naturally involves that of the general principles of grammar; while their peculiar excellences illustrate the points which render language clear, and forcible, and beautiful. But our *application* of this general knowledge must naturally be to our own language; to show us what are its peculiarities, what its beauties, what its defects; to teach us by the patterns or the analogies offered by other languages, how the effect which we admire in them may be produced with a somewhat different instrument. Every lesson in Greek or Latin may and ought to be made a lesson in English; the translation of every sentence in Demosthenes or Tacitus is properly an exercise in extemporaneous English composition; a problem, how to express with equal brevity, clearness and force, in our own language, the thought which the original author has so admirably expressed in his. But the system of construing, far from assisting, is positively injurious to our knowledge and use of English; it accustoms us to a tame and involved arrangement of our words, and to the substitution of foreign idioms in the place of such as are national; it obliges us to caricature every sentence that we render, by turning what is, in its original dress, beautiful and natural, into something which is neither Greek nor English, stiff, obscure, and flat, exemplifying all the faults incident to language, and excluding every excellence.

The exercise of translation, on the other hand, mean-

ing, by translation, the expressing of *an entire sentence* of a foreign language by an entire sentence of our own, as opposed to the rendering separately into English either every separate word, or at most only *parts of the sentence*, whether larger or smaller, the exercise of translation is capable of furnishing improvement to students of every age, according to the measure of their abilities and knowledge. The late Dr. Gabell, than whom in these matters there can be no higher authority, when he was the under-master of Winchester College, never allowed even the lowest forms to *construe;* they always were taught, according to his expression, to *read into English.* From this habit even the youngest boys derived several advantages; the meaning of the sentence was more clearly seen when it was read all at once in English, than when every clause or word of English was interrupted by the intermixture of patches of Latin; and any absurdity in the translation was more apparent. Again, there was the habit gained of constructing English sentences upon any given subject, readily and correctly. Thirdly, with respect to Latin itself, the practice was highly useful. By being accustomed to translate idiomatically, a boy, when turning his own thoughts into Latin, was enabled to render his own natural English into the appropriate expressions in Latin. Having been always accustomed, for instance, to translate "quum venisset" by the participle "having come," he naturally, when he wishes to translate "having come" into Latin, remembers what expression in Latin is equivalent to it. Whereas, if he has been taught to construe literally "when he had come," he never has occasion to use the English participle in his translations from Latin; and when, in his own Latin compositions, he wishes to express it, he is at a loss how to do it, and not unfrequently, from the construing notion that a participle in one language must be a participle in another, renders it by the Latin participle passive; a fault which all who have had any experience in boys' compositions must have frequently noticed.

But as a boy advances in scholarship, he ascends from the idiomatic translation of particular expressions to a similar rendering of an entire sentence. He may be taught that the order of the words in the original is to be preserved as nearly as possible in the translation; and the problem is, how to effect this without violating the idiom of his own language. There are simple sentences, such as "Ardeam Rutuli habebant," in which nothing more is required than to change the Latin accusative into the English nominative, and the active verb into one passive or neuter: "Ardea belonged to the Rutulians." And in the same way the other objective cases, the genitive and the dative, when they occur at the beginning of a sentence, may be often translated by the nominative in English, making a corresponding change in the voice of the verb following. But in many instances also the nominative expresses so completely the principal subject of the sentence, that it is unnatural to put it into any other case than the nominative in the translation. "Omnium primum, avidum novæ libertatis populum, ne postmodum flecti precibus aut donis regiis posset, jurejurando adegit [Brutus] neminem Roma passuros regnare." It will not do here to translate "adegit" by a passive verb, and to make Brutus the ablative case, because Brutus is the principal subject of this and the sentences preceding and following it; the historian is engaged in relating his measures. To preserve, therefore, the order of the words, the clause "avidum novæ libertatis populum" must be translated as a subordinate sentence, by inserting a conjunction and verb. "First of all, while the people were set so keenly on their new liberty, to prevent the possibility of their ever being moved from it hereafter by the entreaties or bribes of the royal house, Brutus bound them by an oath, that they would never suffer any man to be king at Rome." Other passages are still more complicated, and require greater taste and command of language to express them properly; and such will often offer no uninteresting

trial of skill, not to the pupil only, but even to his instructor.

Another point may be mentioned, in which the translation of the Greek and Roman writers is most useful in improving a boy's knowledge of his own language. In the choice of his words, and in the style of his sentences, he should be taught to follow the analogy required by the age and character of the writer whom he is translating. For instance, in translating Homer, hardly any words should be employed except Saxon, and the oldest and simplest of those which are of French origin; and the language should consist of a series of simple propositions, connected with one another only by the most inartificial conjunctions. In translating the tragedians, the words should be principally Saxon, but mixed with many of French or foreign origin, like the language of Shakspeare, and the other dramatists of the reigns of Elizabeth and James I. The term "words of French origin" is used purposely, to denote that large portion of our language which, although of Latin derivation, came to us immediately from the French of our Norman conquerors, and thus became a part of the natural spoken language of that mixed people, which grew out of the melting of the Saxon and Norman races into one another. But these are carefully to be distinguished from another class of words equally of Latin derivation, but which have been introduced by learned men at a much later period, directly from Latin books, and have never, properly speaking, formed any part of the genuine national language. These truly foreign words, which Johnson used so largely, are carefully to be shunned in the translation of poetry, as being unnatural, and associated only with the most unpoetical period of our literature, the middle of the eighteenth century.

So also, in translating the prose writers of Greece and Rome, Herodotus should be rendered in the style and language of the chroniclers; Thucydides in that of Bacon

or Hooker, while Demosthenes, Cicero, Cæsar and Tacitus, require a style completely modern—the perfection of the English language such as we now speak and write it, varied only to suit the individual differences of the different writers, but in its range of words, and in its idioms, substantially the same.

Thus much has been said on the subject of translation, because the practice of construing has naturally tended to bring the exercise into disrepute: and in the contests for academical honours at both Universities, less and less importance, we have heard, is constantly being attached to the power of *vivâ voce* translation. We do not wonder at any contempt that is shown towards *construing*, the practice being a mere folly; but it is of some consequence that the value of *translating* should be better understood, and the exercise more carefully attended to. It is a mere chimera to suppose, as many do, that what they call free translation is a convenient cover for inaccurate scholarship. It can only be so through the incompetence or carelessness of the teacher. If the force of every part of the sentence be not fully given, the translation is so far faulty; but idiomatic translation, much more than literal, is an evidence that the translator does see the force of his original; and it should be remembered that the very object of so translating is to preserve the spirit of an author, where it would be lost or weakened by translating literally; but where a literal translation happens to be faithful to the spirit, there of course it should be adopted; and any omission or misrepresentation of any part of the meaning of the original does not preserve its spirit, but, as far as it goes, sacrifices it, and is not to be called "free translation," but rather "imperfect," "blundering," or, in a word, "bad translation."

In the statement of the business of Rugby School which has been given above, one part of it will be found to consist of works of modern history. An undue importance is attached by some persons to this circumstance, and those

who would care little to have their sons familiar with the history of the Peloponnesian war are delighted that they should study the Campaigns of Frederic the Great or of Napoleon. Information about modern events is more useful, they think, than that which relates to antiquity; and such information they wish to be given to their children.

This favourite notion of filling boys with useful information is likely, we think, to be productive of some mischief. It is a caricature of the principles of inductive philosophy, which, while it taught the importance of a knowledge of facts, never imagined that this knowledge was of itself equivalent to wisdom. Now it is not so much our object to give boys "useful information," as to facilitate their gaining it hereafter for themselves, and to enable them to turn it to account when gained. The first is to be effected by supplying them on any subject with a skeleton which they may fill up hereafter. For instance, a real knowledge of history in after life is highly desirable; let us see how education can best facilitate the gaining of it. It should begin by impressing on a boy's mind the names of the greatest men of different periods, and by giving him a notion of their order in point of time, and the part of the earth on which they lived. This is best done by a set of pictures bound up together in a volume, such, for instance, as those which illustrated Mrs. Trimmer's little histories, and to which the writer of this article is glad to acknowledge his own early obligations. Nor could better service be rendered to the cause of historical instruction than by publishing a volume of prints of universal history, accompanied with a very short description of each. Correctness of costume in such prints, or good taste in the drawing, however desirable if they can be easily obtained, are of very subordinate importance: the great matter is that the print should be striking, and full enough to excite and to gratify curiosity. By these means a lasting association is obtained with the greatest names

in history, and the most remarkable actions of their lives: while their chronological arrangement is learnt at the same time from the order of the pictures; a boy's memory being very apt to recollect the place which a favourite print holds in a volume, whether it comes towards the beginning, middle, or end, what picture comes before it, and what follows it. Such pictures should contain as much as possible the poetry of history: the most striking characters, and most heroic actions, whether of doing or of suffering; but they should not embarrass themselves with its philosophy, with the causes of revolutions, the progress of society, or the merits of great political questions. Their use is of another kind, to make some great name, and great action of every period, familiar to the mind; that so in taking up any more detailed history or biography, (and education should never forget the importance of preparing a boy to derive benefit from his accidental reading,) he may have some association with the subject of it, and may not feel himself to be on ground wholly unknown to him. He may thus be led to open volumes into which he would otherwise have never thought of looking: he need not read them through—indeed it is sad folly to require either man or boy to read through every book they look at, but he will see what is said about such and such persons or actions; and then he will learn by the way something about other persons and other actions; and will have his stock of associations increased, so as to render more and more information acceptable to him.

After this foundation, the object still being rather to create an appetite for knowledge than to satisfy it, it would be desirable to furnish a boy with histories of one or two particular countries, Greece, Rome, and England, for instance, written at no great length, and these also written poetically much more than philosophically, with much liveliness of style, and force of painting, so as to excite an interest about the persons and things spoken of.

The absence of all instruction in politics or political economy, nay even an absolute erroneousness of judgment on such matters, provided always that it involves no wrong principle in morality, are comparatively of slight importance. Let the boy gain, if possible, a strong appetite for knowledge to begin with; it is a later part of education which should enable him to pursue it sensibly, and to make it, when obtained, wisdom.

But should his education, as is often the case, be cut short by circumstances, so that he never receives its finishing lessons, will he not feel the want of more direct information and instruction in its earlier stages? The answer is, that every thing has its proper season, and if summer be cut out of the year, it is vain to suppose that the work of summer can be forestalled in spring. Undoubtedly, much is lost by this abridgment of the term of education, and it is well to insist strongly upon the evil, as it might, in many instances, be easily avoided. But if it is unavoidable, the evil consequences arising from it cannot be prevented. Fulness of knowledge and sagacity of judgment are fruits not to be looked for in early youth; and he who endeavours to force them does but interfere with the natural growth of the plant, and prematurely exhaust its vigour.

In the common course of things, however, where a young person's education is not interrupted, the later process is one of exceeding importance and interest. Supposing a boy to possess that outline of general history which his prints and his abridgments will have given him, with his associations, so far as they go, strong and lively, and his desire of increased knowledge keen, the next thing to be done is to set him to read some first-rate historian, whose mind was formed in, and bears the stamp of, some period of advanced civilization, analogous to that in which we now live. In other words, he should read Thucydides or Tacitus, or any writer equal to them, if such can be found, belonging to the third period of full civil-

ization, that of modern Europe since the middle ages. The particular subject of the history is of little moment, so long as it be taken neither from the barbarian, nor from the romantic, but from the philosophical or civilized stage of human society; and so long as the writer be a man of commanding mind, who has fully imbibed the influences of his age, yet without bearing its exclusive impress. And the study of such a work under an intelligent teacher becomes indeed the key of knowledge and of wisdom: first it affords an example of good historical evidence, and hence the pupil may be taught to notice from time to time the various criteria of a credible narrative, and by the rule of contraries to observe what are the indications of a testimony questionable, suspicious, or worthless. Undue scepticism may be repressed by showing how generally truth has been attained when it has been honestly and judiciously sought; while credulity may be checked by pointing out, on the other hand, how manifold are the errors into which those are betrayed whose intellect or whose principles have been found wanting. Now too the time is come when the pupil may be introduced to that high philosophy which unfolds "the causes of things." The history with which he is engaged presents a view of society in its most advanced state, when the human mind is highly developed, and the various crises which affect the growth of the political fabric are all overpast. Let him be taught to analyze the subject thus presented to him; to trace back institutions, civil and religious, to their origin; to explore the elements of the national character, as now exhibited in maturity, in the vicissitudes of the nation's fortune, and the moral and physical qualities of its race; to observe how the morals and the mind of the people have been subject to a succession of influences, some accidental, others regular; to see and remember what critical seasons of improvement have been neglected, what besetting evils have been wantonly aggravated by wickedness or folly. In short, the pupil may be furnished

as it were with certain formulæ, which shall enable him to read all history beneficially; which shall teach him what to look for in it, how to judge of it, and how to apply it.

Education will thus fulfil its great business, as far as regards the intellect, to inspire it with a desire of knowledge, and to furnish it with power to obtain and to profit by what it seeks for. And a man thus educated, even though he knows no history in detail but that which is called ancient, will be far better fitted to enter on public life than he who could tell the circumstances and the date of every battle and every debate throughout the last century; whose information in the common sense of the term, about modern history, might be twenty times more minute. The fault of systems of classical education in some instances has been, not that they did not teach modern history, but that they did not prepare and dispose their pupils to acquaint themselves with it afterwards; not that they did not attempt to raise an impossible superstructure, but that they did not prepare the ground for the foundation, and put the materials within reach of the builder.

That impatience, which is one of the diseases of the age, is in great danger of possessing the public mind on the subject of education; an unhealthy restlessness may succeed to lethargy. Men are not contented with sowing the seed unless they can also reap the fruit; forgetting how often it is the law of our condition, that "one soweth and another reapeth." It is no wisdom to make boys prodigies of information; but it is our wisdom and our duty to cultivate their faculties each in its season, first the memory and imagination, and then the judgment; to furnish them with the means, and to excite the desire, of improving themselves, and to wait with confidence for God's blessing on the result.

DISCIPLINE

OF

PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

[This Letter, written in 1835, was occasioned by an article against "Flogging and Fagging as practised at Winchester School," which appeared in the Quarterly Journal of Education.]

ON THE

DISCIPLINE OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE JOURNAL OF EDUCATION.

Sir,—As the sentiments contained in this Article will differ materially from those which have appeared from time to time in your Journal, it appears to me most proper to address them to you as coming from a correspondent; and therefore, as in no way pledging you to agree with them, you will not perhaps object to receive my views on a very important subject connected with education, although they may not agree with your own.

Liberal principles and popular principles are by no means necessarily the same: and it is of importance to be aware of the difference between them. Popular principles are opposed simply to restraint—liberal principles to unjust restraint. Popular principles sympathize with all who are subject to authority, and regard with suspicion all punishments—liberal principles sympathize, on the other hand, with authority, whenever the evil tendencies of human nature are more likely to be shown in disregarding it than in abusing it. Popular principles seem to have but one object—the deliverance of the many from the control of the few. Liberal principles, while generally favourable to this same object, yet pursue it as a means, not as an end; and therefore they support the subjection of the many to the few under certain circumstances, when the great end, which they steadily keep in view, is more likely to be promoted by subjection than by

independence. For the great end of liberal principles is indeed " the greatest happiness of the greatest number," if we understand that the happiness of man consists more in his intellectual well-doing than in his physical; and yet more in his moral and religious excellence than in his intellectual.

It must be allowed, however, that the fault of popular principles, as distinguished from liberal, has been greatly provoked by the long-continued prevalence of principles of authority which are no less illiberal. Power has been so constantly perverted that it has come to be generally suspected. Liberty has been so constantly unjustly restrained, that it has been thought impossible that it should ever be indulged too freely. Popular feeling is not quick in observing the change of times and circumstances: it is with difficulty brought to act against a long-standing evil; but, being once set in motion, it is apt to overshoot its mark, and to continue to cry out against an evil long after it has disappeared, and the opposite evil is become most to be dreaded. Something of this excessive recoil of feeling may be observed, I think, in the continued cry against the severity of the penal code, as distinguished from its other defects; and the same disposition is shown in the popular clamour against military flogging, and in the complaints which are often made against the existing system of discipline in our schools.

The points which are attacked in this system are two—flogging and fagging; and we will first consider the question of flogging. We have nothing to do with arguments against the excessive or indiscriminate use of such a punishment: it is but idle to attack what no one defends, and what has at present hardly any real existence. The notion of a schoolmaster being a cruel tyrant, ruling only by the terror of the rod, is about as real as the no less terrific image of Bluebeard. The fault of the old system of flogging at Winchester, alluded to in your last Number, was not its cruelty, but its inefficiency; the punishment

was so frequent and so slight as to inspire very little either of terror or of shame. In other schools, eighty or a hundred years ago, there may have been a system of cruel severity, but scarcely, I should imagine, within the memory of any one now alive. But the argument against *all* corporal punishment applies undoubtedly to an existing state of things; and this argument, therefore, I shall proceed to consider.

"Corporal punishment," it is said, "is degrading." I well know of what feeling this is the expression; it originates in that proud notion of personal independence which is neither reasonable nor Christian, but essentially barbarian. It visited Europe in former times with all the curses of the age of chivalry, and is threatening us now with those of Jacobinism. For so it is, that the evils of ultra-aristocracy and ultra-popular principles spring precisely from the same source—namely, from selfish pride—from an idolatry of personal honour and dignity in the aristocratical form of the disease—of personal independence in its modern and popular form. It is simply impatience of inferiority and submission—a feeling which must be more frequently wrong or right, in proportion to the relative situation and worthiness of him who entertains it, but which cannot be always or generally right except in beings infinitely more perfect than man. Impatience of inferiority felt by a child towards his parents, or by a pupil towards his instructors, is merely wrong, because it is at variance with the truth: there exists a real inferiority in the relation, and it is an error, a fault, a corruption of nature, not to acknowledge it.

Punishment, then, inflicted by a parent or a master for the purposes of correction, is in no true sense of the word degrading; nor is it the more degrading for being corporal. To say that corporal punishment is an appeal to personal fear is a mere abuse of terms. In this sense all bodily pain or inconvenience is an appeal to personal fear; and a man should be ashamed to take any pains to

avoid the tooth-ache or the gout. Pain is an evil; and the fear of pain, like all other natural feelings, is of a mixed character, sometimes useful and becoming, sometimes wrong and mischievous. I believe that we should not do well to extirpate any of these feelings, but to regulate and check them by cherishing and strengthening such as are purely good. To destroy the fear of pain altogether, even if practicable, would be but a doubtful good, until the better elements of our nature were so perfected as wholly to supersede its use. Perfect love of good is the only thing which can profitably cast out all fear. In the meanwhile, what is the course of true wisdom? Not to make a boy insensible to bodily pain, but to make him dread moral evil more; so that fear will do its proper and appointed work, without so going beyond it as to become cowardice. It is cowardice to fear pain or danger more than neglect of duty, or than the commission of evil; but it is useful to fear them, when they are but the accompaniments or the consequences of folly and of faults.

It is very true that the fear of punishment generally (for surely it makes no difference whether it be the fear of the personal pain of flogging, or of the personal inconvenience of what have been proposed as its substitutes, confinement, and a reduced allowance of food,) is not the highest motive of action; and therefore, the course actually followed in education is most agreeable to nature and reason, that the fear of punishment should be appealed to less and less as the moral principle becomes stronger with advancing age. If any one really supposes that young men in the higher forms of public schools are governed by fear, and not by moral motives; that the appeal is not habitually made to the highest and noblest principles and feelings of their nature, he is too little aware of the actual state of those institutions to be properly qualified to speak or write about them.

With regard to the highest forms, indeed, it is well known that corporal punishment is as totally out of the

question in the practice of our schools as it is at the universities; and I believe that there could nowhere be found a set of young men amongst whom punishment of any kind was less frequent, or by whom it was less required. The real point to be considered is merely, whether corporal punishment is in all cases unfit to be inflicted on boys under fifteen, or on those who, being older in years, are not proportionably advanced in understanding or in character, who must be ranked in the lower part of the school, and who are little alive to the feeling of self-respect, and little capable of being influenced by moral motives. Now, with regard to young boys, it appears to me positively mischievous to accustom them to consider themselves insulted or degraded by personal correction. The fruits of such a system were well shown in an incident which occurred in Paris during the three days of the revolution of 1830. A boy of twelve years old, who had been forward in insulting the soldiers, was noticed by one of the officers; and though the action was then raging, the officer, considering the age of the boy, merely struck him with the flat part of his sword, as the fit chastisement for boyish impertinence. But the boy had been taught to consider his person sacred, and that a blow was a deadly insult; he therefore followed the officer, and having watched his opportunity, took deliberate aim at him with a pistol, and murdered him. This was the true spirit of the savage, exactly like that of Callum Beg in Waverley, who, when a "decent gentleman" was going to chastise him with his cane for throwing a quoit at his shins, instantly drew a pistol to vindicate the dignity of his shoulders. We laugh at such a trait in the work of the great novelist, because, according to our notions, the absurdity of Callum Beg's resentment is even more striking than its atrocity. But I doubt whether to the French readers of Waverley it has appeared either laughable or disgusting; at least the similar action of the real Callum in the streets of Paris was noticed at the time as some-

thing entitled to our admiration. And yet what can be more mischievous than thus to anticipate in boyhood those feelings which even in manhood are of a most questionable nature, but which, at an earlier period, are wholly and clearly evil? At an age when it is almost impossible to find a true, manly sense of the degradation of guilt or faults, where is the wisdom of encouraging a fantastic sense of the degradation of personal correction? What can be more false, or more adverse to the simplicity, sobriety, and humbleness of mind which are the best ornament of youth, and offer the best promise of a noble manhood? There is an essential inferiority in a boy as compared with a man, which makes an assumption of equality on his part at once ridiculous and wrong; and where there is no equality, the exercise of superiority implied in personal chastisement cannot in itself be an insult or a degradation.

The total abandonment, then, of corporal punishment for the faults of young boys appears to me not only uncalled for, but absolutely to be deprecated. It is of course most desirable that all punishment should be superseded by the force of moral motives; and up to a certain point this is practicable. All endeavours so to dispense with flogging are the wisdom and the duty of a schoolmaster; and by these means the amount of corporal punishment inflicted may be, and in fact has been, in more than one instance, reduced to something very inconsiderable. But it is one thing to get rid of punishment by lessening the amount of faults, and another to say, that even if the faults are committed, the punishment ought not to be inflicted. Now it is folly to expect that faults will never occur; and it is very essential towards impressing on a boy's mind the natural imperfectness and subordination of his condition, that his faults and the state of his character being different from what they are in after life, so the nature of his punishment should be different also, lest by any means he should unite the pride and self-importance of manhood

with a boy's moral carelessness and low notions of moral responsibility.

The beau-ideal of school discipline with regard to young boys would appear to be this—that whilst corporal punishment was retained on principle as fitly answering to, and marking the naturally inferior state of, boyhood, morally and intellectually, and therefore as conveying no peculiar degradation to persons in such a state, we should cherish and encourage to the utmost all attempts made by the several boys as individuals to escape from the natural punishment of their age by rising above its naturally low tone of principle. While we told them that, as being boys, they were not degraded by being punished as boys, we should tell them also, that in proportion as we saw them trying to anticipate their age morally, so we should delight to anticipate it also in our treatment of them personally—that every approach to the steadiness of principle shown in manhood should be considered as giving a claim to the respectability of manhood—that we should be delighted to forget the inferiority of their age, as they laboured to lessen their moral and intellectual inferiority. This would be a discipline truly generous and wise, in one word, truly Christian—making an increase of dignity the certain consequence of increased virtuous effort, but giving no countenance to that barbarian pride which claims the treatment of a freeman and an equal, while it cherishes all the carelessness, the folly, and the low and selfish principle of a slave.

With regard to older boys, indeed, who yet have not attained that rank in the school which exempts them from corporal punishment, the question is one of greater difficulty. In this case the obvious objections to such a punishment are serious; and the truth is, that if a boy above fifteen is of such a character as to require flogging, the essentially trifling nature of school correction is inadequate to the offence. But in fact boys, after a certain age, who cannot keep their proper rank in a school, ought not to be

retained at it; and if they do stay, the question becomes only a choice of evils. For the standard of attainment at a large school being necessarily adapted for no more than the average rate of capacity, a boy who, after fifteen, continues to fall below it, is either intellectually incapable of deriving benefit from the system of the place, or morally indisposed to do so, and in either case he ought to be removed from it. And as the growth of the body is often exceedingly vigorous where that of the mind is slow, such boys are at once apt for many kinds of evil, and hard to be governed by moral motives, while they have outgrown the fear of school correction. These are fit subjects for private tuition, where the moral and domestic influences may be exercised upon them more constantly and personally than is compatible with the numbers of a large school. Meanwhile such boys, in fact, often continue to be kept at school by their parents, who would regard it as an inconvenience to be required to withdraw them. Now it is superfluous to say, that in these cases corporal punishment should be avoided wherever it is possible; and perhaps it would be best, if for such grave offences as would fitly call for it in younger boys, older boys whose rank in the school renders them equally subject to it, were at once to be punished by expulsion. As it is, the long-continued use of personal correction as a proper school punishment renders it possible to offer the alternative of flogging to an older boy, without subjecting him to any excessive degradation, and his submission to it marks appropriately the greatness and disgraceful character of his offence, while it establishes, at the same time, the important principle, that as long as a boy remains at school, the respectability and immunities of manhood must be earned by manly conduct and a manly sense of duty.

It seems to me, then, that the complaints commonly brought against our system of school discipline are wrong either in their principle or as to the truth of the fact. The complaint against *all* corporal punishment, as degrad-

ing and improper, goes, I think, upon a false and mischievous principle: the complaint against governing boys by fear, and mere authority, without any appeal to their moral feelings, is perfectly just in the abstract, but perfectly inapplicable to the actual state of schools in England. I now proceed to make a few remarks upon another part of the system of public schools, which is even less understood than the subject already considered,—I mean the power of fagging.

Now by "the power of fagging," I understand a power given by the supreme authorities of a school to the boys of the highest class or classes in it, to be exercised by them over the lower boys for the sake of securing the advantages of regular government amongst the boys themselves, and avoiding the evils of anarchy,—in other words, of the lawless tyranny of physical strength. This is the simple statement of the nature and ends of public school fagging—an institution which, like all other government, has been often abused, and requires to be carefully watched, but which is as indispensable to a multitude of boys living together, as government, in like circumstances, is indispensable to a multitude of men.

I have said that fagging is necessary for a multitude of boys when *living together;* for this will show how the system may be required in the public schools of England, and yet be wholly needless in those of Scotland. The great Scotch schools are day-schools—those of England are boarding-schools. Now the difference between these two systems is enormous. In the Scotch schools the boys *live* at their own homes, and are under the government of their own relations; they only meet at school for a certain definite object during a certain portion of the day. But in England the boys, for nearly nine months of the year, live with one another in a distinct society; their school life occupies the whole of their existence; at their studies and at their amusements, by day and by night, they are members of one and the same society, and in closer local

neighbourhood with one another than is the case with the ordinary society of grown men. At all those times, then, when Scotch boys are living at home with their respective families, English boys are living together amongst themselves alone; and for this their habitual living they require a government. It is idle to say that the masters form, or can form, this government; it is impossible to have a sufficient number of masters for the purpose; for, in order to obtain the advantages of home government, the boys should be as much divided as they are at their respective homes. There should be no greater number of schoolfellows living under one master than of brothers commonly living under one parent; nay, the number should be less, inasmuch as there is wanting that bond of natural affection which so greatly facilitates domestic government, and gives it its peculiar virtue. Even a father with thirty sons, all below the age of manhood, and above childhood, would find it no easy matter to govern them effectually—how much less can a master govern thirty boys, with no natural bond to attach them either to him or to one another? He may indeed superintend their government of one another; he may govern them through their own governors; but to govern them immediately, and at the same time effectively, is, I believe, impossible. And hence, if you have a large *boarding*-school, you cannot have it adequately governed without a system of fagging.

Now, a government among the boys themselves being necessary, the actual constitution of public schools places it in the best possible hands. Those to whom the power is committed, are not simply the strongest boys, nor the oldest, nor yet the cleverest; they are those who have risen to the highest form in the school—that is to say, they will be probably at once the oldest, and the strongest, and the cleverest; and further, if the school be well ordered, they will be the most respectable in application and general character—those who have made the best use of the opportunities which the school affords, and are

most capable of entering into its objects. In short, they constitute a real aristocracy, a government of the most worthy, their rank itself being an argument of their deserving. And their business is to keep order amongst the boys; to put a stop to improprieties of conduct, especially to prevent that oppression and ill-usage of the weaker boys by the stronger which is so often ignorantly confounded with a system of fagging. For all these purposes a general authority over the rest of the school is given them; and in some schools they have the power, like the masters, of enforcing this authority by impositions, that is, by setting tasks to be written out or learnt by heart for any misbehaviour. And this authority is exercised over all those boys who are legally subject to it, that is, over all below a certain place in the school, whatever be their age or physical strength; so that many boys who, if there were no regular fagging, would by mere physical force be exercising power over their schoolfellows, although from their idleness, ignorance, and low principle they might be most unfit to do so, are now not only hindered from tyrannizing over others, but are themselves subject to authority —a most wholesome example, and one particularly needed at school, that mere physical strength, even amongst boys, is not to enjoy an ascendancy. Meanwhile this governing part of the school, thus invested with great responsibility, treated by the masters with great confidence and consideration, and being constantly in direct communication with the head-master, and receiving their instruction almost exclusively from him, learn to feel a corresponding self-respect in the best sense of the term; they look upon themselves as answerable for the character of the school, and by the natural effect of their position acquire a manliness of mind and habits of conduct infinitely superior, generally speaking, to those of young men of the same age who have not enjoyed the same advantages.

What becomes then of those terrible stories of cruelty which inspire so many parents with horror at the very

name of fagging; or what shall we say of that very representation of the fagging at Winchester, which appeared in the last Number of your Journal? It is confessed, indeed, in a subsequent page of that Number, that your correspondent's representation is not applicable to the present state of Winchester. Would it not then have been fairer to have inserted in the running title of the article, "Flogging and Fagging at Winchester," the words "as formerly practised?" But, indeed, even as describing a past state of things, there is surely some confusion in the statement. It is important to distinguish such acts of oppression as belong properly to the system of fagging, from such as arise merely from superior physical force, and consequently exist as much, I believe, a thousand times more, in those schools where there is no legal fagging. For instance, your correspondent complains of the tyranny practised at Winchester at bed-time, "tossing in the blanket, tying toes, bolstering, &c." These, indeed, are most odious practices, but what have they to do with fagging? I have known them to exist at private schools, where there was no fagging, to a degree of intolerable cruelty. In college, at Winchester, where there were two or three præfects in every chamber, I scarcely remember them to have been practised at all during the period of which I can speak from my own experience. And this is natural; for the boys who delight in this petty tyranny are very rarely to be found amongst the oldest in a school, and still less amongst those who have raised themselves to the highest rank in it: they are either middle-aged boys, from fourteen to sixteen, or such older boys as never distinguish themselves for any good, and who, never rising high in the school, are by a system of fagging, and by that only, restrained from abusing their size and strength in tyranny. Other abuses which your correspondent mentions, such as toasting, lighting fires, &c., arise so far from a system of fagging, that this system, when ill-regulated, allows a certain well-defined class of boys to exact services which

otherwise would be exacted merely by the strongest. But I said, what every one must be aware of, that the government of boys, like every other government, requires to be watched, or it will surely be guilty of abuses. Those menial offices which were exacted from the juniors at Winchester were only required of them because the attendance of servants was so exceedingly insufficient, and the accommodations of the boys in many particulars so greatly neglected. If you do not provide servants to clean the boys' shoes, to supply them with water of a morning, or to wait on them at their meals, undoubtedly the more powerful among them, whether the power be natural or artificial, will get these things done for them by the weaker; but supply the proper attendance, and all this ceases immediately. There will remain many miscellaneous services, such as watching for balls at cricket or fives, carrying messages, &c., which servants undoubtedly cannot be expected always to perform, and which yet belong to that general authority vested in the boys of the highest form. They belong to that general authority, and are therefore now claimed as rightfully due; but if there were no such authority, they would be claimed by the stronger from the weaker. For I assume it as a certain fact, that if you have two or three hundred boys living with one another as a distinct society, there will be some to command, as in all other societies, and others to obey: the only difference is, that the present system first of all puts the power into the best hands; and, secondly, by recognizing it as legal, is far better able to limit its exercise and to prevent its abuses, than it could be if the whole were a mere irregular dominion of the stronger over the weaker.

There is another thing, which to those who are acquainted with schools, will seem of no small importance. Leave a number of boys together as legally equal, and the irregular tyranny exercised under these circumstances by

every stronger boy over every weaker one, has so far the sanction of the public opinion of the school, that any individual sufferer would be utterly afraid to complain of his ill-usage to the master. But give one class a legal superiority over the rest, and an abuse of power on their part is no longer received with sympathy; and the boy who were to complain of it to the master, instead of being hated as an informer, would rather be regarded by the mass of his companions as an asserter of their common liberties. Now to those who consider the difficulty of getting boys to complain of ill-usage where public opinion condemns the complaining, it will appear an immense security against oppression, that it may be denounced without incurring general odium; and such I fear is the Jacobinical spirit of human nature, that this can never be the case unless the oppression proceed from one invested with *legal* authority.

For my own part, however, I am not one of those who think it an evil that younger or less manly boys should be subject legally to those more advanced in age and in character. Such subjection is not degrading, for it is rendered not to an arbitrary, but to a real superiority; it is shown to a power exercised in the main not for its own good, but for that of the society as a whole. Neither do I regard it as oppressive; for the degree and kind of obedience enforced under a well-regulated system of fagging is beneficial to those who pay it. A strict system is not therefore a cruel one; and the discipline to which boys are thus subjected, and the quickness, handiness, thoughtfulness, and punctuality, which they learn from some of the services required of them, are no despicable part of education. Many a man who went from Winchester to serve in the Peninsula in the course of the last war must have found his school experience and habits no bad preparation for the activity and hardships of a campaign; not only in the mere power of endurance, but in the helpfulness and

independence which his training as a junior had given him. When your correspondent talks of the servility encouraged by the system of fagging, and gravely imputes to this cause what he calls the characteristic servility of English gentlemen, the cause appears to me as wrongly assigned as I think the supposed result imaginary.

The real servility which exists in England, whether amongst men or boys, is not an excessive deference for legal authority, but a surrender of individual judgment and conscience to the tyranny of public opinion. This tyranny exists in schools to a fatal degree; but it is not exercised chiefly by those who have the power of fagging, and far less in virtue of that power; on the contrary, the boys of the highest form are the only corrective of it, and so far as they contribute to it, it is not owing to the power which distinguishes them from the other boys, but to that imperfection of age and judgment which, to a certain degree, they share in common with them. Great, indeed, is this evil; but it is one arising almost inevitably from the circumstances of a *boarding*-school, namely, that it is a society wholly composed of persons whose state, morally and intellectually, is, by reason of their age, exceedingly imperfect.

It is this which renders it so difficult to make a large school a place of Christian education. For while, on the one hand, the boys stand to their masters in the relation of pupils to a teacher, they form, on the other hand, a complete society amongst themselves; and the individual boys, while influenced by him in the one relation, are unhappily in the other more influenced by that whole of which they are members, and which affects them in a much larger portion of their lives. And how can this influence be of a Christian character, when the perfect impression of Christianity cannot possibly be received by any society which is not in the highest state of advancement? by all others it is either taken incorrectly, or

repelled altogether: they can but exhibit that mixture of superstition and profaneness which characterized the semi-barbarous societies of the middle ages; a mixture as unfavourable to the developement of man's highest excellence, as Christianity purely imbibed is favourable to it, and indispensable.

The stress of this remark, however, applies to a *society* in a low moral state, and not to an individual. Boys in their own families, as the members of the natural and wholesome society of their father's household, may receive its lessons, and catch its spirit, and learn at a very early age to estimate right and wrong truly. But a society formed exclusively of boys, that is, of elements each separately weak and imperfect, becomes more than an aggregate of their several defects: the amount of evil in the mass is more than the sum of the evil in the individuals; it is aggravated in its character, while the amount of good, on the contrary, is less in the mass than in the individuals, and its effect greatly weakened.

Now this being the case, and the very fact of a *boarding*-school involving the existence of such an unfavourable state of society, he who wishes really to improve public education would do well to direct his attention to this point; and to consider how there can be infused into a society of boys such elements as, without being too dissimilar to coalesce thoroughly with the rest, shall yet be so superior as to raise the character of the whole. It would be absurd to say that any school has as yet fully solved this problem. I am convinced, however, that in the peculiar relation of the highest form to the rest of the boys, such as it exists in our great public schools, there is to be found the best means of answering it. This relation requires in many respects to be improved in its character; some of its features should be softened, others elevated: but here and here only is the engine which can effect the end desired; and if *boarding*-schools are to be

cleared of their most besetting faults and raised in all that is excellent, it must be done by a judicious improvement; but most assuredly not by the abolition of the system of authorized fagging.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
A WYKEHAMIST.

January 22nd, 1835.

PREFACE

TO

THE THIRD VOLUME OF THE EDITION OF

THUCYDIDES.

[This Preface, written by the Author in 1835, on the completion of his Edition of Thucydides, may be regarded as expressing as it were his farewell thoughts on Greek Literature and Greek History, the critical study of which he now finally abandoned. See Life and Correspondence, 4th Ed. Vol. I. c. 4. p. 209. c. 7. p. 343.]

PREFACE

TO

THE THIRD VOLUME OF THE EDITION OF

THUCYDIDES.

In presenting to the readers of Thucydides the three last books of his History, I may observe that I have received no further assistance from any new manuscripts in addition to those already noticed in the Preface to the second volume of this edition. But I have enjoyed for this last part of my work the benefit of Bekker's third revision of the text of Thucydides, as given in his small Leipzig edition of 1832. My respect for Bekker's judgment has increased continually; and I feel so great a reliance on his experience and tact, that in many instances where the reading seemed doubtful, I have yielded implicitly to his authority; and probably were I to go over my work again, I should follow him still more generally.

It may be asked why I have abandoned my original intention of subjoining appendices to the several volumes of this edition, partly philological, and partly historical. My answer is, that I have not time enough at my command to execute my design, even to my own satisfaction. I neither have sufficient knowledge already, nor is it in my power to gain it. At the same time I am aware that the present state of scholarship, as well as of historical inquiry, makes it especially unbecoming to write on any philological or historical subject, without being completely master of it.

I shall confine myself therefore to the mere statement of two or three points which offer, I think, a tempting

field for investigation. They are not certainly exclusively connected with Thucydides, but as bearing generally upon Greek philology and history, I have thought that the mention of them in this place would not be impertinent.

I. Even after all the labours of the Prussian scholars, much remains to be done towards obtaining a complete knowledge of the number, and still more of the value, of the Greek MSS. now existing in Europe. It is not easy to know how many MSS. of any given writer are extant, where they are to be found, and, above all, whether from their age and character they are worth the trouble of an exact collation. A labour of this kind cannot be accomplished by individuals; but the present spirit of liberal co-operation which seems to influence literary as well as scientific men throughout Europe, renders its accomplishment by the combined exertions of the scholars of different countries by no means impracticable. It would be exceedingly convenient to possess an alphabetical list of all the extant Greek and Latin writers, with a catalogue raisonnée of the MSS. of each: and if such a work were attempted, there is little doubt, I imagine, that in point of number a very large addition would be made to the stock of MSS. already known. What the result might be in point of value is another question; still it is desirable to know what we have to trust to; and when we have obtained a right estimate of our existing resources in manuscripts, we shall then be better able to judge what modern criticism will have to do from its own means towards bringing the text of the ancient writers to the greatest possible state of perfection.

II. We seem now to have reached that point in our knowledge of the Greek language, at which other languages of the same family must be more largely studied before we can make a fresh step in advance. The practice of Greek, if I may be allowed the expression, seems tolerably well understood; the usage of the best writers, not only in points of construction, but even of or-

thography, has been carefully examined. We are now anxious to explain some few words or expressions of less frequent occurrence, or to understand the principle of others whose meaning we have sufficiently learned from experience. I had intended, for instance, to inquire into the difference between the two conjunctions εἰ and ἤν; and there is much in the use of the particle ἄν, which has not yet been explained satisfactorily. I went far enough to ascertain the different uses of εἰ and ἤν in Thucydides, as a matter of fact; but my ignorance of the etymology of the two words made me unable to ascend higher, and to explain the principle of this difference. It is easy enough to guess at etymologies, but this has been done more than enough in times past: and an etymology built on guesses is as worthless as one founded on real knowledge is instructive. It is possible that a more enlarged study of the different languages and dialects of the great Indo-Germanic family, both in their ancient and actual forms, may enable us to acquire such a knowledge; and we shall thus obtain perhaps a more clear understanding of some of those particles which even now are involved in much uncertainty. So far, I think, we may hope to advance not unreasonably; but further progress seems scarcely possible. The origin of language in itself partakes of the same obscurity which surrounds the origin of society: there is a point with both beyond which we cannot penetrate. Attempts to explain the phenomena of language *à priori* seem to me unwise. We cannot conceive the inventing of a language, because we cannot conceive the human mind acting without language. From a certain point we can readily trace the nature of the process: we can understand how simple terms expressive of outward objects were transferred to express by metaphor the operations of the mind; but how these simple terms were themselves arrived at, it seems impossible to discover, or even reasonably to imagine. Wherever the re-

sult is obtained by combination of existing elements, the method is intelligible; but invention, strictly speaking, appears to belong to a higher power than ours. As it has been well observed, that, supposing the first men to have been savages, we cannot understand how, without some divine interference, the human race could ever have arrived at civilization, so, if we suppose men to have been in such a state as to have had to invent or contrive a language, we cannot conceive how mankind, any more than other animals, should ever have been able to speak at all.

III. Passing from the language in Thucydides to the matter contained in his History, the introduction in the first book naturally leads us to consider the question, how far the pretended early history of Greece is really historical or mythical. And here I confess that further consideration has induced me to accede to many of those notions of Niebuhr and Müller which I formerly regarded as unreasonably sceptical. I had not deferred sufficiently to the tact which is gained in these matters by great natural ability aided by long experience. Niebuhr's comparison is most true, that "if any one, on going into Benvenuto's prison when his eyes had for months been accustomed to see the objects around him, had asserted that Benvenuto, like himself, could not distinguish any thing in the darkness, surely he would have been somewhat presumptuous." Yet still the character of the early Grecian history does not seem to have been completely analysed. Niebuhr has shewn that in the Roman history passages wholly legendary occur in the midst of a narration substantially historical; thus the account of the taking of Veii is legendary, while the earlier events of the siege are as clearly historical. This is important, because it prepares us for the same intermixture in the early history of Greece also; and shews us that portions of real history may exist before the beginning of the merely historical period: towards the frontiers of fable

and history patches or fragments of each are often to be found completely insulated within the territories of the other. And to distinguish one from the other, we must be guided by internal evidence; the ancient writers may have offered both indiscriminately as history, and may have erred in doing so; but is it not to imitate their error, if we represent both indiscriminately to be mythical, because we cannot rely on their discernment, and because they have in some instances related as history what has no pretensions to the name?

But with respect to Thucydides himself, it is a question how far he is to be taxed with such want of discernment, and whether he has himself regarded any thing as historical in the traditions of ancient Greece, which was in fact no better than mythical. This question is one which his editor seems naturally called upon to examine: and it may incidentally perhaps throw some light on the question of mythical narratives in general, on which as a whole I do not feel myself competent to enter fully.

There is no doubt that the ablest men may entertain erroneous opinions on points which nothing has led them particularly to examine. If therefore Thucydides had never been led to question the real existence of the chiefs or patriarchs who were said to have given their name to their respective people, his mention of Hellen and Minos as historical persons would afford no proof that they were so. And it is well observed by a most able writer, that the power of distinguishing between history and mythical stories "depends upon a survey of a vast field, of which but a small part was open to the view" of the early Greek historians. *We* suspect the real existence of Hellen and his sons, because we observe a practice widely spread amongst different nations, of deriving the name of a people from a supposed king or leader of it; and not only do we find the lives and actions of these pretended heroes to be for the most part of an unhistorical character, but our more extended knowledge of languages enables us in

many instances to discover the real origin of a national name, and thus to prove the falsehood of its reputed derivation. And thus a general suspicion being thrown upon such stories, any single one of the number, although containing nothing improbable in itself, must yet be regarded as unhistorical, unless there be some peculiar circumstances connected with it, giving it some distinct and particular ground of credibility.

So far then I am willing to allow that Deucalion and Hellen, Pelops, and Eumolpus, and any other heroes whom Thucydides may have named in his History, cannot be safely maintained to be real persons from his having mentioned them as such, without expressing any doubt as to their reality. Nor can it be thought to prove the existence of an individual Homer, the author of the Iliad, Odyssey, and Homeric Hymns, that both Thucydides and Herodotus appear to have been of this opinion, and to have entertained no doubt of its truth. Literary criticism was in their days so much in its infancy, and that experience of the erroneousness of popular traditions which in our times has awakened criticism was then so wanting, that the ablest men may be forgiven for having embraced the common notions on such matters just as they found them, without making any inquiry into their truth. But with regard to the early history of Greece, Thucydides was well aware of its uncertainty, and of the mythic character of some of those accounts which had passed for history. It is with a full consciousness of these facts that he professes to give us notwithstanding a credible outline of the principal revolutions which Greece had undergone, and carries his notices back to a period earlier than the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesus, or even than the war of Troy. His account of the Pelopid kings is professedly drawn from the statements of those "who had received from their fathers the clearest information as to the affairs of the Peloponnesians." Herodotus, when speaking of the Dorian invasion of Peloponnesus, ex-

pressly says that the account given of it by the Lacedæmonians themselves, differed from all the stories of the poets. Is it impossible that there should have existed, along with the poetical version of the early Greek history, another version of a simpler and truer character; and that long before written narratives were known, a faithful tradition may have been handed down in some particular families, which the memory could have retained as readily, when once applied to the task, as it is known to have retained the verses of the rhapsodists? And if this be so, the fabulous actions ascribed to any hero in the poetical version of his exploits are no more a reason for our rejecting the historical traditions respecting him, and for supposing him to be altogether an imaginary personage, than the romances about Charlemagne should make us disbelieve the biography of Eginhard.

Undoubtedly it may be said that these apparently historical traditions have no real foundation; and are no no more than the clumsy attempts of Palæphatus to make fable pass for truth by merely divesting it of its impossibilities. And in this manner, according to Niebuhr, the annalist Piso pruned and mangled the poetical legends of Rome, and thought by so doing to convert them into history. It may be so certainly, but it does not follow that it must be so; and with respect to Greece, the judgment of Thucydides is no inconsiderable argument to prove that it was not so. And if any writer as able and as inquiring as Thucydides, and as fully aware of the existence and real character of the poetical legends, had arisen at Rome in the age of the Scipios, or even of Cicero; and after stating in express terms the general uncertainty of the early Roman history, had given a brief outline of its principal events, collected from sources which he conceived to be trustworthy, such a sketch would in all probability have rendered the immortal work of Niebuhr in great measure superfluous.

It is indeed natural that revolutions which effect a change in the inhabitants of a country should tend to interrupt the traditions of the conquered people, or to corrupt them; and thus the Dorian conquest was likely to obscure the recollections of the Achaian princes of Sparta and Mycenæ. Yet it should be remembered that the Achaians were neither extirpated nor enslaved; that they may have retained their own traditions, as the Welsh and Irish have done under circumstances somewhat similar; and that in one part even of Peloponnesus itself the descendants of the Pelopid princes had established themselves as conquerors, amid the general disasters of their race; so that in Achaia the old Achaian traditions may have been preserved as easily as the Dorian traditions in Laconia and Argolis. With respect to the Dorians themselves, if their whole early history since their establishment in Peloponnesus had in the time of Thucydides become utterly lost, if the very race of their kings had been falsified, so that they pretended to be Achaians and Heraclidæ, whilst in reality they were Dorians like the rest of their people, such a phenomenon would call for some inquiry into its causes, as it has no antecedent probability to induce us to believe it. It is not probable that a people far removed from the condition of savages, and established within historical memory in the country which they were actually occupying; a people who since that period had undergone no great revolutions, whose social and political relations, whose religion, and whose customs had suffered no change, should nevertheless have wholly lost the memory of their ancestors' fortunes, and should have had none but a poetical history, though their traditions were notoriously at variance with the stories of every known poet. But most incredible of all is it that they could have been mistaken as to the race of their kings, to which their existing institutions bore a living witness. A man's race in ancient times was marked by the peculiar religious worship of his family; thus Herodotus, in order to throw light on the extraction

of Isagoras, observes, that the members of his *gens* sacrificed to the Carian Jupiter: and owing to this circumstance, the member of any distinguished person's origin was preserved in as effectual a manner as it could be by a series of contemporary documents. Now the constant voice of tradition as to the Achaian extraction of the Spartan kings must have been confirmed by their peculiar religious ceremonies, such as they existed in the historical age of Greece; and there is no likelihood that these should have undergone any change since the period of the Dorian conquest. But if they were then Achaian, and not Dorian, the period of the alleged expulsion of the Heraclidæ from Peloponnesus was at that time within memory, and a thing so tenaciously remembered as the peculiar ancestry or race of a people would not be forgotten in the course of a hundred years. Besides every tradition of the Spartans attested that the kings were of a different race from their people; the royalty of the one, and the independent allodial property of the other, were derived from a supposed original contract, by which the two parties united for their common benefit; the Heraclidæ recovering the thrones which belonged to their race, whilst the Dorians, to whose aid their restoration was owing, took care to assert their own independent condition, very distinct from that of a mere δῆμος in those early times under its own natural hero chiefs. It seems to me the wildest of fancies to suppose that all these traditions, which were not poetical, as well as the known religious rites of the kings, were the mere fruits of state policy, which artfully represented the Dorian chiefs as being of Achaian extraction, in order to give a sort of colour of right to their occupation of the Peloponnesus. As if barbarian conquerors needed such a pretext, or were in the habit of inventing it; as if the Norman chiefs would have forsworn their own real ancestry, to represent themselves as descended from the race of the conquered Saxons. And where is the improbability of the common

story, which represents the Heraclidæ as exiled from Peloponnesus, and then becoming the chiefs of the people who gave them an asylum? The very same thing happened with the Norman nobles who took refuge in Scotland: they became chiefs of Keltic clans, to which they gave their name without altering the national character of their clansmen; and in little more than two centuries after their flight into Scotland, two of these Norman families, those of Bruce and Balliol, were seated on the Scottish throne. Without pretending then to assert the historical character of the stories told of the individual founders of the Spartan royalty, yet that the Spartan kings were of Achaian and not of Dorian extraction seems to me to admit of no reasonable doubt; being precisely one of those points on which tradition may best be trusted; being proved by what in ancient times was a positive evidence, supplying the place of history, namely, the peculiar character of the religious rites of different races; and being in itself quite consistent with probability, yet had it not been true, most unlikely to have been invented.

IV[a]. There is another point not peculiarly connected with Thucydides, except so far as he may be considered as the representative of all Grecian history, which appears to me deserving of notice; that state of imperfect citizenship so common in Greece under the various names of μέτοικοι, περίοικοι, σύνοικοι, &c. This is a matter of importance, as bearing upon some of the great and eternal

[a] What follows, on the subject of citizenship, has been controverted since the appearance of the first edition of this work, by those whose arguments and authority are alike entitled to the greatest respect. I hope to have an opportunity ere long of returning to the subject, and attempting to meet the objections brought against the theory here maintained. In the meanwhile, I did not think it desirable to carry on such an argument at length in the preface to an edition of Thucydides; so that I have contented myself with reprinting the preface in its original form, reserving a fuller exposition and defence of the positions maintained in it for another occasion.—[Note to the second Edition of Thucyd., 1841. The allusion is to the Appendix to the Inaugural Lecture on Modern History.]

principles of political science, and thus applying more or less to the history of every age and nation.

It seems to be assumed in modern times, that the being born of free parents within the territory of any particular state, and the paying towards the support of its government, conveys a natural claim to the rights of citizenship. In the ancient world, on the contrary, citizenship, unless specially conferred as a favour by some definite law or charter, was derivable only from race. The descendants of a foreigner remained foreigners to the end of time; the circumstance of their being born and bred in the country was held to make no change in their condition; community of place could no more convert aliens into citizens than it could change domestic animals into men. Nor did the paying of taxes confer citizenship; taxation was the price paid by a stranger for the liberty of residing in a country not his own, and for the protection afforded by its laws to his person and property; but it was thought to have no necessary connexion with the franchise of a citizen, far less with the right of legislating for the commonwealth.

Citizenship was derived from race; but distinctions of race were not of that odious and fantastic character which they have borne in modern times; they implied real differences often of the most important kind, religious and moral. Particular races worshipped particular gods, and in a particular manner. But different gods had different attributes, and the moral image thus presented to the continual contemplation and veneration of the people could not but produce some effect on the national character. According to the attributes of the god was the nature of the hymns in which he was celebrated; even the music varied; and this alone to a people of such lively sensibilities as the Greeks, was held to be a powerful moral engine; whilst the accompanying ceremonies of the worship enforced with still greater effect the impression produced by the hymns and music. Again, par-

ticular races had particular customs which affected the relations of domestic life and of public. Amongst some polygamy was allowed, amongst others forbidden; some held infanticide to be an atrocious crime, others in certain cases ordained it by law. Practices and professions regarded as infamous by some, were freely tolerated or honoured amongst others: the laws of property and of inheritance were completely various. It is not then to be wondered at that Thucydides, when speaking of a city founded jointly by Ionians and Dorians, should have thought it right to add "that the prevailing institutions of the place were the Ionian;" for according as they were derived from one or the other of the two races, the whole character of the people would be different. And therefore the mixture of persons of different race in the same commonwealth, unless one race had a complete ascendancy, tended to confuse all the relations of life, and all men's notions of right and wrong; or by compelling men to tolerate in so near a relation as that of fellow citizens differences upon the main points of human life, led to a general carelessness and scepticism, and encouraged the notion that right and wrong have no real existence, but are the mere creatures of human opinion.

But the interests of ambition and avarice are ever impatient of moral barriers. When a conquering prince or people had formed a vast dominion out of a number of different nations, the several customs and religions of each were either to be extirpated, or melted into one mass, in which each learned to tolerate those of its neighbours, and to despise its own. And the same blending of races, and consequent confusion and degeneracy of manners, was favoured by commercial policy; which, regarding men solely in the relation of buyers and sellers, considered other points as comparatively unimportant, and in order to win customers would readily sacrifice or endanger the purity of moral and religious institutions. So that in the ancient world civilization which grew chiefly

out of conquest or commerce, went almost hand in hand with demoralization.

Now to those who think that political society was ordained for higher purposes than those of mere police or of traffic, the principle of the ancient commonwealths in making agreement in religion and morals the test of citizenship cannot but appear wise and good. And yet the mixture of races is essential to the improvement of mankind, and an exclusive attachment to national customs is incompatible with true liberality. How then was the problem to be solved; how could civilization be attained without moral degeneracy, how could a narrow minded bigotry be escaped without falling into the worse evil of Epicurean indifference? Christianity has answered these questions most satisfactorily, by making religious and moral agreement independent of race or national customs; by furnishing us with a sure criterion to distinguish between what is essential and eternal, and what is indifferent, and temporal or local; allowing, nay commanding us to be with regard to every thing of this latter kind in the highest degree tolerant, liberal, and comprehensive; while it gives to the former that only sanction to which implicit reverence may safely and usefully be paid, not the fond sanction of custom, or national prejudice, or human authority of any kind whatever, but the sanction of the truth of God.

That bond and test of citizenship then which the ancient legislatures were compelled to seek in sameness of race, because thus only could they avoid the worst of evils, a confusion and consequent indifference in men's notions of right and wrong, is now furnished to us in the profession of Christianity. He who is a Christian, let his race be what it will, let his national customs be ever so different from ours, is fitted to become our fellow citizen: for his being a Christian implies that he retains such of his national customs only as are morally indifferent; and for all such we ought to feel the most perfect toleration.

He who is not a Christian, though his family may have lived for generations on the same soil with us, though they may have bought and sold with us, though they may have been protected by our laws, and paid taxes in return for that protection[a], is yet essentially not a citizen but a sojourner; and to admit such a person to the rights of citizenship tends in principle to the confusion of right and wrong, and lowers the objects of political society to such as are merely physical and external.

In conclusion I must beg to repeat what I have said before, that the period to which the work of Thucydides refers belongs properly to modern[b] and not to ancient history; and it is this circumstance, over and above the great ability of the historian himself, which makes it so peculiarly deserving of our study. The state of Greece from Pericles to Alexander, fully described to us as it is in the works of the great contemporary historians, poets, orators, and philosophers, affords a political lesson perhaps more applicable to our own times, if taken all together, than any other portion of history which can be named anterior to the eighteenth century. Where Thucydides, in his reflections on the bloody dissensions at

[a] It is considered in our days that those who are possessed of property in a country ought to be citizens in it: the ancient maxim was, that those who were citizens ought to be possessed of property. The difference involved in these two different views is most remarkable.

[b] It is curious to observe how readily men mistake accidental distinctions for such as are really essential. A lively writer, the author of the "Bubbles from the Brunnen of Nassau," ridicules the study of what is called ancient history; and as an instance of its uselessness, asks what lessons in the art of war can be derived from the insignificant contests which took place *before the invention of gunpowder*. Now it so happens that one who well knew what military lessons were instructive, the emperor Napoleon, has selected out of the whole range of history the campaigns of seven generals only, as important to be studied by an officer professionally in all their details; and of these seven three belong to the times of Greece and Rome, namely, Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar. See Napoleon's "Mélanges Historiques," tome II. p. 10.

Corcyra, notices the decay and extinction of the simplicity of old times, he marks the great transition from ancient history to modern, the transition from an age of feeling to one of reflection, from a period of ignorance and credulity to one of inquiry and scepticism. Now such a transition took place in part in the sixteenth century; the period of the Reformation, when compared with the ages preceding it, was undoubtedly one of inquiry and reflection. But still it was an age of strong feeling and of intense belief; the human mind cleared a space for itself vigorously within a certain circle; but except in individual cases, and even those scarcely avowed, there were still acknowledged limits of authority, which inquiry had not yet ventured to question. The period of Roman civilization from the times of the Gracchi to those of the Antonines was in this respect far more completely modern; and accordingly this is one of the periods of history which we should do well to study most carefully. But unfortunately our information respecting it is much scantier than in the case of the corresponding portion of Greek history; the writers, generally speaking, are greatly inferior; and in freedom of inquiry no greater range was or could be taken than that which the mind of Greece had reached already. And in point of political experience, we are even at this hour scarcely on a level with the statesmen of the age of Alexander. Mere lapse of years confers here no increase of knowledge; four thousand years have furnished the Asiatic with scarcely any thing that deserves the name of political experience; two thousand years since the fall of Carthage have furnished the African with absolutely nothing. Even in Europe and in America it would not be easy now to collect such a treasure of experience as the constitutions of 153 commonwealths along the various coasts of the Mediterranean offered to Aristotle. There he might study the institutions of various races derived from various sources: every possible variety of external position, of national character, of positive law; agricultural states

and commercial, military powers and maritime, wealthy countries and poor ones, monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, with every imaginable form and combination of each and all; states overpeopled and underpeopled, old and new, and in every circumstance of advance, maturity, and decline. So rich was the experience which Aristotle enjoyed, but which to us is only attainable mediately and imperfectly through his other writings; his own record of all these commonwealths, as well as all other information concerning the greatest part of them, having unhappily perished. Nor was the moral experience of the age of Greek civilization less complete. By moral experience I mean an acquaintance with the whole compass of those questions which relate to the metaphysical analysis of man's nature and faculties, and to the practical object of his being. This was derived from the strong critical and inquiring spirit of the Greek sophists and philosophers, and from the unbounded freedom which they enjoyed. In mere metaphysical research the schoolmen were indefatigable and bold, but in moral questions there was an authority which restrained them: among Christians the notions of duty and of virtue must be assumed as beyond dispute. But not the wildest extravagance of atheistic wickedness in modern times can go further than the sophists of Greece went before them; whatever audacity can dare and subtilty contrive to make the words "good" and "evil" change their meaning, has been already tried in the days of Plato, and by his eloquence, and wisdom, and faith unshaken, has been put to shame. Thus it is that while the advance of civilization destroys much that is noble, and throws over the mass of human society an atmosphere somewhat dull and hard; yet it is only by its peculiar trials, no less than by its positive advantages, that the utmost virtue of human nature can be matured. And those who vainly lament that progress of earthly things which, whether good or evil, is certainly inevitable, may be consoled by the thought that its sure tendency is

to confirm and purify the virtue of the good: and that to us, holding in our hands not the wisdom of Plato only, but also a treasure of wisdom and of comfort which to Plato was denied, the utmost activity of the human mind may be viewed without apprehension, in the confidence that we possess a charm to deprive it of its evil, and to make it minister for ourselves certainly, and through us, if we use it rightly, for the world in general, to the more perfect triumph of good.

I linger round a subject which nothing could tempt me to quit but the consciousness of treating it too unworthily. What is miscalled ancient history, the really modern history of the civilization of Greece and Rome, has for years interested me so deeply, that is it painful to feel myself after all so unable to paint it fully. Of the manifold imperfections of this edition of Thucydides none can be more aware than I am; but in the present state of knowledge these will be soon corrected and supplied by others: and I will at least hope that these volumes may encourage a spirit of research into history, and may in some measure assist in directing it; that they may contribute to the conviction that history is to be studied as a whole, and according to its philosophical divisions, not such as are merely geographical and chronological; that the history of Greece and of Rome is not an idle inquiry about remote ages and forgotten intitutions, but a living picture of things present, fitted not so much for the curiosity of the scholar, as for the instruction of the statesman and the citizen.

Fox How, Ambleside,
January 1835.

ON THE

DIVISIONS AND MUTUAL RELATIONS

OF

KNOWLEDGE.

LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE MECHANICS' INSTITUTE AT RUGBY, IN 1838.

ADVERTISEMENT.

I HAVE been induced to publish this Lecture in consequence of the efforts which have been lately made by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, to organize the several Mechanics' Institutions now existing throughout the kingdom, and to encourage the establishment of others. The Society has also published a Manual, containing amongst other things a Catalogue of Books recommended as fit for such Institutions and for Apprentice's Libraries: and this Manual is farther submitted to "the friends of adult education," as being intended to promote their great object. Wishing most earnestly to serve the cause of "adult education," and feeling that while it was desirable on the one hand to encourage Mechanics' Institutions on account of the good which they can do, it was no less important to call attention to their necessary imperfections, and to notice that great good which they cannot do, I have thought that the following Lecture might be generally useful, if printed in its original form, as it was actually addressed to the Members of the Institution of Rugby. Only a very few corrections and alterations have been made in it, for I did not wish to give it a more pretending character than belonged to it as it was originally written.

RUGBY,
September, 1839.

ON THE

DIVISIONS AND MUTUAL RELATIONS

OF

KNOWLEDGE.

THE subject which I have chosen for this evening's lecture may seem liable to two objections; it may be thought too dry to awaken interest in the minds of the audience, and too difficult to be properly treated without more time and more research than I have been able to devote to it. I am aware that there is some force in both of these objections: but on the other hand there are reasons which have induced me to choose this subject, and which I think will be found to outweigh them.

It happens necessarily in an institution such as ours, that the lectures delivered embrace a great variety of subjects, and that they are given without any order or mutual connexion. Different views of the great world of knowledge are thus presented to us: but all are necessarily partial, nor do they tell us how they are to be joined on to one another, in order to convey a just notion of the whole. Even an imperfect attempt therefore to show the connexion or relation between them, seemed to me to be better than nothing; that we may understand what is the value of the several branches of knowledge, as helping to make up the great sum of human wisdom; and may also see, which is a point of no small importance, what sort of

knowledge it is which particularly entitles its possessor to be called a well educated man.

Now even this slight statement of the object of this lecture shows that we are going to venture on an inquiry of a very high order, inasmuch as it embraces not the subjects of any one or more of the sciences, but the nature and merits of those very sciences themselves. This sovereign investigation, in which the mind may be said to exert the very fulness of its power, examining at once the world of outward things and its own faculties and operations, standing apart as it were from all things visible and invisible, and as if by a mere abstract power of observation, looking at once above and below, around and within itself, this it is which is properly called philosophy.

First then, with a subject before us so extensive and so various, it will be necessary to break it up into certain divisions, that our minds may be able to comprehend it. This process of philosophical division admits of very considerable variety. We are not to suppose that there are only a certain number of divisions in any subject, and that unless we follow these, we shall divide it wrongly and unsuccessfully: on the contrary every subject is as it were all joints, it will divide wherever we choose to strike it, and therefore according to our particular object at different times we shall see fit to divide it very differently. For instance, let us suppose that our subject be the vegetable creation; we shall see that this subject is divided differently, according to our different objects in studying it. If we consider vegetables only with reference to the uses which man can derive from them, we should divide them first into such as are useful to him directly, and such as are not: and the former again we should divide into such as are useful for food, such as are useful for clothing, and such as minister to our various wants in other ways. But in this division we should class some vegetables together which on another view of the subject we should find it necessary to separate, and separate others which on

another view of the subject we should be obliged to class together. For instance, on the view of the subject already noticed, we should class wheat, and the potatoe, and the grape, and fig, under one division, that of vegetables useful for man's food; and should of course separate them from such plants as are incapable of being applied to the same purpose. But if we consider vegetables without any reference to man, and merely according to the differences or resemblances in their own structure, in other words if we consider them botanically, the wheat, the potatoe, the grape, and the fig, notwithstanding their common usefulness, are immediately separated from one another; the wheat is classed along with the grasses which feed our cattle, the potatoe and the vine are ranked with the nightshade and the henbane, and the fig is placed in the same division as the ash tree.

Bearing this in mind, we shall see that the various branches of human knowledge are capable of the most different arrangements according to the light in which we wish to regard them. Bacon, for instance, makes a threefold division of them, which he derives from a similar division of the powers or operations of the human mind, into the memory, the imagination, and the reason. Accordingly he divides all knowledge into history, poetry, and science or philosophy; the first belonging to the memory, the second to the imagination, and the third to the reason. Another division has been adopted in a work still in the course of publication, the Encyclopædia Metropolitana; a division of which the author was, I believe, the late Mr. Coleridge. He first divides all science into pure and mixed. By pure science he means such as is conversant merely with the acts of the mind in itself, by mixed science that which considers these acts in connexion with the outward world. The pure sciences again he divides into formal and real; under the first of which he places grammar, logic, arithmetic, and geometry; under the second are ranged metaphysics, morals, and theology.

I am aware that this brief statement must be obscure; but my object in making it is to illustrate the truth, that human knowledge may be divided variously according to the purpose of the divider; and I wished to draw attention to the division into formal and real science, for I shall have occasion to make use of these terms hereafter, and shall then attempt to explain them.

For my present object, which is to give such a division as may be most readily and generally understood, I know not that I could adopt a better method than to divide our knowledge into such as relates to man, and such as relates to other objects of what kind soever, animate or inanimate. But when I speak of man, I mean that part of him which is peculiar to himself, namely, his intellectual and moral nature. For the study of his mere bodily frame, or of the phenomena of his physical life, is but a small part of one great whole, of which by far the greatest part relates to objects distinct from himself, and therefore the study may generally be classed more properly with those which relate to external things. Thus the knowledge which relates to man would naturally include every thing relating to his double nature, as a being having an understanding, and a moral part which we may call for convenience a spirit. Thus it would in the first place embrace the study of his mind; the analysis of its faculties and ideas, which is metaphysics; the analysis of the processes of his reason, which is logic; and the analysis of language, the instrument which he necessarily employs in these processes, which is grammar. Secondly, it would embrace the study of his moral nature; the analysis of his feelings and affections; which like that of the faculties of his understanding may be classed under metaphysics; and the analysis of his duties. This last, so long as his duties towards God are not understood, is the part of ethics or morals: but as soon as we are acquainted with God, and with our relations to Him, all our duties, whether towards God or man, are properly to be classed under one name,

that of religion; because it is manifest that all our duties to other men are duties to God, and that whatever we ought to do is our duty for this very reason, because it is the will of God that we should do it.

Besides the study of man's nature in general, knowledge relating to man would also embrace a knowledge of the actions, characters, and fortunes, of particular parts of mankind, whether larger or smaller. Under this head are to be ranked History, with all its sub-divisions, and Biography.

Then turning to the other great division of human knowledge, the knowledge that relates to all other objects besides ourselves; here too the one vast whole thus presented to our imaginations may be broken up into various parts. It will include Natural History in its widest sense, including not only the animal and vegetable kingdoms, but the mineral also, and even the earth itself. But when we speak of the history of animals and plants, we must remember that here history is wholly distinct from biography. Amongst creatures without reason, whether animate or inanimate, one individual is like another; history with them regards only the species. Nor is chronology much more connected with them than biography; for the oak and the lion of the present day are the same, so far as we can discover, as the oak and the lion of the first year of the world's existence. Time has only wrought changes in some few cases, through the agency of man, as in the change effected in particular vegetables by cultivation, and perhaps in one or two instances in animals also, by the attention bestowed on improving the breed. With the history of the earth, on the contrary, chronology is every thing. Here there are constant changes working, altering the limits of land and water, and in some instances, where volcanic agency is busy, or where particular phenomena of wind and soil are combined, actually altering the character of the land, as well as lessening or increasing its limits. But still in all history there is this

common point, that its principal business is to describe facts as they are or have been, rather than to enter into causes or general principles. And thus the natural historian looks as it were but on the outward edifice of nature: it belongs to other branches of knowledge to penetrate within the sanctuary.

It will be obvious that what is most needed for Natural History is careful observation. If we want to know more of an animal than we can collect from one simple view of it, we must examine it more carefully, and watch its habits for a considerable time together. Thus the very amusing account which Huber has given us of bees, was the result of constantly watching them; so that he made himself as it were an eye-witness of the whole life of the animal. So again in Geography, which is the history of the surface of the earth. All that is wanted in order to draw a map of a country, is to bestow sufficient pains on surveying it; it is a long book which takes a great deal of time to read, but still all the information is to be found in the book, if we have but patience to read it through. But we want to do more than this with nature, we want not only to see what she is, but to understand how and why she is so, that we may be able ourselves to form her or reform her for our own purposes. Water, and air, and light, are things which the most ignorant of us enjoy, but not all understand them. The sky with its hosts of stars must strike every one as beautiful, but to how few is there more of order apparent in that bright multitude, or regularity in their movements, than in the wild dance of a swarm of fireflies. Thus on every side above us and around us there are materials not for observation only but for thought and reasoning; we may not only mark and learn the visible result produced by God's working, but observe the laws by which He works, that here too we may after our most imperfect measure learn to work like Him.

In ascending then from Natural History to Natural

Philosophy, the first laws that would be inquired into would be those of a most obvious as well as most extensive class of phenomena, the phenomena of Motion. I use this term in its widest sense, as embracing the motions of the heavenly bodies no less than of earthly, as including the motion of fluids, such as air and water, as well as of solids. With regard to the heavenly bodies, their movements were indeed almost the only point in which human science could study them. The laws which preside over these movements formed the greatest part of the inquiries of Astronomy; as the laws which direct the movements of earthly bodies were, in the case of solids, the subject of Mechanics; and in the case of fluids, the subject of Hydrostatics, Pneumatics, and Optics. In all these instances there is this point in common; that we are considering those laws which act upon bodies from without, and produce in them a change of place only, and not of quality. We are therefore still, if I may so speak, at the outside of things, examining their movement only, and not their composition. It is possible, however, to go farther than this, and to examine another class of phenomena, those namely in which bodies are found to change not their place only but their quality, a change evidently of a deeper kind, and belonging to causes of a different character. And here we come to those studies in which such great progress has been made in our own generation; Electricity, with its kindred subjects Magnetism and Galvanism, and Chemistry. How little progress had been made till a very recent period in the examination of the nature of bodies as opposed to their movement, may be well understood from this fact, that in the popular works on science which were in circulation in our own childhood, fire, air, earth and water, were still represented as the four elements of the universe. To what point the inquiry into these subjects may be carried hereafter, it seems impossible to anticipate: the doctrine of atoms appears indeed to be bringing us to the very cle-

ments of physical existence; while the study of the phenomena of Electricity, of Magnetism, and above all of what is called Animal Magnetism, seems to promise that in the course of years, or it may be of centuries, we may arrive at some glimpses of a yet higher mystery, the relations of physical and moral existence towards each other, and the principle of animate life.

The study of external nature then, that is of all things existing except ourselves, seems to divide itself first of all into two great divisions, History and Science: by the first of which I mean a mere record or description of facts or existing phenomena in the natural world, whether animate or inanimate; while by the second, I understand an inquiry into the laws or causes by which these phenomena are regulated. But Science again admits of a double division, inasmuch as its inquiries may either regard the movements of bodies, or their component parts and qualities; that is, to speak generally, it may consider them as affected mechanically or chemically. So then the divisions of all our knowledge of nature may be said to be three, Natural History, Mechanical Science, and Chemical Science, using all these terms for convenience's sake in a sense rather wider than that which they bear in common language.

It would seem then that the range of natural knowledge is sufficiently extensive, and its subjects sufficiently sublime. To soar to the utmost limits of visible space, to measure the movements of the host of heaven, and on the other side to penetrate into the subtlest laws of being, and to analyse matter up to its very original elements, might surely be enough to vindicate the dignity of the study of nature. But the Greek philosophers exalted it yet further, by making it ascend not only to the purest forms of physical existence, but higher still, to the nature of God Himself. And undoubtedly, according to that grand division of all knowledge which I have adopted, the knowledge of man on the one hand, and of all other

objects except man on the other, the knowledge of God might seem to take its place fitly as the last ascent of natural philosophy, and so the study of nature might infinitely transcend in dignity the study of man. But I would request your attention to this point, as it will be the foundation of all I have to say on the remaining part of my subject, the relations namely of the different divisions of our knowledge to one another. I request attention to this great truth, that God considered in this point of view, as the summit of the scale of existence, as the most exalted of all beings, and therefore in Himself the noblest object of knowledge, that God regarded in this manner is wholly beyond our reach, unapproachable and incomprehensible. No doubt He is the head as well as the author of all being; the fit completion of the pyramid of the knowledge of the universe is that it should end in that point of perfection of unity, the One Great Cause of all. But this pyramid is like that unfinished tower of Babel; its top never can reach to God. It stands for ever manifestly incomplete, yet incapable of being completed; for the power which reared all the rest of the fabric can neither find nor lay in its place that last and crowning stone. God thus hiding Himself altogether from the sight of natural knowledge, reveals Himself only as a part, if I may so speak, of our knowledge of man; first as the fountain of all our duties, and so the perfection not of our natural knowledge but of our moral; and secondly in that great truth of the Christian Revelation, that as man alone he is to be known, or is in any way comprehensible.

We thus remove the centre of all our system from the division of natural knowledge to that of moral; and thus our view of the relations of the different branches to one another becomes greatly modified. That is, we get to regard all science, whether natural or moral, as a matter of duty rather than of simple knowledge: the knowledge being in all cases referable to a farther end, that is, our

duty in compliance with God's will. For as on the one hand it is possible to regard all moral questions as a matter of simple science, inquiring into the actions and fortunes of man, and analysing his passions and faculties and duties purely for the sake of speculative truth, as if we were the inhabitants of another planet; so it is no less possible to regard all physical knowledge as a matter of practice; studying the phenomena, and inquiring into the laws of irrational and inanimate bodies not for the mere intellectual pleasure of discovering truth, but because the discovery of truth is more or less our duty according to the nature of our calling, for the benefit of others directly, or indirectly, or for the improvement of our own powers of mind, that so we may act our part in life more efficiently.

And thus while we see that no knowledge whatever is to be despised, and while we rejoice in the cultivation of all science of whatever kind, we yet cannot but perceive also, that thus looking upon all nature as ministering in a manner to man, and the knowledge of it as valuable because it ministers to his happiness, if other knowledge ministers to his happiness more, and more universally, then that knowledge must be deemed as yet more valuable than the knowledge of nature, and the possession of it must be considered essential to perfect education.

This is universally understood with regard to what is called religious knowledge, which every one allows to be beyond dispute the most valuable of all. It will be my object here to show that it is true also of those studies to which Coleridge gives the name of the pure sciences, and which he divides as I have said before, into those which he calls formal and real.

The pure sciences are all engaged either with mind, or with the operations, or with the ideas and abstractions of the mind; none of them have to do with real material nature. Now the human mind may fitly be called that great and universal machine by which we operate upon all

things. We all know the fame which was so deservedly obtained by the late Mr. James Watt, for his great improvements in the steam engine. The value of the steam engine consists not only in the magnitude of its powers, but in the generality of their application. It is useful not for one purpose only, but for hundreds. How different are the callings of the cotton manufacturer, the brewer, and the packet-master or coach proprietor; yet steam serves the purposes of them all. Now if the steam engine be so general an instrument, the human mind is yet more so. Nothing absolutely can be done without it, and who can set bounds to what may be done with it? In improving then this universal engine we are conferring a service on mankind, something the same in kind with the improvement of the steam engine, but in degree and extent of usefulness beyond all comparison greater.

Unhappily, however, there has either been no James Watt to perfect this mightier engine; or his directions have been despised or neglected; or mind being less manageable than iron and steam, the engine has refused to be moulded according to the model proposed for its improvement. For it is notorious that minds of equal natural power are most unequal in their practical efficiency, and that many persons with considerable talents and favourable opportunities are unable to avail themselves of either to any good purpose, because the cultivation of their mind has been wholly neglected. Now the mind is a universal instrument through its reasoning powers, its judgment, and its power of rapid and extensive combination. By the reasoning powers, I understand the faculty of coming to a true conclusion from premises or data which are undisputed; the power of making the most of our materials of knowledge. As a familiar and most admirable example of this I may refer to the Elements of Euclid: all that we set out with in this case are three simple postulates, or things required to be granted; and from these three are drawn by the strictest process of reasoning all that

variety of truths respecting the properties of triangles, circles, &c., which fill a whole volume. Now all these truths are really contained in the postulates, axioms, and definitions of the two first pages; yet how few persons would have been able to discover and to prove them. This has been done by the power of reasoning; the power, that is, of finding out all the truths which lie hidden in any facts or principles presented to us, and of avoiding false conclusions; that is, the supposing certain truths to be contained in our principles which really do not exist in them. A good reasoner then is he who draws from the data, or premises, or evidence before him, all that may justly be drawn from them, and nothing which may not.

Now as the human mind is eager to gain fresh knowledge, positive faults in reasoning have been quite as common as negative; that is, men have come to wrong conclusions quite as often as they have failed to discover all the right ones. This evil, of positively bad reasoning, of concluding what cannot be justly concluded, arises from a want of a due acquaintance with the instrument necessarily used in every process of reasoning, namely language. And hence appears the importance of those two studies which teach us to analyse language, logic and grammar. Language is indeed a wonderful instrument, but the very facility of using it with a certain degree of effect, for we all talk and occasionally argue, is apt to conceal from us the difficulty of acquiring a perfect command of it. We constantly find persons both speaking and writing vaguely: using words in different senses, or in no well defined sense at all, without being aware of it: and as never having analysed the process of correct reasoning, arguing in a manner at random, and supposing that to be a proof, or an answer to an objection, which in reality is not so. These are faults for which the study of grammar and of logic is the appropriate remedy. In both we take language to pieces, examine its structure, and

learn to appreciate and recognise those defects to which it is most liable. In logic especially, we learn what may be called the skeleton of reasoning, that simple form which however concealed under the more ornamental form of our common style of talking or writing, as the actual skeleton is concealed by our flesh, can never be really departed from without involving a fallacy. Knowing this skeleton accurately, we can in an instant feel, even through the covering, the flesh, so to speak, of our ordinary language, whether all the bones are in their right places, nay, we know where to suspect disorder, and by passing our probe at once to the suspected part, we can see whether or no all is sound. These suspicious parts in reasoning, to speak generally, are first what may be called the joint of the argument, the point of connexion between the premises and the conclusion, and secondly, any abstract terms which are found to occur often in the reasoning. For men's notions about such terms being often indistinct, it happens that they do not always use them in the same sense, and thus may deceive both others and themselves, by a word's imperceptibly shifting its meaning in the course of their argument, and a thing in reality different being thus passed off as the same.

Logic and Grammar then, as putting us on our guard against the fallacies of language, are the great means of cultivating our reasoning powers. And they are called formal sciences, as opposed to real, because they treat not of any particular thing or matter, but of those forms of speech and of reasoning which apply equally to all matter; they are moulds into which we may put any material that we will, but without which none whatever can be shaped properly.

Such are the studies which the mind requires to perfect its reasoning powers; that is, the powers by which it unfolds truth already acquired and recognised. All reasoning must set out from some fixed point supposed to be true; and its business is to see what other hidden truths

may be developed from the truth so granted or assumed. Unhappily, however, the mind is not only liable to error in this process, but the supposed truth itself, which is the foundation of our reasoning, may have been assumed unjustly: we may be wrong in the stating of the sum as well as in the working of it. But here no formal science will be sufficient for us: for though there is one common form for all reasoning, yet things themselves are so infinitely various, and their truth is collected in so many different ways, that no one rule can be applicable to all. The judgment therefore, that power of the mind by which we take cognizance of truth, and transmit it, having stamped upon it our sanction, to our reasoning powers to coin as it were into other truths, can only be probably guided, not infallibly secured from error. But how is this guidance to be given it? How is this task, which most peculiarly deserves the name of education, to be accomplished? What is that great preparation which can dispose the mind, amidst the delusions with which we are surrounded, to fix on truth with a sure instinct, and to avoid error?

Error, according to Bacon's comparison, may originate in ourselves, or without us: outward objects may not communicate a faithful image to us, or our own minds like a broken or uneven mirror may distort the image presented to them. Truth may not be to be found, or we may be in no fit condition to receive it.

What then are the hindrances in our own minds to receiving truth? Bacon divides them into three principal classes, which he calls the spectres or phantoms of the race, of the den, and of the market place. The fancifulness of these names is characteristic of the man: but their meaning is not the less admirable. The phantoms of the race are those prejudices or tendencies to error which are common to the whole race of mankind; the phantoms of the den are those which grow out of the peculiar weakness of each man's individual mind: and those of the market place are such as arise from our com-

munication with other men, from the vagueness and ambiguities of language.

With the last kind we have no concern, as they have been noticed before. The other two demand the greatest attention, but my limits will not allow me to do more than just to point out their importance. Among the common errors of our race may be noticed, 1st, that bondage of our minds to our senses, by which the visible and the present always prevails over the invisible and the absent; that great moral corruption which the Scripture calls unbelief: 2nd, that craving after general truths or principles, which makes us form theories hastily, upon insufficient evidence, and without noticing what makes against them: and 3rd, the abuse of a principle most true in itself, that truth and goodness are identical; a principle which becomes the fruitful parent of error, when setting up blindly and imperfectly our own standard of goodness, we will allow nothing to be true which seems to us to contradict it. These three, the spirit of unbelief, the spirit of impatience, and the spirit of bigotry, are common to all mankind, and we are all more or less affected by them.

Not less important to notice are the phantoms of the den, the tendencies of each man's individual constitution of mind. For example, how great are the differences between men, according as imagination or observation has most power over them. This difference separates the man of feeling and sentiment from the man of fact and reality; the poet from the man of science; the idealist school of philosophy from the sensualist; the admirer of names and associations from the lover of positive rights; the fanatic from the sceptic. How apt are these two classes to sneer at and rail against one another; to tax each other with folly, and with hardness, and low-mindedness! How earnestly should we labour, if our imagination and feelings be predominant, to steady and sober them with the love of fact, and reason, and justice; or if observation and reasoning be our natural tendency, how heartily

should we strive to soften and ennoble them by admiration, and love of the beautiful, and faith in the invisible.

These instances, for I can but just allude to them, will show the discipline which our own minds require, to clear them from the common erroneous tendencies of our nature, as well as from those which infest ourselves individually. But whilst thus making the mirror of our own minds even and pure to receive the image of truth when presented to us; there is a farther difficulty still, in extricating that form entire and unsoiled from the mass of confusion and error in which it so often lies buried. There is in the first place the difficulty of getting at the truth of facts; then at the truth of opinions; and again there is the great question whether the truth of any opinion be eternal or only temporary; for it may be that a doctrine may be very true as applied to one time or place, which would be very false as applied to another. Thirdly there is the comparison of truths, which in practice is every thing; when two statements of principle are alike true in themselves, but are not both practically true with regard to us; because the less of two good things becomes a positive evil if we follow it to the neglect of the better; as for instance, a doctrine may be perfectly true as far as regards political economy, but not true as regards the happiness of a people speaking morally and religiously. Here then comes in the comparison of truths: for the economical truth becomes a practical falsehood if we follow it to the neglect of the moral truth. Let us observe then how many things are required for the perfecting of this great faculty of the mind, the judgment of truth, with which we are now concerned. To ascertain the truth of facts requires a knowledge of the laws of evidence; what makes a testimony credible, and what makes it suspicious. To estimate the value of opinions requires, over and above our knowledge of human nature in general, a particular knowledge of the effect which circumstances have upon men's opinions, circumstances whether of time or country. For instance, it has

often been made a question whether the opinions of ancient or modern times are entitled to most respect; now this question, setting aside its ridiculous vagueness, might even if asked with regard to any two definite periods, require a different answer according to the different opinions about which the dispute turned: for it is very possible that the opinion of one age might be most valuable on one point, and that of another upon another. Again, to know whether an opinion is true generally or partially, requires in itself no slight acquaintance both with the distinguishing characteristics of eternal and partial truth, and with the circumstances of different times and countries, and the bearings of those circumstances upon the truth in question; for a truth may be only local or temporary, and yet may apply to two countries or to two periods differing in many respects from one another, but not in those particular respects which affect the application of the truth to their case. Further, the comparison of truth, renders it necessary that our standard of duty and of good should be clearly settled; that knowing what is the highest truth, and what the subordinate and inferior, we may never follow that lower good, which, when opposed to the higher, becomes evil.

Besides the reasoning powers and the judgment, I spoke of the power of rapid and extensive combination, as one of the things which enabled the mind to be an universal instrument. Perhaps, strictly speaking, I ought not to give it a distinct place, for it is in many cases essential towards forming a sound judgment: but its great importance may justify me in bestowing some separate notice upon it. We live in a world so varied, that without this power of combination our views must be exceedingly narrow, or exceedingly confused. They must be narrow, if confining ourselves to one class of subjects and of relations, we understand them indeed in themselves thoroughly so far as they can be understood thoroughly without considering them as acting or acted on by other things, but

are wholly ignorant of all others; they must be confused, if studying variously, and receiving ideas from many different sources, we let them lie confusedly upon one another, without arranging them into one great whole. The power of combination may be said to consist in a quick perception of likeness: in two different subjects we discern some one point bearing a resemblance to a common third: we group them together, and then notice their disagreements as well as their agreements. And this goes on continually with a multiplied power; for the more ideas we have thus grouped together in our minds, the more points are offered to which some new idea may attach itself; as in a child's card sheep-fold, the more cards you add, the more you multiply points on which to join fresh cards still. This power of combination is most essential to the profitable reading of history, for unless we combine the lessons afforded by the story of one age or country with those afforded by that of others, our recollection of one will confuse that of the others, they will probably be all imperfectly remembered, and most certainly all will be imperfectly understood.

If any of my hearers be surprised at the great number of elements thus required to perfect the human mind as an instrument (for all that I have been saying has borne on this point only; I have spoken nothing of any particular knowledge as useful to ourselves or others, except as far as regards its bearings on the powers of the mind;) let them learn to think more highly than men commonly do think of the full meaning of the term education, and let them not over-estimate the value of the attempts that are now making in various ways to give information to the people, including such institutions as this of ours. Simple knowledge of any the humblest trade may enable us to be useful to others, to maintain our families, and if it be followed as our appointed line of duty, to glorify God. But considered as instruction, as information, as in short an intellectual acquisition, the value of the knowledge

communicated, be it of chemistry, be it of astronomy, be it of geography, be it of history, depends on the powers and on the education of the receiving mind. Knowledge is the material for the mind to work upon; but if the instrument be blunt or out of order, what avails the fineness of the material? it continues stuff unwrought and useless. Further, we shall have seen that education in the proper sense of the word cannot be given equally to a great number of persons. You may teach them the formal sciences indeed equally, so that their reasoning powers may be cultivated alike; but you cannot do the same with their judgment or their power of combination. For the judgment depending greatly on a knowledge of men, and the power of combination increasing with the number of ideas presented to it, they who by circumstances are confined to a limited sphere, who see little variety, who have never associated with many highly cultivated minds, and above all with minds cultivated under different circumstances of rank, profession, and country, must labour under disadvantages which no mere book instruction can remove. But at the same time it is important to see how much mere book instruction can do, if it be applied wisely. If we read the works of great men, philosophers, or orators, poets, historians, or divines, the works of great men, whose own views are large and profound, whose minds have combined actively a great variety of ideas, and beautifully expressed them; and if we read them with our minds alive and awake to catch and to understand, we are not only, as has been often remarked, in a better society than is easily to be found amongst living men, but we gain a far wider and truer experience of men and of things than is gained oftentimes by a whole life of active intercourse with what is called the world. And not to speak of foreign writers, what a treasure of wisdom and of experience is to be gained from the works of Bacon, his Essays and his Advancement of Learning; from the conversation of

Johnson as recorded by Boswell, far more indeed than from his writings; from the Aids to Reflection, and the Literary Remains of Coleridge, from the Sermons of Butler; from the poetry of Milton and of Shakspeare. Only let us read with a mind attentive and inquiring; let us for instance always acquaint ourselves with the age in which the writer lived, with something of the circumstances of his life and the peculiarities of his character. And when I speak of the age in which he lived, I do not speak of a knowledge of a mere date, which is good for nothing; as for instance that Bacon was born in 1560, and died in 1626; but an idea of what that period was, what events Bacon saw, and with what men he held intercourse, how remote from, or how like to our own. An inquiring spirit is not a presumptuous one, but the very contrary: He whose whole recorded life was intended to be our perfect example, is described as gaining instruction in the Temple by hearing and asking questions: the one is almost useless without the other. We should ask questions of our book and of ourselves; what is its purpose; by what means it proceeds to effect that purpose: whether we fully understand the one, whether we go along with the other. Do the arguments satisfy us, do the descriptions convey lively and distinct images to us; do we understand all the allusions to persons or things? in short does our mind act over again from the writer's guidance what his acted before; do we reason as he reasoned, conceive as he conceived, think and feel as he thought and felt; or if not, can we discern where and how far we do not, and can we tell why we do not?

And now in conclusion, if the mind be thus cultivated and exercised, we stand as it were on the edge of the great garden of knowledge, free to turn on which path we choose, with an instrument of surpassing power to make any portion of it yield its fruits for our nourishment and enjoyment. Happily indeed the choice is fixed for most of us, our calling in life decides for us the particular

branch of knowledge, whether physical or moral, which we are most required to study. And inclination or accidental circumstances may farther suggest such branches as we may choose to study besides, in such hours of leisure as we can command. Only it is clear that in whatever it is our duty to act, those matters also it is our duty to study; there are many things of which we must all be ignorant, many of which we may be ignorant because there are other studies which we prefer to follow: but there are two things of which, unless we wholly go out of the world, we may not be ignorant without great blame, our duties as men and as citizens. And thus the very matters which concern us most nearly, are exactly those on which the rules of this and other similar institutions forbid us to enter. I do not dispute the expediency of these rules, or to speak more correctly, their necessity, in the present state of party feeling, both religious and political: but so long as they are observed, it is idle to call Mechanics' Institutes places of adult education. Physical science alone can never make a man educated; even the formal sciences, invaluable as they are with respect to the discipline of the reasoning powers, cannot instruct the judgment; it is only moral and religious knowledge which can accomplish this. And if habitually removing such knowledge from the course of our studies, we exercise our thoughts and understanding exclusively on lower matters, what will be the result, but that when we come to act upon these higher points, in our relations as citizens and as men, we shall act merely upon ignorance, prejudice, and passion? For notions of moral good and evil of some sort or other we must have; and so also in this country we can hardly help having some notions about political good and evil; but if we take no pains that these notions shall be true and good, what will our lives be but a heap of folly and of sin? This should be borne in mind carefully; and if these merely scientific or literary institutions appear to us to be sufficient for our instruction, if having learnt all that they can

teach us, the knowledge so gained shall hide from us our moral ignorance, and make us look upon ourselves as educated men, then they will be more than inefficient, or incomplete; they will have been to us positively mischievous. But if we are well aware of their deficiencies, and take them only at their real value, they may furnish us with some knowledge that may be of use to us in our several callings, and they may undoubtedly give us some innocent and wholesome recreation. They may do more than this, however, if they encourage in us habits of unimpassioned inquiry; if they make us hold commune with our minds, and teach us to feel the difference between understanding a subject and not understanding it. In this manner they may prepare us for the study of those higher matters on which they themselves do not enter; they may make us feel our ignorance where we are ignorant, and the vagueness of our notions where they are vague: they may thus preserve us from presumption on the one hand, and yet, by stimulating the desire of knowledge, may save us from an idolatrous leaning upon human authority on the other; so helping to cherish a state of mind at once docile and inquiring, which best becomes us both as men and as Christians.

ORDER OF DEACONS.

[The following paper was circulated by Dr. Arnold, in 1841, in the hope of calling attention to a subject in which he had long taken great interest. See Life and Correspondence, vol. ii. pp. 151. 180. 4th Edit. Serm. vol. iv. Pref. p. lxiv. Serm. 38.]

ORDER OF DEACONS.

THE want of a sufficient number of ministers of the Church is more or less felt everywhere; but in large towns, and in the extensive and populous parishes of the manufacturing districts, it is a most serious evil. To provide a maintenance for as many additional clergymen as are needed, either out of the actual amount of Church property, or by private subscription, is clearly impracticable. It has been suggested whether the desired end could not be attained by giving efficiency to the order of deacons, and restoring to them that importance in the Church which in ancient times belonged to them.

To get a sufficient number of deacons nothing seems wanted but the repeal of all laws, canons, or customs, which prevent a deacon from following a secular calling, and also of all such as subject him to any civil disqualifications, or confer on him any civil exemptions.

It is conceived that if this were done, a great many pious and active members of the Church would be very glad to be ordained deacons, and to take a part in the ministry. In all spiritual functions they would be under the direction and control of the presbyters of their respective parishes; but in temporal matters, such as the management and distribution of funds for charitable purposes, and in making provision for the bodily wants of the poor, they would form a council, of which the presbyter would be the head, and to which all such matters might be entrusted.

According to the present form of ordaining deacons, no deacon is authorized to preach, except he shall obtain the bishop's licence to do so. This provision might be enforced, and the licence to preach given only to such deacons as the bishop should judge expedient, and might be granted only durante bene placito.

It is conceived that besides the great benefit of increasing the number of ministers of the Church, other advantages might be looked for from allowing deacons to follow secular callings. A link would be formed between the clergy and the laity by the existence of an order partaking of the character of both. The confusion of confining the term Church to the clergy would be greatly dispelled: inasmuch as there would be not only members but even ministers of the Church who did not belong to the clergy considered as a profession. And as the deacons of the Church would be expected to live in all things as became Christians, the same standard would be followed by them which general opinion requires the clergy to conform to, but which it does not always enforce in the laity; as for example in the case of duelling. The ministry of the Church would thus also be safely and most beneficially open to persons of inferior rank and fortune, who cannot afford the expense of an university education, and have no prospects of a maintenance by entering into the ministry as a profession, but who may have gifts which enable them to serve the Church effectually, and who may naturally and lawfully wish not to let these gifts lie idle. It does not seem improbable that many persons who now become preachers amongst the dissenters, without objecting to any of the doctrines of our Church, but simply because they have no means of following what they feel to be their calling in our communion, would gladly become deacons on the system suggested above, and would thus be useful to the Church instead of being in some sort opposed to it.

The subscriptions required by law to be made by all

persons ordained deacons would continue as at present: and the examination previous to ordination might be modified at the discretion of the bishops. With respect to the order of priests or presbyters, it would of course remain in all points as it is at present, and its strictly professional character would be wholly preserved.

Should the above suggestions be approved of by the members of the Church generally, and especially by the bishops, it might be expedient to prepare petitions in the several dioceses, to ask Parliament to carry them into effect.

May, 1841.

LETTERS

TO THE

HERTFORD REFORMER.

[The following Letters were addressed by Dr. Arnold to the "Hertford Reformer," now the "Hertford Mercury and Reformer." His first communications with the Editor, Mr. Austin, were commenced through Mr. Platt, after the discontinuance of his connexion with the Sheffield Courant, and were continued, at various intervals, from 1837 to 1841, but chiefly in 1838, 1839, and 1840, when under the name of F. H. (from his house in Westmoreland, Fox How,) he began a regular series of letters, partly on the social evils of the country, then betraying themselves in the disturbances of Chartism, partly on some questions connected with the relations of Church and State, which had been treated in some letters in the same journal under the name of "Augur," by Sir Culling E. Smith. See Life and Correspondence, vol. ii. c. ix.]

LETTERS

TO THE

HERTFORD REFORMER.

I.—STATE OF PARTIES.

[From the Paper dated May 30, 1837.]

THE defeat of the Liberal candidate at Westminster has been followed by a similar result of the contest at Bridgewater.—It is easy to ascribe these defeats to mismanagement, or to intimidation, or to the good organization of the opposite party:—but we should do well to remember that it was otherwise in 1832;—that the Liberals could scarcely have been better managers then than they are now;—that the Tories were certainly as rich, and as well disposed to avail themselves of their wealth and influence, as they can be at present. But though the boat and her crew be the same, yet she will not make her way into harbour so quickly when the tide is ebbing as she did when it was running in at the rate of ten knots an hour.

There is a turn in the tide,—or if we like it better, the flood is done, and it is slack water. This is enough to account for far greater defeats than the Liberals have as yet sustained,—unsupported by those extraordinary causes which enabled them to crush the Tories in the elections of 1831 and 1832, they now feel the disadvantages to which the Liberal party is ever exposed when contending against Conservatism.

The Liberals profess to be the advocates of truth and justice;—without regarding men's interests or prejudices. Therefore they ever have been and still are a minority in all political contests;—their great victories have been

gained by their course happening to coincide for a time with the interests of some powerful portion of society. Every man appreciates justice when it is on his own side,—and thus all oppressed parties in their turn become auxiliaries of the Liberal cause, but they do not therefore become liberal;—nor are they interested in the struggle on any high ground of principle;—so that when their particular wrong is redressed they presently quit the contest;—and are very likely to engage in it the next time on the other side;—being often as tenacious in upholding the injustice from which they derive profit as they were in combating that under which themselves were sufferers.

Again, nine men out of ten are, under ordinary circumstances, Conservatives.—Who takes the trouble of going out of his way,—of altering his habits,—of watching over the evil tendencies of his nature? Ordinary men are sure to be Conservatives if their outward condition is tolerable;—it is a matter of course that the majority of persons in the richer classes should naturally be Conservative;—so are the majority of the poorer classes, except so far as they suffer or think that they suffer from things as they are:—they are not apt to be Reformers from the pure love of truth and justice.

A truly Liberal government, as it relieves the oppressions suffered by all parties and all orders, so it also reforms the abuses of all.—But it has been long ago remarked that he who reforms an abuse gains lukewarm admiration and zealous enmity.—The present government reformed the Rotten Boroughs, and incurred by so doing the deadly hatred of the Tories:—they reformed the Poor Laws, and have thus given mortal offence to a large proportion of the most ignorant and violent of the poor, who cling to their abuses as fondly as the Tories do to theirs.—But we do not find that the gratitude and support of the country at large are at all in proportion to the resentment and enmity of the Tories on the one hand, or of the misguided advocates of pauperism on the other.

We must be prepared, then, to see a liberal and honest government always in a situation of peril, after the enthusiasm excited by its first great reforms is over.—Its friends relax their efforts, while its enemies rally.—The Liberal governments of George the First and George the Second's reigns, had the steady support of the Crown, because so long as a Pretender was to be dreaded, resting his claim on Tory principles, the Crown was obliged to be liberal.—Had not Charles Edward sunk towards the end of his life into utter personal degradation, and had not he, unhappily, been the last of his race,—for his brother, the Cardinal, was out of the question,—George the Third would not have dared to be a Tory.—Without the support of the Crown,—hated by the aristocracy, the clergy, and the lowest of the populace,—sure of the opposition of ignorance and dishonesty,—where can a really honest government look for friends but amongst the best and wisest part of the people at large,—where is its hope but in the diffusion of principles of truth and honesty?

This is the glorious task of the true liberals;—to appeal to reason, not to ignorance,—to principle, not to selfishness;—for their triumph can be gained by no other means. For any one particular measure they are, indeed, sure of the support of those whose interest it promotes;—but for their cause in general, they can have no supporters but men to a certain degree honest, and intelligent,—and in proportion to the degree of honesty and intelligence in the nation at large, will be the efficiency of the support which they will receive.—We must not doubt that this support is to be won by recalling to men's minds the real merits of some of the great questions now at issue, between the Government and the Conservatives;—and by reminding them of what the Conservatives as a party are, and ever have been. Least of all can we believe that any honest man, after a moment's reflection, would tolerate the notion of looking to measures, rather than to men:—for this doctrine can only mean that provided certain

measures are adopted by the government, it matters not of whom that government consists:—that is, it is a matter of indifference whether that common honesty which we regard as indispensable in the humblest menial servant be, or be not, to be found in the character of a prime minister:—whether the man, who acts from interest, or from compulsion, against his conscience, is for the very sake of his baseness,—because he is ready to be the tool of any one who is the strongest,—a fit person to be entrusted with the government of a Christian people.

II.—CHURCH RATES.

[From the Paper dated June 20, 1837.]

We trust that our meaning will not be mistaken when we say that we do not regret postponement of the Church Rate Question to another year. In that question are involved principles of such vital importance, and the true solution of its difficulties is, in our judgment, so little perceived by the disputants on either side, that we are by no means anxious to see it brought to a precipitate, and therefore an imperfect and mischievous, settlement. The proposed plan of the Government did not make the maintenance of the churches cease to be a national object, because it provided for their repairs out of the proceeds of the bishops' lands. The bishops' lands are as much national property as the lands belonging to Greenwich Hospital. And if the Greenwich Hospital lands presented an amount of surplus revenue, which was to be devoted to the building of King's ships, those ships would be just as much provided by the nation as heretofore. But if such an appropriation were avowedly intended to satisfy the scruples of the Quakers, because they objected to the building of ships of war,—then we think that in allowing this exemption, we should allow an exceedingly important principle, and one which would tend to deprive the royal

navy of its national character,—and make it become the navy of only a certain part of the community,—those, namely, who did not hold Quaker opinions. We hold that it marks a very critical point in the relations of society, when there is reason to allow the protest of a minority, so far as they themselves are concerned, against any measure or institution approved of by the majority. In some cases such a protest must always be inadmissible; —if the minority will not venture their lives and fortunes in support of a war which they disapprove,—the national bond is at once destroyed. Nor does the size of the minority in this case make any difference, because the question admits of no compromise:—there must be either war or no war; and therefore unless the minority yield to the majority, the majority must yield to the minority,—which is still less reasonable. Other cases,—of which the appropriation of national funds is one,—do manifestly admit of compromise:—and here the size of the minority does make a great difference;—for we may truly say with respect to political influence, "*De paucissimis non curat Lex:*"—but supposing the minority to be equal to two-fifths, for instance, of the nation, it would become reasonable that all the national funds should not be appropriated according to the notions of the majority;—it would be fair, that where consideration is so obviously practicable, the notions of so important a minority should be in some degree considered and complied with. But then this consideration should be shown rather in the modified character of the national act or institution in itself,—than by maintaining these in their full rigour,—and allowing the minority to be exempted altogether from their operation. If the Dissenters are so important a minority, that any appropriation of the national funds which they may disapprove cannot strictly be regarded as the act of the nation, they may claim something more than a mere exemption from contributing to the funds so appropriated themselves. They are more than a few individuals,—

they are a substantial part of society;—and therefore they should share, except in cases where no such compromise is possible, in the positive benefits to be derived from the acts of society,—and should not merely be exempted from sustaining from them positive inconvenience. In short the Dissenters' claim of exemption from Church-rates either goes too far, or does not go far enough. If they are felt to be so important, that society must recognize them as a distinct and constituent element of the nation, then the existence of an Establishment as a National Institution which they wholly disapprove, and which does not pay the slightest regard to their notions and wishes, is in itself unjust. If, on the contrary, the Establishment may justly be regarded as a National Institution, then we cannot understand on what ground a certain number of individuals who happen to dissent from it, are to be allowed to withhold their money, when the society of which they are members demands it for the promotion of an object of public benefit. Even if it be contended that the mere exemption from Church-rates is exactly that peculiar form of compromise which is due to the actual political importance of the Dissenters;—that they may claim so much, and have no right to expect more,—yet it is evident that, by parity of reasoning, as soon as they increase in importance, their claims will advance in proportion:—and the Establishment must and ought to be deprived of one mark after another of a National Institution,—because it will more and more represent the opinions of a part only of the community, and not of the whole. It is this which vitiates Warburton's argument, although many persons of great name agree with him, when he contends for an Establishment representing the opinions of one set of Christians, without attempting any comprehension of Dissenters, but giving them an ample toleration.—Warburton forgot that this was merely a temporary state of things; and that as there was a period when Dissenters were so weak that they regarded toleration as a boon;—

and as there afterwards came a period when they claimed it as a right;—so there was likely to come another period, when they would reject it as an insult,—and when the existence of an Establishment from which they were excluded would be at once unjust and impossible. The founders of the Church of England neither contemplated, nor would have consented to tolerate, the existence of any Dissenters. Had their notion been realized, the Church of England would have continued to deserve its name strictly.—When Dissenters first appeared, they were treated as criminals;—and so long as this was the case, no alteration of the Church Establishment was to be expected. Society will not alter its laws for the satisfaction of a few individuals whom it regards as contumacious. But when the Dissenters became strong enough to claim toleration as their right, and to insist on a political equality with the members of the Establishment, then that Establishment must either enlarge its basis, or perish.—In other words, it must either become really as well as in name the Church of the Nation;—or it will not long be able to enjoy the wealth and dignity which belong rightly to a national institution, but cannot be claimed by one which belongs only to a party. The tendency of the times is towards the latter alternative;—narrow-mindedness in all its various forms is agreed in refusing to extend to the whole nation the benefits of an Established Church; whilst a growing sense of justice will teach men, that if the nation is hopelessly divided into a number of sects, no one of these can be suffered to claim an ascendancy over the rest. It is no doubt far easier to cut the knot than to untie it;—far easier to preserve for a time and then to destroy, than to construct, create, and improve.—But as we are satisfied that there is not a single evil existing at this moment in England for which the institution of a truly national Christian Church is not the best remedy;—as we know that the objections to such a Church arise in great measure from misconception,—and from

supposing that all Establishments must share the faults of those that have hitherto existed;—or on the other hand from that wretched bigotry which would sacrifice Christianity, with all its infinite blessings, before the idol of its own sectarianism;—and as we cannot believe that misconceptions must be perpetual,—or that bigotry must for ever triumph over truth and goodness,—so we shall earnestly hope that the Church-rate question may be settled, not by a measure which sanctions the double solecism of calling that a National Church which is only the Church of a part of a nation,—and of allowing individuals to escape contributing towards an institution claiming to be national;—but by making the Church so effectually the Church of the nation, that Church-rates shall be demanded of all with undoubted justice, and paid by all without a murmur.

III.—THE WESLEYAN METHODISTS AND CONSERVATIVE CANDIDATES.

[From the Paper dated Aug. 1, 1837.]

We have heard that some of the Wesleyan Methodists are disposed to vote for Conservative candidates at some of the county elections. We never address any so willingly as those who we are sure can understand and value Christian principles,—whose grounds of reasoning are the same as our own. We venture, then, to submit to the Wesleyan Methodists, and to all sincere Christians of all denominations, the following reasons why they, above all men, should endeavour to exclude the Conservatives from every chance of influencing the tone and measures of the new Parliament.

1st.—He who calls himself a Conservative is self-condemned. Toryism has been often right,—inasmuch as there have been many states of society in which the monarchical principle has been essential to the improvement

of the people; and the popular principle would have been premature, and, therefore, mischievous: but Conservatism has been wrong, at all times, since the Fall, and in every place, except Paradise. The business of good men, at all times and in all countries, has not been to preserve, but to improve, or to prepare the way for improvement.

2nd.—If the Conservatives say that they are opposed not to improvement, but to destruction, then we tell them that men have rarely erred on the side of destructiveness, —never, in any one instance, except when Conservatism has driven them to it. We challenge all the Conservatives in the world to produce a single exception to this rule: and, further, exactly in proportion to the duration and intensity of the dominion of Conservatism, has been the violence of the outbreak of destructiveness. In other words, when a thing is too bad to be mended, there is nothing to be done but to throw it away.

3rd.—If, from general principles, we come to Conservatives in England, their case is even worse. They boast of our unrivalled Constitution: but whatever there is which distinguishes England from other countries, has been won by the Reformers of successive generations, in spite of all the efforts of Conservatism. The Conservatives of King John's time opposed Magna Charta; the Conservatives of Edward the Sixth's time opposed the Reformation; the Conservatives of Charles the Second's time opposed the Habeas Corpus Act; those of William the Third's and of Anne's reign opposed the Toleration Act, and the Protestant Succession,—just as those of our own days opposed the Abolition of the Slave Trade, the Reform of the Penal Code, Catholic Emancipation, and the Reform Bill. If, then, you love the Constitution, vote against every Conservative,—for it was only by triumphing over the Conservatives of old times that the Constitution was obtained: it can only be by triumphing over them now that the Constitution can be perfected and perpetuated.

4th.—But the Conservatives say that they would have been Reformers in old times,—that reforms then were good; but now they are bad. Remember that this was exactly the language used by the Conservative Scribes and Pharisees of Jerusalem—"if we had lived in the days of our fathers, we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets." And remember who it was, who reading the human heart to the bottom, told them that they were the true children of those who slew the prophets; that their spirit was the same, and would show itself in the like acts. And so it has been yet again. The Conservative priesthood of the sixteenth century disclaimed the crimes of the Conservative Scribes and Pharisees—and they did just the same in their own generation,—they persecuted Christ's truest servants, as their true fathers in character had persecuted Christ Himself; and as their ancestors, at a more remote period, had murdered the prophets. Be sure that there is no pedigree so pure and unmixed as that of the Conservatives.—Haters and opposers of good in the earliest ages of the world, they have continued to be so steadily down to this very hour.

5th.—But how is it that Conservatism should always be wrong? May it not be, that after a great many reforms, a thing which was once evil may have become good; and so that our business may be to preserve it merely, and not to improve it? The great answer to this is, that in human things nothing will ever stand still;—it must either grow worse or grow better; and, therefore, to talk of preserving it as it is, means merely to hinder it from growing better, and therefore to make it grow worse. All good Christians know, that if they were to act on Conservative principles with regard to their own hearts, the end would presently be destruction.—They know who made it his one great maxim,—"to forget those things which were behind, and to reach forward to those which were before; and never to count himself to have apprehended,"—that is, to have at-

tained that point where he might cease to exert himself to go farther.

6th.—This, then, is the general reason against all Conservatism: against that of the English Tories; now, there is this farther one, which makes the case yet stronger. All our great reforms in England have been partial; they have only mended some one particular grievance which was grown too bad to be endured any longer. No one has ever looked over the whole system, to construct it on any sound and good principles. Remember always that every thing in England bears or has borne the marks of that most jacobinical system, the system of feudalism in the State and of priestcraft in the Church. Remember that this system went on for centuries with full power to work its evil will. No doubt its worst abuses have been long since removed;—but they have been removed mostly one by one, and many have been still left behind. And in many instances where the actual evil was removed, nothing positively good was put into its place; as was the case especially in the Church and its government. And, therefore, we are indeed delivered from ecclesiastical tyranny, but we have yet to restore in its room the organization of a true Christian Church.

For instance, many of the exemptions and privileges enjoyed by the French noblesse, before the Revolution, have certainly no existence in England. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that the principle of equal law has ever fully been established amongst us. Many persons do not know that a peer or peeress may commit with impunity any felony, provided it be not capital: because their peerage is a bar to their suffering any ignominious punishment short of death. Earl Ferrers was found guilty of wilful murder, and therefore he was hanged; but had the verdict been manslaughter, even though it had been of that aggravated character which in a commoner would have been punished by transportation for life, he would have received no punishment at all. This was actually

the case with a former Lord Byron when tried for murder, and with the Duchess of Kingston when tried for bigamy. It is very true that peers are not apt to commit felonies; but the example is very valuable as proving what we said above, that all our reforms have been partial, and that the feudal system, where not reformed, is utterly iniquitous. And many other proofs might be given of the same thing.

7th.—Above all, every sincere Christian should vote against a Conservative, if he desires the spread of Christ's Gospel in Ireland. You abhor Popery, and we agree with you;—but the real question is, so long as we have anything to do with Ireland,—how is Popery there to be mended? Can there be a more mischievous state of things than what now exists in Ireland? Roman Catholics and Protestants hating one another, and confirming one another, by their opposition, in the most extravagant parts of their respective tenets? Does any man believe that a Roman Catholic people, in any part of Europe, will ever be converted to Protestantism by Protestants, who have been its hereditary adversaries? Was any Roman Catholic Church ever reformed except by itself? If you remember what was done by the Jansenists in France, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—how those great and good men, Arnauld and Pascal, asserted the most vital points of Christian doctrine,—and how far the Gallican Church went in maintaining its independence of Rome; you will be convinced that such is the only prospect of real religious good which is to be looked for in Ireland, and that such a prospect can never be opened, so long as the Roman Catholics are made a mere sect—so long as all the revenues of the Christian Church in Ireland are given to a small minority, and those, for the most part, not in their origin the brethren of the Irish people, but its conquerors and oppressors.

If there is such a rule in the world as doing as we would be done by,— then the exclusive establishment of the

Protestant Church in Ireland is a direct injustice, and therefore a direct sin. If we may take the property of the Irish nation to advance, as we think, the cause of Protestantism, we might certainly with equal justice persecute the persons of the Irish people for the same object. But God's truth is not served by wickedness; you would disclaim the aid of the State to uphold Protestantism; —is the robbery of a nation's property an expedient any way more righteous or more becoming a Christian;—and does it not at this moment, in point of fact, grievously and notoriously obstruct in Ireland the growth of Christ's kingdom?

IV.—THE COPYRIGHT BILL.

[From the Paper dated May 5, 1838.]

Mr. Serjeant Talfourd's Bill on the subject of Copyright, has excited, as was likely, no small stir amongst the booksellers and publishers, and they are using all their influence to organize an opposition against it. If they succeed, it will not be owing to the strength of their interest so much as to mistaken notions about freedom and monopoly and public expediency, which on this question, as on several others, show the great distinction between popular principles and liberal,—between those whose object is simply to get rid of all restraint,—and those who think that freedom is only valuable so long as it is an instrument of moral good and not merely of selfish enjoyment.

The question is, however, one of some real difficulty,—and though the booksellers' arguments, if so they may be called, are shameless almost to absurdity, yet on the other hand some of the advocates of the rights of authors carry their claims too far,—or rather they do not see that the author's right, pushed to an extremity, interferes with what is scarcely less than a right on the part of the public,—and hence arises the necessity of a compromise.

On the one hand nothing seems more natural and just, than that an author should retain a property in the productions of his own mind. Lands and houses, it is said, are much less our own than what we ourselves have created,—what other person can have any right to interfere with our own work, which no one else brought into existence, which it may be none but ourselves could have originated?

But yet, on the other hand, the knowledge which we gain, from whatever sources, becomes our own so soon as we have gained it, and we may use it how we will. When it was the fashion to hear rather than to read, if any man with a good memory had learnt by heart the greatest part of the Homeric Poems, would he not have had a right to rehearse them to others, and might he not justly have derived a profit from such a recitation? And is the case altered if a man uses his money instead of his memory, —and has copies multiplied for various persons to read them, instead of communicating the same pleasure to an equal number of persons by his voice and his recollection?

The act of publication means that you communicate to the public your own discoveries, or knowledge, or thoughts, or fancies. You communicate them, not like a secret entrusted to one or two favoured individuals, but unconditionally to all men. The knowledge which you thus give they may immediately turn to account;—they may teach it to others, and make a profit by so doing;— as in the case of a schoolmaster introducing amongst his boys a useful school-book,—as he communicates this knowledge orally, and receives payment for it, may he not communicate it also by writing,—and if by writing, may he not by printing?—the paper, type, ink, &c., being as lawfully his own as the voice, which is his instrument of communicating the same knowledge to his pupils.

These two conflicting rights, of the author over his own works, of the purchaser of a book over the knowledge which he has so purchased, and which is thus in a manner

become his own, necessarily call for a compromise. The author and purchaser being both members of society, society will decide between them. Society finds the purchaser's right, if unrestrained, destructive to itself;—if he whose interest in any given piece of knowledge is no more than a few shillings, the purchase-money of the book, acquires the same right over it as he whose interest in it may be the labour of years, vast expense, and what is not to be calculated, the exertion of his own mind in bringing it to light, then men will be obliged to devote less time, less exertion, less money, to the pursuit of knowledge, and so there will be a less valuable article for the purchaser to purchase. Society says therefore to the purchaser, "Your rights over this knowledge being far less than those of the author, must yield to his, as otherwise less and less valuable knowledge will be discovered, by which you and society altogether will be the losers."

Thus then the right of literary property is fixed by society on the principle of compromise, yet not as if the rights of the author and purchaser were perfectly equal in the eye of reason; but that there is enough of justice in the claim of the latter to modify the unreserved exercise of the right of the former. But the question may be asked, whether the present statute law has established the compromise fairly: whether to limit an author's right over his works to a period of twenty-eight years, or to his own life, be not rather assuming that the purchaser's right is the greater; but that its extreme exercise is modified by some regard for the inferior right of the author. It is one thing to say that an author's right is not absolutely indefeasible, and another to insist that it shall expire at the end of thirty or forty years at the outside. There is no proportion between the perpetuity of all other property, and the mere brief occupation tenure of this.

That the present law is imperfect, the single case of Mr. Wordsworth is sufficient to show clearly. Mr. Wordsworth's early Poems were published so long ago that on

his death all property in them would be immediately lost to his family. Now the property which a man cannot secure even to his own immediate children, is surely scarcely to be called property at all.

Nature has herself drawn a marked line which may well guide us in fixing the term of such rights as are not absolutely indefeasible. To our children we are bound by the closest ties; our interest in our children's children is in ordinary circumstances very faint beyond the period of their early childhood. The prosperity of our grandchildren is more a gratification to our family pride and ambition than to our natural affections; but the common feeling of all mankind, in allowing men to dispose of their property after their own death, shows that our own welfare is supposed to be inseparably connected with that of our own children; that wealth must lose half its value if we cannot secure it to them, even after we ourselves are taken away from them.

This seems a clear and intelligible ground for the extension of an author's copyright given by Mr. Serjeant Talfourd's Bill. It will be now secured in ordinary cases to him and his children. This seems the very least that can be granted to him consistently with justice; while, on the other hand, the peculiar character of literary property, the sort of right which we have already acknowledged to exist in the purchaser, and the comparative indifference with which mere natural affection regards our remote posterity, may be reasons why no more should be granted. As for the mere consideration of benefit to the purchaser by restricting the term of copyright, this alone cannot be allowed to determine the question, so long as there is any regard paid to common honesty. It might be very convenient to the purchasers, at least for a time, to be able to get bread and meat at half of the market prices: but few probably would be found who would therefore recommend a law for a maximum. Now the booksellers' argument about the public benefit in getting books cheap,

even if true in fact, which it is not, in any calculable degree, is precisely imposing a maximum upon authors:—It says, you all sell your property at such a price; for if you do not, you cannot afford to await for a better market, because after a certain time we will take your property from you for nothing.

V.—CHURCH ESTABLISHMENTS.

[From the Paper dated November 24, 1838.]

Sir,—Your correspondent "Augur" has entered upon a great subject, and he treats it like a man who has thought upon it much and well. No subject can be so important, for, in fact, it includes every other: moral evils are ever at the root of such as are physical and political; and for moral evil I know of only one cure, and that is Christianity, by its double influence, as a Religion and as a Church. This double character of Christianity is continually forgotten: strip it of either of its two essential parts, and you destroy its virtue, although not in an equal degree. The Church without the Religion is, as we all see, worthless. I do not think we enough understand that the Religion without the Church is comparatively powerless—that it benefits comparatively only a few individuals, while for the mass of mankind it produces effects wholly unworthy of the promises which were bestowed on it.

Augur understands the way in which the Priesthood has superseded the Church: he speaks strongly of this evil; but he is mistaken, I think, in connecting the evils of a Priesthood with an Establishment. There is no natural connexion between them; for although where all men are beset with the heresy of the Priesthood, their Establishment, if they have one, will unavoidably bear the marks of their common error, yet the Church can never exist in its perfection without an Establishment, if men

will but consider what an Establishment properly is, and what principles it involves.

The people of a certain country are, we will suppose, Christians; while at the same time they are politically sovereign; that is, they can impose taxes, make laws, and enforce them if need be by capital punishments. By being a sovereign society their control extends over every part of human life; the education, habits, and principles of the several individuals of their society are matters in which they have a direct concern. But a Christian society with a general control over human life, with a direct interest in the moral welfare of its members, and a sovereign power of affecting this welfare by laws, rewards, and punishments, is already a church. It can only cease to be so by forfeiting, more or less, its Christian character; for it is manifest that a Christian government, acting in the name of a Christian people, is bound to shape its practice and its institutions according to Christian principles,—that is, in every thing that relates to moral good; it is bound to do the exact business of a Church, nor can it resign this high duty without being most deeply culpable.

It is bound therefore to provide for the Christian education of the young,—for the Christian instruction of the ignorant, and for the constant and public dissemination of Christian principles amongst all classes of its people. It is as much bound to do this, as it is bound to provide for the external security of society, or for the regular administration of justice.

Now, by the actual law of England, there is a very large portion of the property of the country set apart for these objects; and it has been set apart so long, that it can in no sense be called a tax upon the private property of any single individual. What utter madness would it be to take this public property, and give it away to a certain number of individual landholders! It would be an act of folly unrivalled by the most wanton extravagance

of the worst government on record;—it would be an act of direct robbery also;—for it is a robbery committed against society, when public property is given away to individuals;—it is a robbery against the existing generation and their remotest posterity.

That this portion of public property is not applied in the best manner for the fulfilment of its proper objects, may be, and I think is perfectly true. It may have maintained a priesthood to the injury of the Church,—because the priesthood so long set up an unchristian claim to be the sole representatives of the Church. The rector of every parish was said to be "*persona ecclesiæ;*"—he is in law "a corporation sole," as it is called, because in his single person the rights of the church in that parish are held to be vested. Alter this in its proper measure;—do not let the priest continue alone to represent the Church;—but restore the true and living institution which has been corrupted;—and do not commit the fatal error of extinguishing disease by death: of removing the evils which have impaired the excellence of the best of all institutions only by destroying the institution itself.

I therefore hold it to be an especial blessing that we have in England two facilities for reviving the efficiency of the Christian Church throughout the country, such as we most of all desire. 1st. We have an ample portion of public property already devoted by law to the especial objects of the Church, independent of any tax upon individuals, or any voluntary subscriptions whatever. And 2nd. In the great recognized principle of the King's or Queen's supremacy, which may truly be called the charter of the Church of England, we have the truth clearly established that the Church or Christian society has the complete power of self-government, and is not subject to any privileged caste of priests, whether they may happen to be few or many, or whether their government be called a Presbytery, a Synod, a Convention, a Council, or a Papacy.

VI.—STATE OF THE MANUFACTURING POPULATION.

[From the Paper dated December 1, 1838.]

Sir,—I am rejoiced to find that your attention has been aroused by the proceedings of the manufacturing population in Lancashire and Yorkshire. I believe that our views on this subject are much the same; but perhaps you will not be sorry to address your readers in two parts of your paper on a question so momentous;—for assuredly it is one on which no one can think too often, or with too deep an interest. Should any acts of open violence take place, it will then be the time for acting, not for writing; for the decision of the Government, not for the counsels of individuals. May that acting and that decision, should any occasion unhappily demand it, be prompt, vigorous, and effectual! In such cases timely severity is the greatest mercy; and never would the utmost severity of the law fall more deservedly than on the men whose wicked passions had excited such an outbreak.

But suppose that the Government do its duty to the uttermost; suppose that the vigour of the civil and military authorities, should any tumult arise, shall prevent a repetition of the disgraceful plunder and conflagration of Bristol. Suppose the profligate incendiaries, who are now urging on the people to deeds of robbery and blood, to have received their just reward,—still in a few years' time there will again be the same danger. It was averted in 1831, it may be again averted in 1838 or 1839, but it will not be so always. Like the first signs of a mortal disease, these fainter shocks do but indicate the nature of the evil which will one day prove fatal.

But do I appeal only to our fears? God forbid! There may be something of courage in despising danger; but there is nothing but selfishness in neglecting to remove the evil. The future danger besides is contingent; the actual evil is certain. Undoubtedly, Sir, there is

much in the present state of the manufacturing population which calls for notice on the part of society at large, and not only for notice but for relief. Look at the elements of the whole question. Has the world ever yet seen a population so dangerous in every respect to the society in which it existed as the manufacturing population of Great Britain? Not slaves, not utterly ignorant, not thinly scattered, not restrained by close connexion with other classes of society, not possessing political power, not enjoying physical comfort, not softened by knowledge, not within the reach of the ordinary influences of any religious society; but free men, with much intelligence,—crowded together in most formidable masses, well aware of the force of organization,—ambitious of the power and longing for the comfort which they have not, and which others have;—but not aware of the unreasonableness of their first desire, and the impracticability of their second. If they were slaves, they might be kept down by force: if they were what citizens ought to be, they would be peaceable alike from interest and from duty; but as they are neither the one nor the other, what is to be done?

We are justly proud of having done away with slavery; but we do not remember that slavery cut the knot of the most difficult of all earthly questions,—how to provide for the physical and moral well being of the mass of human society. Slavery cut the knot, by saying that the majority of human beings in every country who constitute the great difficulty of the question, shall not be considered as a part of society. We do well to refuse to cut the knot, but we do ill not to attempt to untie it.

This neglect is encouraged by one of the falsest maxims which ever pandered to human selfishness under the name of political wisdom,—I mean the maxim that civil society ought to leave its members alone, each to look after their several interests, provided they do not employ direct fraud or force against their neighbour. That is, knowing full

well that these are not equal in natural powers,—and that still less have they ever within historical memory started with equal artificial advantages; knowing, also, that power of every sort has a tendency to increase itself, we stand by and let this most unequal race take its own course, forgetting that the very name of society implies that it shall not be a mere race, but that its object is to provide for the common good of all, by restraining the power of the strong and protecting the helplessness of the weak.

This letting alone system argues thus:—"Every man is the best judge of his own interest, and therefore we leave the movement of society to direct itself. Nature points out manufacturing industry as the great source of wealth to this country; and of course the manufacturer must carry on his business in the most profitable manner that he can. Certain parts of the country are more suitable for his purposes than others; manufactories therefore will be crowded together in such districts, and a large population necessarily will grow up within a small compass. It will go on rapidly increasing, for there is a sufficient prospect of employment to encourage a man to marry, where the standard of comfort is not set high, and thoughts of a remote future can scarcely be expected to have any influence. The population thus multiplying necessarily lessens the value of its sole commodity, its labour: a man's wages do not keep pace with his expenses; but his wife and children may do something to help him; and the manufactory will provide them with employment. They must all work early and late, however, in order to earn a sufficiency; but still the sufficiency can be gained. If wages are sufficient, how can the manufacturer be expected to raise them? especially as, were he to do so, he must, by adding to the price of his commodity, be undersold by foreign competitors, and so involve his workmen in his own ruin. Every step in this process is natural, and taken voluntarily by all parties: how can it be interfered with by a government, or how ought it to be interfered with? The

relation between the masters and men is one purely commercial; and who ever attempted to shackle the natural liberty of commerce, without doing infinite mischief to those whom he meant to benefit?"

That there is a truth in this view of the question is indisputable. Nothing can be more unwise than the sneers in which some well meaning persons indulge against political economy: for it is not possible that so many able men should have made a particular subject their study without arriving at far more truth respecting it than can be attained by those who never studied it at all. The truths of political economy are to be learnt from political economists, and like all other truths relating to human affairs ought to be known and respected by the statesman. But it does not follow that he should be exclusively guided by them,—unless there were no other moral and political truths in the world which were to be learnt from other sciences. And here is the presumption and the fault of the political economist, that he assumes for his science the title of political science generally; as if because a thing is right economically, it must also be right politically. Yet the greatest generals know that an operation expedient on mere military grounds may sometimes be forbidden by higher considerations of general policy; and the soldier must then yield to the statesman. So it may well be, that what is economically called expedient may be politically mischievous; and then the economist also should yield to the statesman.

The statesman, for instance, may well say to the economist, "Your system works perfectly well for the objects with which alone you are concerned; and, therefore, on your view of the question, you are perfectly right in upholding it. But as it does not work perfectly well for the general security and happiness of the nation, I am bound to look out for some other truths which do not lie within your province, and to apply their lessons in order to remove certain evils of which you consistently can take no

cognizance. You see an immense mass of capital profitably employed, and increasing prodigiously the national wealth. You see this truly; but I see also a vast and increasing population placed in a very unfavourable state, socially and morally, and this, politically speaking, is an evil of the first magnitude. You say that their relation with their masters is purely commercial, and that, therefore, we must not tamper with its freedom. But I say that this very fact, that the relation between the rich and the poor in so large a part of the kingdom is purely commercial, is in itself most mischievous; because a purely commercial relation not only arises out of nothing better than self-interest, but it goes on to nothing better; it neither springs from nor leads to any feelings of admiration, confidence, reverence, or love, which are the true ties between man and man. Unless, therefore, I can add some better relation to this purely commercial one, we shall see the rich and the poor living in close contact indeed externally; but it is a contact which only irritates. We shall see no sympathy between them, and therefore no society."

This, then, is the great evil in the condition of a manufacturing population, that it implies the congregation of a vast multitude within a comparatively narrow space, and with an object purely commercial. In other words, they are regarded as *hands*—not as heads, hearts, or souls; and yet they are not slaves, and cannot be restrained as such. This is a fearful anomaly, and one peculiar to modern society; and in its excess, peculiar to this country alone.

The political question involved in the demand for universal suffrage, is nothing when compared to the social question which has been stirred in the wild language used with respect to capital and labour. We do not enough consider that such social questions have scarcely ever been mooted;—during the greatest excitement of the French Revolution, no one dreamt of attacking property as such,—or talked of labour and capital as having con-

flicting interests. And yet the far less irritation of political questions has caused bloodshed enough in many countries and many ages. What will be the case if here the exasperation of political contest be farther embittered by the fearful struggle of poverty against property?

Here is the evil, and it is not a light one. Let every man, rich or poor, who loves his country, look well to the remedies of it. You, Sir, I know, will do so, and if you will accept my assistance in the task, I should feel honoured by uniting my efforts to yours in a cause so noble.

VII.—STATE OF THE MANUFACTURING POPULATION.

[From the Paper dated December 29, 1838.]

Sir,—My last two letters were written on subjects apparently very remote from each other,—the Church, and the state of the manufacturing population. Really however they are in my judgment very closely connected;—inasmuch as the one affords the greatest of all social remedies, while the other is the most dangerous of all social disorders. But the particular manner in which the remedy should be applied to the disorder, is a question of great difficulty, and to answer it properly requires an union of various qualifications, such as are scarcely to be found together in any man, and to which most assuredly I am very far from advancing the slightest claim. I would only try to attract the notice of your readers to the peculiar evils of the state of our manufacturing population;—the adaptation of the remedy should be left to those who unite practical experience with a benevolent desire to make that experience available to their neighbour's good.

Let me just state again, that the peculiar evil of a manufacturing population is this; that it is essentially a

crowded population, employed in servile labours, yet possessing the feelings of freemen; and above all, that it owes its existence to a purely commercial relation, that of employer and employed. Consequently, it contains within it one only, and that not the best, element of civil society. The difference will be apparent, if we compare the mere outward appearance of a town or village of any other part of the kingdom with that of a town or village in the manufacturing districts. You see in the former, houses of every variety of size and condition;—from the house of the lord of the manor, or some other great person whose place forms a sort of link between the town and the country, down to the cottage of the poorest artizan. Between these there are the houses of the banker, the lawyer, the clergyman, the medical man, the retired merchant, the private gentleman,—and again, the houses of the richer tradesmen forming a third class,—and a fourth class of the houses of the smaller shopkeepers. Here is variety, and also a just proportion;—for although the houses of the poorest class are the most numerous, yet their number does not so much exceed that of the houses of the richer classes, as wholly to dilute, if I may so speak, that social influence which every class of society ought to exercise upon the rest. The poor, in other words, do not so enormously outnumber the rich, as to make it certain that a large proportion of the former must be personally unknown to any of the latter except to their own employer.

Now consider the appearance of a manufacturing town or village. There is the great manufactory, and there are the long rows of cottages which constitute the dwellings of the poor manufacturing workmen. Besides, there are some poor shops, supplying such articles as the workmen require; and perhaps, but not always, there would be the houses of the clergyman and the medical man. But these are lost amidst the multitude of the poor;—and whilst many of the elements of society which exist elsewhere are here

wholly wanting, those which remain are socially powerless, because the poorest class has been multiplied around them beyond all wholesome proportions.

This is a great difference;—another not so striking to the mere outward eye, is, notwithstanding, of very substantial importance.

I said that a manufacturing population owes its existence to a purely commercial relation, that of employer and employed. This relation of course must be found everywhere, but it has found rather than created the population. I will explain my meaning more fully. A labourer in an agricultural village, or an artizan in a common town, works for an employer, but he did not become an inhabitant of the village or town *in order to work for him.* He lives there because the place is his home,—because his father lived there before him—because his family and friends have lived there from time immemorial. These are all such reasons as become a man and a citizen, and they involve in them circumstances no less elevating. Such a man has a neighbourhood to which he belongs, in which he is known, and where his character is the subject of a certain public opinion, whether for good or for evil. But what is the case with the manufacturer who is brought to a certain part of the country to work for an employer, and must live there only because he works there? Whatever be the physical comfort of the cottage in which he is quartered, how can it be to him like a natural home? What ties has he to the place or to the neighbourhood, except the transient tie of his actual work? And what is his neighbourhood but a mere mixed multitude of persons brought together from different parts of the country, with nothing to bind them either to the place or to one another, as incapable of forming a society as if they were a mere assemblage of slaves? Let any man look at the wretched huts which are often run up by the side of a railway whilst the construction of it is in progress, for the

temporary accommodation of the workmen. Let him go into ten or twelve of these huts, one after the other, and see the different features and mark the different dialects of their respective inmates. He will find them tenanted by persons brought together from all parts of the kingdom, brought together, indeed, but incapable of forming a society, and destined in a few weeks to be separated again, and to be called off to some other railway. Here indeed he will see the evil in its most palpable form; yet this homeless, unsocial, herding, and at the same time vagrant condition, is in the main the lot of every population who are brought to live in a place only because they are employed to work in it.

What the manufacturing workmen want is, first, a home; and then as a natural consequence, to become members of a society more varied in its elements and more wholesome in its character than their own clubs and unions. Unless these wants can be supplied, they will in some of the most important points resemble slaves rather than citizens;—they will feel some of the worst moral evils of the slave's condition;—they will regard the civil society around them with much of the slave's hatred; but because they are not slaves altogether, because they are not chained, nor liable to be crucified by hundreds at a time on the least symptom of mutiny, their power of gratifying their hatred will be a hundred times greater than that of the slave, and consequently they will be a hundred times more dangerous.

That it is difficult to supply these wants of which I have spoken, I am well aware;—the word "impracticable" is for ever on the lips of those who, from blindness, or recklessness, or self-interest, cannot or will not see the evils of their actual state, and will not make the effort which is required to mend it. But that the task is really impracticable and impossible, God forbid that I should believe; for if it be, the prospects of England are scarcely

less gloomy than those of the slave states of America; they threaten equal misery in the issue; they involve, I fear, scarcely less of national guilt.

Thus far I have spoken unhesitatingly; for the evils of the present state of our manufacturing population are perhaps more visible to a bystander than to one actually engaged in the system. But in what I shall say as to remedies, I would suggest doubtfully and diffidently; I would ask whether this or that cannot be done,—I would urge those whose knowledge is far greater than mine, not to be content with showing that my proposed relief is impracticable, but to turn their experience to good account by devising some relief that shall be practicable: for, let my remedies be as visionary as they will, the existing evil unhappily is but too real.

VIII.—STATE OF THE MANUFACTURING POPULATION.

[From the Paper dated January 5, 1839.]

Sir,—I have dwelt rather largely on the actual evils of the state of the manufacturing population, because, if the country could be made sensible of the magnitude of the evil, the remedy, I believe, would surely follow.—We have seen what efforts were made, what sacrifices were submitted to by the English people, in order to put down first the slave trade, and more recently slavery.—We know what societies have been formed, and what large sums are yearly expended, to forward the great work of spreading the knowledge of Christianity amongst heathen and barbarous nations. Surely if we are aware that there exists in the heart of our own country a state combining much of the physical suffering and degradation of slavery, with much of the moral and religious ignorance of heathenism and barbarism, we shall not be deterred by any difficulties or any sacrifices from determining, with God's help, to better it.

I have said that the manufacturing population not only wants many of those varied elements which are essential to society, and combines those which it does possess in no just proportions ;—but that its labourers are inferior in some important points to the labourers of other districts, inasmuch as they have no connection with the place where they live, except as being employed to work in it; —that the feelings of neighbourhood and of home are with them comparatively strangers; that they are rather a motley crowd of accidental sojourners, than a regular society of the natural inhabitants of the country in which they dwell. Being thus without the organization of regular society, the organization which they have amongst themselves is rather mischievous than beneficial—they are formed into clubs and unions,—associations which breathe a narrow and selfish spirit at the best, but which, under unfavourable circumstances, become mere gangs of conspirators : the isolation in which they exist, with respect to the larger national society around them, being apt in a moment to become alienation and active hostility.

Yet these men thus isolated from the national society in the midst of which they live,—as isolated really as ever were the slaves of the old commonwealths of Greece or Rome,—are insisting loudly that they are members of that society,—and are claiming the rights of members accordingly.—In other words they are demanding the right of voting for the election of members of parliament, with the avowed hope of being able thereby to influence the national society according to their own notions. And, strange to say, their demand is at the bottom just,—and therefore, sooner or later, and with more or less of qualification, it will be carried. It is just on our own showing, because we acknowledge that they are not slaves.— Foreigners or sojourners, in the literal sense, they are not certainly,—nothing therefore remains but that they must be freemen and citizens. Yet for freemen and citizens to be wholly without political rights, is contrary to the sim-

plest notions of a free government. What choice is left us, then, but to make them citizens in feeling as well as in name; to make them really as well as nominally members of our national society, that when they obtain political rights in that society, as in process of time they will and ought to do, they may exercise them in harmony with its spirit and institutions, to its benefit, not to its destruction.

The first thing required, as it seems to me, is to organize the population of the manufacturing districts with an organization that shall be legal and beneficial, instead of that organization of clubs and unions which is merely mischievous. For this object we require amidst so dense a population, that the divisions should in point of local extent be extremely small;—whereas unluckily the parishes and townships of the north of England, having been adapted originally to a population as thin and scattered as it is now for the most part dense and numerous, are much larger than those of the south. Again, many of the towns being of recent growth are not as yet incorporated;—and have thus a less effective system of self-government than many much smaller places in the southern part of the kingdom. It is desirable that the primary element in the civil and ecclesiastical divisions of the manufacturing districts, whether in towns or in the country, should be extremely small;—for thus only where the population is so dense, is it possible to get that mutual knowledge of each other amongst the several inhabitants of the same division, which is necessary in order to create a neighbourhood, a public opinion, and a common feeling of kindness, all of them essential points in the constitution of a true civil society.

Every such division should have a certain portion of common land unalienably attached to it,—to serve as a place for exercises and games, and partly it may be for public walks or gardens. Where the population is so great as to make that system of individual allotments which has been practised with such benefit in the agricul-

tural districts, wholly impracticable, it is of the last importance that there should be township or parish allotments; —not only for the direct benefit and pleasure to be derived from them, but also because thus only can we give to the manufacturing workman the consciousness of possessing something of a property in land;—a feeling so salutary that it can scarcely be secured at too dear a price. And therefore this common land should belong to all the inhabitants of the division;—and they all should have a voice in the management of it, care being taken that they should neither be able to sell it, nor let it on a building lease, nor to let it at all except for the shortest possible term.

The importance of securing a portion of ground for games and exercises in all thickly-peopled districts has been urged more than once in parliament, not less wisely than kindly, by Mr. Slaney, the excellent member for Shrewsbury. It is a delightful duty to honour the name of every public man who seeks to promote the innocent pleasure of the poor, and who by thus investing law with a character not of justice only, but of actual kindness, commends it to the affection of those whose worst degradation it is to regard it as their enemy.

The township or parish, thus possessing its common property, should also possess its own internal government. There is at present a wide gap in our system for the administration of justice between the justice of the peace and the constable. The first is too high, and belongs exclusively to the aristocracy,—the latter is too humble and possesses an authority too entirely subordinate. —There might be some officer between these two extremes, something more resembling the *juge de la paix* of the French canton, or the syndic of the villages of Savoy. The object would be not merely one of police,—although that is far from unimportant,—but to train the people themselves to a sympathy with and a practical understanding of the administration of justice, and also to

introduce into a manufacturing population another element besides those of employer and employed. If the office were salaried, it would be on many accounts a great advantage;—and where the object is so important as the raising in all points the condition of so large a portion of our fellow-subjects, the most economical government may well dare to be liberal.

I would rather hint generally at the sort of measures which appear to me to be needed, than venture to propose any thing in detail. I am sure, however, that we have much to learn as to the efficacy of government for something more than the mere purposes of police; for not protecting society merely from external injury, but for giving it inward life and energy, and for putting down that mischievous spirit of individual self-will, which, whether shown in its aristocratical form, as in Europe during the middle ages, or in its democratical, as now in parts of the United States, most truly deserves the name of Jacobinism. But on one point I may dwell with more confidence;—because I am sure of its efficacy, and because its practicability is only impeded by certain misapprehensions respecting it, very widely spread, and very deeply rooted. I speak of that great power of social improvement in the highest and most comprehensive sense of the word which is contained in the institution of the Christian Church.

And here it is necessary that I should a little unfold those views respecting Church Establishments which I stated briefly in my first letter, and which many, I fear, besides your correspondent "Augur," will consider either visionary or profane. With "Augur's" difficulties I can entirely sympathize: he is not the first good and sensible man whom I have known to be perplexed by them; but that they are difficulties which may be removed by a full and large inquiry I feel as satisfied as I can be of any moral truth which has not the direct confirmation of God's Revelation. But I have already trespassed sufficiently on

your columns; and the subject on which we are going to enter demands to be considered in a separate letter.

IX.—THE STATE AND THE CHURCH.

[From the Paper dated January 12, 1839.]

Sir,—Before I enter upon the subject of this letter, I would assure your correspondent Augur, that however different the roads by which we may at present appear to be travelling, the point at which we are both aiming is I trust and believe one and the same. My views of the most perfect condition of the Church have no reference to mere worldly expediency; I love to entertain them, because the Church, as they represent her, appears to me best fitted to perform her appointed work, of bringing many souls to God.

Augur, as it seems to me, imagines that a Christian State and Church must differ from one another, because his notions of a State are too low, whilst the Church, such as he conceives it to be, is rather the Church perfected, than the Church as it ever has been, or as it ever can become, except, as I think, through that very system which in his judgment is so degrading to it.

Of course if the object of a State be merely, as Warburton represents it, the protection of men's bodies and goods, then the ideas of Church and State are necessarily distinct. And the same conclusion follows also, if we hold that the object of a Church, either solely or principally, is to perform certain external ceremonies or to teach certain abstract opinions.

But these are the notions of sensualism on the one hand and of priestcraft on the other,—not of true philosophy and Christianity. The State has a far nobler end than the care of men's bodies and goods: the Church

has a far nobler end than the performance of ritual services or the inculcating abstract dogmas—the end of both is the highest happiness of man; and this must be his moral happiness; but the difference between them has sometimes been, that the State when not Christian has pursued its object ignorantly: the Church has always known how to pursue it rightly,—but it has not always acted according to its knowledge.

The true object of the State, which the old philosophers distinctly recognised and laboured to carry into effect, has been as we know continually lost sight of through the evil passions of men; insomuch that Government has come to be regarded as a mere necessary evil, an encroachment upon individual liberty not to be desired but endured; and of which the smallest possible dose, so to speak, is the most desirable. And the Church, through the same evil nature of man working in this instance by the system of priestcraft, has so fallen short of *its* true object, and so turned aside after a false one, that it too has been regarded as an enemy to man's happiness, and the most perfect school of all truth and goodness has been branded as the source of superstition and of folly.

If the object of the State and that of the Church be always in intention identical;—and if in a Christian State it is really identical;—that is, the Christian State and the Church have precisely the same notions of man's moral happiness;—and if the State by virtue of its sovereign power can control men more effectually than any less sovereign society;—if again they have neither of them of necessity a distinct external form, which cannot be made to assimilate to that of the other;—then the two institutions *may* be identical;—and that common object which both pursue will then be pursued most effectually when they *are* identical;—*i. e.* when the State is Christian, or to express the same thing in other words, when the Church is sovereign.

A hundred fancied forms of evil will I know start up in

the minds of your readers when they shall have followed me to this point. One set of them imagines that a sovereign Church implies spiritual tyranny and persecution; another fancies that to mix the name of State with that of Christianity, is to secularize religion, or even to dethrone Christ from His headship of the Church, and to set up a king or a parliament in His place. I believe that my abhorrence of both these evils is as great as that of any man alive; but if you have patience with this discussion, and these letters are not occupying the room of more interesting matter, it will not be difficult to show that the system which I am upholding implies neither of them, but rather repels them both.

For the present, I must consider Augur's arguments drawn from the addresses of St. Paul's Epistles, from which he thinks it follows that the early Churches consisted only of true Christians. Yet it is certain that those very Epistles notice evils existing in every one of those Churches quite inconsistent with such a supposition; and the particular expression translated in our Bible "Saints," on which Augur apparently grounds an argument, signifies not that those to whom it applied were personally holy, but that they were God's covenanted people now, as the Israelites had been formerly. For the proof that the utmost heterodoxy of belief as well as irregularity of practice were to be found amongst the members of the primitive Churches, and that they were therefore as much mixed societies as any existing Church is now, I would refer your correspondent to the following passages:—Romans, xvi. 17, 18; 1 Corinthians, iii. 1—3; vi. 7, 8, 15—20; viii. 9—12; xi. 17—34; xv. 12; 2 Corinthians, xi. 12—15; xii. 20, 21; Galatians, iii. 1—4; iv. 11; v. 7—15; Philippians, ii. 4, 20, 21; iii. 17—19; 1 Thessalonians, iv. 3—8; v. 14; 2 Thessalonians, iii. 11, 12; 1 Timothy, i. 6, 7—what is implied in the charge iii. 3; v. 22, 24, 25; vi. 9, 10; 2 Timothy, i. 15; iii. 6—9; Titus, i. 12, 13; Hebrews, iii. 12, 14; James,

ii. 1—9; iii. 8—10; iv. 1—10; 1 Peter, iv. 15; 2 Peter, ii. per totum; 3 John, 9—11. See also the character given to so many of the seven Churches in the first chapters of the Revelations. And above all, I appeal to the character given by our Lord Himself, not of the world only, but of His Church, the Kingdom of God, St. Matthew, xiii. 47—50. Yet this Church so described as containing alike both good and evil, is compared, v. 33, to the leaven which influences the whole mass;—and this the Christian Church, with all its corruptions, has done, and will do ever.

Let Augur also consider the mixed multitudes of three thousand persons at a time who were sometimes admitted into the Church, exactly as was the case when Augustine first preached in England. Is it possible to conceive that all these men were deserving of the name of Saints, as implying personal holiness? The system of the Apostles was not to set out with a select society, which if they had done, Christianity could never have triumphed as it did; but to receive in the first instance all who were willing to come, and then by a gradual process to purify them more and more. And, in point of fact, the Christian Church at the end of the first century, and in the second, had a stricter discipline, and enjoyed generally a higher standard of truth and holiness, than it had done for some years after its first foundation.

I would gladly therefore include in the Church all nominal Christians, and by so doing we should greatly increase its efficacy, and it might be raised gradually, not in our days certainly, but in days to come, to as great a degree of purity as was ever attained by the smallest and most exclusive congregation. For we should remember how much of real evil will still lurk in the narrowest sect that most vaunts its purity; all those bad passions of covetousness, envy, and uncharitableness which it is impossible for any human system of discipline to restrain.

X.—THE STATE AND THE CHURCH.

[From the Paper dated February 2, 1839.]

Sir,—I have expressed my conviction that the State and Church are then only in a perfect condition, when they are not allied, but identical; in other words, when the State is a Christian Society, and the Church a Sovereign Society.

This was the doctrine of Hooker, however much it has been forgotten by some of those who profess to be Hooker's warmest admirers. Before I proceed to answer the objections which are commonly brought against it, let me notice the most remarkable of the other systems of the relations of Church and State which exist at present amongst us.

The two extreme systems in one point of view, are those which uphold respectively in the highest and in the lowest degree the principle of centralization; in another point of view the extreme systems are those which uphold respectively the entire identity of Church and State,—and their total alienation and even opposition to each other. Between these come all the various forms of alliance, as it is called, establishment, and endowment;—which also for the most part hold a middle place between the extreme systems in point of centralization.

1. The Roman Catholic system, taken in its full-blown developement, is the extreme of centralization, and also the extreme of identity in Church and State. It would have the whole world subject to one government; and it would have this government absolute. Now as absolute government virtually excludes not only all co-ordinate but even all distinct subordinate power;—every thing emanating from it and being accountable to it;—so the Papacy in its own proper form, as it was exhibited in the days of its greatness, was an identification of the State and the

Church under the form of the latter. For the Christian world was the Church, and of this Church the Pope was sovereign; and the so called temporal princes, emperors, kings, and senates, were responsible to him as to Christ's Vicar, and exercised their functions as subordinate parts of the great system of the Church.

Opposed to this extreme degree of centralization is the system of the Independents, which excludes centralization altogether. According to this system each congregation of Christians meeting in one place for the purposes of worship is independent of all other congregations. Now as in modern times political centralization has nowhere been reduced to so low a point as this, the Independent system has practically implied an entire separation of Church and State, inasmuch as the State has exhibited a centralization which the Church in its independent form has utterly repudiated. But if every distinct town were to be a sovereign commonwealth, as was sometimes the case in ancient Greece, then the independent principle, as such, need not be inconsistent with the identity of Church and State; for in that case the principle of centralization would be as much extinct in the political relations of the town, as it was before in the religious relations of its inhabitants.

2. The Church and the State are identical, when both consisting alike of Christians have one and the same supreme government. This government may be exercised under what is called the Church form, as in the papacy; or under what is called the State form, as where the king is the head of the Church.

The Church and State are in opposition to one another, where the government and the mass of the nation, which constitute the State, are not Christian; where therefore the principles or laws of the State and of the Church are on many important moral points at variance with each other; and a true member of the Church cannot be properly a citizen of the State, but only a subject;—he obeys

it actively in matters not opposed to the laws of the Church;—he obeys it passively, by submitting patiently to its penalties, in such matters as are opposed to the laws of the Church; but he cannot exercise a share in its government, for that were to make himself responsible for its principles;—and its principles are those of the world, and not of the Church.

3. Between these extremes are the cases of alliance, establishment, and endowment; which suppose the State to be distinct from the Church, and yet to be on friendly terms with it, and to give and receive from it certain services. How far a member of the Church can be a member or citizen of the State under such circumstances, depends on the nature of the reasons which hinder the State from identifying itself with the Church, instead of allying itself with it, or patronizing it. If it be merely owing to certain notions of Church government, there is then no objection; for the principles of the State may still be Christian. —But if it be on the ground that the State, as such, should be of no religion, then the State is in fact unchristian, and members of the Church can take no part in its government.

I must notice now the doctrine which on the one hand leads to the extreme of centralization; and on the other has prevented the true identity of Church and State, and has led to all the various schemes of alliance, establishment, or independence and alienation. This doctrine is that of a peculiar form of government existing in the Church, *jure divino*, and therefore incapable of modification at any time or under any circumstances. And the difficulty has been still farther increased by representing this supposed divine form of government to be also a divinely constituted priesthood.

This doctrine leads to the extreme of centralization, because it represents all Christians in all parts of the world as subject to one government, which derives its title from a source foreign and far superior to the laws of the

land,—and much more to the by-laws of any particular congregation. According to this view, if consistent with itself, the whole Christian Church all over the world must be subject either to a Pope or to a General Council: which of these two be preferred is a very subordinate question, both being consistent, and alone consistent, with the notion of a divinely constituted Christian priesthood.

For the same reasons this doctrine prevents the identity of Church and State in all ages which have any just notion of good government. For a power neither derived from law nor responsible to law, such as that of a pretended *jure divino* priesthood, is so clear an evil, that no men in their senses, when arrived at that period of society at which mere might is taught to yield to right, would allow it to exercise dominion over them. The Papacy therefore is unsuited to an age which begins to have a sense of justice. On the other hand, the claim of divine authority in the priesthood will not yield to those offices which are derived from human law, and have only so far God's sanction. Thus as men's common sense will not allow the priest to be King,—and the belief in a priesthood equally interferes with the King's sovereignty over the priest, the Church and the State are kept of necessity distinct, and the connexion between them must be one of alliance, whether equal or dependent, or else there can be no friendly relation at all between them.

From this supposed divine right of a priesthood, flowed directly the distinction between the so called secular and spiritual powers; and farther between secular matters, as the phrase runs, and spiritual. This distinction striking as with a two-edged sword, and pulling asunder what God had joined, made common life profane and religious life formal and superstitious;—for what are all our business and our studies but profane, if not done in Christ's name? and what are our acts of religion but the extremest folly and falsehood, if they are not made to act upon our common life? Every act of a Christian is at once secular and spi-

ritual;—secular, inasmuch as it is done in the body, in time, and on earth;—spiritual, as it proceeds from the mind and the heart, and therefore affects the soul, and reaches on to eternity.

Here then we have, in point of centralization, three systems. One which would subject all the Christian world to one government, namely to that of one or more persons of the pretended divine order of priesthood. Another, which rejecting the priesthood and the extreme of centralization, is not content with this, but rejects all centralization whatever; bringing back society almost to its simplest element, that of a single town or village. Between these there is the third system, which adopts centralization as far as God's providence appears visibly to have sanctioned it, and no farther; not placing all the world under one government, nor yet making sovereignty ridiculous by ascribing it to what may be called social atoms: but taking the clearly marked and practical division of nations or commonwealths: so that the nation should be sovereign,—and not each particular town or village on the one hand,—nor on the other hand, the whole world.

Again, we have the system of a pretended priesthood, which, to be consistent, requires the system of extreme centralization, and that the centre should be itself. But being driven from this by the common sense of mankind, it has yet prevented the acknowledgment of any other centre, and has therefore been the fruitful parent of division, contradictions, and anarchy. It has given occasion to the notion of a Church in alliance with a State, or patronized by a State; and having thus led men to conceive of the State as of something not Christian in itself, it has tended to produce that system of extreme anti-centralization, which has renounced the ideas both of the Church and of the State together.

And here I pause,—fearful of having trespassed too much on your columns;—yet afraid also lest in trying not to write too tediously I should have written obscurely,

or have omitted to anticipate objections, and so have written unsatisfactorily.

XI.—THE LABOURING POPULATION AND THE CHARTISTS.

[From the Paper dated May 25th, 1839.]

Sir,—During the session of Parliament, your columns, I know, are better employed in recording what is actually said or done by persons in public stations, than in circulating the mere comments of a private individual; nor would I wish you to depart from your practice in this respect. I will not comment upon facts,—I would only again and again entreat my countrymen to consider the facts themselves.

We read with interest the accounts of changes in the ministry,—we rejoice or grieve, as it may happen, at the result of the late negociations. And we do well in this;—for it is not a light matter whether our rulers be wise or unwise, equal to the emergencies of our condition, or unequal to them. Yet I verily believe, that the existence of the worst conceivable administration would be a light evil, in comparison to the insensibility which appears so general, as to the amount and real nature of the mischiefs which threaten us.

Are we not apt to be a great deal too lenient in punishing crime, and a great deal too sluggish in removing real evil?

Language is publicly held by the Chartist leaders, as wicked and as mischievous as the tongue of man can frame;—they recommend, directly or indirectly, murder and arson to thousands:—and yet these men, a hundred times more wicked than any felon who suffers death for a single crime,—are either allowed to enjoy perfect impunity,—or their offence is a misdemeanour, to be corrected merely by fine and imprisonment.

If history teach any one point clearly, it is that the leaders and instigators of a populace, as opposed to a people, are always either foolish or wicked,—and mostly in the highest degree both. They are entitled to no respect and to no compassion. The heaviest punishments of law never fall more deservedly than on the heads of such men. They are a mere curse to the human race, and most especially to the wretched victims of their delusions, in the actual evil which they do in their own generation, and still more in the good which they hinder, through disgust and terror at their crimes, in many generations after them.

Against these men we use neither prevention nor adequate punishment. This may be most wise and most noble, if we render them powerless by removing or lessening that real evil which alone makes them dangerous; it is mere suicidal folly, if we at once allow them to go on in their wickedness, and allow their victims to remain in such a state, that when the pestilence is let loose amongst them they cannot but catch its infection.

But whether we prevent or punish these men, or whether we let them alone, still if the real evil is not attended to, it must come in the end to the same thing. Could these men produce any impression at all in any healthy state of society? Could they be listened to for a single instant unless suffering and ignorance had already prepared the minds and hearts of their hearers for the reception of any wickedness and any folly? Suffering and ignorance are co-existent amongst a vast mass of our people, with a power of organization, and with a sense of personal and civil rights, not clear indeed or just, but lively, and with a foundation of justice which makes it doubly dangerous. Poverty, ignorance, numbers, organization and a sense of wrong done and right withheld,—I know not how any country can be more cursed than by having all these points combined together within its bosom, in opposition to every one of its existing institutions.

Greater poverty may have existed elsewhere, and

greater ignorance, perhaps too in a greater multitude of persons; but never with such organization, never with such a keen consciousness of evil suffered, never in such fearful and exasperating contrast with wealth and knowledge, never within historical memory, I speak advisedly, did there exist in any country so alarming a mass of disaffection towards the whole actual frame of society as we have now around us in England.

When Prussia, in the hour of her greatest need, wanted to wield the united energy of her whole population in one unanimous effort against the tyranny of France, she at one stroke emancipated her peasantry. It was a great measure, a measure to alarm the timid and offend the selfish; but yet the way to effect it was obvious and easy: a servile tenure was easily changed into a free one: the peasant held the land before and he continued to hold it still: the change required was but political, the relieving him from certain oppressive services, which had needlessly galled and degraded him: but these once removed, the boor was ready at once to start into the free landholder and citizen.

When France shook off the accumulated iniquities of centuries of neglect and oppression, her path too was comparatively easy. She had but to destroy the mere gratuitous insolences of feudality, as we might do away with the vexations of copyhold or customary tenures: but there, as in Prussia, the peasant had his house and his land, and the multitude of feudal tenants became a multitude of free proprietors, constituting the strength and happiness of their country.

But what can remove the evil here? It is no remnant of an unjust political system, which can be swept away in an instant; it is no mere accidental incumbrance on a social state essentially sound, and which, as soon as the incumbrance is shaken off, springs up with unabated vigour. It is a social evil merely; the growth not of feudality but of free trade, not of minute and insulting

tyranny, but of the system of letting alone, and therefore its remedy is the most difficult problem ever submitted to civilized man; nor can the solution be obtained without shocking many favourite prejudices and involving some painful sacrifices. But the slave trade was overthrown; and shall an evil equal abstractedly and to us far greater than that of the slave trade be allowed to exist unchecked for ever? What Bible or Missionary Society can propose to itself an object so great as the redemption of the labouring population of England from their present wretched state,—wretched alike to body and mind and soul? And if the work is to be done by combined efforts, will no society be formed for this highest and holiest of all purposes? If it is to be accomplished by individual energy, will there be no new Howard, or Clarkson, or Fry, to lay bare this evil in all its enormity, and to resolve with God's help that it shall no longer remain unremedied? If the aid of the legislature be needed, will the Government or will Parliament refuse their assistance to the most glorious and most blessed undertaking which ever immortalized the memory of a statesman or a legislator? It is not for an individual to prescribe in presumptuous ignorance what is to be done: but he may implore all his countrymen to apply their best thoughts to the question, to consider the present evil in all its length and breadth, and then to ask themselves, in the sight of God, whether any difficulties ought to deter them from resolving at any price to remove it.

XII.—STATE OF THE MANUFACTURING AND LABOURING POPULATION.

[From the Paper dated July 20, 1839.]

Sir,—It is very natural that you should expect from me, after having dwelt so much on the evils of the actual state of our manufacturing and labouring population, that I should attempt to suggest something as a remedy. But

if I were to do so, I should virtually belie the representation which I have made of the magnitude of the evil. That could be no deep and wide-spreading disorder in the political system, for which a common observer like myself, with no particular sources of information at his command, could confidently recommend a cure. It is in fact the common error committed by unprofessional men,—by those who are laymen, if I may so speak, with regard to the subject which they are discussing,—that not contented with calling attention to the evil, they venture also to prescribe a remedy for it. And by thus unwisely stepping beyond their proper province, they often defeat their own object. If from want of practical familiarity with the working of a system, they propose, as often happens, some awkward or impossible alteration in it, not only do they furnish a triumph to the interested supporters of old abuses, but even good and wise practical men are so shocked at the evident presumption and ignorance of the proposed reform, that they do not listen to the really true statement of grievances, which abundantly showed that some reform was needed.

But although incompetent to suggest the most proper remedies, yet a bystander may do good service by calling the attention of those who are competent to do so, but who in their turn labour under a disadvantage of another kind; namely, that their long familiarity with the actual state of things makes them less apt to perceive and to dread its dangers. The practical man is often wanting in this, that the practice with which he is well acquainted is merely his own, or that of those immediately around him;—the practice of other times and countries he often does not know;—and what he calls experience is therefore delusive, because it is too partial to furnish any safe general conclusions. "There have been riots in the manufacturing districts often without any serious consequences:—why should the danger be greater now?—It is no new thing in England for a large portion of the population to

be dependent merely on their labour,—why should we regard it a state so fraught with evil?" And sometimes if we speak of the great number of poor persons in England as compared with the rich, we are answered by a text from Scripture, misapplied as stray texts generally are,—and are told that God Himself has said "that the poor shall never cease out of the land." Now (not to dwell upon the false impression conveyed to an English reader by the word "shall" in this passage, which in the time of our translators expressed mere futurity, but now in our present language expresses also the will or intention of the speaker;)—yet it is one thing to say that the poor shall never cease out of the land altogether, and another, that they shall form the greatest proportion of its inhabitants. And this, so far from being according to the intention of the Mosaic law, was one of the things which it most laboured to obviate: the Israelitish people were to be a nation of landed proprietors: poverty was to be the occasional exception, but not the rule.

Lord Lansdowne, in the late debate in the House of Lords on the Government scheme of education, expressed a benevolent wish that education, if generally introduced amongst our manufacturing population, might greatly reduce the amount of crime. God forbid that I should speak or think slightingly of the blessings of education; but I greatly fear that we are expecting more from it in the actual state of our society than it can alone by possibility accomplish. Most wisely has Mr. Laing said in his most instructive account of Norway, that "a man may read and write and yet have a totally uneducated mind; but that he who possesses property, whether he can read and write or not, has an educated mind; he has forethought, caution, and reflection guiding every action; he knows the value of self-restraint and is in the constant habitual practice of it." What we commonly call education is invaluable when it is given in time to a people possessing the education of property;—when it opens to them

intellectual enjoyments whilst they are yet in a condition to taste them,—and so, by accustoming them to raise their standard of happiness, it prevents them from recklessly sinking to a lower condition. Education, in the common sense of the word, is required by a people before poverty has made havoc amongst them ;—at that critical moment when civilization makes its first burst,—and is accompanied by an immense commercial activity. Then is the time for general education, to teach the man of smaller means how to conduct himself in the coming fever of national developement:—to make him understand the misery of sinking from the condition of a proprietor to that of a mere labourer; and if this cannot be avoided at home, then to dispose him to emigrate to a new country, whilst he still retains the habits which will make him a valuable element in a new society there. But can what is called education,—can book learning really educate beggars, or those whose condition is so low that it cannot become lower? Our population want book knowledge, and they also want the means in point of social well-being to render this knowledge available. This is the difficulty of the problem that we know not where to begin. And we shall have gained something, if we are well convinced that no single measure, whether of so called education, or of emigration, or of an improved poor-law,—and far less any political privilege which when given to men unfit to use it is an evil to themselves rather than a good,—will be of real efficacy to better our condition.

If I can impress your readers with this conviction, I shall do more good than by proposing any remedy of my own, to which there might be serious practicable objections; and then he who makes these objections would be supposed to have overthrown all that I had been urging. I cannot tell by myself how to mend the existing evil, but I wish to call attention to its magnitude. I wish to persuade men that a prodigious effort is required: we want every man's wisdom and every man's virtue to con-

sider carefully the state in which we are now living, and to shrink from no sacrifices which may be called for to correct it.

XIII.—THE EVILS OF OUR NATIONAL STATE.

[From the Paper dated November 9, 1839.]

Sir,—If I have not troubled you lately with any of my communications, it is not that my interest is at all abated in these great questions to which I have tried to awaken the attention of your readers; nor yet that the present apparent slumber of Chartism encourages me to hope that the symptoms of the great national evil which afflicts us are really wearing a more favourable aspect; but it is much rather because the contrast between the magnitude of the disease, and the feebleness of my efforts to check its progress, is so absolutely startling, that to hope to do good by such means in such a matter seems at once ridiculous and desperate.

I feel, Sir, but too truly that it is so. And I could often find it in my heart to turn away my eyes altogether from the prospect of our national state, and solacing myself with the hope that the dreaded evil may after all not come in my life-time, to occupy myself wholly with private interests and duties. Many I believe do this; the supposed desperateness of the case veiling to their consciences the blameableness of thus abandoning it. But, Sir, although things as they now are may last out my time, can we persuade ourselves that they will last out the time of our children? And it is surely no very romantic patriotism to dread for one's own immediate children the arrival of a season of crime and misery, such as I will believe the whole preceding experience of the human race will have never seen paralleled.

What no individual efforts could compass,—I am not

speaking of any thing so insignificant as my own,—but what really is beyond the powers of any one man to accomplish, that may possibly be effected by the joint efforts of many. But a Society, to be worthy of such a cause should be truly comprehensive, should embrace men of all varieties of rank, calling, and political party. Yet we know that in England, although men of different ranks and occupations will work together, yet men of different parties will not,—and indeed in some respects cannot. For if my neighbour's truth be to me a falsehood, how can I assist him in propagating it; or how can he help to circulate what I hold to be truth, if to him it seems to be error?

In order to meet this difficulty, and yet to obtain that general co-operation which is on every account so desirable, it would seem desirable that the object of the proposed Society should be merely to collect facts relative to the condition of the labouring classes, and to bring them to the knowledge of the public, without expressing any opinion as to the most effectual remedies for the state of things thus developed. It is obvious that to present a full view of the condition of the labouring classes throughout the kingdom, would be at once a very costly and a very laborious undertaking; that it would find ample employment for the contributions and for the personal exertions of a very numerous and wealthy society. And I conceive that the points of inquiry might be made so definite, as greatly to check, if not altogether to exclude, the exhibition of party feeling in the reports of such a society. For instance, in order to obtain a correct notion of the state of the poor in any given town or parish, we should wish to know,—1st, the total population, and the proportion of mere labourers to shopkeepers, professional men, farmers, or proprietors; 2nd, the rate of wages, and their proportion to the price of provisions, lodging, and fuel; 3rd, the quality of the labouring population, how many of them are strangers, and how many have been born in the

place where they are now working; 4th, the ecclesiastical divisions of the place, and the number and size of places of worship, and the number of ministers, whether of the Established Church or dissenters; 5th, the number and character of the schools, and other places of instruction, including the age at which the children generally go to and are taken away from school; 6th, police details: the amount and character of crime, and, so far as it exists in a noticeable shape, of vice; the number of public houses and beer houses; 6th, wherever it is possible there should be a comparison of the actual state of the country in all these points, and its state ten, twenty, and fifty years ago; for by comparing the present with the past, we find out which way things are tending, whether for the better or for the worse; 7th, the size and situation of labourers' dwellings; how many persons live in cellars under ground; how many sleep in the same room, and the size of rooms; how many have gardens, or any accessible outlet, where they may have fresh air and healthy exercise; 8th, the quality and quantity of food, the comparative use of bread and potatoes; what is the consumption of animal food on the one hand, or of ardent spirits on the other; how many human beings live actually on bread or potatoes, and on tea; 9th, what books, newspapers, tracts, or addresses, circulate amongst them; whether they read much, and what they read; and also the number and character of such clubs, unions, associations, &c., as may exist among them. I might add yet other points, but these which I have given are all tangible matters of fact, and as such might be faithfully reported by men of the most opposite opinions, so long as they agreed in the wish that the real state of the poor in all particulars should be brought before the eyes of the rest of the community.

But to a Society so formed for the exclusive purpose of bringing to light matters of fact, without proposing any remedies to the evils thus made public, much objection has within my own knowledge been made; and it has

been said that before we thus reveal the evil in its tremendous magnitude, we ought to come to some understanding as to the best means of removing or reducing it. I contend, on the contrary, that at present such an understanding is absolutely impossible; and I cannot conceal my conviction that the remedies required will involve sacrifices on the part of the richer classes, which if not willingly made but wrested from them will be wholly useless, and which will not be made voluntarily unless they are first thoroughly impressed with the enormity of the existing evil. I do not say that such sacrifices would be made, even then; it may be that they would not; but I am sure that they will not be made otherwise. There are men who will not deny their appetites in eating and drinking, even if they are aware that the consequences of continued self-indulgence is certain death; but there are thousands and tens of thousands who would undoubtedly refuse to observe a very strict regimen, if they were not aware of any thing in themselves or in the state of the atmosphere which threatened them, unless they were careful, with serious or fatal diseases.

But can it be supposed that there is danger in revealing the evils of our social condition, unless we offer at the same time the hope of a remedy for them? Surely the danger consists not in knowing that our neighbour is in distress, but in his knowing it himself. The rich might safely be ignorant of what the poor suffer, if the poor could be ignorant of it also. If both were ignorant of it equally, there would be safety; if both were clearly aware of it, there would be hope; but for the poor to know and feel it keenly, while the rich are ignorant of or inattentive to it, this is dangerous, this is a state of things almost desperate. Would the most elaborate reports that could be published add to that deep sense of disquiet and privation which prevails amongst the poorer classes, and which is not the less dangerous because it neither understands clearly the causes of its suffering, nor judges rightly

of the remedy? A real knowledge of their own state, and of its causes, would be desirable even for the poor themselves: bad as the truth is when seen wholly, it is not nearly so bad as it seems to be when viewed only partially; but for the richer classes, the fullest knowledge, the liveliest sense of the evils endured by their poorer countrymen, is not danger, but recovery: ignorance in them is not bliss, but inevitable destruction.

Therefore it seems to me that a Society, consisting of men of all parties, might be advantageously formed for the purpose of collecting information, at once comprehensive and minute, respecting the state of the class of labourers, agricultural and manufacturing, throughout the kingdom, and of calling public attention to the facts so collected. This appears to be a step practicable and important; safe, yet leading to great results hereafter. If any of your readers agree with me in this, let them think whether they can do any thing to carry our idea into effect; if they have any better plan to propose, gladly would I adopt it, and, so far as I could, further it. Only let our great object be effected, and it matters little who are the instruments.

XIV.—NATIONAL CHURCH ESTABLISHMENTS.

[From the Paper dated January 18, 1840.]

Sir,—I trust that your correspondent, Sir Culling Eardley Smith, will not accuse me of disrespect if I still address you under my accustomed signature. To say the truth, I am so unknown to the great majority of your readers, and so much a stranger to your county, that I should accuse myself of presumption if I obtruded myself personally by name upon their notice. The character of my letters will I hope be a sufficient voucher that I can have no unworthy motives for not affixing my name to them; there has been, I trust, nothing in any of them which as a

Christian or a gentleman I should be ashamed to avow. This being the case, it seems to me more becoming that I should leave my communications wholly to their own fate, that nothing of a personal nature may affect any one's judgment of their contents, whether for good or for bad.

The question now at issue in the Church of Scotland is doubtless one of considerable importance. I do not feel enough acquainted with the constitution of that Church to enter into the legal points;—but I do not see how the present dispute affects the question of Church Establishments. It is surely perfectly feasible in a Church, as well as in any other society, to provide for the due appointment of the officers of the society: the right of patronage is held subject to such laws as may be required to qualify it. These laws may be at present too lax,—that is, they may not sufficiently provide against the appointment of unfit persons; if so, let them be made more stringent: for certain it is that it is the theory of a Church Establishment, as of all other institutions, that unfit persons should not be made its officers;—and this theory may be reduced to practice as nearly in the appointment of a minister of the Church as of a judge, or a governor of a colony;—it will never of course be perfectly acted upon owing to the faults of human nature.

Thus far then I should agree with Dr. Chalmers, that if by the actual constitution of the Scotch Church the choice of the individual patron is too unrestrained, so that in spite of the remonstrances of the proper Church authorities he may appoint an unfit and unworthy minister, then that constitution requires amendment, and undoubtedly it may be amended, if it be found expedient, without any injustice to the patrons; for patronage is essentially a trust rather than a property, and as such may be, has been, and is, controlled by law.

But, on the other hand, if the Church of Scotland were to cease to-morrow to be an Establishment, I for one, if I were a member of it, should deprecate earnestly the

language used by Dr. Chalmers and I think also by Sir Culling Smith,—as assuming a power of judgment such as belongs to God alone,—and tending in practice either to a system of priestly tyranny, or to one of party and sectarian exclusiveness, most injurious to the spiritual welfare of the Church.

It is a grievance, according to Dr. Chalmers;—and your correspondent quotes the sentiment, I think, with admiration,—"that before a man can forfeit the privilege" (of Church membership and access to the Communion,) "there must be a *corpus delicti*,—some specific delinquency palpable enough for cognizance and condemnation by a bench of secular judges, at whose mandate the prostrate Church must receive into her inmost sanctuary men who in her own judgment, though living without any gross or definable immorality, are yet living without God in the world." I have no doubt that many of your readers will sympathize with this language. I have heard other good and sensible men, besides Dr. Chalmers, speak in this manner,—yet it seems to me either extremely vague and incautious in its expression, or else in a high degree unjust and unchristian. It is the misuse of the invidious term "secular judges," which deceives so many. If it be meant that heathens should not judge in a matter pertaining to the Christian Church, no one, so far as I am aware, disputes it. If it be meant that Christians, whether judges or bishops, clergy or laymen, are sometimes rather worldly than spiritually minded, it is true, and to be lamented, but by no human power effectually remedied. If it be meant again that the courts of common law can only take cognizance of violations of that law, and that there are sins and vices which are not crimes, then such courts, acting on such a principle, would be unfit to judge of the propriety of a Church appointment; but their unfitness would have nothing to do with their secularity,—for courts martial, which I suppose are secular enough, can and do take cognizance not only of

crimes but of vices, and even of things so undefined as "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." But Dr. Chalmers himself does not appear to charge the civil courts with proceeding on such a limited view of their duty as to consider nothing but legal criminality in a question of Church membership. His complaint is that they require "a *Corpus delicti*, some specific delinquency;" whereas the Church, or more properly the clergy, would exclude a man who was "living without any gross or definable immorality," because "in their judgment he was yet living without God in the world." That is to say, that the civil courts require at least "a definable immorality" before they will exclude a baptized Christian from the communion of his Church;—but Dr. Chalmers and his brother clergymen would exclude him, "because in their judgment he was living without God in the world." If a Christian man's "living without God in the world" be not indicated by so much as any "definable immorality," by what power shall any human eye ascertain it? And are Christ's people, with no offence charged or chargeable against them, to be excluded from the Church because their brethren presume to judge, in spite of their baptism, in spite of their continued profession, in spite of their moral lives,—that they are "living without God in the world?"

Let me not be misunderstood. I know that they may be so living;—I know that there are evils of the heart which may exclude many even eminent and useful members of the visible Church from entering into Christ's perfected Church or kingdom hereafter. Let Dr. Chalmers, let us all, be deeply aware for our own selves, that there is One who seeth not as man seeth, who trieth the very hearts and reins. But no less earnestly do I deprecate the pretensions of any human judge to invade the peculiar province of Christ the Judge of all;—it is for Him and Him alone to judge of the heart by itself and not from its actions; but we even in His Church must

require "some specific delinquency:" "some definable immorality," or else our judgment will not be spiritual as opposed to secular,—but presumptuous, uncharitable and unjust, as opposed to what is wise and good and christian.

This fond desire after an unattainable spiritual purity in the Church on earth is the great error of many of the best men amongst the Dissenters. I call it without hesitation an error, both because it is I think contrary to Scripture, wholly at variance with the practice of the early Church, and considered both theoretically and in its practical results injurious to the interests of Christianity. St. Paul has no other idea of exclusion from the Church than as the punishment of open and scandalous sin;—"If any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner; with such an one, no not to eat." It is well known that the words, translated "covetous" and "an extortioner," mean much more than these English terms: and signify rather "one who defrauds," and "one who takes by violence." All these are proveable and tangible offences, and as such are proper subjects for human judgment; with regard to these things and such as these the discipline of the early Church was strict, and that great strictness in such matters is by no means out of the reach of civil magistrates is shown, (to take one famous example out of the general practice of the ancient world,) by the severity of the Roman censorship. But the mischief of going farther than this, and of attempting to punish what is called "living without God in the world," consists in the opening a door to all uncharitableness and to all party prejudice,—feelings whose favourite weapon is vague and unproveable accusation. And again, from the vagueness of the charge of a want of spirituality, and the impossibility of really proving this against a man, people are apt to set up various imaginary criteria of the offence, according to their various tempers and prejudices;—even look and manner are held to be indications of a worldly mind; again, opinions

on all sorts of subjects are regarded as symptoms of the same thing, and thus a captious and narrow disposition is generated, and while worldly-mindedness is in vain attempted to be hunted out of the Church, other sins no less unchristian, such as malice, spiritual pride, and hypocrisy, are actually encouraged by the process.

A really strict discipline, such as the Christian Church once had, strict against open and proveable offences, but not pretending to judge the heart, is practicable and has been practised amongst large bodies of men, and even amongst an entire people. In proportion as public opinion is purified, discipline may rise with it; but public opinion in every Christian country would at this instant sanction a very considerable amount of discipline, if men would leave off confounding the Church with the clergy, and supposing that the legislation and government of the Church rest not with itself, but with one particular order of men amongst its members.

Dr. Chalmers's letter is full of this confusion, which indeed the unhappy constitution of the Scotch Church, in this respect agreeing unconsciously with the original and inherent error of the Romish, does but too much encourage. But we in England have no excuse for being so beguiled. The foundation of our Church is laid in the great principle that the clergy are not its rulers but the King: the King, who is the representative of the whole Church, and in whose supremacy the claims of popes, bishops, or presbyteries to be by divine right the rulers of Christ's people, have been by God's blessing both in principle and practice denied.

If a heathen government endeavour to invade the rights of the Christian Church, Christians should lay down their lives rather than abet such a sacrilege. But in England, —and would that it were so also in Scotland,—in any quarrel between the clergy and the government, it is begging the whole question to talk of it as a dispute between the Church and the State. It may be so indeed,

and then there is no doubt that the highest obedience of every Christian is due to the Church. But it may be also a dispute between the Church and the clergy; and then also our duty is the same, and the sacrilege and profaneness is not in the supreme government of the Church, but in its inferior officers; not in the Crown but in the clergy.

XV.—STATE OF THE POOR.

[From the Paper dated January 25, 1840.]

Sir,—I remember well that the year 1840 was fixed upon more than once by various persons, as a period which would be marked with great calamities. And in the course of the last summer there seemed to prevail, as I have heard, an indefinite apprehension over many parts of the Continent, as if some great change were at hand. Such forebodings, as we all know, are sometimes verified by the reality; but whether they may be so or not in this instance, the prospects with which the year 1840 has opened, are certainly full of reasonable alarm.

We see a slave rebellion breaking out,—or burning just below the surface, over a large part of the kingdom. I call it a slave rebellion, advisedly; for the words and actions of the Chartists show them to be slaves of the most degraded sort, and if we give them their right name it will teach us how to deal with them.

Slaves, Sir, by the curse of their unhappy condition, are in a certain degree morally mad. The ideas of freemen are not intelligible to them, while they go wild after some strange chimeras of their own; they plait their straw into the shape of a crown, and they fancy themselves to be kings.

It is for this reason that I call the Chartists slaves. When I hear them speaking against the institution of

property, what is it but a slave's language? A slave can neither acquire nor alienate,—he has and can have no property; the notion of property is essentially foreign to his condition; but to freemen, it is one of the highest distinctions of humanity that men cannot only possess what they eat and drink and wear,—which the beasts can do no less, but that they can lay by, improve and increase, give and even bequeath certain portions of the earth or of the things upon it, portions taken by industry and preserved by law from being subject to the wasteful scramble of ignorance and force. An institution so sacred, and so essential to the elevation of our nature, is and ever has been deeply valued by all freemen who have been more than savages. Slaves, as I said, have no share in it, and no perception of it; and they who speak of it slightingly proclaim themselves to be as slaves.

Again; freemen have held it a part of their condition, that they should not be confined to one place, but be able to go to other countries when their circumstances at home are unfavourable. By the exercise of this freedom the whole earth has been subdued to man's uses, and civilization has been spread all over the world. When then I hear a Chartist leader protest against emigration, and call it transportation, I hear the language not of freemen but of slaves; of persons bound to the soil, *glebæ adscripti*, who, being fastened to one spot like the trees and rocks around them, have no knowledge or conception of living in any other:—when distress and scarcity come, they have no choice but to starve and die.

Freemen, further, have a love for the past, and an anticipation of the future. Brought up by the tender care of their own parents, they are immediately connected with the generation before them; rearing up their own children with equal care, they are connected no less with the generation that is to follow them. And as every generation of freemen is so linked with the one before and after it, and as they have works of their hands and much more of

their minds which live through many generations, so freemen are, as becomes them, "Beings of large discourse, looking before and after;" what is ancient, is not so much distant from them as consecrated to their minds by having been known and loved by so many of their fathers, in so many ages; what is remote in futurity, is that high blessing to which, if they forfeit not a freeman's privilege, their children, helped by their care and institutions, may one day be enabled to attain.

But how is it with the slave? Alas! in the stern but true language of the law, he is "*nullius filius*," the son of nobody; he has no parent, and can have no children. What is the past to him or what the future, so far as earth is concerned, more than to the beasts? Ancient buildings, ancient birth, ancient usages, ancient laws, are to him but words without a meaning. All behind him is a blank, and so is all before him. And thus, again, when I hear the Chartist leaders talk with indifference or with hatred of all our old institutions,—when I find them perfectly ignorant and careless of history, and as incapable of carrying forward their view beyond the immediate present, I see again the certain marks of slaves,—I hear a language which in all but slaves is insanity.

Most of all, in the most degraded state of slavery, the slave has had no sense of the virtues or crimes of freemen; he has been unable to understand their very religion. He has been false, dishonest, bloodthirsty, and godless. And when we hear them recommending and practising arson and murder, when we find them echoing the wretched blasphemies of the Socialists, as dead to a Christian's hope as to a freeman's honesty, what can we say but that they are slaves of the very lowest and vilest sort, sunk to a far worse state than that of the beasts who cannot be better than they are.

But now, Sir, what shall we say, if this slavery in which the Chartists, or at least their loudest organs, are sunk, be a state in which they have in great measure brought on

themselves? With much of neglect on the part of others towards them, a neglect which I acknowldge to be our sin in the sight of God, yet there is not oppression. They are not slaves in law or in fact by the injustice of their neighbours; the men whose writings and actions exhibit the worst wickedness and ignorance of a slave's condition, have sold themselves. The wretches who call themselves Chartist leaders, who in no other known age or country would have escaped condign punishment for the atrocity of their daily language and proceedings, are slaves indeed of the worst sort, but they are slaves of their own making.

For the working classes of England, our free and Christian brethren, who, from the course of circumstances ill watched and ill understood, are labouring at the present moment under a distress and an ignorance most unfit for freemen and Christians, our most tender sympathy, our most zealous efforts of counsel and action may most justly be claimed. But for the Chartists—I speak of them from their speeches and their acts, as long as they make themselves slaves in all falsehood, ignorance, and atrocity, so long they should be treated as slaves, strictly coerced and severely punished; lest by any means they should be able to exhibit the spectacle of slaves broken loose, and trampling down every thing dear to freemen in their brutish ferocity.

It seems to me quite necessary to say this, because there is a portion of the public press which seems to confound the Chartists with the working classes, and appears unwilling to condemn the former strongly, lest it should appear insensible to the rights and sufferings of the latter. Whereas precisely because the elevation of the working classes is to me an object more precious than any other in the world, I abhor these wretched self-made slaves who would degrade the working classes and all others body and soul to their own level. Nor must we confound

political opinions with flagrant crimes. Granting that the former should have free course, is it disseminating political opinions to recommend burning and robbing and murdering? And could not the plain sense of any jury in the land distinguish between even an intemperate or scurrilous argument and a direct incentive to crime?

I honour the Government for their wish to leave the repression of these outrages to the ordinary course of law. But it should be remembered that the proceedings of our law, so admirably fitted to prevent the oppression of innocence, are for that very reason unfitted to a state of open crime, which does not seek to escape justice, but defies it. The common sense of all mankind has adopted extraordinary measures of prevention or of punishment in times when sedition was breaking out into rebellion; and it is not wise to allow our towns to be burned and our citizens to be murdered, because one or two of the guilty, if caught in the fact, may by possibility, after much delay and every exertion of legal ingenuity in their favour, be convicted and punished.

I have called the Chartists, judging from their language and actions, slaves of the most degraded sort; and made such not by others, but by themselves. And so their emancipation can come only from themselves. We may encourage it indeed, and are bound to do so; we may call upon them to remember that they are freemen, if they will but know their privileges; but we can do no more than this: if they will hold the slave's language, and practise the slave's crimes, no power of man can raise them into citizens, whether of an earthly commonwealth, or of the city of God.

But cannot we and are we not bound to stop these slave's principles from tainting our freemen? Are we not bound to consider earnestly and immediately the condition of the working classes, remembering always that the freeman without property is in some danger of becoming

the slave who hates property, that the poor freeman not treated by the rich as a brother, is apt to sink into the slave who hates the rich as his enemies.

Every motive that can rouse man to action calls us to this duty; if we neglect it, surely it must be that God has stricken us, rulers and people together, with that blindness which is the consequence of sin and the forerunner of destruction.

XVI.—STATE OF THE WORKING CLASSES.

[From the Paper dated February 1, 1840.]

Sir,—It is satisfactory to see that the condition of our working classes has attracted the serious attention of Parliament. To observe and to inquire must surely lead us to remedy and to improve. May I at this moment venture to offer one or two suggestions,—suggestions indeed presented with a deep consciousness of my imperfect knowledge,—and if for brevity's sake I speak without qualification, I would beg my readers to believe, once for all, that nothing is farther from my mind than a presumptuous confidence in the wisdom of my own conclusions.

1st. The evil to be remedied is not local or temporary. The present aggravated symptoms may be both these,—and there is great danger of our mistaking these symptoms for the whole disorder. It is neither the indifferent harvest, nor the American embarrassments, nor the Corn Laws, which constitute the real mischief. Trade may revive, and the ultimate evil may be only the more increased. The evil is universal and perpetual on our present system, because that system, in all its manifold branches, allows the poorer classes, being freemen, to sink more and more into the state of slaves; or as I believe I have said before, it congratulates itself on having done

away with slavery, and it does not understand how great a task it undertook in so doing. For it undertook to solve and not to cut that great difficulty which puzzled the wisest men and the wisest nations of the ancient world, how to keep all the *human beings* in any given country in a condition worthy of their common humanity.

This is the real problem;—it is how to keep more than twenty millions of human beings in such a state, as that, speaking in the mass, they shall have sufficient physical comforts, and a share of political rights, and some degree at least of intellectual and spiritual cultivation. All these are the just portion of freemen,—and if we do not think it possible to provide these for our people, then let us cease to revile the Greeks and Romans and Americans, and confess that we too have slavery amongst us, and confess it to be an inevitable evil.

No, Sir,—by God's blessing it is not inevitable, if we look steadily at it, and will pay the price of removing it. We did not scruple to pay twenty millions to get rid of it in the West Indies;—would we and ought we not to pay twice as much if needful to remove it at home?

Now for the remedies; this seems a clear general rule that many being equally needed should be applied together. A remedy in itself good for one particular symptom may do harm rather than good to the whole case, if applied alone; or if not mischievous it may be inefficient. Many a man has some favourite specific which he loudly presses on our notice. If we take any one of these singly we are but trusting to a quack medicine, and shall pay the penalty of our folly—but if we take all, we may be likely to be much nearer the remedy.

Again, some things can be pointed out confidently as both practicable and beneficial;—of others we can but say that the remedy lies somewhere about them, and should be well looked for,—but its distinct shape and proportions are not yet manifest.

Of things certainly practicable and beneficial I place

first, the subdivision of parishes and townships, so as to furnish to every thousand of human beings the benefits of what may really be called society. The inhabitants of a fashionable square in London, or those of a wretched row of cottages in a mere manufacturing village, are neither by themselves deserving of the name. Into the masses of poor now herded together in many of our large towns, the influences of society cannot penetrate. The best charm and the highest virtue of neighbourhood, that every one knows every one, is there utterly lost.

The Church Building Society has had a notion of this evil, but has surely mistaken the means of remedying it. What is wanted is to build up living churches,—not dead ones of brick and stone. That was a true and living Church which met for prayer and praise in the subterranean quarries without the walls of Rome; and such Churches would better serve our purposes than all the splendour of St. Peter's. Not that the splendour of the material church impairs the purity of the living Church; to think so were a puritanical folly; but each in its own order,—first that which is necessary, the living Church; then in its season, the natural fruit of the prosperity of the living Church, comes the church of brick or stone.

The money which is given for building places of worship should be given to provide ministers. Those ministers should have each their deacons—not clergymen, nor men paid by society, which is impossible; but such good men and women as do now after a manner supply the deacon's place in large towns, under the name of visitors of the poor, supported by their own ordinary callings, and never dreaming of being paid for their services. But if these were as they should be, the deacons and deaconesses of the Church, what a variety of benefits would result from it in more ways, and in larger measure than I can now fully develope!

Together with this, it would be surely practicable and

clearly beneficial to have in every division so constituted something of an internal administration, in which every man should be more or less concerned. A vestry is an excellent institution, but it includes only the rate-payers. It has been the misfortune of our constitution in all things to consider government too exclusively as a matter of mere management of money, and therefore to give a share in it only towards those who pay. Now there is no surer law in human affairs than that the possession of a certain degree of administrative and legislative power, if it be but administering and legislating for a common club, is in itself highly softening and civilizing; it inculcates obedience to law, because it acquaints men practically with law's importance, and identifies it in some degree with their own.

All that I have been urging was actually the system of our Saxon forefathers. They were fully aware how important it was in society that every man should know every man; they went even farther, and made every man answerable for every man. They had no notion of a mass of human beings poor and ignorant, wandering often from one place to another to find work,—unmissed in the place they leave,—unnoticed in that to which they migrate. And ask of the officers of local regiments, where the men all come from the same neighbourhood,—whether this principle has not been found of wonderful force in maintaining discipline and good conduct. I have heard of a Highland regiment in which the commanding-officer has been known to substitute for the threat of ordinary punishment that of writing to the offender's father, and it was a threat which was seldom used in vain.

In short, the unwieldy and utterly unorganized mass of our population requires to be thoroughly organized. Where is the part of our body into which minute blood-vessels and nerves of the most acute sensibility are not insinuated, so that every part there is truly alive? Not

less true than the old tyrant's maxim of "divide and conquer," is the rule of political and Christian wisdom, "divide and improve."

This could be done at once, easily and with certain benefit. But is this enough? Then indeed if I said so my remedy would be a quack's nostrum,—I should be doing the very thing which I deprecate. This is not enough; but thus far I see my way clearly,—beyond I see only that we must advance,—I see what direction generally the road must take, but the country has not yet been sufficiently surveyed to determine the particular line.

Something must be done to restrain the enormous accumulation of property in single hands, to facilitate its acquisition and secure its possession to the mass of the community. Men must distinguish clearly between small tenancies and small properties; the former, as in Ireland, are but a source of servility, wretchedness, and crime; the latter, as in Norway, and in every other country where they have ever existed, have been a source no less sure of independence, comfort, and virtue.

Sooner or later men must look to the question of the debt. Do we really think that the property and industry of the nation can struggle against this burden for ever? Why do we make such a cry about the Corn Laws, and not look to that monstrous evil from which the whole difficulty of the Corn Law question proceeds? Every acre in the kingdom is deeply mortgaged; every manufactory is mortgaged, every mine is mortgaged;—our very limbs and minds,—our industry and our skill,—are so to speak mortgaged, and yet our very existence depends, not on our merely rivalling but actually surpassing all the competition of nations whose land, capital, and faculties are alike unburdened.

This has been well known by the greatest and ablest of men,—by Burke and by Niebuhr; this was clearly seen by the unprejudiced sagacity of Hume; this must com-

mend itself one would think to the common sense of every man who has ever felt the burden of being in debt, and the pleasure of feeling that his property and his income were his own. That the greatest sacrifices would be wisely made to ensure this object, and that thus alone can a scandalous bankruptcy sooner or later be prevented, appears to me perfectly certain.

There is enough to think on in what has been already stated. Would that others would carry on the train of thought which I have suggested, would improve it where it is just, and would correct it where in error!

XVII.—CHURCH ESTABLISHMENTS.

[From the Paper dated March 21, 1840.]

Sir,—I am sincerely unwilling to add to the number of your correspondents on the subject of Church Establishments;—unwilling besides, if I trouble you at all, to write upon any other question than that to which I have generally confined myself. But in truth this discussion about Establishments does touch most nearly the question of the social improvement of our poorer classes. Difficult as such improvement must be under any circumstances, it must be, humanly speaking, utterly impossible, if the voluntary system, as it is called, should ever be set up on the ruins of the Establishment. Inadequate as our means are at this moment, what would they be if all those funds, which now in every part of the kingdom are set apart for public purposes, were to be taken from the public, and given over to private individuals?

If I understand the objections to an Establishment rightly, they resolve themselves, at least so far as the writers in the *Christian Reformer* are concerned, into these

three following: 1st. That what is called the King's supremacy and the power of parliament over the Church is a profane subjecting of Christ's kingdom to a secular authority. 2nd. That the Church ought to be a congregation of good and holy men, and of such only: and 3rd. That an Establishment interferes of necessity with its becoming so.

You will feel at once, Sir, that it is impossible to argue all these points fully within the limits of a newspaper; and even if I could discuss them all satisfactorily, there would still remain the positive side of my argument; that Establishments are not only not sinful but are absolutely essential to the full manifestation of Christ's kingdom; and then again I should have to show how far our actual English Establishment realizes its theory or idea; and what are the causes which make it in any degree fall short of it. A great subject indeed,—I know of none worthier; but one requiring for its full developement, not a newspaper, nor even a pamphlet; but a large volume.

Again, my own views differ very widely I believe from those of the greater part of the defenders of Establishments. On their principles I could not maintain their conclusions. It is very likely therefore that although my view is perfectly intelligible to myself, yet that if stated briefly it may not be so to others: that it may be judged from the views of other writers who agree with me in my result, and that I may be supposed, therefore, unless I expressly state the contrary, to agree with them in their principles; so that I may appear to be holding inconsistent opinions, or some which lead to mischievous consequences, because such have been often held by those who in this question are, to speak in common language, engaged with me on the same side.

For instance, if I held the necessity of what is called the apostolical succession of bishops and presbyters, I must allow that the King's supremacy is an usurpation of the State over the Church; and such an usurpation

I hold to be clearly contrary to Christianity. For if a government for the Christian Church has been fixed for all time by divine authority, and of this government the King forms no part, nor is mentioned in what may be called on this supposition the Church's constitutional charter, then he must be clearly an extraneous element, and his supremacy must be that of a stranger over the household of God.

But, Sir, it is just this one grand falsehood of the necessity or possible reality of such a succession, which from the earliest times has confused this whole question. The Church, like every other society, has varied practically in its government in different times and countries; and these varieties have all had their good as well as their evil. It must have *a* government clearly; but whether this government shall be popular, aristocratical, or monarchical, has been no more fixed for it by divine authority, than for any other society in the world. As long as it is merely a subordinate part of any nation, the alterations of its government depend on other causes; but as soon as it becomes co-extensive with the whole nation, then its government takes the form which it found existing in that nation; being democratical in a democracy, aristocratical in an aristocracy, monarchical in a pure monarchy, and mixed under a mixed government like ours.

The Church, having no government fixed for it by divine authority, naturally assumes the form existing in the nation, when its members coinciding with the members of the nation, it expands into its higher character of a Christian commonwealth or kingdom. It is not of necessity that it should do so, the nation may assume the form of the Church government if it will; in other words, the members of the nation and the members of the Church being the self-same persons, may appoint for their supreme government whatever form shall seem good to them.

Now, Sir, having thus far shown that the doctrine of

apostolical succession by divine right is inconsistent with the King's supremacy; in other words, that the King's supremacy is only to be defended as the form of government adopted by the Church for herself in her more perfect form of a Christian commonwealth, she having no form of government prescribed for her by divine authority for all times and countries. I come next to confess, no less fairly, that such an identity of Church and State as I have here supposed, identity be it observed, and by no means alliance merely, that this identity of Church and State, which I hold to be the highest perfection of each, and which Mr. Hallam and many others hold to be a notion fraught with mischief, is clearly false and impracticable if the doctrine first broached in the eighteenth or seventeenth century be true, namely, that the highest object of the State is the physical well-being of its members, or as Warburton expresses it, the conservation of body and goods.

Undoubtedly, Sir, if this be the true notion of a State, it never can be identical with the Church of Christ. But neither can there properly be an alliance between them, for they are as if this be really the highest object of the State, not different merely, but opposed to one another. The State is then "the World," which is not the ally of the Church, but its enemy. It is the very contrast exhibited in the account of our Lord's temptation; the Church declaring that man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word of God: the State insisting that the stone shall be turned into bread.

And here we have before us in these two doctrines, that of the supposed apostolical succession of bishops and presbyters on the one hand, and that of the exclusively physical and external objects of government on the other, two principles utterly at variance as I think with any just views of an Establishment. If I held either of these to be true, I should be obliged to confess that an Established

Church in the full extension of the term could not and ought not to be.

But as I regard these two principles to be respectively types or representatives of the two great forms of evil by which the world has been cursed from the beginning, which apparently most adverse to one another have yet continually promoted each other's success, and have alike thwarted and persecuted the cause of good; those great forms of evil which may be called, the one idolatry and the other ungodliness; so the incompatibility of each of these with what appears on other grounds to be the perfect idea of the Christian Church, is, to my mind, a most encouraging and comforting circumstance; inasmuch as it affords no mean presumption that what these two arch and opposite falsehoods each repel with equal aversion, can be no other than the very pure and perfect truth.

The supremacy then of King and Parliament in a Christian nation, over bishops and presbyters, is the supremacy of no external or secular power over the Church, but of the sovereign power of and in the Church, over its subordinate officers; or, to speak more correctly, it is the assertion of the sovereignty of the Church as a whole over any one particular portion of its members; a principle which is the foundation of all good government, and which it were the strangest of all strange phenomena, did I not know the infinite confusions which possess men's minds on this question, to see disputed by English Dissenters.

The writers against Establishments, in the *Christian Reformer*, do not hold the doctrine of the apostolical succession in more respect than I do. But they hold, I fear, the other and not less mischievous doctrine, that the objects of civil society are purely physical and external. And the prevailing opinions and practices of the present age, in this country not less than in others, are likely no doubt to countenance them in it. But the accordant voice of all governments and of all philosophers, till within the last

hundred and fifty years at the outside, is against them; and in no age or country has the doctrine of the merely physical objects of law and government been fully acted upon; for if it were brought out consistently in all its consequences, the common sense and conscience of mankind would at once reject it.

He who holds that government was instituted, I do not mean in historical fact but according to its true idea, and God's purpose, for the general improvement and well-being of man; and that this object has been pursued more or less successfully according to the more or less correct views which have prevailed as to what man's well-being in the highest sense is; will see that government, when endowed with Christian knowledge, is then and then only in a condition to accomplish its object thoroughly, that then its object becomes identical with that of the Church; and two societies with the self-same object and the self-same members, must inevitably, unless there be a necessary hindrance in their formal constitution, blend together into one. The alleged apostolical succession would be such an hindrance, unless the society chose to take that form of government, and become a priestly aristocracy: but those who reject the pretended succession ought not surely to see any objection in point of principle to that perfected form of a Christian commonwealth in which the knowledge of the Church is blended with the power of the State, and both are combined to work out man's highest good.

Space is wanting for an answer to the objections which may be made to this statement. I must by the necessity of the case content myself with stating my view of the question, and endeavouring at any rate to make it intelligible. Two points urged by the opponents to Establishments yet remain to be noticed; but I have already trespassed upon your columns too largely.

XVIII.—WAR WITH FRANCE.

[From the Paper dated November 28, 1840.]

Sir,—There seems almost a foolishness in any attempts on the part of obscure individuals to influence the measures of the government of a great nation. Yet it is hardly in human nature to see oneself on the edge of a cataract, and to surrender oneself to destruction without moving a hand or uttering a sound. And though one journal,—and certainly a mere correspondent of one journal, can do little or nothing,—yet if the press throughout the kingdom could be roused to the magnitude of the danger, the evil would undoubtedly be averted.

History is full of wars undertaken on slight grounds, and as foolish as they were wicked. But taking all things into the account, the increased sense of the evils of war, now so generally prevalent, the actual difficulties of the country, the object aimed at, and the enemy selected, Lord Palmerston's war with France, should such a calamity unhappily take place, will stand, I verily believe, unmatched in the records of human folly.

For the last five and twenty years nations have been learning more and more to appreciate the evils of war. They have found out more than they ever did before the blessings of free and friendly intercourse with each other; and they have become aware that the interruption of these by war is mostly a mere evil: that war answers to nobody: that with an infinity of crime and suffering during its progress, its results are to all parties unsatisfactory; that they are mostly nothing but a compromise produced by mutual exhaustion; that the object aimed at, utterly unworthy as it was of the sacrifices made to purchase it, is for the most part not purchased after all. Comparing too the progress of mankind during the last twenty-five years, with the twenty years of war which pre-

ceded them, men have observed how fatally war checks internal improvement; how all social evils thrive unchecked during its continuance; because the whole energies of the nation are turned to outward objects, she has neither time nor interest to bestow on watching her domestic condition.

A statesman therefore who provokes a war now, is far more inexcusable than he ever could have been before. He is sinning in spite of knowledge; he is gathering a fruit which he and all the world know to be poisonous.

This applies to all statesmen; how much more to those of England? Is it not enough that the last war has mortgaged for ever every acre of land, every house, every article of property, nay, the very bodies and minds, the limbs, the skill, the industry and the genius of every individual in the nation. Do we forget the debt, and the manner in which it was contracted? Do we forget how every question which most embarrasses us derives its peculiar difficulty from this single cause? What is the great defence of the Corn Laws, but that burden of taxation which far more than any inferiority of climate disables the English agriculturist from competing with foreigners? What is the weight which almost crushes the marvellous energy of our manufacturers, but that they are struggling against those of the continent as men heavily taxed against those lightly taxed; that out of their capital and skill, and out of the ingenuity and labour of their workmen, they have not only to rival the foreign manufacturer, but to pay over and above the dividends of the English fundholder? And what if we follow this a little farther? Is our population perfectly united and tranquil? Will no favourable opportunity encourage agitation in Ireland? Is Canada pacified? Is India secure? Is Chartism above all so extinct that the confusion and pressure of war would be unable to awaken it? Surely never was any country in the world less in that state of fulness

of bread and exuberance of strength which should seek war as a pastime or an exercise.

Still no doubt there might be a cause so sacred as to force us to forget all the evils of war, general and particular; it is conceivable, that is, the thing is physically possible, that we should be called upon to sacrifice interests so precious as to leave us no choice but to draw the sword. Physically possible it is no doubt, but scarcely morally. No nation in existence would so force this great country into a clearly unavoidable war. But a cause of war so frivolous as that which now threatens us, may be looked for in vain through our annals, except in the case of that scandalous war which Charles II. made upon Holland. Our trade, lawful or contraband, is not interfered with: no barren rock of so much as the size of half an acre has been claimed from us; no boundary line involving the acquisition of some square miles of bog or forest is disputed. Lord Chatham, carrying the doctrine of British interference to the greatest possible length, said that not a single shot should ever be fired in Europe without our permission. But no single shot was fired or going to be fired. Here is no disputed Austrian or Spanish succession; no question about the opening of the Scheldt or the obstruction of the Rhine. It is a quarrel between the Sultan of Turkey and one of his overgrown subjects, which is to involve England, Europe, and the world in all the guilt and misery of war.

The parties in this quarrel are remote, but what is geographically remote, may sometimes be politically near. Let us see what in this present case is the nearness and the magnitude of the danger dreaded. If the Pacha of Egypt retains Syria, his power will become highly dangerous to the independence of Turkey; if Turkey's independence be threatened, Turkey will call in Russia to her aid; if Russia protects Turkey, her protection will be soon changed into dominion; and finally, we shall see the

Russians at Constantinople. As if the evil of seeing the Russians at Constantinople, an evil depending on a series of contingencies, were in any degree to be compared to the evil of a war between England and France. What surer way can there be of bringing the Russians, not to Constantinople only, but to Vienna and to Berlin, nay, perhaps to Paris and to London, than to involve England and France in war with each other, that when the lion and the tiger have torn each other to pieces, the fox may steal away the prey from both of them. And what surer way of keeping the Russians from Constantinople, than to bind our alliance with France trebly fast, thus keeping for ever before the eyes of Russia a control which she dared not to disregard. What Russian soldier would ever set foot across the Balkan, if England and France, indissolubly joined together as the protectors of the old civilization of Europe, were ready at an instant to pour their fleets into the Black Sea, and without repeating the folly of the march to Moscow, to strike at the life of Russia through her vulnerable heel; to drive her back behind the Pruth, to thrust her away from the shores of the Euxine, and by occupying the Crimea, as an impregnable fortress, to seal up the only outlet by which the evil spirit of Russian ambition can issue forth to trouble the world?

But instead of this, we are ready to verify all that Russia's wildest dreams could hope for, and involve ourselves and all Europe in a war with France. For what imaginable end except to smooth the path of Russian ambition? So long as England and France are friends, the peace of Europe cannot be disturbed; their enmity alone can endanger it. We choose for our enemy our nearest neighbour, with whom we have so often tried our strength before that either nation is well taught to respect the other, and to know that their contest can and must entail the greatest evils on both, with no possible advantage to either. We each have our separate course to run, in which we cannot interfere with each other. France has no desire to inter-

fere with our colonial empire, and what can we wish to take from France? And if the French be burning for war, so that their heroic king can scarcely restrain them, if their press has been madly violent, if the recollections of 1815 are rankling in the hearts of the French people, shall we irritate them still farther by cold and insulting language, shall we encourage them to believe that we too would gladly revive the old quarrel; or shall we meet them in a spirit of frankness and friendliness, going beyond what we are strictly bound to do, to lull their suspicions, and manifesting to them our conviction that in this contest between Turkey and Egypt their interests and ours are identical, and that if we differ as to the means of advancing them, no madness can be so great as to let this difference lead to a quarrel, like two physicians tearing their patient to pieces whilst each was so eager to monopolize his cure?

War is a dreadful evil, war for England at this moment more than ordinarily dreadful, war with France is an evil deeper than all. One thing alone is wanting to the bitterness of this prospect, that it should have been brought on smilingly and complacently, like a child in its simplicity putting a match to a barrel of gunpowder, and thinking that the explosion would be a fine sight to look upon. Ten years ago the Whig ministry came into power with the cry of peace, reform, and retrenchment. Is it from them above all other men that we are to receive the boon of the most unjust, the most insane, and most ruinous war?

Surely Lord Lansdowne and Lord John Russell do not forget that from them at least better things may be expected; and if some of their colleagues retain the anti-Gallican feelings of their old political connexions, yet they at any rate must be well aware of the inestimable value of our alliance with France, and that to forsake France for Russia is such utter impolicy in a British minister as to excuse those who not being aware of the de-

gree of ignorance so often displayed by our governments in their foreign transactions, are disposed at once to ascribe it to corruption, or to some other influence equally discreditable. But he who knows the history of those administrations with which Lord Palmerston was originally connected, will believe no amount of honest blundering to be impossible in one trained in such a school.

XIX.—WAR WITH FRANCE.

[From the Paper dated December 5, 1840.]

SIR—I thank you for your comments on my last letter. If we are agreed as to the tremendous evil of a war with France, I am quite willing to hope that you may judge more justly than I of Lord Palmerston's past policy, and I can truly say that I would far rather that the foolishness should be in my writings than in his conduct. At any rate I will not again separate Lord Palmerston from his colleagues, and as no man can wish more earnestly than I do for the continuance of the Whig government, I certainly am not disposed to cavil at its measures, nor would wish to speak of it in any unfriendly language.

But without irritating any one, if I can help it, I would again press upon your readers the dangers of the actual crisis, and the urgent need of a generous and utterly unselfish and unpassionate policy on the part of the British government. No one can doubt that our late success at Acre will exasperate the war party in France, and render the task of the French government in preserving peace more difficult. But our newspapers are fanning the flame, not only by absurd comparisons between Napoleon's failure before Acre and our success, but actually in some instances by calling upon our government to keep Acre in its own hands, and convert it into another Gibraltar. I do not insult the government by suspecting them of such

an act of infamy: but I speak of the mischief done to public feeling in France by the mere broaching of such a project, even though it never entered any more influential head than that of an obscure writer in a newspaper. But we know that suspicion of English Machiavelism has been one of the inherent faults of the French character; we know that the most extravagant crimes were imputed to our government on no foundation at all; how much more plausibly will our nation be charged with what is truly the guilt of some at any rate amongst us,—and how naturally will the French transfer to the English people and government what is known to be the language of some of the leading English journals.

If, again, in an evil hour our demands should in any way rise with our success;—if, without the baseness of appropriating to ourselves what we have won in the name of our ally, we demand even for that ally, and in a fancied spirit of general policy, any greater concessions than we had before insisted on; then too we shall be overstraining the patience of the French people,—and all the virtue of their government, nay all the prudence of the majority of the Chamber of Deputies, may be too weak to stop the tempest.

For let us not believe that the decision of the French Chambers must necessarily be in the last resort the decision of France. One single step foolishly taken in the exultation of success, may so gather round the more jacobinical war party all that vast mass of elements which in France are most intolerant of a peace represented as prudential but dishonourable, that the Chambers must either yield, or the door of revolution is well nigh opened. Should it indeed open, and should the heroic king of the French and his wise and virtuous minister fall in such a struggle, how deep would be the guilt of those British ministers who in mere childish vanity were, with their eyes open, the original causes of such a catastrophe.

All that has been hitherto done in Syria cannot in itself

be welcome to Russia; its object, its only justification has been, that it is to raise up a barrier against Russian encroachments. Thus far then Russia, in lending her name to the treaty of July, may be said to have been acting against herself. But what then is to be her reward? Or is not the moment now come when she hopes to reap it? Let us unite if we will under the Sultan's sceptre all the countries which once obeyed Solyman the Magnificent; let us strip Mohammed Ali of Egypt as well as of Syria, and advance the Turkish frontier not to the Pruth but to the Borysthenes or even to the Don; what would Russia care, if the price paid her for allowing armour to be put on the limbs and a sword into the hand of a dying enemy, be the wasting mutual hostility of those two powers who, had they remained united, would have been enemies invincible by the utmost efforts of her ambition. If Russia be wise, she will not only tolerate but will gladly tempt our worst excesses of pride or of ambition;—let her but involve us in a war with France, and all her momentary sacrifices will be over paid a thousand fold.

Nor let me be thought to have any the slightest sympathy with that violent party in France whose language no doubt has given much provocation to the people of England. But that party can be wholesomely and effectually put down, not by the arms of Europe, but only by the wisdom and virtue of France herself. The more and the wilder may be the elements of anarchy and blood existing in the mass of the French nation, the more closely should we sympathize with those better elements which hitherto have so nobly resisted them: the more earnestly should we avoid giving to the evil an additional power by weakening the hands of the good. Let it ever be remembered that the crimes of September could not have been perpetrated had it not been for the unjust invasion of France and the proclamation of the Duke of Brunswick. Thousands of good and brave men, in 1793 and 1794, thought that even the government of the Mountain Committees

was a less evil than the triumph of the Coalition over the French nation.

It is the unfortunate result at any rate of Lord Palmerston's policy, even now that it has added strength to that violent party in France, which twenty-five years of peace and increasing prosperity had gone far to weaken. It has revived half-extinguished jealousies and animosities between France and England: an evil dearly purchased by the expulsion of Mohammed Ali from Syria. At this moment the mischief may be remediable; if the British government meets M. Guizot more than half way in the work of peace,—if its tone be frank and friendly,—its conduct moderate and straightforward; if it be made manifest that we prize the friendship of France most highly,—that our object in our apparent estrangement was but to secure benefits no less important to France than to ourselves,—but having no secret or selfish ends to gratify we have done what we honestly thought but for the peace and welfare of Europe, and trust that as our interests and those of France are in fact identical, so they may be identical no less in our mutual apprehension of them; but we may pursue the same ends side by side, with no other strife but as to which shall pursue them most purely and most zealously.

XX.—THE ELECTIONS.

[From the Paper dated August 21, 1841.]

Sir,—The event has answered to, or even surpassed my expectations. The Tories have obtained not only a large but a commanding majority. The wheel *is* "come full circle." The "reaction" is consummated, and the prospects which it opens to us are of the gravest.

Your correspondent, Vigil, wishes that the daily press might be made a vehicle for communicating *systematic* information on politics; he laments, and with justice, the

general want of such information. But the misfortune is, that if the information could be conveyed in a newspaper, I doubt whether common readers would bring with them the state of mind which would enable them to profit by it. The evil in my opinion lies deeper, it is not only that men are not well informed on political subjects, but that the whole spirit with which they turn to them is faulty; they do not regard them as a matter of solemn duty, they bring to them not their better mind but their worst; either their lightest or their most passionate and most unscrupulous. The temper of most men, I fear, in reading a newspaper, or in talking or acting about political subjects, is the very most unlike in the world to that with which they would say their prayers, or consider any practical question of duty in common life, or perform acts of charity.

Now I am well aware that we are even in our best tempers far enough from what we ought to be. Nevertheless we are not by many degrees so bad as our talking or writing or acting on political matters would make us appear to be. If our morality at elections, for example, was a fair specimen of our principles and practice in general, we should be indeed utterly hateful both in the sight of God and of man.

The remedy of this evil is not obvious. Political preaching is a matter so delicate that one hardly dares to wish for its adoption. It is greatly to be feared that the preacher would soon go off from the state of mind with which political questions should be approached, and try to give his hearers what he would call right notions on political subjects; the consequence of which would be, not the purifying of our politics but the polluting of our devotions; we should not read newspapers with a better mind, but pray with a worse.

Undoubtedly, I wish that men held on political subjects those opinions which I believe to be true. But this is by no means my most earnest wish on the matter. What I wish far above all other things, is that men would talk,

write, and act on political subjects, in the fear of God; as if they were forthwith going to stand before His judgment. Even so talking, writing, and acting, they might and would often be in great error; still if ever we are to come to any generally sound knowledge about public matters, it can be only gained by this previous moral improvement in our way of studying them. Error of course will always remain, but it will be thus least prevalent and least mischievous.

But when I speak of men's talking and acting about political matters in the fear of God, I do not mean that they should persuade themselves that their own opinions are according to God's will, and that in pushing those opinions vehemently they are doing God service. This does not purify their political conduct, but deeply corrupts themselves; this is fanaticism, the fruitful mother of all falsehood and all cruelty. The fear of God should come in not as an excuse for violence against our opponents, but in the formation of our own opinions, and in considering our own temper and conduct. Whether such and such an opinion be clearly according to God's will, can never be so certain as that taking up an opinion hastily, talking about it without knowledge, maintaining it or pressing it unfairly or passionately, are against God's will. That our adversaries' opinions are sinful, can never be so sure as that unkindness, sophistry, violence, and uncharitableness in ourselves towards them, are sinful in us. God will judge them; it is our business to judge ourselves.

If men approached a newspaper, the political part of it I mean, with such a temper, the effects would be speedily felt both by the publishers of newspapers and by themselves. By the publishers of newspapers, for they would soon find that mere scurrility, gross unfairness, falsehood and misrepresentation, in all their varieties, would disgust their readers, and injure the sale of their journals; by the readers themselves, because while they were in a better

state for arriving at true knowledge, the newspapers would have become more capable and more disposed to communicate it. Now, Sir, if your correspondent Vigil desires systematic instruction for the people, he will at least allow that I have in this letter begun at the beginning. I have also best suited my own capacity; for I am by no means sure that I could inform any one rightly upon the "poor-law, commerce, corn, or taxation," although I, like others, have my opinions on these points; but I am quite sure, that in advising men to seek for political information by setting about the study of politics in a pure, a lofty, a loving, and a holy temper, I am putting them on the right road to gain it. And, therefore, although the tone of this letter is more serious than that of communications to newspapers in general, yet I am inclined to hope that you will not consider it really out of place or unnatural.

THE END.

G. Woodfall and Son, Printers, Angel Court, Skinner Street, London.

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